Podela dobiti i gubitka među ortacima - rimsko pravo i moderna rešenja

Abstract

U ovom članku autor, na osnovu raspoloživih rimskih pravnih tekstova pokazuje kako u pozadini veoma liberalnog stava rimskog prava, kad je reč o podeli dobiti i gubitka među ortacima, stoji dug istorijski razvoj ovog instituta. Za najstariji tip ortakluka svih dobara vezano je pravilo o podeli dobiti i gubitka na jednake delove u nedostatku drugačijeg sporazuma stranaka. Jedan od važnih zaokreta u razvoju instituta predstavljao je momenat kada se udeo ortaka mogao sastojati isključivo u radu, a ne kao do tada samo u kapitalu, a takav ortak mogao je dogovorom stranaka biti isključen iz podele gubitka ortakluka. Analizirajući odredbe modernih zakonodavstava koje se odnose na pitanje podele dobiti i gubitka među ortacima, autor dokazuje nesumnjiv, snažan uticaj rimskog prava, uz zaključak da se rimska rešenja preuzimaju zbog svoje racionalnosti i superiornosti, a ponekad na prvom mestu kao dug tradiciji i velikom poštovanju prema rimskom pravu.

Classical Roman jurisprudence has offered solutions which represent a strong affirmation of the party autonomy principle with respect to division of profit and loss among partners; it is possible to exclude a partner from division of risks. However, it was prohibited to exclude a partner from division of profits only (lion's partnership). Roman Iurisprudence did not arrive to this solution straightforwardly. This was the result of a sudden change of course and abandonment of tradition, as evidenced in fragment 3.149 of Gaius' Institutions which state that, already during the period of the Republic, and within the time period when famous lawyers Quintus Mucius Sceviola nad Servius Sulpicius Rufus, it was considered doubtful if a partner's share in profit allocation may differ from his share in allocation of risk (so-called magna questio). Liberal approach of Servius Sulpicius has prevailed. Conservative (negative) position of Quintus Mucius may be traced to an earlier period of partnership development, when one could only invest his own capital, but could not invest his own work. Documents do not tackle the issue of evaluation of work/capital ratio in so-called mixed partnership, but it is worth noting that three texts state that a partner who contributes exclusively his own work into the partnership may be, in accordance with agreement of the parties, be excluded from the division of risks. This rule should not, however, be taken without reservation – it is applicable unless partnership is in the red (si tanti sit opera quanti damnum est). Modern legislations are under a clear and strong influence of Roman law. Roman principle that, unless parties agree otherwise profit and loss and distributed evenly among partners, has remained until today in modern laws, even as it is being challenged by the principle that profit and loss are divided in accordance with one's share. Most of the modern legislations explicitly allows a partner to invest solely his own work, which in turn suggests that such partner enjoys a special status. Particularity of this position reflects itself on several issues: a) partner who invested solely her own work may participate in the division of profit but can not participate in the division of the share capital, b) such partner undertakes risk to a different and limited degree, c) only such a parntner may be excluded from allocation of risks, d) a judge shall apply equity principles unless the contract stipulates the share of the partner who invests solely her work. Lion's clause, akin to solution proposed by Roman lawyer Gaius Cassius Longinus, is provided for in almost all of the modern legislations. Roman solutions are adopted for their rationality and superiority, but they sometimes represent primarily a tribute to tradition and expression of respect for Roman law.