The essay addresses two different senses of important problems for contemporary legal philosophy. In the first case, the problem is having forgotten things we learned from H.L.A. Hart, and, partly as a result, encouraging pointless metaphysical inquiries in other directions that take us very far from questions about the nature of law and legal reasoning. In the second case, the problem is to attend more carefully to Harts views and his philosophical context to think about the problem of theoretical disagreement, and to understand the way in which later commentators have misunderstood his behaviorist (Rylean) analysis of accepting a rule from an internal point of view.
Keywords:
Theoretical disagreement / Metaphysical grounding / Internal point of view / H.L.A. Hart / Gilbert Ryle
Source:
Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 2021, 69, 4, 749-760
TY - JOUR
AU - Leiter, Brian
PY - 2021
UR - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1813
AB - The essay addresses two different senses of important problems for contemporary legal philosophy. In the first case, the problem is having forgotten things we learned from H.L.A. Hart, and, partly as a result, encouraging pointless metaphysical inquiries in other directions that take us very far from questions about the nature of law and legal reasoning. In the second case, the problem is to attend more carefully to Harts views and his philosophical context to think about the problem of theoretical disagreement, and to understand the way in which later commentators have misunderstood his behaviorist (Rylean) analysis of accepting a rule from an internal point of view.
T2 - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1 - Back to Hart
EP - 760
IS - 4
SP - 749
VL - 69
DO - 10.51204/Anali_PFBU_21401A
UR - conv_3378_6
ER -
@article{
author = "Leiter, Brian",
year = "2021",
abstract = "The essay addresses two different senses of important problems for contemporary legal philosophy. In the first case, the problem is having forgotten things we learned from H.L.A. Hart, and, partly as a result, encouraging pointless metaphysical inquiries in other directions that take us very far from questions about the nature of law and legal reasoning. In the second case, the problem is to attend more carefully to Harts views and his philosophical context to think about the problem of theoretical disagreement, and to understand the way in which later commentators have misunderstood his behaviorist (Rylean) analysis of accepting a rule from an internal point of view.",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Back to Hart",
pages = "760-749",
number = "4",
volume = "69",
doi = "10.51204/Anali_PFBU_21401A",
url = "conv_3378_6"
}
Leiter, B.. (2021). Back to Hart. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 69(4), 749-760.
https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_21401A
conv_3378_6
Leiter B. Back to Hart. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2021;69(4):749-760.
doi:10.51204/Anali_PFBU_21401A
conv_3378_6 .
Leiter, Brian, "Back to Hart" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 69, no. 4 (2021):749-760,
https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_21401A .,
conv_3378_6 .
