Cena van dohvata ruke kao antievaziona mera u PDV zakonodavstvu EU

Abstract

U sistemu poreza na dodatu vrednost visina poreskog tereta zavisi od dogovora učesnika transakcije o iznosu stvarne naknade za izvršeni promet. Zloupotreba ovog pravila može voditi poreskim uštedama direktno na štetu fiskusa. Iako je opasnost od evazionog postupanja ograničena na transakcije među povezanim licima, neophodno je predvideti adekvatne mere za suprotstavljanje ovoj pojavi. Direktivom 2006/69/EC svim državama članicama omogućena je primena tržišne vrednosti - cene van dohvata ruke na transakcije među povezanim licima koje se vrše uz naknadu. Primena ove antievazione mere u Evropskoj uniji nalazi se u fokusu autora predstojećeg rada. Razmotrićemo šta je podstaklo njeno uvođenje u evropsko PDV zakonodavstvo, kao i koje su granice njene primene i zaključiti da je njena pozitivnopravna implementacija opravdana i poželjna.

In the system of value added tax, the size of tax burden depends on the agreement between parties in a transaction about the amount of actual consideration for the given transaction. To abuse this rule may result in tax savings directly at the expense of the treasury. And even though the threat of evasion is limited to transaction between connected persons, it is essential to introduce adequate measures against such actions. Directive 2006/69/EC enables all member states to implement open market value - arm’s length price to all paid transactions between connected parties. The application of this anti-evasion measure in the EU is what the author of this work focuses on. We shall consider the causes for its introduction into the European VAT legislation, as well as the limitations of its application, and conclude that its positive legal implementation is both justified and desirable.