TY  - JOUR
AU  - Hiber, Dragor
PY  - 2022
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1857
AB  - Sloboda ugovaranja i dispozitivne norme zakona karakteristične su za ugovorno pravo. Imperativne su izuzetak i njihovo kršenje vodi nevažnosti ugovora ili drugim posledicama. Otuda je u svakom konkretnom slučaju bitno utvrditi da li je norma ugovornog prava koju treba primeniti dispozitivna ili imperativna. U skladu sa slobodom ugovaranja, u zakonu se polazi od pretpostavke da su norme dispozitivne, izuzetak treba utvrditi. U pojedinim slučajevima praksa se kolebala, a sudovi su stav da su u pitanju imperativne norme branili neprihvatljivim argumentom da zakonom nije izričito dozvoljeno drugačije ugovaranje. Suprotno, u pojedine međunarodne ugovore, za koje je kao merodavno ugovoreno pravo Srbije, naročito o prodaji udela u privrednom društvu, sve češće se unose ustanove koje potiču iz anglosaksonskog prava, Representations and Warranties i Put option. Praksa tada nije uvek spremna da prepozna i primeni imperativne norme srpskog prava. U članku se kritički analiziraju primeri takve prakse.
AB  - Freedom of contract and non-mandatory statutory rules are characteristics of the law on contracts. Mandatory provisions are exceptional and their violation leads to the invalidity of contract and other consequences. Freedom of contract assumes that the rules are non-mandatory, while the exception is to be determined. In a number of cases jurisprudence wavered, and the courts tend to defend their position that a rule is mandatory by invoking the unacceptable position that the Statute has not explicitly allowed different contracting. By contrast, Anglo-Saxon legal institutions representations and warranties and put option are often incorporated in international agreements in which Serbias law is accepted as applicable, especially in agreements on the sale of shares in limited liability companies. In such cases the jurisprudence is not always willing to recognise and apply mandatory provisions of Serbias law. In the paper the examples of such practice are subject to a critical analysis.
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Prinudni propisi u novijoj domaćoj sudskoj i ugovornoj praksi
T1  - Mandatory rules in recent Serbian jurisprudence and contractual practice
EP  - 476
IS  - poseban
SP  - 451
VL  - 70
DO  - 10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22MK16A
UR  - conv_3411
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Hiber, Dragor",
year = "2022",
abstract = "Sloboda ugovaranja i dispozitivne norme zakona karakteristične su za ugovorno pravo. Imperativne su izuzetak i njihovo kršenje vodi nevažnosti ugovora ili drugim posledicama. Otuda je u svakom konkretnom slučaju bitno utvrditi da li je norma ugovornog prava koju treba primeniti dispozitivna ili imperativna. U skladu sa slobodom ugovaranja, u zakonu se polazi od pretpostavke da su norme dispozitivne, izuzetak treba utvrditi. U pojedinim slučajevima praksa se kolebala, a sudovi su stav da su u pitanju imperativne norme branili neprihvatljivim argumentom da zakonom nije izričito dozvoljeno drugačije ugovaranje. Suprotno, u pojedine međunarodne ugovore, za koje je kao merodavno ugovoreno pravo Srbije, naročito o prodaji udela u privrednom društvu, sve češće se unose ustanove koje potiču iz anglosaksonskog prava, Representations and Warranties i Put option. Praksa tada nije uvek spremna da prepozna i primeni imperativne norme srpskog prava. U članku se kritički analiziraju primeri takve prakse., Freedom of contract and non-mandatory statutory rules are characteristics of the law on contracts. Mandatory provisions are exceptional and their violation leads to the invalidity of contract and other consequences. Freedom of contract assumes that the rules are non-mandatory, while the exception is to be determined. In a number of cases jurisprudence wavered, and the courts tend to defend their position that a rule is mandatory by invoking the unacceptable position that the Statute has not explicitly allowed different contracting. By contrast, Anglo-Saxon legal institutions representations and warranties and put option are often incorporated in international agreements in which Serbias law is accepted as applicable, especially in agreements on the sale of shares in limited liability companies. In such cases the jurisprudence is not always willing to recognise and apply mandatory provisions of Serbias law. In the paper the examples of such practice are subject to a critical analysis.",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Prinudni propisi u novijoj domaćoj sudskoj i ugovornoj praksi, Mandatory rules in recent Serbian jurisprudence and contractual practice",
pages = "476-451",
number = "poseban",
volume = "70",
doi = "10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22MK16A",
url = "conv_3411"
}

Hiber, D.. (2022). Prinudni propisi u novijoj domaćoj sudskoj i ugovornoj praksi. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 70(poseban), 451-476.
https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22MK16A
conv_3411

Hiber D. Prinudni propisi u novijoj domaćoj sudskoj i ugovornoj praksi. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2022;70(poseban):451-476.
doi:10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22MK16A
conv_3411 .

Hiber, Dragor, "Prinudni propisi u novijoj domaćoj sudskoj i ugovornoj praksi" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 70, no. poseban (2022):451-476,
https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22MK16A .,
conv_3411 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Hiber, Dragor
PY  - 2018
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1721
AB  - Zaključenju ugovora o prometu nepokretnosti u pravnoj praksi često prethodi predugovor, a ugovara se i kapara, jednako i uz predugovor i uz konačni ugovor. Obe ustanove, predugovor i kapara, u teoriji i praksi otvaraju brojna pitanja. U tekstu je analizirano o čemu se stranke moraju saglasiti da bi nastao predugovor, u kojoj se formi zaključuje i naročito koje su pravne posledice neizvršenja obaveze da se zaključi glavni ugovor. Kod poslednjeg, autor smatra da je rasprostranjen stav da će u tom slučaju sudska presuda zameniti konačni ugovor moguće prihvatiti samo ako se poveže sa prinudnim izvršenjem kondemnatorne odluke kojom se naređuje zaključenje ugovora, a ne kao neposredno dejstvo takve odluke. U analizi kapare ugovorene uz predugovor u prometu nepokretnosti, razmatrana su otvorena pitanja, uključujući dozvoljenost i celishodnost takvog ugovaranja. U praksi se često kapara u predugovoru ugovara za neispunjenje obaveze iz konačnog ugovora, a ne predugovora. Sudovi s pravom takvo ugovaranje nište. Kapara uz predugovor, istina, nema sve karakteristike (funkcije) kapare, na primer, ona se po prirodi stvari ne može uračunati u ispunjenje. Ispitivano je i, u svetlu nedoumica u sudskoj praksi, da li su pravila o kapari i odustanici dispozitivna, odnosno mogu li stranke ugovoriti drugačije. Opšti je zaključak rasprave da, mada je predugovor složena i kontroverzna ustanova i mada se razlozi predugovaranja mogu ostvariti drugim ustanovama (odložnim uslovom ili rokom na primer), s obzirom na tradiciju može ostati ustanova ugovornog prava, ali je korisno preispitati i precizirati pravila o pojedinim pitanjima, kao što su dejstva i prinudno ostvarenje i druge posledice. Što se kapare tiče, ma koliko da je arhaična i uporedno pomalo zaboravljena ustanova, u pojedinim slučajevima još uvek može biti korisna, posebno zato što se unapred daje a ne duguje, i to ako se dopusti da je stranke, u granicama pravnog poretka, prilagode svojim potrebama.
AB  - In the legal practice a preliminary contract often precedes the conclusion of the contracts on the transfer of immovable property, but deposit is also frequently stipulated both along with the preliminary contract and the final contract. These two concepts open numerous questions both in theory and in practice. The author analyses the details the parties have to agree upon if the preliminary contract is to emerge, the form of conclusion and especially the legal consequences of omission to execute the obligation to conclude the main contract. With respect to the latter, his position is that the idea that in such case a judicial judgement can replace the main contract can be accepted only if it is linked to the enforced execution of the decision ordering such conclusion and not as direct effect of the judgement. Analysing the deposit along the preliminary contract on the transfer of immovable property, open issues were considered, including the permissibility and the usefulness of such contracting. In practice, the deposit is frequently stipulated in the preliminary contract against omission to fulfil the obligation from the final contract rather than from the preliminary contract. This is not allowed by the law and the courts often pass such verdicts. The deposit along the preliminary contract actually does not have all the characteristics (functions) of the standard deposit: e. g. it cannot by definition be included into fulfilment of the obligation. In the light of the jurisprudence dilemmas, the author investigated whether the norms on the deposit and dedit are dispositional - namely, whether the parties may stipulate a different design. The general conclusion is that, in spite of the fact that the preliminary contract is a complex and controversial concept, and although the reasons for the preliminary contracting could be achieved by other means (e. g. deferred condition or time-limit), with respect the tradition, it can remain an institution of contract law, but it is useful to re-examine and specify the rules on certain issues, for example, effects and enforced execution and other consequences. With respect to the deposit, no matter how it seems archaic and globally abandoned institution, in certain cases it may still be useful, especially because it is given in advance and not owed and especially if the parties are allowed, within the limits established by the legal order, to adjust it to their needs.
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Predugovor obezbeđen kaparom kod Ugovora o prometu nepokretnosti u pravu Srbije
T1  - Preliminary contract secured by deposit in the case of transfer of immovable property in Serbian law
EP  - 87
IS  - 3
SP  - 57
VL  - 66
DO  - 10.5937/AnaliPFB1803057H
UR  - conv_3056
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Hiber, Dragor",
year = "2018",
abstract = "Zaključenju ugovora o prometu nepokretnosti u pravnoj praksi često prethodi predugovor, a ugovara se i kapara, jednako i uz predugovor i uz konačni ugovor. Obe ustanove, predugovor i kapara, u teoriji i praksi otvaraju brojna pitanja. U tekstu je analizirano o čemu se stranke moraju saglasiti da bi nastao predugovor, u kojoj se formi zaključuje i naročito koje su pravne posledice neizvršenja obaveze da se zaključi glavni ugovor. Kod poslednjeg, autor smatra da je rasprostranjen stav da će u tom slučaju sudska presuda zameniti konačni ugovor moguće prihvatiti samo ako se poveže sa prinudnim izvršenjem kondemnatorne odluke kojom se naređuje zaključenje ugovora, a ne kao neposredno dejstvo takve odluke. U analizi kapare ugovorene uz predugovor u prometu nepokretnosti, razmatrana su otvorena pitanja, uključujući dozvoljenost i celishodnost takvog ugovaranja. U praksi se često kapara u predugovoru ugovara za neispunjenje obaveze iz konačnog ugovora, a ne predugovora. Sudovi s pravom takvo ugovaranje nište. Kapara uz predugovor, istina, nema sve karakteristike (funkcije) kapare, na primer, ona se po prirodi stvari ne može uračunati u ispunjenje. Ispitivano je i, u svetlu nedoumica u sudskoj praksi, da li su pravila o kapari i odustanici dispozitivna, odnosno mogu li stranke ugovoriti drugačije. Opšti je zaključak rasprave da, mada je predugovor složena i kontroverzna ustanova i mada se razlozi predugovaranja mogu ostvariti drugim ustanovama (odložnim uslovom ili rokom na primer), s obzirom na tradiciju može ostati ustanova ugovornog prava, ali je korisno preispitati i precizirati pravila o pojedinim pitanjima, kao što su dejstva i prinudno ostvarenje i druge posledice. Što se kapare tiče, ma koliko da je arhaična i uporedno pomalo zaboravljena ustanova, u pojedinim slučajevima još uvek može biti korisna, posebno zato što se unapred daje a ne duguje, i to ako se dopusti da je stranke, u granicama pravnog poretka, prilagode svojim potrebama., In the legal practice a preliminary contract often precedes the conclusion of the contracts on the transfer of immovable property, but deposit is also frequently stipulated both along with the preliminary contract and the final contract. These two concepts open numerous questions both in theory and in practice. The author analyses the details the parties have to agree upon if the preliminary contract is to emerge, the form of conclusion and especially the legal consequences of omission to execute the obligation to conclude the main contract. With respect to the latter, his position is that the idea that in such case a judicial judgement can replace the main contract can be accepted only if it is linked to the enforced execution of the decision ordering such conclusion and not as direct effect of the judgement. Analysing the deposit along the preliminary contract on the transfer of immovable property, open issues were considered, including the permissibility and the usefulness of such contracting. In practice, the deposit is frequently stipulated in the preliminary contract against omission to fulfil the obligation from the final contract rather than from the preliminary contract. This is not allowed by the law and the courts often pass such verdicts. The deposit along the preliminary contract actually does not have all the characteristics (functions) of the standard deposit: e. g. it cannot by definition be included into fulfilment of the obligation. In the light of the jurisprudence dilemmas, the author investigated whether the norms on the deposit and dedit are dispositional - namely, whether the parties may stipulate a different design. The general conclusion is that, in spite of the fact that the preliminary contract is a complex and controversial concept, and although the reasons for the preliminary contracting could be achieved by other means (e. g. deferred condition or time-limit), with respect the tradition, it can remain an institution of contract law, but it is useful to re-examine and specify the rules on certain issues, for example, effects and enforced execution and other consequences. With respect to the deposit, no matter how it seems archaic and globally abandoned institution, in certain cases it may still be useful, especially because it is given in advance and not owed and especially if the parties are allowed, within the limits established by the legal order, to adjust it to their needs.",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Predugovor obezbeđen kaparom kod Ugovora o prometu nepokretnosti u pravu Srbije, Preliminary contract secured by deposit in the case of transfer of immovable property in Serbian law",
pages = "87-57",
number = "3",
volume = "66",
doi = "10.5937/AnaliPFB1803057H",
url = "conv_3056"
}

Hiber, D.. (2018). Predugovor obezbeđen kaparom kod Ugovora o prometu nepokretnosti u pravu Srbije. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 66(3), 57-87.
https://doi.org/10.5937/AnaliPFB1803057H
conv_3056

Hiber D. Predugovor obezbeđen kaparom kod Ugovora o prometu nepokretnosti u pravu Srbije. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2018;66(3):57-87.
doi:10.5937/AnaliPFB1803057H
conv_3056 .

Hiber, Dragor, "Predugovor obezbeđen kaparom kod Ugovora o prometu nepokretnosti u pravu Srbije" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 66, no. 3 (2018):57-87,
https://doi.org/10.5937/AnaliPFB1803057H .,
conv_3056 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Hiber, Dragor
PY  - 2015
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1646
AB  - Sudska praksa u Srbiji se oštro podelila oko pitanja da li je ugovor o jemstvu ugovor bez naknade, koji se može pobijati bez daljih uslova, kada jemac padne u stečaj, ili je u pitanju teretan ugovor. Pitanje teretnosti ugovora o jemstvu je inače sporno u teoriji. Po jednom mišljenju, ovaj ugovor je uvek dobročin, jer nasuprot jemčevoj obavezi ne stoji korist koju jemac može očekivati od druge ugovorne strane, poverioca. Po drugom, to je (gotovo) uvek teretan ugovor, jer zaključujući ga, jemac nema nameru darežljivosti (intentio liberalis). Brojna i nijansirana su shvatanja koja se grade na analizi odnosa između jemca i dužnika zasnivaju se na argumentu da je jemstvo ugovor bez naknade ako je u odnosu na glavnog dužnika (a ne poverioca) postojala intentio liberalis. U našoj literaturi doskora za ovo pitanje nije bilo mnogo interesovanja. U jednom od retkih napisa na ovu temu osnovno stanovište je da je jemstvo posao bez naknade, jer poverilac ne daje jemcu nikakvu protivnaknadu. Izuzetak može biti, po okolnostima slučaja, jemstvo matičnog društva za obavezu zavisnog, ako je ono davanjem jemstva opravdano očekivalo korist u vidu povećanja vrednosti akcija. Ovo shvatanje je kao savetodavno prihvaćeno od strane privrednih sudova. Suprotno, u ovom članku se brani stav, prvo, da se teretnost jemstva mora procenjivati prema odnosu jemca i glavnog dužnika, a ne jemca i poverioca, da je jemstvo po pravilu teretno, već zbog toga što jemac očekuje da će po osnovu subrogacije ostvariti od dužnika ono što eventualno poveriocu plati na ime dužnikovog duga, a da će izuzetno biti besteretno ako postoji intentio liberalis prema glavnom dužniku. To, međutim, ne znači da se jemac odriče prava da zahteva od dužnika plaćeno, jer bi to bio indirektan poklon a ne jemstvo, već da ne postoji naknada za jemčenje, direktna ili indirektna, korist koju jemac od zaključenja ugovora o jemstvu od glavnog dužnika očekuje.
AB  - Serbias courts jurisprudence has divergent attitudes with respect to the dilemma whether a surety contract represents a contract without consideration, which may be avoided once the guarantor is subject to bankruptcy procedure without any additional conditions, or an onerous contract. Whether a surety contract is an onerous one has anyhow been disputed in the legal theory. One school of thought considers this contract as non-onerous one, since vis-a-vis guarantors obligation no benefit to be expected from the other contractual party (i. e. creditor) exists. The other school of thought understands surety (almost always) as an onerous contract bearing in mind that the guarantor who enters into this contract does not have intentio liberalis. There are numerous and nuanced views based on analyses of the relation between a guarantor and a debtor focused on the argument that surety is a contract without consideration if intentio liberalis existed vis-a-vis main debtor rather than vis-a-vis creditor. Our legal literature did not pay much attention to that issue until recently. In a rare text dedicated to it the authors basic standpoint is that surety represents a contract without consideration. An exception, depending on the circumstances of the case, could be surety given by a parent company for the obligation of a subsidiary, provided the former reasonably expected a benefit in terms of an increase in the value of shares. Commercial courts followed such reasoning. In this article an opposite stance has been argued. Namely, the onerousness of surety must be assessed based on the relation between the guarantor and the main debtor rather than between the guarantor and the creditor. As a rule, surety is an onerous contract because the guarantor expects to collect from the debtor through subrogation the amount he paid to the creditor; exceptionally, surety may be a non-onerous contract if intentio liberalis existed vis-a-vis main debtor. However, this does not mean that the guarantor gives up his right to claim from the debtor the amount paid because otherwise such transaction would represent an indirect gift rather than surety. This does mean that there is no remuneration for surety - a benefit the guarantor could expect from entering into a surety contract. Therefore, the author rejects the approach followed by a number of Serbias courts that bankruptcy trustee may request a declaration that, in accordance with the rules on avoiding debtors transactions, a surety contract has no legal effects.
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Pobijanje ugovora o jemstvu u stečajnom postupku
T1  - Avoiding surety contracts in bankruptcy procedure
EP  - 74
IS  - 1
SP  - 58
VL  - 63
DO  - 10.5937/AnaliPFB1501058H
UR  - conv_3305
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Hiber, Dragor",
year = "2015",
abstract = "Sudska praksa u Srbiji se oštro podelila oko pitanja da li je ugovor o jemstvu ugovor bez naknade, koji se može pobijati bez daljih uslova, kada jemac padne u stečaj, ili je u pitanju teretan ugovor. Pitanje teretnosti ugovora o jemstvu je inače sporno u teoriji. Po jednom mišljenju, ovaj ugovor je uvek dobročin, jer nasuprot jemčevoj obavezi ne stoji korist koju jemac može očekivati od druge ugovorne strane, poverioca. Po drugom, to je (gotovo) uvek teretan ugovor, jer zaključujući ga, jemac nema nameru darežljivosti (intentio liberalis). Brojna i nijansirana su shvatanja koja se grade na analizi odnosa između jemca i dužnika zasnivaju se na argumentu da je jemstvo ugovor bez naknade ako je u odnosu na glavnog dužnika (a ne poverioca) postojala intentio liberalis. U našoj literaturi doskora za ovo pitanje nije bilo mnogo interesovanja. U jednom od retkih napisa na ovu temu osnovno stanovište je da je jemstvo posao bez naknade, jer poverilac ne daje jemcu nikakvu protivnaknadu. Izuzetak može biti, po okolnostima slučaja, jemstvo matičnog društva za obavezu zavisnog, ako je ono davanjem jemstva opravdano očekivalo korist u vidu povećanja vrednosti akcija. Ovo shvatanje je kao savetodavno prihvaćeno od strane privrednih sudova. Suprotno, u ovom članku se brani stav, prvo, da se teretnost jemstva mora procenjivati prema odnosu jemca i glavnog dužnika, a ne jemca i poverioca, da je jemstvo po pravilu teretno, već zbog toga što jemac očekuje da će po osnovu subrogacije ostvariti od dužnika ono što eventualno poveriocu plati na ime dužnikovog duga, a da će izuzetno biti besteretno ako postoji intentio liberalis prema glavnom dužniku. To, međutim, ne znači da se jemac odriče prava da zahteva od dužnika plaćeno, jer bi to bio indirektan poklon a ne jemstvo, već da ne postoji naknada za jemčenje, direktna ili indirektna, korist koju jemac od zaključenja ugovora o jemstvu od glavnog dužnika očekuje., Serbias courts jurisprudence has divergent attitudes with respect to the dilemma whether a surety contract represents a contract without consideration, which may be avoided once the guarantor is subject to bankruptcy procedure without any additional conditions, or an onerous contract. Whether a surety contract is an onerous one has anyhow been disputed in the legal theory. One school of thought considers this contract as non-onerous one, since vis-a-vis guarantors obligation no benefit to be expected from the other contractual party (i. e. creditor) exists. The other school of thought understands surety (almost always) as an onerous contract bearing in mind that the guarantor who enters into this contract does not have intentio liberalis. There are numerous and nuanced views based on analyses of the relation between a guarantor and a debtor focused on the argument that surety is a contract without consideration if intentio liberalis existed vis-a-vis main debtor rather than vis-a-vis creditor. Our legal literature did not pay much attention to that issue until recently. In a rare text dedicated to it the authors basic standpoint is that surety represents a contract without consideration. An exception, depending on the circumstances of the case, could be surety given by a parent company for the obligation of a subsidiary, provided the former reasonably expected a benefit in terms of an increase in the value of shares. Commercial courts followed such reasoning. In this article an opposite stance has been argued. Namely, the onerousness of surety must be assessed based on the relation between the guarantor and the main debtor rather than between the guarantor and the creditor. As a rule, surety is an onerous contract because the guarantor expects to collect from the debtor through subrogation the amount he paid to the creditor; exceptionally, surety may be a non-onerous contract if intentio liberalis existed vis-a-vis main debtor. However, this does not mean that the guarantor gives up his right to claim from the debtor the amount paid because otherwise such transaction would represent an indirect gift rather than surety. This does mean that there is no remuneration for surety - a benefit the guarantor could expect from entering into a surety contract. Therefore, the author rejects the approach followed by a number of Serbias courts that bankruptcy trustee may request a declaration that, in accordance with the rules on avoiding debtors transactions, a surety contract has no legal effects.",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Pobijanje ugovora o jemstvu u stečajnom postupku, Avoiding surety contracts in bankruptcy procedure",
pages = "74-58",
number = "1",
volume = "63",
doi = "10.5937/AnaliPFB1501058H",
url = "conv_3305"
}

Hiber, D.. (2015). Pobijanje ugovora o jemstvu u stečajnom postupku. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 63(1), 58-74.
https://doi.org/10.5937/AnaliPFB1501058H
conv_3305

Hiber D. Pobijanje ugovora o jemstvu u stečajnom postupku. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2015;63(1):58-74.
doi:10.5937/AnaliPFB1501058H
conv_3305 .

Hiber, Dragor, "Pobijanje ugovora o jemstvu u stečajnom postupku" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 63, no. 1 (2015):58-74,
https://doi.org/10.5937/AnaliPFB1501058H .,
conv_3305 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Hiber, Dragor
PY  - 2013
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1589
AB  - Primena opštih i na izgled stabilnih ustanova građanskog prava s vremena na vreme (ipak) dovede do novih i ozbiljnih kontroverzi u primeni prava. Takav slučaj često biva kada stare ustanove treba primeniti na odnose naknadno preuređene specijalnim zakonima donetim za neku posebnu situaciju. Nedovoljna usklađenost posebnih i opštih normi tada može dovesti do odstupanja od opšteusvojenih principa građanskog prava i sporne prakse koja prouzrokuje pravnu nesigurnost. Takav slučaj je nastao nakon što je država (Srbija odnosno SR Jugoslavija) sporazumom sa stranim poveriocima okupljenim u tzv. Londonski i Pariski klub poverilaca preuzela i počela da izmiruje dugove domaćih banaka za koje je bila garant. Po opštim pravilima obligacionog prava to je dovelo do subrogacije države u potraživanja stranih poverilaca prema tim bankama, a po posebnim zakonima tim povodom donetim i do i konverzije tako stečenih potraživanja države u kapital banaka čije je dugove platila, a zatim, naročito s obzirom na njihov stečaj, i do nastojanja da se zakonom uspostavi direktna pravnu veza sa krajnjim dužnicima, kojima su banke dalje plasirale sredstva u pitanju. Kada su docnije ova potraživanja (prema korisnicima) utužena, dužnici su se pozvali na zastarelost. Privredni sudovi su najčešće - u tom smislu je njihova praksa praktično jedinstvena - odbijali ovaj prigovor, pozivajući se na različite, međusobno isključujuće razloge: da je plaćanjem stranom poveriocu od strane države nastala sasvim nova obligacija, da je to obligacija iz pravno neosnovanog obogaćenja i da ona nije zastarela, da je plaćanjem došlo do novacije, da je nastupio prekid (prvobitnog) toka zastarelosti, da je u pitanju zakonska obligacija. Istovrsne meritorne odluke i potpuno različiti osnovi za njihovo donošenje pokazuju da je jedinstvenost prividna i da sudovi lutaju u primeni tako stare ustanove kao što je zastarelost. U tekstu su, iz ugla obligacionog prava kome ustanova zastarelosti pripada,, kritikovana rešenja odnosno razlozi na koje su se sudovi pozivali, pokazana je njihova nezakonitost, istovremeno i podržan stav Vrhovnog kasacionog suda koji je (u manjem broju odluka) našao da ustanovi zastarelosti ima mesta, jer promena poverioca, sama po sebi, ne može uticati na zastarelost potraživanja.
AB  - Application of general and seemingly well-established institutes of civil law is bound to provoke a controversy at some point in time. This is often so when the old institutes are to be applied to relationships which have been regulated by subsequently enacted special legislation. Lack of coordination and harmonization between the general and the special rules might result in departure from the generally accepted principle and bring about controversial practice, eroding legal certainty. One of such cases arose after Serbia (i.e. FR Yugoslavia) reached agreements with so-called Paris and London creditors clubs and took over debts of the domestic banks, the very debts it has guaranteed for. Pursuant to the general rules of the contract law this brought about subrogation of the State into the claims of the foreign banks vis-a-vis the banks. Pursuant to the legislation enacted subsequently and dealing specifically with this matter, the amount of the assumed debts was converted into shares of the State in the banks it has shielded from their creditors. Furthermore, given that the banks have ended in bankruptcy, the State has attempted to establish a direct legal link to the end users of the credits that the banks drew from the foreign creditors. When these claims were brought before the courts, the debtors invoked statute of limitations which has time-barred the original claims. Commercial courts were - on most ocassions, and almost uniformly - quick to reject such objection, offering widely different, and even contradictory, explanations: that payment to the foreign creditors resulted in a completely new obligation, that the obligation in question stems from unjust enrichment and is thus not time-barred, that the payment resulted in novatio, that the run of the original period of the statute of limitations was interrupted and paused, that the obligation in question stems from the statute itself. The discrepancy among the explanations shows that the uniformity of the final holdings (operative parts of the judgments) is deceptive and that the courts are at a loss when having to apply a well-known and established institute of statute of limitations. This paper offers detailed analysis of the case law and critique of the reasonings offered by the courts. At the same time, the paper offers reasons why a somewhat smaller number of decisions of the Supreme Court of Cassation arrived to a correct conclusion that the claims were time-barred, since the change of creditors cannot affect the run of the statute of limitations.
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Promena poverioca ili novacija i zastarelost
T1  - Personal subrogation or novatio and statute of limitations
EP  - 20
IS  - 2
SP  - 5
VL  - 61
UR  - conv_3070_6
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Hiber, Dragor",
year = "2013",
abstract = "Primena opštih i na izgled stabilnih ustanova građanskog prava s vremena na vreme (ipak) dovede do novih i ozbiljnih kontroverzi u primeni prava. Takav slučaj često biva kada stare ustanove treba primeniti na odnose naknadno preuređene specijalnim zakonima donetim za neku posebnu situaciju. Nedovoljna usklađenost posebnih i opštih normi tada može dovesti do odstupanja od opšteusvojenih principa građanskog prava i sporne prakse koja prouzrokuje pravnu nesigurnost. Takav slučaj je nastao nakon što je država (Srbija odnosno SR Jugoslavija) sporazumom sa stranim poveriocima okupljenim u tzv. Londonski i Pariski klub poverilaca preuzela i počela da izmiruje dugove domaćih banaka za koje je bila garant. Po opštim pravilima obligacionog prava to je dovelo do subrogacije države u potraživanja stranih poverilaca prema tim bankama, a po posebnim zakonima tim povodom donetim i do i konverzije tako stečenih potraživanja države u kapital banaka čije je dugove platila, a zatim, naročito s obzirom na njihov stečaj, i do nastojanja da se zakonom uspostavi direktna pravnu veza sa krajnjim dužnicima, kojima su banke dalje plasirale sredstva u pitanju. Kada su docnije ova potraživanja (prema korisnicima) utužena, dužnici su se pozvali na zastarelost. Privredni sudovi su najčešće - u tom smislu je njihova praksa praktično jedinstvena - odbijali ovaj prigovor, pozivajući se na različite, međusobno isključujuće razloge: da je plaćanjem stranom poveriocu od strane države nastala sasvim nova obligacija, da je to obligacija iz pravno neosnovanog obogaćenja i da ona nije zastarela, da je plaćanjem došlo do novacije, da je nastupio prekid (prvobitnog) toka zastarelosti, da je u pitanju zakonska obligacija. Istovrsne meritorne odluke i potpuno različiti osnovi za njihovo donošenje pokazuju da je jedinstvenost prividna i da sudovi lutaju u primeni tako stare ustanove kao što je zastarelost. U tekstu su, iz ugla obligacionog prava kome ustanova zastarelosti pripada,, kritikovana rešenja odnosno razlozi na koje su se sudovi pozivali, pokazana je njihova nezakonitost, istovremeno i podržan stav Vrhovnog kasacionog suda koji je (u manjem broju odluka) našao da ustanovi zastarelosti ima mesta, jer promena poverioca, sama po sebi, ne može uticati na zastarelost potraživanja., Application of general and seemingly well-established institutes of civil law is bound to provoke a controversy at some point in time. This is often so when the old institutes are to be applied to relationships which have been regulated by subsequently enacted special legislation. Lack of coordination and harmonization between the general and the special rules might result in departure from the generally accepted principle and bring about controversial practice, eroding legal certainty. One of such cases arose after Serbia (i.e. FR Yugoslavia) reached agreements with so-called Paris and London creditors clubs and took over debts of the domestic banks, the very debts it has guaranteed for. Pursuant to the general rules of the contract law this brought about subrogation of the State into the claims of the foreign banks vis-a-vis the banks. Pursuant to the legislation enacted subsequently and dealing specifically with this matter, the amount of the assumed debts was converted into shares of the State in the banks it has shielded from their creditors. Furthermore, given that the banks have ended in bankruptcy, the State has attempted to establish a direct legal link to the end users of the credits that the banks drew from the foreign creditors. When these claims were brought before the courts, the debtors invoked statute of limitations which has time-barred the original claims. Commercial courts were - on most ocassions, and almost uniformly - quick to reject such objection, offering widely different, and even contradictory, explanations: that payment to the foreign creditors resulted in a completely new obligation, that the obligation in question stems from unjust enrichment and is thus not time-barred, that the payment resulted in novatio, that the run of the original period of the statute of limitations was interrupted and paused, that the obligation in question stems from the statute itself. The discrepancy among the explanations shows that the uniformity of the final holdings (operative parts of the judgments) is deceptive and that the courts are at a loss when having to apply a well-known and established institute of statute of limitations. This paper offers detailed analysis of the case law and critique of the reasonings offered by the courts. At the same time, the paper offers reasons why a somewhat smaller number of decisions of the Supreme Court of Cassation arrived to a correct conclusion that the claims were time-barred, since the change of creditors cannot affect the run of the statute of limitations.",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Promena poverioca ili novacija i zastarelost, Personal subrogation or novatio and statute of limitations",
pages = "20-5",
number = "2",
volume = "61",
url = "conv_3070_6"
}

Hiber, D.. (2013). Promena poverioca ili novacija i zastarelost. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 61(2), 5-20.
conv_3070_6

Hiber D. Promena poverioca ili novacija i zastarelost. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2013;61(2):5-20.
conv_3070_6 .

Hiber, Dragor, "Promena poverioca ili novacija i zastarelost" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 61, no. 2 (2013):5-20,
conv_3070_6 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Hiber, Dragor
PY  - 2013
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1585
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Andrej Savin: EU internet law, Elgar European law, Cheltenham, UK, Northamton, MA, USA, 2013
EP  - 343
IS  - 2
SP  - 338
VL  - 61
UR  - conv_3075
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Hiber, Dragor",
year = "2013",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Andrej Savin: EU internet law, Elgar European law, Cheltenham, UK, Northamton, MA, USA, 2013",
pages = "343-338",
number = "2",
volume = "61",
url = "conv_3075"
}

Hiber, D.. (2013). Andrej Savin: EU internet law, Elgar European law, Cheltenham, UK, Northamton, MA, USA, 2013. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 61(2), 338-343.
conv_3075

Hiber D. Andrej Savin: EU internet law, Elgar European law, Cheltenham, UK, Northamton, MA, USA, 2013. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2013;61(2):338-343.
conv_3075 .

Hiber, Dragor, "Andrej Savin: EU internet law, Elgar European law, Cheltenham, UK, Northamton, MA, USA, 2013" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 61, no. 2 (2013):338-343,
conv_3075 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Hiber, Dragor
AU  - Pavić, Vladimir
PY  - 2013
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/696
AB  - The focus of the paper is on the analysis of different approaches to situation when the parties are allowed to agree on sums payable in the event of breach of obligations, issues pertaining to contractual penalties in general as well as practical and doctrinal differences in their compensatory and penal goal. The authors reflect on some of the acute issues raised in recent arbitral practice with respect to the topic of contractual penalties, particularly in the sphere of privatization agreements. One of the problems analyzed relates to characterization of the secured obligations in privatizations, reductions of penalties as well as the issue of combining contractual penalties with bank guarantees and with the prohibition of restitution contained in the Law on Privatization of the Republic of Serbia.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Contractual penalty clauses in recent Serbian arbitration practice
EP  - 81
IS  - 3
SP  - 63
VL  - 61
UR  - conv_317
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Hiber, Dragor and Pavić, Vladimir",
year = "2013",
abstract = "The focus of the paper is on the analysis of different approaches to situation when the parties are allowed to agree on sums payable in the event of breach of obligations, issues pertaining to contractual penalties in general as well as practical and doctrinal differences in their compensatory and penal goal. The authors reflect on some of the acute issues raised in recent arbitral practice with respect to the topic of contractual penalties, particularly in the sphere of privatization agreements. One of the problems analyzed relates to characterization of the secured obligations in privatizations, reductions of penalties as well as the issue of combining contractual penalties with bank guarantees and with the prohibition of restitution contained in the Law on Privatization of the Republic of Serbia.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Contractual penalty clauses in recent Serbian arbitration practice",
pages = "81-63",
number = "3",
volume = "61",
url = "conv_317"
}

Hiber, D.,& Pavić, V.. (2013). Contractual penalty clauses in recent Serbian arbitration practice. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 61(3), 63-81.
conv_317

Hiber D, Pavić V. Contractual penalty clauses in recent Serbian arbitration practice. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2013;61(3):63-81.
conv_317 .

Hiber, Dragor, Pavić, Vladimir, "Contractual penalty clauses in recent Serbian arbitration practice" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 61, no. 3 (2013):63-81,
conv_317 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Hiber, Dragor
AU  - Pavić, Vladimir
PY  - 2008
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/376
AB  - Arbitration is usually regarded as a domain exclusively reserved for private law. Inevitably, however, certain criminal matters and allegations might creep into arbitral proceedings. The dispute itself could be fictitious, a screen for money laundering, or the underlying purpose of alleged consultancy might be bribery. Testimony or expertise offered before the tribunal might be false. In such cases, arbitrators can either address the criminal matters or turn a blind eye to them. Immediately, there is a dilemma whether the arbitrator's duty to report, if any, overrides the principle of confidentiality of arbitral proceedings. It is submitted that arbitrators are a part of the judicial system and they fail to qualify for any privilege exception. When deciding issues of bribery, however, they are still faced with difficult issues of burden of proof and law applicable to illegality. The task of deciding on the merits becomes particularly difficult if they do not take the jurisdictional way to terminate the proceedings. In such a case, it might prove fairly difficult to avoid unjust solutions. Finally, false testimony may undermine the very foundation on which an award is based, yet it is not always clear which procedural mechanisms should be used to rectify such deficiency. This difficult dilemma is, however, for legislators and judiciary, rather than for arbitrators.
PB  - Kluwer Law Int, Alphen Aan Den Rijn
T2  - Journal of International Arbitration
T1  - Arbitration and Crime
EP  - 478
IS  - 4
SP  - 461
VL  - 25
UR  - conv_3034
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Hiber, Dragor and Pavić, Vladimir",
year = "2008",
abstract = "Arbitration is usually regarded as a domain exclusively reserved for private law. Inevitably, however, certain criminal matters and allegations might creep into arbitral proceedings. The dispute itself could be fictitious, a screen for money laundering, or the underlying purpose of alleged consultancy might be bribery. Testimony or expertise offered before the tribunal might be false. In such cases, arbitrators can either address the criminal matters or turn a blind eye to them. Immediately, there is a dilemma whether the arbitrator's duty to report, if any, overrides the principle of confidentiality of arbitral proceedings. It is submitted that arbitrators are a part of the judicial system and they fail to qualify for any privilege exception. When deciding issues of bribery, however, they are still faced with difficult issues of burden of proof and law applicable to illegality. The task of deciding on the merits becomes particularly difficult if they do not take the jurisdictional way to terminate the proceedings. In such a case, it might prove fairly difficult to avoid unjust solutions. Finally, false testimony may undermine the very foundation on which an award is based, yet it is not always clear which procedural mechanisms should be used to rectify such deficiency. This difficult dilemma is, however, for legislators and judiciary, rather than for arbitrators.",
publisher = "Kluwer Law Int, Alphen Aan Den Rijn",
journal = "Journal of International Arbitration",
title = "Arbitration and Crime",
pages = "478-461",
number = "4",
volume = "25",
url = "conv_3034"
}

Hiber, D.,& Pavić, V.. (2008). Arbitration and Crime. in Journal of International Arbitration
Kluwer Law Int, Alphen Aan Den Rijn., 25(4), 461-478.
conv_3034

Hiber D, Pavić V. Arbitration and Crime. in Journal of International Arbitration. 2008;25(4):461-478.
conv_3034 .

Hiber, Dragor, Pavić, Vladimir, "Arbitration and Crime" in Journal of International Arbitration, 25, no. 4 (2008):461-478,
conv_3034 .