TY  - JOUR
AU  - Đorđević, Mila
AU  - Zdravković, Ana
AU  - Vojnović, Sava
PY  - 2025-11
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2375
AB  - The debates on access to justice emerged from the historical contexts of post-industrial Western countries, and the concept gained prominence in the 1960s, during the rise of the welfare state (Maranlou, 2014: 17).1 A major turning point in the discourse was the Florence Access to Justice Project, led by Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth (1981). In October 1979, a conference at the European University Institute examined the prospects for further action, and participants sought to identify the most pressing issues, evaluate key insights, and assess the broader significance of what they termed the “access to justice” movement (Cappelletti, Garth, 1981: 3).
Cappelletti and Garth discuss three “waves” of access to justice. The first wave was concerned primarily with access to courts, and the emphasis was on the problems faced by poor and marginalized groups in accessing expensive legal services and complex legal systems. The second wave related to access to justice gaps that arise not predominantly because of socio-economic factors, but as a result of the nature of the problems people experience in particular contexts. For example, so-called “diffuse interests” include consumer problems, where large groups are affected by similar issues, but there are difficulties in launching individual claims and, as a result, a significant access to justice gap. The third wave, while continuing to incorporate the concerns of the first and second waves, broadened the concern of access to justice even further, so that a host of procedural innovations that might allow access to justice began to be discussed. This included alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and other means by which people might resolve their problems without accessing the courts (Garth, Cappelletti, 1981: 9-25).
PB  - Lisboa : Lisbon Public Law Research Centre, Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa
T2  - e-Publica: revista electrónica de direito público, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1-8)
T1  - Access to justice and enforcement of rights – an introduction
EP  - 8
SP  - 1
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2375
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Đorđević, Mila and Zdravković, Ana and Vojnović, Sava",
year = "2025-11",
abstract = "The debates on access to justice emerged from the historical contexts of post-industrial Western countries, and the concept gained prominence in the 1960s, during the rise of the welfare state (Maranlou, 2014: 17).1 A major turning point in the discourse was the Florence Access to Justice Project, led by Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth (1981). In October 1979, a conference at the European University Institute examined the prospects for further action, and participants sought to identify the most pressing issues, evaluate key insights, and assess the broader significance of what they termed the “access to justice” movement (Cappelletti, Garth, 1981: 3).
Cappelletti and Garth discuss three “waves” of access to justice. The first wave was concerned primarily with access to courts, and the emphasis was on the problems faced by poor and marginalized groups in accessing expensive legal services and complex legal systems. The second wave related to access to justice gaps that arise not predominantly because of socio-economic factors, but as a result of the nature of the problems people experience in particular contexts. For example, so-called “diffuse interests” include consumer problems, where large groups are affected by similar issues, but there are difficulties in launching individual claims and, as a result, a significant access to justice gap. The third wave, while continuing to incorporate the concerns of the first and second waves, broadened the concern of access to justice even further, so that a host of procedural innovations that might allow access to justice began to be discussed. This included alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and other means by which people might resolve their problems without accessing the courts (Garth, Cappelletti, 1981: 9-25).",
publisher = "Lisboa : Lisbon Public Law Research Centre, Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa",
journal = "e-Publica: revista electrónica de direito público, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1-8)",
title = "Access to justice and enforcement of rights – an introduction",
pages = "8-1",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2375"
}

Đorđević, M., Zdravković, A.,& Vojnović, S.. (2025-11). Access to justice and enforcement of rights – an introduction. in e-Publica: revista electrónica de direito público, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1-8)
Lisboa : Lisbon Public Law Research Centre, Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa., 1-8.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2375

Đorđević M, Zdravković A, Vojnović S. Access to justice and enforcement of rights – an introduction. in e-Publica: revista electrónica de direito público, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1-8). 2025;:1-8.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2375 .

Đorđević, Mila, Zdravković, Ana, Vojnović, Sava, "Access to justice and enforcement of rights – an introduction" in e-Publica: revista electrónica de direito público, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1-8) (2025-11):1-8,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2375 .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2399
AB  - Th e relationship between law and coercion is perhaps one of the most controversial
topics in legal philosophy – a topic that has made quite a comeback in legal discussion
in recent decades aft er a period of apparent abandonment. 1 On the basis of various
analytical criteria, a broad, complex spectrum of positions on this relationship can be
reconstructed. For example, if one analyses the necessary or essential conditions of
concepts, positions on the question of whether ‘ coercion ’ is an essential or necessary
element of ‘ law ’ range from a strong affi rmative 2 to a strong negative, 3 including positions
that question the way the question is posed. 4 Furthermore, if one analyses the
nature or type of element, the positions range from coercion as an instrumental element
(function or use) 5 to coercion as a substantive element (content or object) 6 of law.
Finally, leaving aside the analysis in terms of essential or necessary conditions, the positions
include law as a type of coercion, coercion as the distinctive feature of law qua
social normative order, coercion as the most prominent or salient feature of law qua
social normative order, 7 and coercion as one of the central or paradigmatic features
of law.
PB  - London : Hart Publishing
T2  - Kelsen's Legacy : Legal Normativity, International Law and Democracy
T1  - On Force, Effectiveness, and Law in Kelsen
EP  - 199
SP  - 181
DO  - 10.5040/9781509965830.ch-006
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2025",
abstract = "Th e relationship between law and coercion is perhaps one of the most controversial
topics in legal philosophy – a topic that has made quite a comeback in legal discussion
in recent decades aft er a period of apparent abandonment. 1 On the basis of various
analytical criteria, a broad, complex spectrum of positions on this relationship can be
reconstructed. For example, if one analyses the necessary or essential conditions of
concepts, positions on the question of whether ‘ coercion ’ is an essential or necessary
element of ‘ law ’ range from a strong affi rmative 2 to a strong negative, 3 including positions
that question the way the question is posed. 4 Furthermore, if one analyses the
nature or type of element, the positions range from coercion as an instrumental element
(function or use) 5 to coercion as a substantive element (content or object) 6 of law.
Finally, leaving aside the analysis in terms of essential or necessary conditions, the positions
include law as a type of coercion, coercion as the distinctive feature of law qua
social normative order, coercion as the most prominent or salient feature of law qua
social normative order, 7 and coercion as one of the central or paradigmatic features
of law.",
publisher = "London : Hart Publishing",
journal = "Kelsen's Legacy : Legal Normativity, International Law and Democracy",
booktitle = "On Force, Effectiveness, and Law in Kelsen",
pages = "199-181",
doi = "10.5040/9781509965830.ch-006"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2025). On Force, Effectiveness, and Law in Kelsen. in Kelsen's Legacy : Legal Normativity, International Law and Democracy
London : Hart Publishing., 181-199.
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509965830.ch-006

Rabanos JA. On Force, Effectiveness, and Law in Kelsen. in Kelsen's Legacy : Legal Normativity, International Law and Democracy. 2025;:181-199.
doi:10.5040/9781509965830.ch-006 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "On Force, Effectiveness, and Law in Kelsen" in Kelsen's Legacy : Legal Normativity, International Law and Democracy (2025):181-199,
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509965830.ch-006 . .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2383
AB  - This chapter highlights the relevance of coercion to both the existence and the function(s) of law. Julieta A. Rabanos argues that if law is seen as a tool or artefact, the fulfilment of its function(s) depends on both its existence and its possession of a certain property that enables the achievement of that end. Following that she shows how coercion can be understood as necessary for the existence of law by analysing two main arguments for coercion-dependent existence: that coercion is motivationally necessary to ensure conformity to the law, and that coercion is necessary to guarantee the existence of a community. Finally, even if this argument fails, she shows that coercion can nevertheless be understood as the particular property that law has to fulfil its function(s); especially those related to behaviour-guidance and coordination-solving.
PB  - Springer
T2  - Sanctions : an essential element of law?
T1  - On Coercion and the (Functions of) Law
EP  - 35
SP  - 13
DO  - 10.1007/978-3-031-88512-9_3
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2025",
abstract = "This chapter highlights the relevance of coercion to both the existence and the function(s) of law. Julieta A. Rabanos argues that if law is seen as a tool or artefact, the fulfilment of its function(s) depends on both its existence and its possession of a certain property that enables the achievement of that end. Following that she shows how coercion can be understood as necessary for the existence of law by analysing two main arguments for coercion-dependent existence: that coercion is motivationally necessary to ensure conformity to the law, and that coercion is necessary to guarantee the existence of a community. Finally, even if this argument fails, she shows that coercion can nevertheless be understood as the particular property that law has to fulfil its function(s); especially those related to behaviour-guidance and coordination-solving.",
publisher = "Springer",
journal = "Sanctions : an essential element of law?",
booktitle = "On Coercion and the (Functions of) Law",
pages = "35-13",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-031-88512-9_3"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2025). On Coercion and the (Functions of) Law. in Sanctions : an essential element of law?
Springer., 13-35.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-88512-9_3

Rabanos JA. On Coercion and the (Functions of) Law. in Sanctions : an essential element of law?. 2025;:13-35.
doi:10.1007/978-3-031-88512-9_3 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "On Coercion and the (Functions of) Law" in Sanctions : an essential element of law? (2025):13-35,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-88512-9_3 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2379
AB  - En el marco de la conmemoración de Latinoamérica a Joseph Raz, en este trabajo propongo analizar con detenimiento su postura acerca del así llamado “deber de obedecer al derecho”. En la sección 2, elaboraré con cierta profundidad cuál es el contenido que Raz le asigna al “deber de obediencia al derecho”. En la sección 3, exploraré su rechazo a la existencia de un “deber general de obediencia al derecho”, para luego explorar lo que Raz llama “actitudes morales permisibles en relación con el derecho” en la sección 4. En la sección 5, realizaré algunas consideraciones críticas a la posición de Raz, proponiendo reflexionar sobre si en última instancia no termina reconociendo la existencia de un deber general de obediencia en el marco de un Estado razonablemente justo (5.1), si una actitud de “respeto por el derecho” puede ser realmente voluntaria en el marco de su particular concepción de la autonomía (5.2), y si el rechazo de la existencia de este deber puede sostenerse también si la legitimidad de la autoridad se justifica con base en el argumento de la coordinación (5.3).
AB  - In the context of the Latin American commemoration of Joseph Raz, I propose in this paper to analyse in detail his position on the so-called “duty to obey the law”. In section 2, I will elaborate on the content Raz assigns to the “duty to obey the law”. In section 3, I will address his rejection of the existence of a “general duty to obey the law” and then, in section 4, explore what Raz calls “permissible moral attitudes in relation to the law”. In section 5, I will offer some critical reflections on Raz’s position and suggest reflecting on whether he does not ultimately acknowledge the existence of a general duty to obey in the context of a reasonably just state (5.1), whether an attitude of “respect for the law” can be truly voluntary in the context of his particular conception of autonomy (5.2), and whether the rejection of the existence of this duty can be sustained if the legitimacy of authority is justified on the basis of the coordination argument (5.3).
PB  - Bueno Aires : Centro de Investigaciones Filosoficas
T2  - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política, 13, 4
T1  - Joseph Raz y el deber de obedecer al derecho
EP  - 78
SP  - 40
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2379
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2025",
abstract = "En el marco de la conmemoración de Latinoamérica a Joseph Raz, en este trabajo propongo analizar con detenimiento su postura acerca del así llamado “deber de obedecer al derecho”. En la sección 2, elaboraré con cierta profundidad cuál es el contenido que Raz le asigna al “deber de obediencia al derecho”. En la sección 3, exploraré su rechazo a la existencia de un “deber general de obediencia al derecho”, para luego explorar lo que Raz llama “actitudes morales permisibles en relación con el derecho” en la sección 4. En la sección 5, realizaré algunas consideraciones críticas a la posición de Raz, proponiendo reflexionar sobre si en última instancia no termina reconociendo la existencia de un deber general de obediencia en el marco de un Estado razonablemente justo (5.1), si una actitud de “respeto por el derecho” puede ser realmente voluntaria en el marco de su particular concepción de la autonomía (5.2), y si el rechazo de la existencia de este deber puede sostenerse también si la legitimidad de la autoridad se justifica con base en el argumento de la coordinación (5.3)., In the context of the Latin American commemoration of Joseph Raz, I propose in this paper to analyse in detail his position on the so-called “duty to obey the law”. In section 2, I will elaborate on the content Raz assigns to the “duty to obey the law”. In section 3, I will address his rejection of the existence of a “general duty to obey the law” and then, in section 4, explore what Raz calls “permissible moral attitudes in relation to the law”. In section 5, I will offer some critical reflections on Raz’s position and suggest reflecting on whether he does not ultimately acknowledge the existence of a general duty to obey in the context of a reasonably just state (5.1), whether an attitude of “respect for the law” can be truly voluntary in the context of his particular conception of autonomy (5.2), and whether the rejection of the existence of this duty can be sustained if the legitimacy of authority is justified on the basis of the coordination argument (5.3).",
publisher = "Bueno Aires : Centro de Investigaciones Filosoficas",
journal = "Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política, 13, 4",
title = "Joseph Raz y el deber de obedecer al derecho",
pages = "78-40",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2379"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2025). Joseph Raz y el deber de obedecer al derecho. in Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política, 13, 4
Bueno Aires : Centro de Investigaciones Filosoficas., 40-78.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2379

Rabanos JA. Joseph Raz y el deber de obedecer al derecho. in Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política, 13, 4. 2025;:40-78.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2379 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "Joseph Raz y el deber de obedecer al derecho" in Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política, 13, 4 (2025):40-78,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2379 .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2378
PB  - London : Hart Publishing
T2  - Law and the Unity of Practical Reasoning
T1  - On the Concept of Authority and the Unity of Practical Reason
EP  - 220
SP  - 201
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2378
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2025",
publisher = "London : Hart Publishing",
journal = "Law and the Unity of Practical Reasoning",
booktitle = "On the Concept of Authority and the Unity of Practical Reason",
pages = "220-201",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2378"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2025). On the Concept of Authority and the Unity of Practical Reason. in Law and the Unity of Practical Reasoning
London : Hart Publishing., 201-220.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2378

Rabanos JA. On the Concept of Authority and the Unity of Practical Reason. in Law and the Unity of Practical Reasoning. 2025;:201-220.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2378 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "On the Concept of Authority and the Unity of Practical Reason" in Law and the Unity of Practical Reasoning (2025):201-220,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2378 .

TY  - BOOK
AU  - Bojić, Filip
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2205
AB  - Социјално право специфичну пажњу посвећује рањивим категоријама
становништва, односно обезбеђивању социјалне сигурности лицима која нису
у могућности да остварују приходе због наступања неког од социјалних ризика
а нису остварила основна права из социјалног осигурања. Публикација је подељена на три дела, уз увод и закључак. Први део је
посвећен одређивању појма и правне природе института социјалне пензије. У другом делу проблематизовано је и питање положаја жена у пензијским
системима, са циљем да се потврди хипотеза да се жене још увек налазе
у неповољнијем положају у односу на мушкарце у системима социјалне
сигурности, те да им је неопходна одговарајућа заштита по наступању
социјалног ризика старости. У последњем, трећем делу публикације, сходно основним циљевима
института, утврђују се позитивне и негативне стране института социјалне
пензије за национални систем социјалне сигурности у целини, у циљу давања
разлога за увођење овог института у законодавство Републике Србије.
PB  - Beograd : Udruženje "Žene na prekretnici"
T1  - Obezbeđivanje socijalne sigurnosti putem instituta socijalne penzije
T1  - Обезбеђивање социјалне сигурности путем института социјалне пензије
EP  - 50
SP  - 4
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2205
ER  - 

@book{
author = "Bojić, Filip",
year = "2025",
abstract = "Социјално право специфичну пажњу посвећује рањивим категоријама
становништва, односно обезбеђивању социјалне сигурности лицима која нису
у могућности да остварују приходе због наступања неког од социјалних ризика
а нису остварила основна права из социјалног осигурања. Публикација је подељена на три дела, уз увод и закључак. Први део је
посвећен одређивању појма и правне природе института социјалне пензије. У другом делу проблематизовано је и питање положаја жена у пензијским
системима, са циљем да се потврди хипотеза да се жене још увек налазе
у неповољнијем положају у односу на мушкарце у системима социјалне
сигурности, те да им је неопходна одговарајућа заштита по наступању
социјалног ризика старости. У последњем, трећем делу публикације, сходно основним циљевима
института, утврђују се позитивне и негативне стране института социјалне
пензије за национални систем социјалне сигурности у целини, у циљу давања
разлога за увођење овог института у законодавство Републике Србије.",
publisher = "Beograd : Udruženje "Žene na prekretnici"",
title = "Obezbeđivanje socijalne sigurnosti putem instituta socijalne penzije, Обезбеђивање социјалне сигурности путем института социјалне пензије",
pages = "50-4",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2205"
}

Bojić, F.. (2025). Obezbeđivanje socijalne sigurnosti putem instituta socijalne penzije. 
Beograd : Udruženje "Žene na prekretnici"., 4-50.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2205

Bojić F. Obezbeđivanje socijalne sigurnosti putem instituta socijalne penzije. 2025;:4-50.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2205 .

Bojić, Filip, "Obezbeđivanje socijalne sigurnosti putem instituta socijalne penzije" (2025):4-50,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2205 .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Aleš, Novak
AU  - 
AU  - 
AU  - 
AU  - 
AU  - 
AU  - 
AU  - 
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2184
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
T1  - Some cursory remarks on the history of slovenian legal theory and philosophy of law
EP  - 80
SP  - 45
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2184
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Aleš, Novak and  and  and  and  and  and  and ",
year = "2025",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država",
booktitle = "Some cursory remarks on the history of slovenian legal theory and philosophy of law",
pages = "80-45",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2184"
}

Aleš, N., , , , , , ,& . (2025). Some cursory remarks on the history of slovenian legal theory and philosophy of law. in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 45-80.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2184

Aleš N, , , , , , , . Some cursory remarks on the history of slovenian legal theory and philosophy of law. in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država. 2025;:45-80.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2184 .

Aleš, Novak, , , , , , , , "Some cursory remarks on the history of slovenian legal theory and philosophy of law" in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država (2025):45-80,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2184 .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Dajović, Goran
AU  - Dragosavac, Branka
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2190
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
T1  - Istorija i razvoj temeljnih pravnih znanja u XX i XXI veku na prostoru Srbije
T1  - Reč bibliotekarske struke
EP  - 107
SP  - 82
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2190
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Dajović, Goran and Dragosavac, Branka",
year = "2025",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država",
booktitle = "Istorija i razvoj temeljnih pravnih znanja u XX i XXI veku na prostoru Srbije, Reč bibliotekarske struke",
pages = "107-82",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2190"
}

Dajović, G.,& Dragosavac, B.. (2025). Istorija i razvoj temeljnih pravnih znanja u XX i XXI veku na prostoru Srbije. in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 82-107.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2190

Dajović G, Dragosavac B. Istorija i razvoj temeljnih pravnih znanja u XX i XXI veku na prostoru Srbije. in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država. 2025;:82-107.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2190 .

Dajović, Goran, Dragosavac, Branka, "Istorija i razvoj temeljnih pravnih znanja u XX i XXI veku na prostoru Srbije" in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država (2025):82-107,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2190 .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Tucak, Ivana
AU  - Rešetar Čulo, Ivana
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2187
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
T1  - Pregled razvoja hrvatske filozofije i teorije prava
EP  - 43
SP  - 27
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2187
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Tucak, Ivana and Rešetar Čulo, Ivana",
year = "2025",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država",
booktitle = "Pregled razvoja hrvatske filozofije i teorije prava",
pages = "43-27",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2187"
}

Tucak, I.,& Rešetar Čulo, I.. (2025). Pregled razvoja hrvatske filozofije i teorije prava. in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 27-43.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2187

Tucak I, Rešetar Čulo I. Pregled razvoja hrvatske filozofije i teorije prava. in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država. 2025;:27-43.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2187 .

Tucak, Ivana, Rešetar Čulo, Ivana, "Pregled razvoja hrvatske filozofije i teorije prava" in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država (2025):27-43,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2187 .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Rožajac-Zulčić, Mirela
AU  - Banović, Damir
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2185
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
T1  - Razvoj pravnoteorijske misli u Bosni i Hercegovini
EP  - 25
SP  - 7
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2185
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Rožajac-Zulčić, Mirela and Banović, Damir",
year = "2025",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država",
booktitle = "Razvoj pravnoteorijske misli u Bosni i Hercegovini",
pages = "25-7",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2185"
}

Rožajac-Zulčić, M.,& Banović, D.. (2025). Razvoj pravnoteorijske misli u Bosni i Hercegovini. in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 7-25.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2185

Rožajac-Zulčić M, Banović D. Razvoj pravnoteorijske misli u Bosni i Hercegovini. in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država. 2025;:7-25.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2185 .

Rožajac-Zulčić, Mirela, Banović, Damir, "Razvoj pravnoteorijske misli u Bosni i Hercegovini" in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država (2025):7-25,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2185 .

TY  - BOOK
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2186
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T1  - Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2186
ER  - 

@book{
year = "2025",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
title = "Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2186"
}

(2025). Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država. 
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2186

Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država. 2025;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2186 .

"Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država" (2025),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2186 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
AU  - Spaić, Bojan
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2180
AB  - Generative artificial intelligence in the form of chatbots based on
large language models (LLMs) has taken the world of law by storm. Philosophy of
law is struggling to catch up with the theoretical significance of the advent of
technological development and the way it may modify traditionally established
understanding of legal phenomena, such as law-creation and authority. In this
sense, for the most part, heated philosophical debates have circled around a
normative question: ‘Should AI create and interpret law?’. Much less attention has
been given to a different, albeit previous, question: ‘Can AI create and interpret law?’
That is, is AI capable of producing outputs that can be deemed as ‘law’ (at least, law as
we know it)? Can AI be a ‘legal author’? This paper explores this unattended question
and endeavours to provide some provisional answers. In the first part, we define legal
authority, legal authorship, and legal interpretation and claim that the intention of a
determinate authoritative author is often considered the condition of the possibility
of creating and interpreting contemporary legal texts. In the second part, we argue
that LLM AI, in general, and ChatGPT, in particular, generate legal texts without
having any intention. In the third part, we consider the positions of the authors that
downplay or even eliminate intention from the discussions about the legal character
of prescriptive texts. 4. Finally, we argue that there are good reasons to side with the
second group of authors. The ability of agents without intentions, like ChatGPT, to
create legal text is an argument in favour of the thesis that law can be created without
intention behind the creation and that nonintentional creation can be interpreted to
arrive at legal norms.
PB  - Springer Nature
T2  - Law and Philosophy
T1  - The Death of the Legal Author: Authority, Intention, and Law-Creation in the Advent of GenAI
DO  - 10.1007/s10982-025-09524-9
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A. and Spaić, Bojan",
year = "2025",
abstract = "Generative artificial intelligence in the form of chatbots based on
large language models (LLMs) has taken the world of law by storm. Philosophy of
law is struggling to catch up with the theoretical significance of the advent of
technological development and the way it may modify traditionally established
understanding of legal phenomena, such as law-creation and authority. In this
sense, for the most part, heated philosophical debates have circled around a
normative question: ‘Should AI create and interpret law?’. Much less attention has
been given to a different, albeit previous, question: ‘Can AI create and interpret law?’
That is, is AI capable of producing outputs that can be deemed as ‘law’ (at least, law as
we know it)? Can AI be a ‘legal author’? This paper explores this unattended question
and endeavours to provide some provisional answers. In the first part, we define legal
authority, legal authorship, and legal interpretation and claim that the intention of a
determinate authoritative author is often considered the condition of the possibility
of creating and interpreting contemporary legal texts. In the second part, we argue
that LLM AI, in general, and ChatGPT, in particular, generate legal texts without
having any intention. In the third part, we consider the positions of the authors that
downplay or even eliminate intention from the discussions about the legal character
of prescriptive texts. 4. Finally, we argue that there are good reasons to side with the
second group of authors. The ability of agents without intentions, like ChatGPT, to
create legal text is an argument in favour of the thesis that law can be created without
intention behind the creation and that nonintentional creation can be interpreted to
arrive at legal norms.",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
journal = "Law and Philosophy",
title = "The Death of the Legal Author: Authority, Intention, and Law-Creation in the Advent of GenAI",
doi = "10.1007/s10982-025-09524-9"
}

Rabanos, J. A.,& Spaić, B.. (2025). The Death of the Legal Author: Authority, Intention, and Law-Creation in the Advent of GenAI. in Law and Philosophy
Springer Nature..
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-025-09524-9

Rabanos JA, Spaić B. The Death of the Legal Author: Authority, Intention, and Law-Creation in the Advent of GenAI. in Law and Philosophy. 2025;.
doi:10.1007/s10982-025-09524-9 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., Spaić, Bojan, "The Death of the Legal Author: Authority, Intention, and Law-Creation in the Advent of GenAI" in Law and Philosophy (2025),
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-025-09524-9 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rodríguez, Jorge L.
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2460
AB  - The paper explores Wróblewski’s classical distinction
between internal and external justification,
highlighting two interpretations. According to
the first, a decision is internally justified if it follows
from the chosen premises and externally
justified if those premises are also justified. From
this perspective, some theorists have claimed that
internal justification suffices for easy cases, while
hard cases require external justification. However,
it will be shown that this is a mistake arising from
an ambiguity in the term “justification”, and clarifying
this ambiguity reveals that both easy and
hard cases require the same kind of justification.
In the second interpretation, a decision is internally
justified if it is derived from existing law and
externally justified if its content is morally acceptable.
This leads to an examination of the relationship
between legal and moral justification. In this
regard, Carlos Nino’s claim that legal reasoning
is a form of moral reasoning will be critically assessed
by showing that it ultimately conflates the
nature of norms with the nature of the reasons for
their acceptance. Finally, it will be argued that
moral objectivism is irrelevant for strong justification
of judicial decisions (which requires valid
reasoning with correct premises). Metaethical
scepticism does not undermine substantive moral
judgments or weaken moral debate, just as metaethical
objectivism does not strengthen them.
AB  - Rad istražuje vroblevskijevsku klasičnu razliku
između unutrašnjeg i spoljašnjeg opravdanja,
naglašavajući dva tumačenja. Prema prvom,
odluka je interno opravdana ako proizilazi iz izabranih
premisa i eksterno opravdana ako su i te
premise opravdane. Iz ove perspektive, neki teoretičari
tvrde da je unutrašnje opravdanje dovoljno
za lake slučajeve, dok teški slučajevi zahtevaju
spoljno opravdanje. Međutim, pokazaće se da je
reč o grešci koja proizilazi iz dvosmislenosti termina
„opravdanje“, a razjašnjavanje ove dvosmislenosti
otkriva da i laki i teški slučajevi zahtevaju
istu vrstu opravdanja. Prema drugom tumačenju,
odluka je iznutra opravdana ako je izvedena iz
postojećeg zakona i eksterno opravdana ako je
njen sadržaj moralno prihvatljiv. Ovo dovodi do
ispitivanja odnosa između pravnog i moralnog
opravdanja. S tim u vezi, tvrdnja Karlosa Nina da
je pravno rasuđivanje oblik moralnog rasuđivanja
biće kritički ocenjena tako što će se pokazati
da ono na kraju spaja prirodu normi sa prirodom
razloga za njihovo prihvatanje. Konačno, biće
argumentovano da je moralni objektivizam irelevantan
za snažno opravdanje sudskih odluka (što
zahteva valjano rasuđivanje sa ispravnim premisama).
Metaetički skepticizam ne podriva suštinske
moralne sudove niti slabi moralnu debatu,
kao što ih metaetički objektivizam ne jača.
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024
T1  - Legal Adjudication, Material Corecctness, and Moral Objectivity
T1  - Rešavanje pravnih sporova, materijalna ispravnost i moralni objektivizam
EP  - 51
SP  - 30
DO  - 10.51204/IVRS_24208A
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rodríguez, Jorge L.",
year = "2024",
abstract = "The paper explores Wróblewski’s classical distinction
between internal and external justification,
highlighting two interpretations. According to
the first, a decision is internally justified if it follows
from the chosen premises and externally
justified if those premises are also justified. From
this perspective, some theorists have claimed that
internal justification suffices for easy cases, while
hard cases require external justification. However,
it will be shown that this is a mistake arising from
an ambiguity in the term “justification”, and clarifying
this ambiguity reveals that both easy and
hard cases require the same kind of justification.
In the second interpretation, a decision is internally
justified if it is derived from existing law and
externally justified if its content is morally acceptable.
This leads to an examination of the relationship
between legal and moral justification. In this
regard, Carlos Nino’s claim that legal reasoning
is a form of moral reasoning will be critically assessed
by showing that it ultimately conflates the
nature of norms with the nature of the reasons for
their acceptance. Finally, it will be argued that
moral objectivism is irrelevant for strong justification
of judicial decisions (which requires valid
reasoning with correct premises). Metaethical
scepticism does not undermine substantive moral
judgments or weaken moral debate, just as metaethical
objectivism does not strengthen them., Rad istražuje vroblevskijevsku klasičnu razliku
između unutrašnjeg i spoljašnjeg opravdanja,
naglašavajući dva tumačenja. Prema prvom,
odluka je interno opravdana ako proizilazi iz izabranih
premisa i eksterno opravdana ako su i te
premise opravdane. Iz ove perspektive, neki teoretičari
tvrde da je unutrašnje opravdanje dovoljno
za lake slučajeve, dok teški slučajevi zahtevaju
spoljno opravdanje. Međutim, pokazaće se da je
reč o grešci koja proizilazi iz dvosmislenosti termina
„opravdanje“, a razjašnjavanje ove dvosmislenosti
otkriva da i laki i teški slučajevi zahtevaju
istu vrstu opravdanja. Prema drugom tumačenju,
odluka je iznutra opravdana ako je izvedena iz
postojećeg zakona i eksterno opravdana ako je
njen sadržaj moralno prihvatljiv. Ovo dovodi do
ispitivanja odnosa između pravnog i moralnog
opravdanja. S tim u vezi, tvrdnja Karlosa Nina da
je pravno rasuđivanje oblik moralnog rasuđivanja
biće kritički ocenjena tako što će se pokazati
da ono na kraju spaja prirodu normi sa prirodom
razloga za njihovo prihvatanje. Konačno, biće
argumentovano da je moralni objektivizam irelevantan
za snažno opravdanje sudskih odluka (što
zahteva valjano rasuđivanje sa ispravnim premisama).
Metaetički skepticizam ne podriva suštinske
moralne sudove niti slabi moralnu debatu,
kao što ih metaetički objektivizam ne jača.",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024",
title = "Legal Adjudication, Material Corecctness, and Moral Objectivity, Rešavanje pravnih sporova, materijalna ispravnost i moralni objektivizam",
pages = "51-30",
doi = "10.51204/IVRS_24208A"
}

Rodríguez, J. L.. (2024). Legal Adjudication, Material Corecctness, and Moral Objectivity. in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 30-51.
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_24208A

Rodríguez JL. Legal Adjudication, Material Corecctness, and Moral Objectivity. in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024. 2024;:30-51.
doi:10.51204/IVRS_24208A .

Rodríguez, Jorge L., "Legal Adjudication, Material Corecctness, and Moral Objectivity" in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024 (2024):30-51,
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_24208A . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Timotijević, Đorđe
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2459
AB  - U radu se prikazuju različiti koncepti pojma
uprave koje je pravna nauka iznedrila,
a koji su izvršili veliki uticaj na celokupnu
upravnopravnu teoriju, uz istovremeni
osvrt na ključna načela na kojima bi trebalo
da se zasniva delovanje i funkcionisanje
uprave. Autor nastoji da u radu iznese svoja
opažanja i zaključke u vezi sa različitim
teorijskim shvatanjima, kako domaćih,
tako i stranih pravnih teoretičara, kao i da
kroz analizu različitih stavova i pristupa
određivanju pojma uprave dođe do zaključaka
koji se odnose na definisanje uprave,
osnovne principe koji su od značaja za njenu
organizaciju, funkcionisanje i delotvornost,
ali i na karakteristike koje bi uprava
trebalo da ima kako bi predstavljala jedan
od stubova pravne države.
AB  - The paper presents different understandings
of the concept of administration, realized
in legal theory, which had a great impact
on the theory of entire administrative law,
with a simultaneous review of the key principles
on which the action and functioning
of the administration should be based. In
the paper, the author attempts to present
his observations and conclusions regarding
different theoretical understandings of both
domestic and foreign legal theoreticians, as
well as to reach the findings (based on the
analysis of different attitudes and approaches
to defining the concept of administration),
related to the definition of administration,
the basic principles that are important for its
organization, functioning and effectiveness,
but also to the characteristics that administration
should have to represent one of the
pillars of the rule of law.
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024
T1  - Pojam uprave – shvatanja u teoriji i osvrt na osnovna načela
T1  - The Concept of Administration – Comprehension of Theory and Review of the Basic Principles
EP  - 88
SP  - 70
DO  - 10.51204/IVRS_24206A
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Timotijević, Đorđe",
year = "2024",
abstract = "U radu se prikazuju različiti koncepti pojma
uprave koje je pravna nauka iznedrila,
a koji su izvršili veliki uticaj na celokupnu
upravnopravnu teoriju, uz istovremeni
osvrt na ključna načela na kojima bi trebalo
da se zasniva delovanje i funkcionisanje
uprave. Autor nastoji da u radu iznese svoja
opažanja i zaključke u vezi sa različitim
teorijskim shvatanjima, kako domaćih,
tako i stranih pravnih teoretičara, kao i da
kroz analizu različitih stavova i pristupa
određivanju pojma uprave dođe do zaključaka
koji se odnose na definisanje uprave,
osnovne principe koji su od značaja za njenu
organizaciju, funkcionisanje i delotvornost,
ali i na karakteristike koje bi uprava
trebalo da ima kako bi predstavljala jedan
od stubova pravne države., The paper presents different understandings
of the concept of administration, realized
in legal theory, which had a great impact
on the theory of entire administrative law,
with a simultaneous review of the key principles
on which the action and functioning
of the administration should be based. In
the paper, the author attempts to present
his observations and conclusions regarding
different theoretical understandings of both
domestic and foreign legal theoreticians, as
well as to reach the findings (based on the
analysis of different attitudes and approaches
to defining the concept of administration),
related to the definition of administration,
the basic principles that are important for its
organization, functioning and effectiveness,
but also to the characteristics that administration
should have to represent one of the
pillars of the rule of law.",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024",
title = "Pojam uprave – shvatanja u teoriji i osvrt na osnovna načela, The Concept of Administration – Comprehension of Theory and Review of the Basic Principles",
pages = "88-70",
doi = "10.51204/IVRS_24206A"
}

Timotijević, Đ.. (2024). Pojam uprave – shvatanja u teoriji i osvrt na osnovna načela. in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 70-88.
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_24206A

Timotijević Đ. Pojam uprave – shvatanja u teoriji i osvrt na osnovna načela. in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024. 2024;:70-88.
doi:10.51204/IVRS_24206A .

Timotijević, Đorđe, "Pojam uprave – shvatanja u teoriji i osvrt na osnovna načela" in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024 (2024):70-88,
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_24206A . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Novak, Aleš
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2458
AB  - The article engages with a rich and provocative
book by Bojan Spaić titled Priroda i
determinante sudijskog tumačenja prava.
While expressing agreement with the overall
refutation of formalism as a theory of judicial
decision-making, the critique challenges
Spaić’s extreme version of legal scepticism.
While linguistic formulations of legal norms
are undoubtedly indeterminate, this indeterminacy
is not as pervasive as Spaić contends.
A degree of determinacy, however,
explains more convincingly the interpretive
uniformity that Spaić tries to explain by relying
on determinants of judicial interpretation
of law. While these factors may throw
some light on the actual process of adjudication,
the critique expresses doubts as to
whether they can guarantee uniformity to
the degree that Spaić asserts
AB  - Članak se bavi provokativnom knjigom Bojana
Spaića pod naslovom,,Priroda i determinante
sudijskog tumačenja prava”.
Izražavajući saglasnost sa sveukupnim
opovrgavanjem formalizma kao teorije sudijskog
odlučivanja, kritički osvrt u radu osporava
Spaićevu ekstremnu verziju pravnog
skepticizma. Dok su jezičke formulacije
pravnih normi nesumnjivo neodređene, ta
neodređenost nije toliko prožimajuća kako
to Spaić tvrdi. Izvestan stepen određenosti,
međutim, ubedljivije objašnjava interpretativnu
uniformnost koju Spaić pokušava
da objasni oslanjajući se na determinante
sudijskog tumačenja prava. Iako ovi faktori
mogu donekle baciti svetlo na stvarni proces
donošenja presuda, kritika izražava sumnju
da li oni mogu garantovati uniformnost do
stepena koji tvrdi Spaić.
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024
T1  - Legal Realism Bound
T1  - Ograničenje pravnog realizma
EP  - 113
SP  - 90
DO  - 10.51204/IVRS_24202A
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Novak, Aleš",
year = "2024",
abstract = "The article engages with a rich and provocative
book by Bojan Spaić titled Priroda i
determinante sudijskog tumačenja prava.
While expressing agreement with the overall
refutation of formalism as a theory of judicial
decision-making, the critique challenges
Spaić’s extreme version of legal scepticism.
While linguistic formulations of legal norms
are undoubtedly indeterminate, this indeterminacy
is not as pervasive as Spaić contends.
A degree of determinacy, however,
explains more convincingly the interpretive
uniformity that Spaić tries to explain by relying
on determinants of judicial interpretation
of law. While these factors may throw
some light on the actual process of adjudication,
the critique expresses doubts as to
whether they can guarantee uniformity to
the degree that Spaić asserts, Članak se bavi provokativnom knjigom Bojana
Spaića pod naslovom,,Priroda i determinante
sudijskog tumačenja prava”.
Izražavajući saglasnost sa sveukupnim
opovrgavanjem formalizma kao teorije sudijskog
odlučivanja, kritički osvrt u radu osporava
Spaićevu ekstremnu verziju pravnog
skepticizma. Dok su jezičke formulacije
pravnih normi nesumnjivo neodređene, ta
neodređenost nije toliko prožimajuća kako
to Spaić tvrdi. Izvestan stepen određenosti,
međutim, ubedljivije objašnjava interpretativnu
uniformnost koju Spaić pokušava
da objasni oslanjajući se na determinante
sudijskog tumačenja prava. Iako ovi faktori
mogu donekle baciti svetlo na stvarni proces
donošenja presuda, kritika izražava sumnju
da li oni mogu garantovati uniformnost do
stepena koji tvrdi Spaić.",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024",
title = "Legal Realism Bound, Ograničenje pravnog realizma",
pages = "113-90",
doi = "10.51204/IVRS_24202A"
}

Novak, A.. (2024). Legal Realism Bound. in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 90-113.
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_24202A

Novak A. Legal Realism Bound. in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024. 2024;:90-113.
doi:10.51204/IVRS_24202A .

Novak, Aleš, "Legal Realism Bound" in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024 (2024):90-113,
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_24202A . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Jovanović, Miodrag
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2457
AB  - Nakon kratkog osvrta na osnovne teze iznete
u ovoj knjizi, iznosim tri kritike. Prvo, umesto
da nas primarno uputi u to na koji bi način
uvidi bihevioralne psihologije mogli da budu
značajni za razumevanje jednog posve specifičnog
postupka odlučivanja, kakvo je ono
sudijsko, Spaić naširoko raspravlja o krajnjim
domašajima tih naučnih saznanja za
naše razumevanje procesa odlučivanja uopšte.
Tako se pretežno bavi efektima postojanja
pravnih pravila na generička obeležja
donošenja odluka umesto da osvetli značaj
pomenutih obeležja za specifičan postupak
sudijskog odlučivanja po unapred utvrđenim
pravilima. Drugo, Spaić ne uspeva da
na uverljiv način odgovori na problem spojivosti
normativne doktrine formalizma sa radikalno
antiformalističkom teorijom prava.
Najzad, Spaićeva pozicija deli sudbinu ostalih
radikalno nekognitivističkih (realističkih)
pozicija u pogledu sudijskog tumačenja, utoliko
što suštinski osporava normativnost zakona
kao najtipičnijeg autoritativnog teksta
po kojem sudija postupa.
AB  - After a brief review of the basic theses presented
in this book, I turn to three criticisms.
First, instead of primarily instructing us in
how the insights of behavioral psychology
could be significant for the understanding
of a very specific decision-making process,
such as that of judge, Spaić discusses at
length the ultimate implications of those scientific
findings for our understanding of the
decision-making process in general. Thus,
he mainly deals with the effects of the existence
of legal rules on the generic characteristics
of decision-making instead of shedding
light on the importance of the mentioned
characteristics for the specific procedure of
judicial decision-making within the setting
of predetermined rules. Second, Spaić fails
to convincingly answer the problem of the
compatibility of the normative doctrine of
formalism with the radically anti-formalist
theory of law. Finally, Spaić's position shares
the fate of other radically non-cognitivist (realist)
positions regarding judicial interpretation,
insofar as he essentially challenges the
normativity of the law as the most typical
authoritative text by which a judge acts.
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024
T1  - Sudijsko odlučivanje – između skepticizma i formalizma
T1  - Judicial Decision-Making – Between Skepticism And Formalism
EP  - 125
SP  - 114
DO  - 10.51204/IVRS_24204A
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Jovanović, Miodrag",
year = "2024",
abstract = "Nakon kratkog osvrta na osnovne teze iznete
u ovoj knjizi, iznosim tri kritike. Prvo, umesto
da nas primarno uputi u to na koji bi način
uvidi bihevioralne psihologije mogli da budu
značajni za razumevanje jednog posve specifičnog
postupka odlučivanja, kakvo je ono
sudijsko, Spaić naširoko raspravlja o krajnjim
domašajima tih naučnih saznanja za
naše razumevanje procesa odlučivanja uopšte.
Tako se pretežno bavi efektima postojanja
pravnih pravila na generička obeležja
donošenja odluka umesto da osvetli značaj
pomenutih obeležja za specifičan postupak
sudijskog odlučivanja po unapred utvrđenim
pravilima. Drugo, Spaić ne uspeva da
na uverljiv način odgovori na problem spojivosti
normativne doktrine formalizma sa radikalno
antiformalističkom teorijom prava.
Najzad, Spaićeva pozicija deli sudbinu ostalih
radikalno nekognitivističkih (realističkih)
pozicija u pogledu sudijskog tumačenja, utoliko
što suštinski osporava normativnost zakona
kao najtipičnijeg autoritativnog teksta
po kojem sudija postupa., After a brief review of the basic theses presented
in this book, I turn to three criticisms.
First, instead of primarily instructing us in
how the insights of behavioral psychology
could be significant for the understanding
of a very specific decision-making process,
such as that of judge, Spaić discusses at
length the ultimate implications of those scientific
findings for our understanding of the
decision-making process in general. Thus,
he mainly deals with the effects of the existence
of legal rules on the generic characteristics
of decision-making instead of shedding
light on the importance of the mentioned
characteristics for the specific procedure of
judicial decision-making within the setting
of predetermined rules. Second, Spaić fails
to convincingly answer the problem of the
compatibility of the normative doctrine of
formalism with the radically anti-formalist
theory of law. Finally, Spaić's position shares
the fate of other radically non-cognitivist (realist)
positions regarding judicial interpretation,
insofar as he essentially challenges the
normativity of the law as the most typical
authoritative text by which a judge acts.",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024",
title = "Sudijsko odlučivanje – između skepticizma i formalizma, Judicial Decision-Making – Between Skepticism And Formalism",
pages = "125-114",
doi = "10.51204/IVRS_24204A"
}

Jovanović, M.. (2024). Sudijsko odlučivanje – između skepticizma i formalizma. in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 114-125.
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_24204A

Jovanović M. Sudijsko odlučivanje – između skepticizma i formalizma. in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024. 2024;:114-125.
doi:10.51204/IVRS_24204A .

Jovanović, Miodrag, "Sudijsko odlučivanje – između skepticizma i formalizma" in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024 (2024):114-125,
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_24204A . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Jovanović, Miodrag
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2456
AB  - Proceeding from the common assertion that
the war in Ukraine proves that international
law “doesn’t work” anymore, the article tries
to differentiate among the three possible
readings of this claim. First, the statement
may mean that a central part of international
law, namely the regime on the use
of force, has been stripped of its ‘legality’.
Second, the allegation may be that we are
dealing with a situation which Hart characterized
as “the pathology of a legal system”.
The third possible reading would be that international
law on the use of force is not authoritative,
meaning it does not have the capacity
to generate the sense of bindingness
among its addressees. The article argues in
favor of the second reading.
AB  - Polazeći od uobičajene tvrdnje da rat u
Ukrajini dokazuje da međunarodno pravo
(MP) „više ne funkcioniše“, članak pokušava
da napravi razliku između tri moguća
tumačenja ove tvrdnje. Prvo, izjava može
značiti da je centralnom delu IL, odnosno
režimu upotrebe sile, oduzeta „legalnost“.
Drugo, može biti reči o tome da imamo posla
sa situacijom koju je Hart okarakterisao
kao „patologiju pravnog sistema“. Treće
moguće tumačenje bi bilo da MP o upotrebi
sile nije autoritativan, što znači da nema
kapacitet da stvori osećaj obaveznosti kod
adresata normi. Članak se zalaže za drugo
tumačenje.
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024
T1  - The War in Ukraine – Pathology of the International Legal System?
T1  - Rat u Ukrajini – patologija međunarodnopravnog sistema?
EP  - 68
SP  - 52
DO  - 10.51204/IVRS_24207A
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Jovanović, Miodrag",
year = "2024",
abstract = "Proceeding from the common assertion that
the war in Ukraine proves that international
law “doesn’t work” anymore, the article tries
to differentiate among the three possible
readings of this claim. First, the statement
may mean that a central part of international
law, namely the regime on the use
of force, has been stripped of its ‘legality’.
Second, the allegation may be that we are
dealing with a situation which Hart characterized
as “the pathology of a legal system”.
The third possible reading would be that international
law on the use of force is not authoritative,
meaning it does not have the capacity
to generate the sense of bindingness
among its addressees. The article argues in
favor of the second reading., Polazeći od uobičajene tvrdnje da rat u
Ukrajini dokazuje da međunarodno pravo
(MP) „više ne funkcioniše“, članak pokušava
da napravi razliku između tri moguća
tumačenja ove tvrdnje. Prvo, izjava može
značiti da je centralnom delu IL, odnosno
režimu upotrebe sile, oduzeta „legalnost“.
Drugo, može biti reči o tome da imamo posla
sa situacijom koju je Hart okarakterisao
kao „patologiju pravnog sistema“. Treće
moguće tumačenje bi bilo da MP o upotrebi
sile nije autoritativan, što znači da nema
kapacitet da stvori osećaj obaveznosti kod
adresata normi. Članak se zalaže za drugo
tumačenje.",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024",
title = "The War in Ukraine – Pathology of the International Legal System?, Rat u Ukrajini – patologija međunarodnopravnog sistema?",
pages = "68-52",
doi = "10.51204/IVRS_24207A"
}

Jovanović, M.. (2024). The War in Ukraine – Pathology of the International Legal System?. in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 52-68.
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_24207A

Jovanović M. The War in Ukraine – Pathology of the International Legal System?. in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024. 2024;:52-68.
doi:10.51204/IVRS_24207A .

Jovanović, Miodrag, "The War in Ukraine – Pathology of the International Legal System?" in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024 (2024):52-68,
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_24207A . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2455
AB  - Bojan Spaić se u svojoj knjizi Priroda i determinante
sudijskog tumačenja prava bavi temom koja je
u domaćoj pravnoj teoriji i filozofiji prava zanemarena:
sudijskim rasuđivanjem, tumačenjem i odlučivanjem.
I prema zamisli autora, cilj knjige je da
poluči opis sudijskog tumačenja prava, pod pretpostavkom
da je takozvani antiformalizam ispravna
teorija o prirodi sudijskog tumačenja. U članku
se, najpre, analiziraju neki aspekti ovog dela koji
se čine podložnim kritici. Tako se, primera radi,
skreće pažnja na izostanak razmatranja kritičke
protivargumentacije o (nekim) važnim tezama
koje autor zastupa, Ili se, s druge strane, ukazuje
da je problematično pravila tumačenja kategorizovati
kao izvanpravna samo zato što nemaju svoj
formalnopravno kanonizovani, pisani oblik. Ipak,
osnovni cilj članka je da se, uprkos određenim
manjkavostima u njihovom postavljanju i razvijanju,
„valorizuju“ uvidi koje autor iznosi, a koji se
mogu objediniti sintagmom „antiformalistički formalizam“.
To zdravo jezgro ove knjige čine uvidi da
ne postoji jedno jedino „pravo značenje“ pravnog
teksta, da je sudijsko tumačenje odluka, da je ta
odluka opravdana mahom pozivanjem na autoritativne
pravne razloge koji se nalaze u formalnim
ili faktičkim izvorima prava, da sudije ne tumače
norme nego pravne tekstove, a da su norme ishod
tumačenja, da sudije prilikom tumačenja dopunjavaju,
razvijaju a katkad i ni iz čega stvaraju pravo.
AB  - In his book The Nature and Determinants of Judicial
Interpretation of Law, Bojan Spaić addresses a topic
that has been largely neglected in domestic legal
theory and philosophy of law: judicial reasoning, interpretation,
and decision-making. According to the
author’s design, the aim of the book is to provide a
description of judicial interpretation of law, based
on the assumption that so-called antiformalism is
a correct theory of the nature of judicial interpretation.
This article first analyzes certain aspects of the
book that seem open to critique. For example, attention
is drawn to the absence of consideration of
critical counterarguments regarding (some of) the
significant theses that the author advocates. Alternatively,
it points out the problematic nature of categorizing
interpretative rules as extralegal merely
because they lack a formally codified, written form
in the legal framework. Nevertheless, the primary
objective of the article is to “evaluate” the insights
presented by the author, despite certain shortcomings
in their formulation and development. These
insights can be summarized under the phrase “antiformalist
formalism.” The core of the book’s value
lies in the recognition that there is no singular “true
meaning” of a legal text, that judicial interpretation
is a decision, that this decision is predominantly
justified by reference to authoritative legal reasons
found in formal or factual sources of law, that judges
do not interpret norms but legal texts, that norms
are the outcome of interpretation, and that judges,
in the process of interpretation, supplement, develop,
and occasionally even create law from nothing.
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024
T1  - O jednoj verziji „antiformalističkog formalizma“ u sudijskom tumačenju prava
T1  - On a Version of “Antiformalist Formalism” in Judicial Interpretation of Law
EP  - 140
SP  - 126
DO  - 10.51204/IVRS_24203A
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2024",
abstract = "Bojan Spaić se u svojoj knjizi Priroda i determinante
sudijskog tumačenja prava bavi temom koja je
u domaćoj pravnoj teoriji i filozofiji prava zanemarena:
sudijskim rasuđivanjem, tumačenjem i odlučivanjem.
I prema zamisli autora, cilj knjige je da
poluči opis sudijskog tumačenja prava, pod pretpostavkom
da je takozvani antiformalizam ispravna
teorija o prirodi sudijskog tumačenja. U članku
se, najpre, analiziraju neki aspekti ovog dela koji
se čine podložnim kritici. Tako se, primera radi,
skreće pažnja na izostanak razmatranja kritičke
protivargumentacije o (nekim) važnim tezama
koje autor zastupa, Ili se, s druge strane, ukazuje
da je problematično pravila tumačenja kategorizovati
kao izvanpravna samo zato što nemaju svoj
formalnopravno kanonizovani, pisani oblik. Ipak,
osnovni cilj članka je da se, uprkos određenim
manjkavostima u njihovom postavljanju i razvijanju,
„valorizuju“ uvidi koje autor iznosi, a koji se
mogu objediniti sintagmom „antiformalistički formalizam“.
To zdravo jezgro ove knjige čine uvidi da
ne postoji jedno jedino „pravo značenje“ pravnog
teksta, da je sudijsko tumačenje odluka, da je ta
odluka opravdana mahom pozivanjem na autoritativne
pravne razloge koji se nalaze u formalnim
ili faktičkim izvorima prava, da sudije ne tumače
norme nego pravne tekstove, a da su norme ishod
tumačenja, da sudije prilikom tumačenja dopunjavaju,
razvijaju a katkad i ni iz čega stvaraju pravo., In his book The Nature and Determinants of Judicial
Interpretation of Law, Bojan Spaić addresses a topic
that has been largely neglected in domestic legal
theory and philosophy of law: judicial reasoning, interpretation,
and decision-making. According to the
author’s design, the aim of the book is to provide a
description of judicial interpretation of law, based
on the assumption that so-called antiformalism is
a correct theory of the nature of judicial interpretation.
This article first analyzes certain aspects of the
book that seem open to critique. For example, attention
is drawn to the absence of consideration of
critical counterarguments regarding (some of) the
significant theses that the author advocates. Alternatively,
it points out the problematic nature of categorizing
interpretative rules as extralegal merely
because they lack a formally codified, written form
in the legal framework. Nevertheless, the primary
objective of the article is to “evaluate” the insights
presented by the author, despite certain shortcomings
in their formulation and development. These
insights can be summarized under the phrase “antiformalist
formalism.” The core of the book’s value
lies in the recognition that there is no singular “true
meaning” of a legal text, that judicial interpretation
is a decision, that this decision is predominantly
justified by reference to authoritative legal reasons
found in formal or factual sources of law, that judges
do not interpret norms but legal texts, that norms
are the outcome of interpretation, and that judges,
in the process of interpretation, supplement, develop,
and occasionally even create law from nothing.",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024",
title = "O jednoj verziji „antiformalističkog formalizma“ u sudijskom tumačenju prava, On a Version of “Antiformalist Formalism” in Judicial Interpretation of Law",
pages = "140-126",
doi = "10.51204/IVRS_24203A"
}

Dajović, G.. (2024). O jednoj verziji „antiformalističkog formalizma“ u sudijskom tumačenju prava. in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 126-140.
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_24203A

Dajović G. O jednoj verziji „antiformalističkog formalizma“ u sudijskom tumačenju prava. in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024. 2024;:126-140.
doi:10.51204/IVRS_24203A .

Dajović, Goran, "O jednoj verziji „antiformalističkog formalizma“ u sudijskom tumačenju prava" in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024 (2024):126-140,
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_24203A . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Spaić, Bojan
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2454
AB  - U članku se precizira teorija pravnog tumačenja
izložena u monografiji „Priroda i determinante
sudijskog tumačenja prava“, povodom kritika
koje su uputili Miodrag Jovanović, Goran Dajović
i Aleš Novak. Poseban akcenat je na problemima
(1) odnosa između sudijskog tumačenja
prava, naučnog tumačenja prava i laičkog tumačenja
prava, (2) odnosa između prirodnog jezika
i podrazumevanog razumevanja prirodnog
jezika i pravnog jezika, kao i (3) determinantama
koje utiču na sudijsko tumačenje prava.
U vezi s tim problemima autor donosi sledeće
zaključke: (1) sudijsko tumačenje prava za razliku
od naučnog i laičkog tumačenja predstavlja
tumačenje u normativnoj funkciji, te da sudije
pripisuju pravnim tekstovima jedno od mogućih
normativnih značenja; (2) normativna značenja
pravnih tekstova nisu određena njihovim jezičkim
sadržajem već su i sama pravila tumačenja
koje nazivamo jezičkim pravila koja su formulisana
i koja se kontingentno uvažavaju u okviru
pravne struke; (3) legitimne i nelegitimne determinante
sudijskog tumačenja prava u dva svoja
značenja – kognitivnom i volitivnom – određuju
mogućnosti normativnih značenja pravnih
tekstova i odluke o normativnom značenju tih
tekstova koje donose sudije. Argumenti koji su
izloženi u tekstu pridružuju se argumentima
izloženim u monografiji kao razlozi za prihvatanja
realističkih (antiformalističkih) stanovišta u
teoriji pravnog tumačenja.
AB  - The article clarifies the theory of legal interpretation
introduced in the monograph “Nature
and determinants of judicial interpretation
of law” regarding the criticisms by Miodrag
Jovanović, Goran Dajović and Aleš Novak. Special
emphasis is placed on the problems of (1)
the relationship between judicial interpretation
of law, scientific interpretation of law, and lay interpretation
of law, (2) the relationship between
natural language and the default understanding
of natural language and legal language,
as well as (3) determinants that influence the
judicial interpretation of law. In connection with
these problems, the author draws the following
conclusions: (1) judicial interpretation of law, in
contrast to scientific and lay interpretation, represents
interpretation in a normative function,
and judges attribute one of the possible normative
meanings to legal texts; (2) the normative
meanings of legal texts are not determined by
their linguistic content, but are the very rules
of interpretation that we call linguistic rules
that are formulated and contingently respected
within the legal profession; (3) legitimate and
illegitimate determinants of judicial interpretation
in its two meanings – cognitive and volitional
– determine the possibilities of normative
meanings of legal texts and decisions about
the normative meaning of those texts made by
judges. The arguments presented in the text join
the arguments presented in the monograph as
reasons for accepting realistic (anti-formalist)
viewpoints in the theory of legal interpretation.
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024
T1  - Sudije, jezik i tumačenje prava: odgovor na kritike
T1  - Judges, Language, and Legal Interpretation: A Reply To Critics
EP  - 167
SP  - 142
DO  - 10.51204/IVRS_24205A
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Spaić, Bojan",
year = "2024",
abstract = "U članku se precizira teorija pravnog tumačenja
izložena u monografiji „Priroda i determinante
sudijskog tumačenja prava“, povodom kritika
koje su uputili Miodrag Jovanović, Goran Dajović
i Aleš Novak. Poseban akcenat je na problemima
(1) odnosa između sudijskog tumačenja
prava, naučnog tumačenja prava i laičkog tumačenja
prava, (2) odnosa između prirodnog jezika
i podrazumevanog razumevanja prirodnog
jezika i pravnog jezika, kao i (3) determinantama
koje utiču na sudijsko tumačenje prava.
U vezi s tim problemima autor donosi sledeće
zaključke: (1) sudijsko tumačenje prava za razliku
od naučnog i laičkog tumačenja predstavlja
tumačenje u normativnoj funkciji, te da sudije
pripisuju pravnim tekstovima jedno od mogućih
normativnih značenja; (2) normativna značenja
pravnih tekstova nisu određena njihovim jezičkim
sadržajem već su i sama pravila tumačenja
koje nazivamo jezičkim pravila koja su formulisana
i koja se kontingentno uvažavaju u okviru
pravne struke; (3) legitimne i nelegitimne determinante
sudijskog tumačenja prava u dva svoja
značenja – kognitivnom i volitivnom – određuju
mogućnosti normativnih značenja pravnih
tekstova i odluke o normativnom značenju tih
tekstova koje donose sudije. Argumenti koji su
izloženi u tekstu pridružuju se argumentima
izloženim u monografiji kao razlozi za prihvatanja
realističkih (antiformalističkih) stanovišta u
teoriji pravnog tumačenja., The article clarifies the theory of legal interpretation
introduced in the monograph “Nature
and determinants of judicial interpretation
of law” regarding the criticisms by Miodrag
Jovanović, Goran Dajović and Aleš Novak. Special
emphasis is placed on the problems of (1)
the relationship between judicial interpretation
of law, scientific interpretation of law, and lay interpretation
of law, (2) the relationship between
natural language and the default understanding
of natural language and legal language,
as well as (3) determinants that influence the
judicial interpretation of law. In connection with
these problems, the author draws the following
conclusions: (1) judicial interpretation of law, in
contrast to scientific and lay interpretation, represents
interpretation in a normative function,
and judges attribute one of the possible normative
meanings to legal texts; (2) the normative
meanings of legal texts are not determined by
their linguistic content, but are the very rules
of interpretation that we call linguistic rules
that are formulated and contingently respected
within the legal profession; (3) legitimate and
illegitimate determinants of judicial interpretation
in its two meanings – cognitive and volitional
– determine the possibilities of normative
meanings of legal texts and decisions about
the normative meaning of those texts made by
judges. The arguments presented in the text join
the arguments presented in the monograph as
reasons for accepting realistic (anti-formalist)
viewpoints in the theory of legal interpretation.",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024",
title = "Sudije, jezik i tumačenje prava: odgovor na kritike, Judges, Language, and Legal Interpretation: A Reply To Critics",
pages = "167-142",
doi = "10.51204/IVRS_24205A"
}

Spaić, B.. (2024). Sudije, jezik i tumačenje prava: odgovor na kritike. in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 142-167.
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_24205A

Spaić B. Sudije, jezik i tumačenje prava: odgovor na kritike. in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024. 2024;:142-167.
doi:10.51204/IVRS_24205A .

Spaić, Bojan, "Sudije, jezik i tumačenje prava: odgovor na kritike" in Eudaimonia – Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024 (2024):142-167,
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_24205A . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Bezbradica, Anja
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2452
AB  - Razumevanje prava kao specifične društvene
činjenice – institucionalne – kod neoinstitucionalista
poput Nila Mekormika i Ote
Vajnbergera, predstavljalo je značajan zaokret
u jurisprudenciji. Makar u delu pravne
teorije napušten je voluntarizam, a lokus
normativnosti prava premešten je u društvene
(interakcijske) prakse. Iako je ovakvo
shvatanje prava, čini se, prirodno vodilo
akcentovanju njegovog faktičkog sastojka,
neoinstitucionalizam je ostao pretežno analitički
i normativistički. Ovaj rad je pokušaj
da se skrene pažnja na to da se on mogao
kretati i u drugačijem pravcu, pravcu socioloških
i drugih empirijskih istraživanja prava,
kao i da mu je socijalna ontologija Džona
Serla od koje pozajmljuje pojam institucije,
davala dovoljno inspiracije za tako nešto. U
radu smo pokušali da detektujemo one delove
Serlove socijalne ontologije iz kojih se
mogu derivirati teme/hipoteze za sociološka
i druga naučna istraživanja prava, te da
ukažemo na moguće pravce njihove razrade.
AB  - Neo-institutionalists like Neil McCormick and
Ota Weinberger brought a significant shift to
jurisprudence by viewing law as a specific
social fact – the institutional one. This perspective
moved away from the voluntarism
of traditional legal science, pointing instead
on social practices as a locus of law’s normativity.
While this approach emphasized
the factual aspects of law, neo-institutionalism
primarily maintained an analytical
and normative stance. Our analysis aims to
highlight its potential for exploring alternative
paths, such as engaging in sociological
and other empirical research of law. We believe
that John Searle’s social ontology, from
which neo-institutionalists borrowed the
concept of institution, provides substantial
motivation for such direction. In this paper,
we tried to detect those aspects of Searle’s
theory of institutions from which themes/hypotheses
for sociological and other scientific
research of law can be derived, as well as to
point out the possible directions of their development.
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Eudaimonia, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024
T1  - Socijalna ontologija Džona Serla kao paradigma za empirijska istraživanja prava
T1  - John Searle’s Social Ontology as a Paradigm for Empirical Research of Law
EP  - 29
SP  - 6
DO  - 10.51204/IVRS_24201A
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Bezbradica, Anja",
year = "2024",
abstract = "Razumevanje prava kao specifične društvene
činjenice – institucionalne – kod neoinstitucionalista
poput Nila Mekormika i Ote
Vajnbergera, predstavljalo je značajan zaokret
u jurisprudenciji. Makar u delu pravne
teorije napušten je voluntarizam, a lokus
normativnosti prava premešten je u društvene
(interakcijske) prakse. Iako je ovakvo
shvatanje prava, čini se, prirodno vodilo
akcentovanju njegovog faktičkog sastojka,
neoinstitucionalizam je ostao pretežno analitički
i normativistički. Ovaj rad je pokušaj
da se skrene pažnja na to da se on mogao
kretati i u drugačijem pravcu, pravcu socioloških
i drugih empirijskih istraživanja prava,
kao i da mu je socijalna ontologija Džona
Serla od koje pozajmljuje pojam institucije,
davala dovoljno inspiracije za tako nešto. U
radu smo pokušali da detektujemo one delove
Serlove socijalne ontologije iz kojih se
mogu derivirati teme/hipoteze za sociološka
i druga naučna istraživanja prava, te da
ukažemo na moguće pravce njihove razrade., Neo-institutionalists like Neil McCormick and
Ota Weinberger brought a significant shift to
jurisprudence by viewing law as a specific
social fact – the institutional one. This perspective
moved away from the voluntarism
of traditional legal science, pointing instead
on social practices as a locus of law’s normativity.
While this approach emphasized
the factual aspects of law, neo-institutionalism
primarily maintained an analytical
and normative stance. Our analysis aims to
highlight its potential for exploring alternative
paths, such as engaging in sociological
and other empirical research of law. We believe
that John Searle’s social ontology, from
which neo-institutionalists borrowed the
concept of institution, provides substantial
motivation for such direction. In this paper,
we tried to detect those aspects of Searle’s
theory of institutions from which themes/hypotheses
for sociological and other scientific
research of law can be derived, as well as to
point out the possible directions of their development.",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Eudaimonia, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024",
title = "Socijalna ontologija Džona Serla kao paradigma za empirijska istraživanja prava, John Searle’s Social Ontology as a Paradigm for Empirical Research of Law",
pages = "29-6",
doi = "10.51204/IVRS_24201A"
}

Bezbradica, A.. (2024). Socijalna ontologija Džona Serla kao paradigma za empirijska istraživanja prava. in Eudaimonia, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 6-29.
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_24201A

Bezbradica A. Socijalna ontologija Džona Serla kao paradigma za empirijska istraživanja prava. in Eudaimonia, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024. 2024;:6-29.
doi:10.51204/IVRS_24201A .

Bezbradica, Anja, "Socijalna ontologija Džona Serla kao paradigma za empirijska istraživanja prava" in Eudaimonia, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2024 (2024):6-29,
https://doi.org/10.51204/IVRS_24201A . .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Babović Vuksanović, Branka
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2451
AB  - This chapter analyses the effects that legislative changes in the area of consumer collective redress have on the right to the fair trial of consumers in the Republic of Serbia. The most remarkable change was the decision of the Constitutional Court by which the provisions on the organisational claim were repealed as unconstitutional. One of the reasons for such a decision is the procedural law tradition, which does not include collective redress. This chapter examines if this ‘blast from the past’ is appropriately interpreted and shows that this approach was not suitable and, consequently, led to procedural inadequacies. The primary symptom of procedural inadequacies is a massive influx of mass claims before Serbian courts. Furthermore, the effects of these legislative changes on the consumer’s access to justice are analysed. The results show that the collectivisation of consumer protection is not appropriately regulated. Finally, this has affected the relationship between consumers and traders, so that the weaker party became weaker. Apart from that, there are no effective procedural mechanisms to deter traders from the collective infringement of consumer rights and interests.
PB  - London : Bloomsbury Publishing
T2  - European Convention on Human Rights and Private Law: Comparative Perspectives from South-Eastern Europe
T1  - Blast from the Past – Consumer Collective Redress in Serbia
EP  - 196
SP  - 177
DO  - 10.5040/9781509958115.ch-010
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Babović Vuksanović, Branka",
year = "2024",
abstract = "This chapter analyses the effects that legislative changes in the area of consumer collective redress have on the right to the fair trial of consumers in the Republic of Serbia. The most remarkable change was the decision of the Constitutional Court by which the provisions on the organisational claim were repealed as unconstitutional. One of the reasons for such a decision is the procedural law tradition, which does not include collective redress. This chapter examines if this ‘blast from the past’ is appropriately interpreted and shows that this approach was not suitable and, consequently, led to procedural inadequacies. The primary symptom of procedural inadequacies is a massive influx of mass claims before Serbian courts. Furthermore, the effects of these legislative changes on the consumer’s access to justice are analysed. The results show that the collectivisation of consumer protection is not appropriately regulated. Finally, this has affected the relationship between consumers and traders, so that the weaker party became weaker. Apart from that, there are no effective procedural mechanisms to deter traders from the collective infringement of consumer rights and interests.",
publisher = "London : Bloomsbury Publishing",
journal = "European Convention on Human Rights and Private Law: Comparative Perspectives from South-Eastern Europe",
booktitle = "Blast from the Past – Consumer Collective Redress in Serbia",
pages = "196-177",
doi = "10.5040/9781509958115.ch-010"
}

Babović Vuksanović, B.. (2024). Blast from the Past – Consumer Collective Redress in Serbia. in European Convention on Human Rights and Private Law: Comparative Perspectives from South-Eastern Europe
London : Bloomsbury Publishing., 177-196.
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509958115.ch-010

Babović Vuksanović B. Blast from the Past – Consumer Collective Redress in Serbia. in European Convention on Human Rights and Private Law: Comparative Perspectives from South-Eastern Europe. 2024;:177-196.
doi:10.5040/9781509958115.ch-010 .

Babović Vuksanović, Branka, "Blast from the Past – Consumer Collective Redress in Serbia" in European Convention on Human Rights and Private Law: Comparative Perspectives from South-Eastern Europe (2024):177-196,
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509958115.ch-010 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2385
AB  - Raz’s Legacy. The Law Between Legitimate Authority and Protected Reasons. The work of Joseph
Raz has exerted an undoubted influence on discussions in the field of the philosophy of law
in recent decades. One of the points of particular influence is his position regarding the philosophy
of law as a branch of practical philosophy, alongside moral philosophy and political
philosophy, and therefore necessarily focused on the analysis of the practical reasoning of the
addressees of legal norms. In this short contribution, I will show the originality and depth of
the Razian work in the framework of legal philosophy by focusing on two points: the idea of
legal norms as protected reasons for action and the Razian concept of legitimate authority. I
will also show how these theses can be understood as the product of a conceptually and chronologically
concatenated elaboration in response to one of the greatest challenges concerning
law and authority: the so-called anarchist challenge – that is, the idea that it is impossible to
find compatibility between authority and autonomy, and between authority and rationality.
PB  - Palermo : Università di Palermo
T2  - Rivista di filosofia del diritto e cultura giuridica, 2/2024
T1  - L’eredità di Raz: il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette
EP  - 282
SP  - 265
DO  - 10.4477/115507
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2024",
abstract = "Raz’s Legacy. The Law Between Legitimate Authority and Protected Reasons. The work of Joseph
Raz has exerted an undoubted influence on discussions in the field of the philosophy of law
in recent decades. One of the points of particular influence is his position regarding the philosophy
of law as a branch of practical philosophy, alongside moral philosophy and political
philosophy, and therefore necessarily focused on the analysis of the practical reasoning of the
addressees of legal norms. In this short contribution, I will show the originality and depth of
the Razian work in the framework of legal philosophy by focusing on two points: the idea of
legal norms as protected reasons for action and the Razian concept of legitimate authority. I
will also show how these theses can be understood as the product of a conceptually and chronologically
concatenated elaboration in response to one of the greatest challenges concerning
law and authority: the so-called anarchist challenge – that is, the idea that it is impossible to
find compatibility between authority and autonomy, and between authority and rationality.",
publisher = "Palermo : Università di Palermo",
journal = "Rivista di filosofia del diritto e cultura giuridica, 2/2024",
title = "L’eredità di Raz: il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette",
pages = "282-265",
doi = "10.4477/115507"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2024). L’eredità di Raz: il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette. in Rivista di filosofia del diritto e cultura giuridica, 2/2024
Palermo : Università di Palermo., 265-282.
https://doi.org/10.4477/115507

Rabanos JA. L’eredità di Raz: il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette. in Rivista di filosofia del diritto e cultura giuridica, 2/2024. 2024;:265-282.
doi:10.4477/115507 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "L’eredità di Raz: il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette" in Rivista di filosofia del diritto e cultura giuridica, 2/2024 (2024):265-282,
https://doi.org/10.4477/115507 . .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2384
AB  - The ideas that law is (or can be regarded as) a legal system, and that law evolves over time in adaptation to its context, are two of the most widely shared and presupposed ideas in contemporary legal theory. However, even if much interest has been dedicated in legal theory and legal dogmatics to the evolution of specific legal concepts or institutions, as well as legal norms in particular, not so much attention has been dedicated to the evolution of legal systems in themselves. In this chapter, I will try to offer an overview of the evolution of the concept of legal system and critically analyse whether an evolutionary theory of legal systems - i.e., a theory about the evolution of legal systems - can be reconstructed and laid down for the analysis both of the past, the present, and the future of legal systems.
PB  - Cheltenham :  Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
T2  - Research Handbook on Legal Evolution
T1  - On An ‘Evolutionary’ Theory of Legal Systems
EP  - 148
SP  - 130
DO  - 10.4337/9781803921822.00019
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2024",
abstract = "The ideas that law is (or can be regarded as) a legal system, and that law evolves over time in adaptation to its context, are two of the most widely shared and presupposed ideas in contemporary legal theory. However, even if much interest has been dedicated in legal theory and legal dogmatics to the evolution of specific legal concepts or institutions, as well as legal norms in particular, not so much attention has been dedicated to the evolution of legal systems in themselves. In this chapter, I will try to offer an overview of the evolution of the concept of legal system and critically analyse whether an evolutionary theory of legal systems - i.e., a theory about the evolution of legal systems - can be reconstructed and laid down for the analysis both of the past, the present, and the future of legal systems.",
publisher = "Cheltenham :  Edward Elgar Publishing Limited",
journal = "Research Handbook on Legal Evolution",
booktitle = "On An ‘Evolutionary’ Theory of Legal Systems",
pages = "148-130",
doi = "10.4337/9781803921822.00019"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2024). On An ‘Evolutionary’ Theory of Legal Systems. in Research Handbook on Legal Evolution
Cheltenham :  Edward Elgar Publishing Limited., 130-148.
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781803921822.00019

Rabanos JA. On An ‘Evolutionary’ Theory of Legal Systems. in Research Handbook on Legal Evolution. 2024;:130-148.
doi:10.4337/9781803921822.00019 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "On An ‘Evolutionary’ Theory of Legal Systems" in Research Handbook on Legal Evolution (2024):130-148,
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781803921822.00019 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Spaić, Bojan
AU  - Jovanović, Miodrag A.
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2380
AB  - Despite the widespread adoption of generative transformer large language 
models and the interest of the global legal community, discussions about the 
models in philosophy of law mainly have been focusing on what LLMs cannot 
do. In making the first steps towards a philosophical analysis of the capabilities 
of AI models in the field of law, we follow the basic idea of Turing’s „imitation 
game“. Proceeding from the frequently raised characterization of legal 
reasoning as „artificial“, the paper identifies the undisputed minimum core of 
the „artificiality“ thesis and asks to what extent it can be imitated by artificial 
intelligence. To answer this question, we test the legal reasoning capabilities of 
ChatGPT, the most advanced, up-to-date LLM version of artificial intelligence. 
The conclusion is that in all relevant types of activities usually associated 
with legal reasoning – fact-finding, interpretation, qualification, and decision
making – ChatGPT can generate outcomes as if it reasons legally.
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, God. 72, br. 3, 2024
T1  - Artificial Reason and Artificial Intelligence: the Legal Reasoning Capabilities of GPT-4
EP  - 422
SP  - 383
DO  - 10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24302A
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Spaić, Bojan and Jovanović, Miodrag A.",
year = "2024",
abstract = "Despite the widespread adoption of generative transformer large language 
models and the interest of the global legal community, discussions about the 
models in philosophy of law mainly have been focusing on what LLMs cannot 
do. In making the first steps towards a philosophical analysis of the capabilities 
of AI models in the field of law, we follow the basic idea of Turing’s „imitation 
game“. Proceeding from the frequently raised characterization of legal 
reasoning as „artificial“, the paper identifies the undisputed minimum core of 
the „artificiality“ thesis and asks to what extent it can be imitated by artificial 
intelligence. To answer this question, we test the legal reasoning capabilities of 
ChatGPT, the most advanced, up-to-date LLM version of artificial intelligence. 
The conclusion is that in all relevant types of activities usually associated 
with legal reasoning – fact-finding, interpretation, qualification, and decision
making – ChatGPT can generate outcomes as if it reasons legally.",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, God. 72, br. 3, 2024",
title = "Artificial Reason and Artificial Intelligence: the Legal Reasoning Capabilities of GPT-4",
pages = "422-383",
doi = "10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24302A"
}

Spaić, B.,& Jovanović, M. A.. (2024). Artificial Reason and Artificial Intelligence: the Legal Reasoning Capabilities of GPT-4. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, God. 72, br. 3, 2024
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 383-422.
https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24302A

Spaić B, Jovanović MA. Artificial Reason and Artificial Intelligence: the Legal Reasoning Capabilities of GPT-4. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, God. 72, br. 3, 2024. 2024;:383-422.
doi:10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24302A .

Spaić, Bojan, Jovanović, Miodrag A., "Artificial Reason and Artificial Intelligence: the Legal Reasoning Capabilities of GPT-4" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, God. 72, br. 3, 2024 (2024):383-422,
https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24302A . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2376
AB  - Raz’s Legacy. The Law Between Legitimate Authority and Protected Reasons. The work of Joseph
Raz has exerted an undoubted influence on discussions in the field of the philosophy of law
in recent decades. One of the points of particular influence is his position regarding the philosophy
of law as a branch of practical philosophy, alongside moral philosophy and political
philosophy, and therefore necessarily focused on the analysis of the practical reasoning of the
addressees of legal norms. In this short contribution, I will show the originality and depth of
the Razian work in the framework of legal philosophy by focusing on two points: the idea of
legal norms as protected reasons for action and the Razian concept of legitimate authority. I
will also show how these theses can be understood as the product of a conceptually and chronologically
concatenated elaboration in response to one of the greatest challenges concerning
law and authority: the so-called anarchist challenge – that is, the idea that it is impossible to
find compatibility between authority and autonomy, and between authority and rationality.
PB  - Bologna : Società editrice il Mulino
T2  - Rivista di filosofia del diritto, 12 , 2/2024
T1  - L’eredità di Raz : Il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette
EP  - 282
SP  - 265
DO  - 10.4477/115507
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2024",
abstract = "Raz’s Legacy. The Law Between Legitimate Authority and Protected Reasons. The work of Joseph
Raz has exerted an undoubted influence on discussions in the field of the philosophy of law
in recent decades. One of the points of particular influence is his position regarding the philosophy
of law as a branch of practical philosophy, alongside moral philosophy and political
philosophy, and therefore necessarily focused on the analysis of the practical reasoning of the
addressees of legal norms. In this short contribution, I will show the originality and depth of
the Razian work in the framework of legal philosophy by focusing on two points: the idea of
legal norms as protected reasons for action and the Razian concept of legitimate authority. I
will also show how these theses can be understood as the product of a conceptually and chronologically
concatenated elaboration in response to one of the greatest challenges concerning
law and authority: the so-called anarchist challenge – that is, the idea that it is impossible to
find compatibility between authority and autonomy, and between authority and rationality.",
publisher = "Bologna : Società editrice il Mulino",
journal = "Rivista di filosofia del diritto, 12 , 2/2024",
title = "L’eredità di Raz : Il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette",
pages = "282-265",
doi = "10.4477/115507"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2024). L’eredità di Raz : Il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette. in Rivista di filosofia del diritto, 12 , 2/2024
Bologna : Società editrice il Mulino., 265-282.
https://doi.org/10.4477/115507

Rabanos JA. L’eredità di Raz : Il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette. in Rivista di filosofia del diritto, 12 , 2/2024. 2024;:265-282.
doi:10.4477/115507 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "L’eredità di Raz : Il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette" in Rivista di filosofia del diritto, 12 , 2/2024 (2024):265-282,
https://doi.org/10.4477/115507 . .