Objektivni identitet presude i optužbe

Abstract

U radu se razmatra problem objektivnog identiteta presude i optužbe, odnosno pitanje u kojoj je meri sud vezan činjeničnim opisom dela navedenim u optužnom aktu, a u kojoj meri i u pogledu kojih činjenica od istog može odstupiti. Može li sud optuženog koga optužba tereti, primera radi da je držao opojnu drogu s ciljem prodaje oglasiti krivim za držanje opojne droge za sopstvenu upotrebu ili da je izvršenjem krivičnog dela pribavio imovinsku korist u vrednosti od 500.000 dinara oglasiti krivim za pribavljanje imovinske koristi u većem ili manjem iznosu? U teoriji je bilo svega par nastojanja da se ovaj problem reši postavljanjem opšteg principa koji bi važio u svim slučajevima, a praksa već decenijama luta rešavajući ovaj problem na različite načine od slučaja do slučaja. Autor smatra da bi u rešavanju ovog problema najpre trebalo napraviti jasno razgraničenje između činjeničnog i pravnog, imajući u vidu da pravna ocena dela data od strane tužioca ne obavezuje sud. I drugo, autor smatra da pitanje povrede identiteta ne treba posmatrati polazeći od toga da 'utvrđene činjenice nisu na štetu okrivljenog' kako se to obično čini, već pre svega iz konteksta prava na odbranu i dužnosti da se optuženom ovo pravo omogući.

One of the basic principles of modern criminal procedure is that the judgment does not exceed the facts and circumstances described in the charges. In order to adequately prepare for the proceedings, the defendant must be properly informed about factual allegations he or she is accused of. The question that remains unresolved is to what extent is the court limited by the facts and circumstances presented by the prosecutor, and whether it is authorized to depart from them, depending on the result of the trial. For example, if the prosecutor states that the defendant had the intention to sell the drugs, would it be possible for the judge to find that the defendant is guilty not of supplying, but possession of prohibited drugs? This concern in fact represents the focus of this paper. As it presents, in common-law adversarial systems of jury-trial, the problem of identity does not exist, having in mind that the jury is not permitted to give the reasons for their verdict, but only to find the defendant guilty or not guilty in regards of prosecutor's allegations. However, in the systems of trials without jury, the judge is obliged to give reasons for every charge and to explain the facts and circumstances that constitute the elements of the crime that the accused has committed. Thus, it would be possible to check if the defendant was found guilty based on the factual allegations of the charge, or under the facts determined during proceedings. According to the law, the judgment may relate only to the offense which is the subject of the charges while the court is not bound by the prosecutor's legal qualification of the offense. Factual findings established in the judgment do not have to be fully identical to factual allegations from the indictment, but the question is where the border of allowed deviation lies? As the discussion within the paper shows, this is still regarded as an extremely complex issue in court practice, while only a few scholars tried to find definitive, compact answers that could be utilized in a universal manner. The paper analysis presents both the theory of 'another' crime (that allows for factual modification of indictment by the court according to results of the trial, as any deviation is allowed as long as the crime stays within the same (or lighter) legal qualification) and the theory of factual sets (according to which the defendant could be found guilty only on the basis of facts stated in the indictment (all or some of them) - where any factual modification according to result of the trial would not be regarded as allowed). Following the comparative overview of the theoretical approaches to this issue, the paper critically examines the practice of Serbian courts and the actual scope of application of the above-mentioned theories, offering a practical 'solving-key' for this problem the relies on differentiation between factual and legal categories, special regard of factual issues, as well observance of the issue of identity from a perspective of the right to defense.