Poimanje sekularnosti u Srbiji - refleksije sa javne rasprave u Ustavnom sudu

Abstract

U javnoj raspravi na Ustavnom sudu Srbije 2010. godine razmatran je jedan broj osporenih odredbi Zakona o crkvama i verskim zajednicama. Autor izlaže stavove koje je zauzeo tom prilikom, u nastojanju da dokaže da odredbe koje razlikuju tradicionalne u odnosu na druge crkve i verske zajednice nisu neustavne ni diskriminatorne, kao i da uslovi koje Zakon predviđa za registrovanje crkava i verskih zajednica ne vređaju ni forum internum ni forum externum verske slobode, već da su u skladu s evropskim standardima i praksom. Posebnu pažnju poklanja pitanju da li pominjanje načela svetovnosti (sekularnosti) i odvojenosti države, crkava i verskih zajednica u Ustavu od 2006. godine per se isključuje mogućnost i ustavnost uspostavljanja modela kooperativne odvojenosti crkava i verskih zajednica. Taj model je sve rašireniji u Evropi i u osnovi je afirmisan u Srbiji ne samo osporenim zakonom, već i pojedinim zakonima koji su donošeni pre i posle njega, naročito onim koji su uveli versku nastavu u državnim školama, a koji su već preživeli test ustavnosti pred Ustavnim sudom Srbije 2003. godine.

The author offers his views presented at the public hearing before the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia on constitutionality of certain norms of the Act on Churches and Religious Communities of 2006. Firstly, on the basis of comparative, theoretical and normative analysis, he argues against the claim that any differentiation between traditional and other churches and religious communities is discriminatory and unconstitutional. He finds that the Serbian criterion of classification has been derived from the legal status that particular churches and religious communities had acquired before the World War Two, which they were therafter deprived of by the communist regime. He asserts that the criterion is set forth clearly, firmly and appropriately, with reasonable justification, as well as that it is more objective than, for example, the number of followers or long presence, which are usually applied in other legal systems for the purpose of defining traditional or some other category of religious institutions with special status. The motive and goal of its application is a specific kind of restoration of once attained legal status, in the manner similar to the restitution of nationalized property. Secondly, the author emphasizes that demands imposed upon other religious entities who wish to be registered are not burdensome or discriminatory, but are in fact in accordance with European standards and solutions in comparative law. The Serbian solution takes the middle path by requiring a threshold number of followers of 0,001% of the population (100 nationals or foreign citizens altogether). Thirdly, the author points to the outdated perception of secularity that came to light in some discussions at the hearing before the Constitutional Court, and argues instead that the principle of separation of state and church comprises not only strict, but also cooperative separation, including possible presence of religious organizations in the public sphere. Finally, along the same lines, he refers to the recent ECHR Grand Chamber judgment in the case Lautzi v. Italy, as well as to the recent decision of the Constitutional Court of Austria, declaring that the displaying of crucifix or cross in state educational institutions did not breach the right to secular education or violated in any other way the European Convention on Human Rights Art. 9. Those rulings post a significant road sign which warns that a more comprehensive understanding of secularity in modern democratic Europe is right ahead of us.