Formalni prijem na znanje presuđenih činjenica u međunarodnom krivičnom pravosuđu

Abstract

Autor kritički analizira koncept formalnog prijema na znanje presuđenih činjenica u pravu i praksi savremenih međunarodnih krivičnih sudova i tribunala, Međunarodnog krivičnog tribunala za bivšu Jugoslaviju (MKTJ), Međunarodnog krivičnog tribunala za Ruandu (MKTR), Posebnog tribunala za Liban (PTL) i Međunarodnog krivičnog suda (MKS). Autor je stanovišta da je koncept formalnog prijema na znanje presuđenih činjenica, na način na koji je razvijen u jurisprudenciji MKTJ i MKTR, neprimeren za međunarodni krivični postupak koji teži ostvarivanju najviših standarda pravičnog suđenja. Od usvajanja Rimskog statuta MKS treba da je nesporno da optuženi ima, kao minimalnu garanciju, pravo da 'mu ne bude nametnut nikakav obrt tereta dokazivanja ili teret pobijanja'. Autor zaključuje da, osim pred MKTJ i MKTR, postoji mogućnost primene koncepta presuđenih činjenica pred savremenim i budućim privremenim međunarodnim krivičnim tribunalima (što pokazuju i Pravilnik o postupku i dokazima Posebnog suda za Liban), ali da bi ispravna primena doktrine formalnog prijema na znanje zahtevala da se formalno mogu primiti na znanje samo one činjenice koje su utvrđene u nekom drugom postupku pred istim tribunalom koje nisu predmet 'razumnog spora' i da one ne bi trebalo da budu predmet pobijanja.

Subject of this paper is critical analysis of the concept of judicial notice of adjudicated facts in the law and practice of the contemporary international criminal courts and tribunals, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and International Criminal Court (ICC). The author is of the opinion that the concept of judicial notice of adjudicated facts, as developed in the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, is inappropriate for international criminal proceedings tending to achieve the highest standards of fair trial and full protection of the rights of the accused. Since the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC it should be undisputable that the accused has, as one of the minimal guarantees, a right 'not to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden of proof or any onus of rebuttal'. The author concludes that, apart from ICTY and ICTR, there is a possibility of the application of the concept of judicial notice of adjudicated facts before contemporary or some future ad hoc international criminal courts and tribunals (the STL is an example). However, correct and proper application of the doctrine of judicial notice would require that the subject of judicial notice should be only facts (or factual findings) that are not subject of reasonable dispute, and that they should not be a subject of rebuttal.