Jemstva sudijske nezavisnosti u ustavima Kneževine i Kraljevine Srbije

Abstract

U pravnoj i političkoj misli sudijska nezavisnost se smatra jednom od ključnih institucionalnih garantija vladavine prava. Otuda ona još od donošenja prvih ustava u Evropi i Severnoj Americi uživa najvišu pravnu zaštitu. S obzirom na ovakav njen značaj u radu se analiziraju jemstva funkcionalne i lične nezavisnosti sudija u ustavima Kneževine i Kraljevine Srbije. Polazeći od odgovarajućih teorijsko-komparativnih merila autor dolazi do zaključka da je u datim ustavima, grosso modo, sudijska nezavisnost bila zajemčena na zavidnom nivou, naročito imajući u vidu da su se u devetnaestovekovnoj Srbiji institucije pravne države izgrađivale uporedo sa stvaranjem same države. Štaviše, u ustavima od 1888. i 1903. godine autor uočava jemstva sudijske nezavisnosti koja idu daleko ispred ustava svoga doba i koja odgovaraju savremenim zahtevima sudijske nezavisnosti i odgovornosti.

In the legal and political thought judicial independence is considered to be one of the key institutional guaranties of the rule of law. It has therefore enjoyed the highest legal safeguards as manifested by its inclusion in the very first constitutional texts in Europe and North America. In view of the above considerations, this paper addresses the guaranties of the substantive and personal independence of judges in the Constitutions of the Principality and Kingdom of Serbia. Analysing the given Constitutions from the perspective of the relevant theoretical and comparative standards, the author reaches the conclusion that the judicial independence enjoyed, in general, an impressive level of protection, particularly when account is taken of the fact that in the nineteen century Serbia the institutions of the rule of law were being developed together with the making of the state itself. Furthermore, in the 1888 and 1903 Constitutions the author points out that the guaranties of judicial independence go well beyond the guaranties provided for by other constitutions of that epoch and that they correspond to the contemporary standards of judicial independence and accountability.