

Andreas SERAFIM, PhD*

REVISITING THE HILL OF PNYX: THE PHYSICAL, RHETORICAL, AND SOCIOCULTURAL CONTEXTS

This paper offers a holistic reconsideration and reexamination of what the transmitted texts say about the political and rhetorical processes on the hill of Pnyx in classical Athens. It has three specific aims: (1) to explore existing ancient literature references to the Pnyx as a physical and constitutional/political place; (2) to identify and discuss a wide range of aspects of rhetoric in action, or performance, in a suitable sample of symbouleutic (or political) speeches – specifically, the three Olynthiacs and the four Philippics of Demosthenes; and (3) to offer answers to the question about the how physical conditions and the architectural form of the Pnyx might have affected acoustics and delivery of speeches, and why the hill was chosen to be the location of the Athenian Assembly meetings.

Key words: *Pnyx. – Assembly. – Political speeches. – Performance. – Acoustics.*

* Assistant Professor, Department of Classical Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland, aseraphim@umk.pl. This research has been funded in part by National Science Centre, Poland, grant number 2021/41/B/HS2/00755. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments. I also owe sincerest thanks to Professor Christos Zerefos, Secretary General of the Academy of Athens: it is because of his steady and incisive encouragement that I decided to reexplore the topographical, institutional, rhetorical, and overall cultural importance of the Pnyx. This paper is dedicated with gratitude to the staff of the library at the Academy of Athens for their moral and practical support when life was tough.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Pnyx is rightly considered the most important landmark of the mature phase of Athenian democracy.¹ Yet, despite intense interdisciplinary research, many questions remain unanswered. It is also notable that in classical scholarship references to the Pnyx are mostly concentrated in studies about its function within the system of Athenian democratic politics, and its legislative importance as the location of the meetings of the *ecclesia*, the Assembly (see Hansen 1991, 128–129 for a succinct description of the physical construction of the Pnyx in a book that discusses Athenian democracy; Bicknell 1987, 51–92; Bicknell 1989, 83–100 on the constitutionalized character of political conventions on the Pnyx). A prominent exception is H.M. Hansen’s full-scale study, entitled *The Athenian Ecclesia: A Collection of Articles 1976–1983* (Hansen 1983; also, Hansen 1985, 129–141; Hansen 1986, 143–153). Another striking common feature of most publications is that they are early (on archaeological evidence, following the excavations of the 1930s, and the function of the hill as the meeting place of the Athenian Assembly see Kourouniotes, Thompson 1932, 96ff.; Thompson 1936; and Thompson, Scranton 1943, 299ff.), leaving the question why there was no up-to-date interest in intriguing cultural aspects of the hill. Studies are also focused on technical aspects, e.g., how many Athenians were allowed to gather on the hill, and where and how they were seated in the auditorium (see Hansen 1976, 130–132; Hansen 1982, 241–249; and Hansen 1989, 129–153). The most influential, fully-fledged, and comprehensive study of several aspects of the Pnyx is *The Pnyx in the History of Athens*, by Forsén and Stanton. This volume contains chapters, specifically, on the archaeological construction of the hill, the shape and size of the place of the Assembly meetings, the date of its construction, and matters that

¹ Aristophanes, *Knights* 42: “We two have a master who’s rustic in his bad temper, a bean-chewer, quick to be irritated — Demos of the Pnyx (*Δῆμος πικνίτης* or *Δῆμος Πυγκίτης*), a peevish little hard-of-hearing old man”; translation: Sommerstein 1981, 15. The assumption of Sommerstein 1981, 146 that the reference may be to an individual, as in *Wasps* 98 (“And, by Zeus, if he sees scribbled on a door anywhere ‘Pyrilampes’ son of Demos is beautiful’, he goes on and writes close beside it ‘the voting-urn’s funnel is beautiful’”; translation: Sommerstein 1983, 13), seems to be erroneous for two reasons: first, because in the whole of *Knights* the Orchestra represents the Pnyx in Athens; and second, because there is a reference to the Pnyx in relation to Demos, which corroborates the idea that the latter is a reference to the democratic body of citizens in classical Athens. The combination of two passages from Aeschines 3, *Against Ctesiphon*, leaves no doubt that the Pnyx and *ecclesia* are used interchangeably: in §35, where a law is cited, specifying the crowning of the Athenians who contributed to the protection of the city on the site of the Pnyx, and §32, where it is mentioned that the crowning should take place in the *ecclesia*.

underline its religious function in the Athenian *polis* (see Forsén, Stanton 1996). C. L. Johnstone's combination of textual investigation and field work on the acoustics of the Pnyx is also memorable in posing and answering (regrettably, not invariably in a fully satisfactory way) questions about the physical context of the Pnyx and the practical restraints this imposed on political speech-making (including the audibility of vocal delivery; on acoustics on the Pnyx see Johnstone 1996, 122–127; on performance in the Assembly see Johnstone 2001, 121–143; Johnstone and Graff 2018, 2–88; and Bers 2013, 27–40).

This paper has three interrelated aims, as per each of the main sections it comprises. The first is to explore the references that exist in ancient literature to the Pnyx as a physical and constitutional/political place; hence, the search for two specific words, *Πνύξ* and *ἐκκλησία*, was carried out, to compile an annotated compendium of references, which will help readers to find information and passages relating to the Pnyx. The second aim of this paper is to provide an analysis of rhetoric in action, i.e., performance, in a suitable sample of symbouleutic (or political) speeches – specifically, the three *Olynthiacs* and the four *Philippics* of Demosthenes. Beyond the most obvious aspect of performance, *hypocrisis*, i.e., vocalics and kinesics, two other aspects are considered – first, the means of establishing and facilitating the communicative relationship between the speaker and the audience, and, second, *ēthopoiia* and *pathos*. A comparison between forensic (court) and symbouleutic (Assembly on the Pnyx) performance is carried out, with the aim of drawing conclusions about the difference in rhetorical tactics between the two institutional contexts. The third and final aim of the paper is to offer some answers to two questions that are still largely under-researched and unanswered by researchers, exploiting the texts of ancient (Greco-Roman) literature and applying the knowledge of archaeoacoustics (a field that adopts theories and research tools from a wide range of disciplines such as archaeology, audio production, and sensory history). The first question concerns the physical conditions and architectural form of the place and how these affected the political and rhetorical mechanisms, specifically what the acoustics on the hill might have been like and whether they allowed speeches to be delivered to the whole audience of 6,000 Athenians who could gather on the Pnyx at once, or many times to rotating audiences. The other question concerns the sociocultural significance of the Pnyx, which has left the scholarly community wondering why it was chosen to be the location of the Athenian Assembly meetings.

2. TEXTUAL REFERENCES TO THE PNYX AND THE *ECCLĒSIA*

This section, using *The Diorsis Ancient Greek Corpus*, a digital collection of 820 ancient Greek texts (from Homer to the early 5th century AD), explores and presents passages that reference the Pnyx, and discusses both its political function as the nucleus of Athenian democracy in the 4th century and other practical issues (e.g., seating and buildings). Particularly examined is the use of two Greek words (in various cases): *Πνύξ* and *ἐκκλησία*. The references to the latter, discussed below, are those that strictly refer to the Pnyx as the meeting place of the Assembly in the 4th century BC. Surprisingly, there are only three references to the first term, while there are 104 to the second; but despite references to the *ecclēsia* evidently being more numerous than references to the Pnyx, the frequency is still low – the quotient of the number of references and the total number of words in the corpus of Attic speeches is ca. 0.05%.

The dearth of references cannot easily be explained; it presumably may be due to the self-evident character of the information that is conveyed by the two terms, i.e., every Athenian (and possibly even non-Athenian) knew that the *ecclēsia* was assembled on the Pnyx. The three references to the Pnyx are all in Aeschines' speeches. The only reference to the political function of the place can be found in 3.34: "You hear, fellow citizens, how the lawgiver commands that the man who is crowned by the people be proclaimed among the people, on the Pnyx, at a meeting of the assembly, 'and nowhere else.'" The mention of the Pnyx in 1.81 has nothing to do with the political function of the place, but rather concerns topography and residential matters,² while the mention in 1.82 refers to the reputation of the place. As such, this is discussed in the third section of this paper, which examines the sociocultural reasons why the Pnyx was used as the physical setting for the meetings of the Assembly.³

² Aeschines 1.81: "The Senate of the Areopagus appeared before the people in accordance with the resolution that Timarchus had introduced in the matter of the dwelling-houses on the Pnyx. The member of the Areopagus who spoke was Autolycus, a man whose life has been good and pious, by Zeus and Apollo, and worthy of that body." Translations of texts in this paper are from LOEB Classical Library Editions, unless otherwise stated.

³ Aeschines 1.82: "Now when in the course of his speech he declared that the Areopagus disapproved the proposition of Timarchus, and said, 'You must not be surprised, fellow citizens, if Timarchus is better acquainted than the Senate of the Areopagus with this lonely spot and the region of the Pnyx,' then you applauded and said Autolycus was right, for Timarchus was indeed acquainted with it."

References to the *ecclēsia* were made most frequently when it was necessary for the speaker to describe what had happened in the past and can be classified in three major categories. The first category consists of references to the Athenians, mainly with the purpose of castigating the unconstitutional behavior of the audience when, by means of uproar, they created impediments to the fully free expression of the speakers, or when the audience members let themselves be beguiled by mere rhetoric, rather than rational arguments; this kind of references could be labeled as *internal*. The second category of references contains those that indicate the presence of non-Athenians in the *ecclēsia*, or about matters that regulate or determine the relation between the Athenians and groups of foreigners; this kind of references could be labeled as *external*. The third category includes what could be labeled as *neutral* references, i.e., those that simply convey information about the political gathering of the Assembly.

The following is an annotated list of the references to the political functioning of the Pnyx.⁴

⁴ It is important to note, at this point, that not all attestations of the word *ecclēsia* refer to various functions of the Athenian political decision-making body. Those mentioned in the annotated compendium provided in this paper are those that relate to the political space of the Pnyx.

Table 1 - An annotated list of the references to the political functioning of the Pnyx

Internal references	External references	Neutral references
<p>Demosthenes 8.32, in a plea for the unimpeded right of speakers to express themselves at the meetings of the <i>ecclesia</i> (the so-called <i>parrhēsia</i>),⁵ Demades 1.54⁶ and 9.1, about foreign threats that are discussed;⁷</p> <p>Demosthenes 8.33, for the benign behavior that people should exhibit in the Assembly, most likely indicating that the <i>cle</i> used to boo or shush the speaker,⁸ and Aeschines 2.72 on ways of manipulating the audience in the Assembly;⁹</p>	<p>Demosthenes 7.19, Aeschines 1.180, 2.53, 3.68, Lycurgus 13.8, with references to the presence of foreign ambassadors at the Assembly;</p> <p>Isocrates 8.59, on the relationship between the Athenians and foreigners.¹⁶</p>	<p>Aeschines 1.110, 121, 2.63, 65–67, 82–85, 95, 158, 3.69,¹⁷ 71 (2 references), 125–126, 146, 149, 175, 224, on the presence of people from Athens and other Greek cities in the Assembly,¹⁸ 251, Andocides 1.11, 82, Dinarchus 1.42, 99, Hyperides 1.3, 3.32, Isaeus 1.38, Lycurgus 1.16, Lysias 12.71–72, 75–76, 13.32, 55, 19.49, 28.9;</p>

⁵ Demosthenes 8.32: “But as to the reason for this—and in Heaven’s name, when I am pleading for your best interests, allow me to speak freely—some of our politicians have been training you to be threatening and intractable in the meetings of the Assembly, but in preparing for war, careless and contemptible.”

⁶ Demades 1.54: “War, like a cloud, was threatening Europe from every quarter, suppressing my right to speak my mind in the assembly and taking away all power of free and noble utterance.”

⁷ Demosthenes 9.1: “Many speeches are delivered, men of Athens, at almost every meeting of the Assembly, about the wrongs that Philip has been committing, ever since the conclusion of peace, not only against you but also against the other states.”

⁸ Demosthenes 8.33: “For it ought to have been the reverse, men of Athens; all your politicians should have trained you to be gentle and humane in the Assembly, for there you are dealing with rights that concern yourselves and your allies, but in preparing for war they should have made you threatening and intractable, because there you are pitted against your enemies and rivals.”

⁹ Aeschines 2.72: “And Philip from his base in Macedonia was no longer contending with us for Amphipolis, but already for Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, our own possessions, while our citizens were abandoning the Chersonese, the undisputed property of Athens. And the special meetings of the assembly which you were forced to hold, in fear and tumult, were more in number than the regular meetings.”

¹⁶ Isocrates 8.59: “But now matters have taken such a turn that the Thebans are saving us and we them, and they are procuring allies for us and we for them. So that if we were sensible, we should supply each other with money for our general assemblies; for the oftener we meet to deliberate the more do we promote the success of our rivals.”

¹⁷ Aeschines 3.69: “When now, fellow citizens, the Dionysia were past and the assemblies took place, in the first assembly a resolution of the synod of the allies was read, the substance of which I will give briefly before having it read to you.”

¹⁸ Aeschines 3.224: “When I convicted you of this in the presence of all Athens and charged you with being the murderer of your host, you did not deny the impious crime, but gave an answer that called forth a cry of protest from the citizens and all the foreigners who were standing about the assembly.”

Internal references	External references	Neutral references
<p>Aeschines 1.178, Demosthenes 8.34, 9.4, and Isocrates 8.52, where instructions are given to audience members about how to listen to the essence of arguments and the gist of a case, not to flattery or unreasonable thinking that deprives them of the right to make the best decision;</p> <p>Aeschines 3.2, on the proper constitutional way of functioning of the <i>ecclēsia</i>; and Aeschines 2.60–61, 3.24, 27, 32, 35 (2 references), 39, 43–45, 47–48, 204 (2 references), 211 on the constitutional uses of the place, e.g., for the election of magistrates, Aeschines 1.22 and Dinarchus 2.16 on the importance of the proceedings in the Assembly;¹⁰</p> <p>Demosthenes 9.6 on the malpractice of rhetoric in the Assembly, when speakers are accused of propagating the arguments of foreigners;¹¹ Aeschines 1.26,¹² 1.33 (2 references), 1.86, 2.71, 2.92 (on falsifying the accounts about the meetings of the</p>		<p>Aeschines 1.35 (2 references), 1.81, 3.95 on procedural issues, such as speech-making by others, not the speaker himself (these are not simply references that convey information, but have an ironic dimension, which is, however, only implicit and indirect), Andocides 4.14;</p>

¹⁰ Aeschines 1.22: “For when the lawgiver had finished with these laws, he next turned to the question of the proper manner of conducting our deliberations concerning the most important matters, when we are met in public assembly.” Dinarchus 2.16: “Like the early lawgivers, Athenians, who made laws to deal with those addressing your ancestors in the Assembly, you too should try, by your behavior as listeners, to make the speakers who come before you better. What was the attitude of the lawgivers to these men? In the first place, at every sitting of the Assembly they publicly proclaimed curses against wrongdoers, calling down destruction on any who, after accepting bribes, made speeches or proposals upon state affairs, and to that class Aristogiton now belongs.”

¹¹ Demosthenes 9.6: “If, then, we were all agreed that Philip is at war with Athens and is violating the peace, the only task of a speaker would be to come forward and recommend the safest and easiest method of defence; but since some of you are in such a strange mood that, though Philip is seizing cities, and retaining many of your possessions, and inflicting injury on everybody, you tolerate some speakers who repeatedly assert in the Assembly that the real aggressors are certain of ourselves, we must be on our guard and set this matter right.”

¹² Aeschines 1.26: “See now, fellow citizens, how unlike to Timarchus were Solon and those men of old whom I mentioned a moment ago. They were too modest to speak with the arm outside the cloak, but this man not long ago, yes, only the other day, in an assembly of the people threw off his cloak and leaped about like a gymnast, half naked, his body so reduced and befouled through drunkenness and lewdness that right-minded men, at least, covered their eyes, being ashamed for the city, that we should let such men as he be our advisers.”

Internal references	External references	Neutral references
<p>Assembly),¹³ 3.67, 3.73; Dinarchus 1.46, on other forms of malfunctioning in, and of, the Assembly (e.g., the improper nonverbal behavior of orators the unconstitutional election of the presiding officer in the Assembly, as in Aeschines 1.26 and 33);</p> <p>Isocrates 8.25, on how to keep peace;¹⁴ Lysias 13.17, on the meeting of the Assembly examining a peace treaty;¹⁵</p> <p>Aeschines 2.145, Dinarchus 1.99, Isocrates 8.129–130 and 12.13, with references to two kinds of menace against Athenian democracy, i.e., sycophancy and the exaggerated love the Athenians have for participation in trials and Assembly meetings.</p>		<p>Isocrates 7.68 on economic examination of a debt payment.¹⁹</p>

Source: Author

¹³ Aeschines 2.92: “And now do you imagine that there is one word of truth in his account of what was done in Macedonia or of what was done in Thessaly, when he gives the lie to the senate-house and the public archives and falsifies the date and the meetings of the assembly?”

¹⁴ Isocrates 8.25: “But I think we should not go forth from this assembly, having merely adopted resolutions in favor of the peace, without also taking counsel how we shall keep it [...]” Lysias 13.17: “Theramenes and the others who were intriguing against you took note of the fact that there were some men proposing to prevent the subversion of the democracy and to make a stand for the defence of freedom; so they resolved, before the Assembly met to consider the peace, to involve these men first in calumnious prosecutions, in order that there should be none to take up the defence of your people at the meeting. Now, let me tell you the scheme that they laid.”

¹⁵ Lysias 13.17: “Theramenes and the others who were intriguing against you took note of the fact that there were some men proposing to prevent the subversion of the democracy and to make a stand for the defence of freedom; so they resolved, before the Assembly met to consider the peace, to involve these men first in calumnious prosecutions, in order that there should be none to take up the defence of your people at the meeting. Now, let me tell you the scheme that they laid.”

¹⁹ Isocrates 7.68: “But the best and strongest proof of the fairness of the people is that, although those who had remained in the city had borrowed a hundred talents from the Lacedaemonians with which to prosecute the siege of those who occupied the Piraeus, yet later when an assembly of the people was held to consider the payment of the debt, and when many insisted that it was only fair that the claims of the Lacedaemonians should be settled, not by those who had suffered the siege, but by those who had borrowed the money, nevertheless the people voted to pay the debt out of the public treasury.”

3. RHETORIC IN ACTION: PERFORMANCE IN DEMOSTHENES' *OLYNTHIACS* AND *PHILIPPICS*

3.1. Performing in the Court and the Assembly: Convergences and Divergences

This section aims to examine “rhetoric in action”, a term that is comparable to and almost synonymous with “performance”: both describe how rhetorical strategies were used by speakers in public speaking forums in antiquity, with the aim of communicating effectively with the audience and winning it over cognitively – both in terms of reason and emotion. Seven high-profile symbouletic (political) speeches of Demosthenes (the three *Olynthiacs* and the four *Philippics*)²⁰ are selected for a case study about what were the features of rhetoric in the Assembly and how they were used for agonistic political processes, to achieve the principal desired outcome – persuasion. Three categories of rhetorical stratagems are examined: those used to establish a relationship between the speaker and the audience, enabling the former to win over the latter; techniques of *ēthopoiia* (presentation of the character and general behavior of individuals and collectives, e.g., the Athenians or foreign ethnic/cultural communities) that rouse emotions (*pathopoiia*); and *hypocrisis*, i.e., the clues in the text that point to the use of vocalics and kinesics of all sorts.

The recently published book *Attic Oratory and Performance* (Serafim 2017) offers a full theoretical reinterpretation of performance, how it was practically applied to the ancient forensic oratorical context, and what impact this may have had on the trial audience. By examining the same aspects of performance that have been examined in recent studies, it is the aim of this paper to reconstruct a picture of the convergences and divergences between forensic and symbouletic performance – a topic that

²⁰ A note on the selection of the seven specific speeches is necessary at this point. The decision to discuss these speeches was made for two reasons. The first is that these speeches were given at crucial points in Athenian political and military history, when the escalation in the relationship between Athens and Macedon was at its peak, requiring urgent action by the former to diminish the strength of the latter and impede its expansion into mainland Greece. The second reason for exploring these seven symbouletic speeches was that they are by Demosthenes, whose speeches 18 and 19 have recently been a topic of updated discussion in Serafim (2017). Given that in this chapter, performance in forensic and symbouletic oratory are compared, it was necessary to choose speeches by the same author, since arguably performance differs from author to author. Oratorical performance is neither simply a matter of place (e.g., law court or Assembly) nor is it only tailored to the expectations of the occasion (e.g., the need for military action), but it is also determined by the distinctive personal and rhetorical style of the speaker.

remains, in classical scholarship, an essential research enquiry (for attempts to examine oratorical performance, centered on forensic speeches, see Hall 1995, 39–58; 2006, 353–392; Serafim 2017). Johnstone and Bers argue that the performative style of speakers (with special reference to *hypocrisis*) was vastly determined by the architectural and topographical development of the Pnyx, and that for this reason performance of symbouleutic oratory was significantly different from that of forensic oratory (see Johnstone 1996, 128–133; Bers 2013, 27–40).²¹ I argue for the opposite: that, despite some differences between rhetoric in forensic and symbouleutic oratory, mainly in style and frequency, the similarities are noteworthy, effectively implying that persuasion was uniform in public speaking settings, despite the variations in the character and etiquette of the institutional contexts in Athens. The notable difference in the approach to and analysis of performance and persuasion in forensic and symbouleutic oratory between this paper and the work of Bers (2013, 34, 36) is perhaps due to the approach adopted by the latter: it bases its conclusions about the relationship between symbouleutic and political oratory largely on rhetorical theory (despite occasional glimpses into the use of language, e.g., the particles *οὐν*, *τοίνυν*, and *τε...τε*). On the other hand, I explore symbouleutic passages themselves to discern linguistic, stylistic, and rhetorical patterns, and compare these aspects of rhetoric in action/performance with those that can be found in Attic forensic oratory.

Before proceeding to the core of this research inquiry into the texts themselves, it is worth mentioning and shedding light on the notion of performance. Performance is, as Bauman (1990, 41) suggests, “an aesthetically marked, heightened form of communication, framed in a special way, and put on display for an audience,” or, as Taplin (1999, 33) argues, “an occasion on which appropriate individuals enact events, in accordance with certain recognized conventions, in the sight and hearing of a larger social group, and in some sense for their benefit.” This “benefit” is strong in political speech-making on the Pnyx, since all the meetings evidently were regarding important political, military, and economic matters, and discussions determined the decisions of the Athenians, which had the greatest impact on the *polis*. The following definition of the notion of performance adds another dimension that enhances the “benefit” that Taplin mentions in his book: “performance is the [kind of] communication between a performer and an audience, which is informed by the etiquette of a specific occasion and is based on the interactive communication, explicit or otherwise, between the transmitter of a message and its receiver” (Serafim 2017, 16–17). Benefit can be obtained from the communication between the

²¹ On the three phases of the construction of Pnyx, see Section 4.1. below.

speaker (performer) and the audience, especially inasmuch as the audience is not a passive recipient of stimuli but rather an active co-producer of them via *thorubos* (the vocal or nonverbal reaction, such as booing or applauding the speaker (see Bers 1985, 1–15; Thomas 2011, 175–185)).²² The reactions of the audience, which are sometimes described in the speeches themselves (such as, e.g., in Demosthenes 18.52),²³ regardless of whether accurate or not, convey to us the opinion of the wider public about individuals and actions alike (on fake news in oratory, see: Worthington 2020, 15–31; Serafim, forthcoming).²⁴ Therefore, the available texts reveal a lot about the mindset and practice of ancient civic and cultural communities.

The similarities that have been argued above exist among the seven symbouleutic speeches (of Demosthenes), which were delivered in the Assembly on the Pnyx and law court speeches, cover all three broad areas of features of rhetoric in action that this paper examines. The techniques that Demosthenes uses to establish a channel of communication with the audience, in both the *Olynthiacs* and the *Philippics*, are addressed to the audience specifically: the presentation of the speaker in the role of the good advisor to the Athenian *dēmos*, criticism of the Athenians for inertness and indecisiveness, and the importance of the proverbial synergy between divine will and human determination. The techniques of *ēthopoia* in forensic and in symbouleutic speeches also share commonalities in that in both oratorical genres the speaker constructs and deconstructs the *ēthos* of the Athenians and his/their opponents, depending on the circumstances and the purposes he aims to serve. *Hypocrisis*, finally, is indicated in the transmitted texts by

²² Cf. Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 40–42: “Oh! Athens! Athens! As for myself, I do not fail to come here before all the rest, and now, finding myself alone, I groan, yawn, stretch, break wind, and know not what to do.” It is of course necessary to say that there were no provisions for direct and unimpeded conversation between the speaker and the audience in the law court and perhaps possibly in the Assembly on the Pnyx, but the reaction of the audience, which revealed its knowledge of and attitude towards the matter of discussion, was important in determining or altering the arguments of the speakers and their way of communicating them to the audience.

²³ Demosthenes 18.52: “But it is not so. How could it be? Far from it! I call you Philip’s hireling of yesterday, and Alexander’s hireling of today, and so does every man in this Assembly. If you doubt my word, ask them; or rather I will ask them myself. Come, men of Athens, what do you think? Is Aeschines Alexander’s hireling, or Alexander’s friend? You hear what they say.”

²⁴ We can say, as a matter of principle, that the transmitted oratorical speeches are not “objective” accounts of historical reality or actions, but rather a biased means by which the speakers present (part of the truth about) what happened. In other words, fake news is not simply occasional in speeches, but an inherent feature of the speeches themselves.

figures of speech (such as repetition); the accumulation of questions and/or their elaborate use (e.g., when questions are asked without the need for or expectation of answers, or in the form of *hypophora*, when the speaker answers his own questions) to make the speech more forcible; direct speech; use of strong moralistic terms and other expressions that denote emotions; and references to religion, which are accompanied, at least according to ancient sources, by gestural and vocal ploys.

The similarities between the law court and the Assembly indicate that, when persuasion is the purpose and desired outcome of political or public speaking processes, the techniques employed do not vary considerably. The setting that accommodates speech-making, the specific occasion to which an oration is tailored, and institutional processes, i.e., what happens in the settings of forensic, symbouleutic, and epideictic orations, determine the use of argumentative and stylistic modes (see Serafim 2021, especially Chapters 1 and 2). This conclusion about the patterns of using religious discourse is in full alignment with the theory of New Institutionalism, according to which different institutions have different “logics of appropriateness” that condition the ways in which discourses interact and affect society. The findings of the present paper, however, indicate that, when it comes to persuasion, the difference between forensic and symbouleutic oratorical texts and public speaking contexts does not generate significant divergences, despite what scholars argue about the differences between other generic oratorical dichotomies, i.e., public and private cases (on how appeals to emotion are made in speeches and how other rhetorical techniques are used, see Rubinstein 2004, 187–203; 2005, 129–145).

The only considerable identified divergence concerns the use of tragic and comic markers, i.e., themes, language, and imagery that draw on ancient drama, mostly for *ēthopoia*, the depiction of characters. The lack of such techniques in symbouleutic speeches is easily discernible. In the seven Demosthenic speeches examined in this paper, the only identified passage that may, arguably, have some affinities with tragedy is in Demosthenes 2.18 (the *Second Olynthiac*), where Philip is told to put aside the soldiers who prove themselves skillful and talented on the battlefield – because they overshadowed him.²⁵ This is reminiscent of the behavior of tyrants, as presented in tragedy, who, being suspicious of their (apparent) allies, do not

²⁵ Demosthenes 2.18: “If there is anyone among them who can be described as experienced in war and battle, I was told that Philip from jealousy keeps all such in the background, because he wants to have the credit himself of every action, among his many faults being an insatiable ambition. Any fairly decent or honest man, who cannot stomach the licentiousness of his daily life, the drunkenness and the lewd dancing, is pushed aside as of no account.”

hesitate to put them aside or even kill them (e.g., the depiction of Creon in *Antigone*, *Medea*, and *Oedipus at Colonus*). But this is merely an intuition, as there is nothing in the text itself – no specific word, for example, as we have in forensic speeches – that points unambiguously to tragedy (on the use of language, themes, and imagery that have implications for or strong affinities with tragedy in forensic speeches, see Serafim 2017, 99–105). After all, the depiction of tyrants as suspicious and cruel toward their allies is also made in non-dramatic works (cf. Herodotus 3.39 and Polyaeus, *Στρατηγήματα* 1.23, where Polycrates is depicted as having obtained power unlawfully and killed his associates; and Periander in Herodotus 3.49, 5.92, who killed his wife).

Demosthenes 2.18 is the only section of the seven speeches that vaguely resembles a theme that appears in and is thematized by tragedy. It has been argued – and rightly so – that the law courts and the Assembly share significant features, given the politicized nature of trials that are, at times, about important political matters, as are the meetings in the Assembly. As argued elsewhere, “often, it was the synergy between forensic rhetoric and political momentum that determined the outcome of trials” (Serafim 2021, 68). The key suggested for answering the intriguing question about why there is a significant lack of dramatic patterns in symbolleutic oratory (at least in the seven speeches of Demosthenes examined in this paper) is that histrionic and theater-related techniques may have been deemed indecorous and inappropriate when there were urgent matters of discussion and decisions to be made, which would have benefited or harmed the *polis* as a whole, rather than a single individual. Speakers in trials – even in those that had to do with political affairs, both within the city and in the Hellenic world in general – had the convenience of discussing the past without the pressure of persuading the judges to make decisions that would affect the historical present of the entire city. One can be as elaborate and sophisticated as one likes in articulating arguments in a way that appears decorous, proper, and potentially persuasive, when there is time to do so, but it is necessary to be to the point, without using theatricalized ornaments, when the decisions one is convincing the audience to make will instantly affect the entire civic community. Knowing one’s audience and being specific, clever, and effective in using rhetorical strategies for persuasion, but not diverting from the core political, military, and moral argumentation is key when fellow citizens need to urgently make up their minds and pass their verdict. Carefully targeted, not “literary” and thus also a bit vague, arguments are necessary in times of political and military crises, such as those at the center of the seven speeches

of Demosthenes explored in this paper.²⁶ One of the most notorious features of the forensic speeches of Demosthenes, which leaves him vulnerable to the accusation of insincerity, especially speeches 18 and 19, is the extensive use of probability arguments and the overelaboration of rhetoric, not least the use of theatrical quotations and dramatic patterns for the presentation of his character and that of Aeschines.

The following sections discuss passages that show how rhetoric was set in action in the Assembly to satisfy persuasive ends. Emphasis is placed on two levels: the *macroscopic* (the overarching), i.e., how the speakers try to communicate with and engage the audience, and what their purpose is in each case; and the *microscopic*, examining the pragmatic features of the text (e.g., language, religious discourse, issues of morality), which reflect the socio-political and cultural context of the time when the speech was given and indicate the beliefs, customs, and general mindset of the Athenians.

3.1.1. Speaker–Audience

It is reasonable expect – at least from a modern standpoint – that the speaker, whether at a political convention, other occasions for public speaking, or even in the private company of friends, will try to win over the audience through cajoling, establishing in them a sense of self-value and self-importance, in order to indicate how much he supports and admires them and how many values they all share within the group. Sustaining groups to which the speaker and the audience both belong is an effective way of swaying the decision-making body to accept the speaker’s propositions and arguments. As Burke (1969, 54–55) argues, rhetoric can generate unity (which presupposes exclusion); it focuses on appealing to core groups and defining oneself against others. A speaker gives signals to the audience that indicate that his “characteristics” are the same as or similar to those of the audience, thereby affirming a shared community.

Of all the means that Demosthenes uses in the political meetings of the Assembly, the most puzzling, yet intriguing, is the criticism that he hurls at the Athenians regarding their inaction and indecision. It is undoubtedly risky

²⁶ Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Isaeus* 4, on the claim that the process of construction of Demosthenes’ speeches aroused suspicion in people. Dionysius refers to Pythias’ allegation that the speeches of Demosthenes, like those of his teacher Isaeus, were generally suspected of chicanery and deception “because of their great rhetorical skill” (4.23–24: τῆς πολλῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως). Plutarch, *Demosthenes* 8.4–6 refers to Pythias’ barbed comments on Demosthenes’ speeches as having the “smell of lamp” because he prepares them in advance.

to accuse the members of the decision-making audience of not being worthy of their ancestral glory and of being unable to defend the *polis* and promote its best interests because they cannot make up their minds about the actions that should be undertaken. But the Pnyx is not called the cradle of democracy for nothing: the speakers had *parrhēsia*, the freedom and determination to express themselves without restraint and at any cost to them as politicians; this is a diachronically praiseworthy virtue not only of speakers but also of all citizens who might want to prove themselves useful to their country and fellows. I do not argue that Athenian (what is erroneously called Greek) democracy was perfect: it evidently was not. It was marred by exclusion (e.g. of women, slaves, and metics), socio-economic discrepancies that affected the right of some people to speak (those who could not afford to pay for the services of a speechwriter did not have any chance of preparing and delivering an effective oration in court, let alone winning a case), procedural malfunctions and undemocratic deliberations described and complained about by the speakers themselves (e.g., Demosthenes in 4.29).²⁷ Rhetoric was misused in the Athenian forums of public speaking for deceiving or misleading the audience and distorting the truth. Yet, the orators on the Pnyx showed integrity, decency, and sincerity whenever it came to matters that concerned the *polis*. This is perhaps because their own lives were not in immediate danger that they had the license to speak freely and criticize the audience for what they thought was not right for the city.²⁸

In the Pnyx orations that are examined in this paper, Demosthenes steadily accuses the Athenians of inaction. Examples of this accusation can be found in 1.8, 9–11, 14–15, 19–20; 4.2, 8; 9.5; and 10.1, 6, 8–9, 20, 29. There is, unsurprisingly, yet also interestingly, an incessant play between the notions of inaction and action, and indecision and decisiveness. Demosthenes says, specifically, that the Athenians are slow in making decisions and taking action (if they ever do so), while it is decisive communities (and individuals) who see themselves as benefitting from the gods and prospering. A good example of this line of criticism can be found in 2.20:

²⁷ Demosthenes 4.29: “Your habit, then, is not to listen until, as now, the events themselves are upon you, and not to discuss any question at your leisure but whenever Philip makes his preparations, you neglect the chance of doing the same, and you are too remiss to make counter-preparations; and if anyone speaks out, you drive him from the platform, but when you learn of the loss of this place or the siege of that, then you pay attention and begin to prepare.”

²⁸ Criticism of the audience also happened in the law court, but the frequency at which such tactics were used in the Assembly is significant.

καίτοι ταῦτα, καὶ εἰ μικρά τις ἡγεῖται, μεγάλ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δείγματα τῆς ἐκείνου γνώμης καὶ κακοδαιμονίας ἐστὶ τοῖς εὖ φρονούσιν. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, νῦν μὲν ἐπισκοτεῖ τούτοις τὸ κατορθοῦν: αἱ γὰρ εὐπραξίαι δειναὶ συγκρύψαι τὰ τοιαῦτ' ὄνειδη: εἰ δέ τι πταίσει, τότε' ἀκριβῶς αὐτοῦ ταῦτ' ἐξετασθήσεται. δοκεῖ δ' ἔμοιγ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δείξειν οὐκ εἰς μακράν, **ἂν οἱ τε θεοὶ θέλωσι καὶ ὑμεῖς βούλησθε.**

These are perhaps trivial things, and yet, Athenians, to wise men they afford an important proof of the infatuation of his character. For the present, however, his prosperity throws all this into the shade (for success is apt to cover a multitude of faults); but if he trips, then we shall know all about his vices. And it seems to me, Athenians, **that we shall not have to wait long for the exposure, if heaven wills and you so resolve** (emphasis by the author).

The speaker claims that the success of Philip is not due to his ability, but to the supineness of the Athenians. But if Demosthenes' fellows take decisive action and Philip fails, the entire Hellenic world will realize how weak the king of Macedon truly is. By mingling divine will with human determination in stating that together they make things happen in human (political and military) history, Demosthenes underlines the value of self-initiative, while also reminding his fellows of the cultural belief that the gods (and *tychē*) intervene in human affairs, and that prosperity is the result of the synergy between them and people (whether individuals or communities).²⁹ Beyond the speaker himself, who, a few paragraphs later, in 2.23, repeats that "one who is himself idle cannot possibly call upon his friends, much less upon the gods, to work for him," other sources also underline the synergy between the gods and humans as the determining factor of progress; cf. Aeschylus (fr. 395) notes, "φιλεῖ δὲ τῶ κάμνοντι συσπεύδειν θεός" ("god loves to aid the man who toils"); Sophocles fr. 407: "οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς μὴ δρῶσι σύμμαχος τύχη" ("good luck never accompanies those who do not work"). Aesop (6th century BC) also underlines the significance of action in his notable phrase "σὺν Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ χεῖρα κίνει" ("along with Athena, move also your hand") (*Fables*

²⁹ References to the belief that the gods and fortune intervene in human affairs: for Eubulides' prayer to the gods that a son might be born to him as a daughter had been see *Against Macartatus* 12, for rituals devoted to specific gods in order for them to issue a divine portent and send good fortune see §66). References to the belief that individuals are attached to ill fortune for the misfortunes that befell the Athenians because of Theocrines, see *Against Nicostratus* 7; *Against Theocrines* 60. On *tychē* in particular, see Demosthenes 1.1, 3, 10–11.

30: *Shipwrecker*; cf. *Proverbs* 36). Demosthenes, perhaps capitalizing on these established cultural patterns, many times in his symbouleutic speeches (as indeed in 2.1)³⁰ points out that the gods (and *tychē*, as in 4.12)³¹ favor the city of Athens.

A question that may readily occur to modern readers of Demosthenes is why in some parts of his speeches he presents Philip's success as being fragile, while mentioning in others (as in 4.42 and 10.23)³² that it is stable because it is the admirable result of his steadfast determination and hyperpolitical and skillful military action. This is because the speaker has different purposes to serve at different points in his speech. The central argument remains the same throughout his three *Olynthiacs* and four *Philippics*: Philip is exploiting the inactivity of the Athenians – and he has the gods on his side for this very reason. If the Athenians change course, Philip's luck will, almost Surely, vanish and be overturned; in Demosthenes' words, "[w]herever, I believe, we send out a force composed partly or wholly of our citizens, there the gods are gracious and fortune fights on our side."

A clearer example of Demosthenes' claim about the instability of Philip's power can be found in 4.8:

³⁰ Demosthenes 2.1: "On many occasions, men of Athens, one may, I think, recognize the manifest favour of heaven towards our city, and not least at the present crisis. That Philip has found men willing to fight him, situated on his frontiers and possessed of considerable power, above all so determined that they regard any accommodation with him as both delusive and fatal to their own country— this has all the appearance of a superhuman, a divine beneficence."

³¹ Demosthenes 4.12: "Nor is this all. If anything happened to him, or if Fortune, which always cares for us better than we care for ourselves, should bring that result about, remember that you must be on the spot if you want to take advantage of the general confusion and to control the situation at your pleasure; but in your present condition you would be unable, even if the opportunity offered, to take over Amphipolis, having neither a force nor a policy ready to hand."

³² Demosthenes 4.42: "It seems to me, Athenians, as if some god, out of very shame for the conduct of our city, had inspired Philip with this activity. For if he did nothing more but were willing to rest satisfied with what he has already captured and subdued, I believe some of you would be quite content with what must bring the deepest disgrace upon us and brand us as a nation of cowards. But by always attempting something new, always grasping at more power, he may possibly rouse even you, if you have not utterly abandoned hope." 2.23: "No wonder that Philip, sharing himself in the toils of the campaign, present at every action, neglecting no chance and wasting no season, gets the better of us, while we procrastinate and pass resolutions and ask questions. I cannot wonder at this: the contrary would rather surprise me, that we, performing no single duty of a combatant, should overcome the man who fulfils them all."

μη γὰρ ὡς θεῶ νομίζετ' ἐκείνω τὰ παρόντα πεπηγέσθαι πράγματ' ἀθάνατα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μισεῖ τις ἐκείνον καὶ δέδιεν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ φθονεῖ, καὶ τῶν πάνυ νῦν δοκούντων οἰκείως ἔχειν: καὶ ἅπανθ' ὅσα περ κὰν ἄλλοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις ἔνι, ταῦτα κὰν τοῖς μετ' ἐκείνου χρὴ νομίζειν ἐνεῖναι. Κατέπτηχε μέντοι πάντα ταῦτα νῦν, οὐκ ἔχοντ' ἀποστροφὴν διὰ τὴν ὑμετέραν βραδυτῆτα καὶ ῥαθυμίαν: ἦν ἀποθέσθαι φημί δεῖν ἤδη.

Do not believe that his present power is fixed and unchangeable like that of a god. No, men of Athens; he is a mark for the *hatred and fear and envy* even of those who now seem devoted to him. One must assume that even his adherents are subject to the same passions as any other men. At present, however, all these feelings are repressed and have no outlet, thanks to your indolence and apathy, which I urge you to throw off at once (emphasis by the author).

Apostrophizing the Athenians directly, Demosthenes claims that Philip's power conceals his great weakness, that he is isolated from the rest of the Macedonians, a situation that is in turn caused by his high-handedness, as indicated in the text by three strongly emotional verbs: Philip is accused of hating (*μισεῖ*), fearing (*δέδιεν*), and envying (*φθονεῖ*). It is notable that the speech in 4.8 starts with an imperative, which issues a forceful and prompt exhortation to the audience to realize that Philip's power is not as stable as that of the gods. Present-stem, or *imperfective/durative*, imperatives denote that the order, i.e., the request of the speaker to the addressees, is constant, continuous, and repeating; “[this] is the obvious choice for an imperative when there can be no doubt as to *what* action the person addressed is supposed to be taking – whether 1) because this action has been mentioned or implied earlier or 2) because he is already performing it – and the imperative serves to ask him or her either to continue or stop doing so” (Sicking 1991, 157, emphasis in original). Imperatives, as in the context of 4.8, do not have an abrasive, aggressive, or impolite character or force, but they do aim to instill forcibly in the mind of the audience members the need to take immediate action (see Serafim 2021, 388–417). The first part of the text in 4.8 links well to the last part: “do not believe Philip's power is stable,” Demosthenes asks the Athenians, and “take action against him” (“*βραδυτῆτα*

καὶ ῥαθυμίαν ἀποθέσθαι”). Imperatives that urge actions are regularly used both in forensic and in symbouleutic orations (as in 1.25 and 4.14; for more on imperatives in symbouleutic orations see Serafim 2022).³³

An interesting feature of Demosthenes 2.20 is the use of the civic address, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. It has been argued that any speaker in Athens had at his disposal three stock formulas of address: in addition to the civic address, he also had the judicial address (ὦ ἄνδρες δικάσταί) and the descriptive one (ὦ ἄνδρες). And however reasonable and expected the use of the civic address in political orations may be, it is also important to underline the persuasive role this pattern serves by reinforcing the belief in the Athenians that their decision is important for the entire city, and that they should, therefore, cast their vote responsibly (on addresses to the audience see Martin 2006, 75–88; Serafim 2017, 26–41; 2021, 71–98). The speaker thinks that he has an important message to convey to his audience, as indeed indicated at the beginning and end of 2.20, where he states emphatically the need for the Athenians to act, so that they would have the support of the gods. The use of the civic address in this context makes it abundantly clear that the audience, as members of the city, should take immediate and decisive action. Because the addresses have this important message to communicate to the audience, they are used heavily in all seven speeches that are explored in this paper, and they occur evenly, i.e., from exordium to peroration: *Olynthiac 1*, 14 instances; *Olynthiac 2*, 19 instances; *Olynthiac 3*, 20 instances; and *Philippic 1*, 25 instances; *Philippic 2*, 5 instances; *Philippic 3*, 10 instances; *Philippic 4*, 14 instances.

The civic addresses to the audience also enable Demosthenes to undertake the political role he always reserves for himself: he is talking to the men of the city as their virtuous advisor. In his words in 6.1:

If the question before us were a new one, men of Athens, I should have waited until most of the regular speakers had delivered their opinions, and if satisfied with any of their

³³ Demosthenes 1.25: “One point more, men of Athens. Do not forget [μηδέ... λανθανέτω] that you can today choose whether you must fight there, or Philip must fight here. If Olynthus holds out, you will fight there, to the detriment of his territory, while you enjoy in security the land that is your home. But if Philip takes Olynthus, who is to prevent his marching hither? The Thebans?”; 4.14: “Wait till you have heard everything before you pass judgement [κρίνατε]. Do not be premature [μὴ πρότερον προλαμβάνετε]; and even if at the outset I seem to be suggesting a novel kind of expeditionary force, do not imagine that I am trying to postpone our operations. It is not those who cry ‘at once’ or ‘today’ that really speak to the purpose, for no dispatch of forces now could prevent what has already happened.”

proposals, I should have remained silent, but if not satisfied, I should then have tried to express my own views. Since, however, it is our fortune to be still debating a point on which they have often spoken before, **I can safely claim your indulgence if I am the first to rise and address you [ἡγοῦμαι καὶ πρῶτος ἀναστᾶς]**. For if in the past their advice had been sound, there would be no need for deliberation today (emphasis by the author).

Demosthenes claims that he alone can offer the best advice to the Athenian *dēmos* on the Pnyx, whereas the other speakers are failed advisors whose help has led the city into misfortune and political turmoil. This strongly resembles the phraseology in 18.172–173, where Demosthenes, after describing the panicked reactions of the Athenians to the news that Philip had captured an allied *polis*, Elatea, claims that he was the only citizen willing and able to stand up in the Assembly and advise the Athenians about how to cope with their foreign enemy (for further details see Serafim 2015, 103–105).³⁴

3.1.2. *Ēthos and Pathos*

It is well established in both ancient and modern theory that the presentation of character is persuasive because it stirs up emotions. Aristotle, to mention an important figure in the process of systematizing ancient rhetorical theory, says that to persuade is “to put the hearer into a certain frame of mind” (“τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πῶς”; *Rhetoric* 1356a1–4), a condition achieved by means of the portrayal of moral character and *pathos*. *Ēthopoia*, the process of presenting character, often mentioned in works of modern scholarship (Serafim 2017, 25), aims to create groupings that unite or divide people – both those present on the Pnyx and those absent from the political proceedings of the Assembly. It is important to note that symbouleutic speeches were made for political reasons (as indeed trials were politicized), not simply to sway those citizens present in the audience, but

³⁴ Demosthenes 18.172–173: “But, it seems, that day and that crisis called not only for the patriot and the rich man, but for the man who had followed the course of events from the beginning and had calculated correctly the reason and purpose of Philip’s actions. For anyone who had not grasped those purposes, or had not studied them long beforehand, however patriotic, and however wealthy he might be, was not the man to appreciate the needs of the hour, or to find any counsel to offer to the people. Well, I was the man who came forth on that day and addressed you.”

also all the Athenians in the *polis*. This is the distinction between *immediate* and *distant audience* that has been made elsewhere by the author (Serafim 2017). Unity and division, as argued in modern sociological theories, e.g., the *social identity* in Tajfel, Turner (1979) and the *emotional community* in Rosenwein (2002), determine the cognitive attitudes toward persons and actions (see Tajfel, Turner 1979; Miller *et al.* 1981, 494–511; Conover 1984, 760–785; Lau 1989, 220–223; Rosenwein 2002, 821–845; Huddy 2003, 511–558; Hall 2006, 388; Rosenwein 2006; Arena 2007, 151; Michalopoulos *et al.* 2021). The speaker presents himself in such a way as to denote that he belongs to the same group as the other audience members because they all espouse the same values, the most important of which is love of the *polis*, and must cope with common dangers that are fondly encapsulated by their opponents within and outside the *polis*, both individuals and hostile communities. This is close to the Aristotelian assertions that “the orator persuades by moral character when his speech is delivered in such a manner as to render him worthy of confidence” (*Rhetoric* 1356a4–6) and “character has almost, so to speak, the greatest authority in winning belief” (1356a13; cf. 1377b20–24; 1378a6–15). *Ēthopoiia* also generates division, alienation or dissociation, and prolongs hostility, denigrating individuals against the background of societal preconceptions, with the aim of isolating them from the community, and persuading the audience by setting up people, matters and ideas as antithetical to the listeners.

The construction (positive presentation) and deconstruction (negative presentation) of character is a common feature of both symbouleutic and forensic oratory. There is a difference in technique, however, in that, in symbouleutic oratory, *the character of collectivities*, i.e., civic/ethnic and cultural communities, is presented positively or negatively, whereas, in forensic oratory, it is mostly *the character of individuals* that is depicted. This is reasonable, given that forensic speeches are accusations or apologies about a past legal incident, in which individuals are involved either as perpetrators or as victims of the illegality. Symbouleutic orations, on the other hand, are about matters that concern and affect the entire city – that is why there are abundant references to the city itself: its ancestral past, its historical successes and failures, and the attitude its people have toward important matters of inter- and intra-state politics. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the symbouleutic speeches that are examined, Demosthenes at times praises the Athenians as a political whole and at times castigates them, depending on his aim at crucial points in the process of speech-making in the Assembly on the Pnyx.

His accusations mostly revolve around the supine attitude that he accuses the Athenians of showing toward Philip, as he does in *Olynthiac* 1.24. What marks this attempt of the speaker to deconstruct the collective *ēthos* is the use of terms that have strong emotive value. The text is as follows:

δεῖ τοίνυν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν ἀκαιρίαν τὴν ἐκείνου καιρὸν ὑμέτερον νομίσαντας ἐτοίμως συνάρασθαι τὰ πράγματα, καὶ πρεσβευομένους ἐφ’ ἃ δεῖ καὶ στρατευομένους αὐτοὺς καὶ παροξύνοντας τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας, λογιζομένους, εἰ Φίλιππος λάβοι καθ’ ἡμῶν τοιοῦτον καιρὸν καὶ πόλεμος γένοιτο πρὸς τῇ χώρᾳ, πῶς ἂν αὐτὸν οἴεσθ’ ἐτοίμως ἐφ’ ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν; **εἴτ’ οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθε**, εἰ μὴδ’ ἂ πάθοιτ’ ἄν, εἰ δύναται ἐκεῖνος, ταῦτα ποιῆσαι καιρὸν ἔχοντες οὐ τολμήσετε;

Look then, Athenians, upon his difficulties as your opportunity. Be prompt to take up the challenge. Send embassies when necessary. Take the field in person. Rouse all the other states. Reflect how eagerly Philip would march against you, if he had such a chance as we have, and if the war were on our frontiers. **Are you not ashamed if**, having the opportunity, you lack the courage to do to him what he would certainly do to you if he could (emphasis by the author)?

The speaker addresses the Athenians directly (this is why the civic address is most pertinent in the given context) to exhort them strongly as to what decisions they should make and what actions should be urgently undertaken against Philip of Macedon. This part of the Demosthenic speech ends climactically with a rhetorical question, a means of argumentative *auxēsis*, i.e., the strengthening of the argument that a speech puts forward, which adds to the liveliness of the speech and generates emotional reactions, given also that a word that carries strong emotional force is used (*αἰσχύνεσθε*). By its very lack of restraint – meaning that this word has an innate aggressive character, as it is used to accuse the audience of inertness and exert moral and emotional pressure – *αἰσχύνεσθε* works well in the general context of the question, as a means of grasping the attention of the audience and affecting the way its members think of others (i.e., Philip and how to oppose him), but above all of themselves (i.e., what to do to regain self-confidence and protect themselves from the infamy of inaction). Demosthenes is clever here in twisting the standard version of character assassination: instead of claiming that the Athenians have a blameworthy collective character, he says they will acquire such a character if they do not stand up to Philip. The deconstruction of character is, thus, forthcoming, imminent, and potentially perdurable, in the sense that the Athenians will be ashamed whenever they

do not stand up to their enemies, especially when they have opportunities to do so effectively. This negative *ēthopoia* is intended to intimidate the Athenians, who are emphatically urged by the speaker to avoid shameful inaction *in perpetuum*; the burden on their shoulders is extremely heavy.

Regarding the use of questions in particular, ancient theory acknowledges that, if skillfully used, they serve strategic purposes. For Longinus in *On the Sublime* 18.1–2, for example, questions add to the vehemence of a speech. Demetrius, in his treatise *On Style* 279, points out that “in speaking it is sometimes forcible to address questions to the audience without disclosing one’s own view. For instance: ‘nay, he was appropriating Euboea and establishing a fortress to command Attica; and in so doing was he wronging us and violating the peace, or was he not?’ The orator forces his auditor into a sort of corner, so that he seems to be brought to task and to have no answer. If the positive statement ‘he was wronging us and violating the peace’ were substituted, the effect would be that of precise information rather than of cross-examination.” Tiberius, in *Figures* 13, recognizes four functions of questions: to engage the audience and grasp the attention of its members, to clarify matters, to create vividness or convey excitement, and to refute an opponent’s arguments (Serafim 2020, 229–248; Hall 2022).

Therefore, *ēthopoia*, which is achieved by means of combined rhetorical techniques, such as questions and carefully chosen wording, increases the emotional power of political oration and perhaps its effectiveness in controlling the audience. An intriguing aspect of the emotions that the speeches of Demosthenes delivered on the Pnyx aim to stir up (e.g. intimidation in 1.24, 1.2, 12–14, and 4.11, and anger in 1.8–11, 4.42) is that they aim unambiguously to lead to decisive actions. Fear can thus be defined as “an intervening variable between sets of context-dependent stimuli and suites of behavioral response” (Adolphs 2013, 1). It has been proved by experimental psychological and neurophysiological research that fear scenarios, such as danger and inescapability, may lead to *passive* or *active behavioral responses*. Passivity in responses describes an utter lack of physical or mental/cognitive action (e.g., fear leads to freezing and immobility). Unlike anxiety, which leads to prediction and preparedness, fear may cause people to “cringe” when they see or must face a shocking incident and are unable to perform cognitive processes. To be in fear means, in some cases, to be in a state of helplessness, having no way to extricate yourself from excruciating difficulties. Activeness in behavioral responses is when a living creature that faces a threatening stimulus reacts by physical movement (both kinetic, e.g., running, and vocal, e.g., screaming) and cognitive activity (e.g., working out how to overcome danger; see Adolphs 2013, 1). Researchers seek to explain the difference between passive and active responses to fear through the lens

of physiology. Adolphs notes, for example, that “switches from passive to active fear responses ([from] freezing to fleeing) are tightly dependent on distance from a predator, because different behaviors would be adaptive at different distances (for example, the possibility of evading detection *versus* the need to engage). [...] A major contextual factor in the evaluation of fear-inducing stimuli is whether or not escape might be possible, or whether the threat seems inescapable, a distinction related to the modulatory factor of control that we noted earlier. The former is typically associated with flight, whereas the latter is typically associated with freezing and defense” (Adolphs 2013, 10).

Thousands of years before Adolphs and other researchers thought of and undertook experiments to explain the difference between passive and active responses to fear, Demosthenes himself presented these two kinds of behavior when, in 18.170, he described his fellow Athenians as being so terrified by the news that Philip had conquered an ally of theirs, the city of Elatea, that they did not even dare to ascend the *bēma* in the Assembly to debate how they could escape the dire consequences of Philip’s imperialism.³⁵ They rather ran around (this is an example of a kinetic, active response to fear), as we are told in §169,³⁶ but were unable to think, make decisions, or implement them.

It is noteworthy that in the speeches delivered on the Pnyx, which are examined in this paper, where emphasis is placed on the actions of the Athenians against Philip, Demosthenes makes sure his fellow citizens receive as clearly and forcefully as possible the message that they should act in a cognitively coherent and effective way. A good example is in 4.11:

³⁵ Demosthenes 18.170: “The Council arrived, the presiding Councilors formally reported the intelligence they had received, and the courier was introduced. As soon as he had told his tale, the marshal put the question, “Who wishes to speak?” No one came forward. The marshal repeated his question again and again, but still no one rose to speak, although all the commanders were there, and all the orators, and although the country with her civic voice was calling for the man who should speak for her salvation; for we may justly regard the voice, which the crier raises as the laws direct, as the civic voice of our country.”

³⁶ Demosthenes 18.169: “Evening had already fallen when a messenger arrived bringing to the presiding councillors <https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Dem.+18+169&fromdoc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0072> the news that Elatea had been taken. They were sitting at supper, but they instantly rose from table, cleared the booths in the marketplace of their occupants, and unfolded the hurdles, while others summoned the commanders and ordered the attendance of the trumpeter. The commotion spread through the whole city. At daybreak on the morrow the presidents summoned the Council to the Council House, and the citizens flocked to the place of assembly. Before the Council could introduce the business and prepare the agenda, the whole body of citizens had taken their places on the hill.”

“Is Philip dead?” you ask. “No, indeed; but he is ill.” And what is that to you? Even if something happens to him, you will soon raise up a second Philip, if that is the way you attend to your affairs; for even this Philip has not grown great through his own unaided strength so much as through our carelessness.

Demosthenes calculatedly tries to present Philip as a threat, and thus a source of fear – *in perpetuum* (as in 1.24, discussed above): even if “the current Philip” dies, another will emerge to move against the Athenians. Audience members and citizens are made the center of actions and events; they bear all the responsibility for whatever might happen. They cause the problem because of inactivity, i.e., character deconstruction or negative *ēthopoiia*, but they have a solution to that: changing their collective character and showing dynamism in dealing with their enemies. Inaction is what causes fear in this passage, so it can no longer be the Athenians’ choice.

More bitter and thorny are the words of Demosthenes in 4.42. Fear is no longer the emotion that he thinks will best serve his purposes; instead he chooses to elicit anger from the Athenians, but without simply referring to Philip’s *ēthos* – how rapacious he is and how aggressive toward Athens he shows himself to be (e.g., in 2.5 where Philip is accused of perjury and chicanery; or in 4.9 and 10.2, passages that derogate Philip systematically, from beginning to end).³⁷ Demosthenes 4.42 is as follows:

It seems to me, Athenians, as if some god, **out of very shame** [ἀίσχυνόμενος] **for the conduct of our city**, had inspired Philip with this activity. For if he did nothing more but were willing to

³⁷ Demosthenes 2.5: “Now to call a man perjured and faithless, without drawing attention to his acts, might justly be termed mere abuse; but to describe his conduct in detail and convict him on the whole count fortunately requires only a short speech. Moreover, I have two reasons for thinking the story worth the telling: Philip shall appear as worthless as he really is, and those who stand aghast at his apparent invincibility shall see that he has exhausted all the arts of chicanery on which his greatness was founded at the first, and that his career has now reached its extreme limit.” 4.9: “For observe, Athenians, the height to which the fellow’s insolence has soared; he leaves you no choice of action or inaction; he blusters and talks big, according to all accounts; he cannot rest content with what he has conquered; he is always taking in more, everywhere casting his net round us, while we sit idle and do nothing.” 10.4: “Now the extent of the recklessness and rapacity that Philip shows in his dealings with all men is indeed as great as it has been described to you; but how impossible it is to stay him in this career by argument and declamation, assuredly no one is ignorant. For indeed, if no single thing else can teach a man the truth of that, let him weigh the following consideration. When we have had to speak in defence of our rights, we have never yet been defeated or proved in the wrong, but in every case we vanquish all our opponents and have the best of it in argument.”

rest satisfied with what he has already captured and subdued, I believe some of you would be quite content with what must bring the deepest disgrace upon us and brand us as a nation of cowards. But by always attempting something new, always grasping at more power, he may possibly rouse even you, if you have not utterly abandoned hope. (emphasis by the author)

It appears that the target of anger in this passage is not only Philip, however covetous, insolent, and reckless he is presented to be. The target of anger is mostly the Athenians themselves, since the actions that Philip undertook are masterfully correlated in the passage with their inertness. Rhetoric is put into action superbly here. Demosthenes identifies the target audience by means of the address – the Athenians are the recipients of the central message that they need to become active agents by deciding to stand up to Philip, immediately and decisively. Therefore, the agents are directed by the speaker to blame themselves for the actions of the king of Macedon. “Self-anger” leads to the urgent undertaking of actions before it is too late to act. Anger at Philip may have theoretically been caused by the events themselves, since he had conquered the allied cities of Athens one after another; this, however, led to no action by the Athenians if we are to believe Demosthenes. But the feeling that the Athenians themselves should be ashamed – specifically, that the gods feel that the citizens of Athens have brought shame on their city through their political and military conduct – aims to move them decisively forward. Shame generates a sense of guilt, and this leads to self-anger, relief from which is achieved by removing the cause of shame and guilt – inaction, in the case of the Athenians (on the phenomenology of shame and guilt see Gilbert, Pehl, and Allan 1994, 23–36; Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni 2011).

Because anger is mostly other-directed (at individuals, groups, and institutions), its self-direction is left vastly understudied in modern interdisciplinary phenomenology, as also in classical scholarship on the Attic orators (see Ellsworth, Tong 2006, 572–586). Current research unambiguously indicates that anger is, of all humanly felt emotions, the one that generates action; as L. Silva points out, “unlike other negative emotions such as sadness, where coping potential is paradigmatically low (little can typically be done to change the saddening event or its consequences), anger involves an element of optimism regarding the agent’s capacity to change the triggering event, keep it from repeating itself, or seek reparations for

it” (Silva 2022, 2; cf. Roseman 1991, 161–200; Scherer 2005, 312–324). A superb description of self-directed anger is offered by Plato at *Republic* 439e–440b (see also Jimenez 2020, 285–307).³⁸

The construction, i.e., the positive depiction, of the collective *ēthos* of the Athenian community is also made by means of the presentation of exceptional examples of citizens who encapsulate the ancestral glory and the civic ideal of *kalokagathia*, virtue and goodness. Heroes and respected statesmen, and the stories told about them, frame a community’s consciousness, worldview, and perception of the past. As James Mayer pointed out, “[t]hey are seen as exemplars of the community ideal and they attain (semi-)divine status in the worldviews of those who are imagined as their descendants. [...] Constructing myths around the stories of heroic figures is a straightforward means to streamline a complex history into a simple and instructive narrative. Heroic figures carry preconceived associations that can be easily attached to new narratives, and the form of the epic or other heroic narrative is an entertaining and easily memorable structure to transmit and perpetuate understandings of the community’s past” (Mayer 2011, 15–16). One such an example of how exceptional individuals represent the whole Athenian body politic is given in Demosthenes 3.26:

ὥστε τὴν Ἀριστείδου καὶ τὴν Μιλτιάδου καὶ τῶν τότε λαμπρῶν οἰκίαν εἴ τις ἄρ’ οἶδεν ὑμῶν ὅποια ποτ’ ἐστίν, ὄρᾳ τῆς τοῦ γείτονος οὐδὲν σεμνοτέραν οὔσαν: οὐ γὰρ εἰς περιουσίαν ἐπράττετ’ αὐτοῖς τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινὸν αὔξειν ἕκαστος ὤετο δεῖν. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τὰ μὲν Ἑλληνικὰ πιστῶς, **τὰ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσεβῶς**, τὰ δ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἴσως διοικεῖν μεγάλην εἰκότως ἐκτήσαντ’ εὐδαιμονίαν.

The houses of their famous men, of Aristides or of Miltiades, as any of you can see that knows them, are not a whit more splendid than those of their neighbors. For selfish greed had

³⁸ Plato, *Republic* 439e–440b: “Leontius, the son of Aglaion, was going up from the Piraeus along the outside of the North Wall when he saw some corpses lying at the executioner’s feet. He had an appetite to look at them but at the same time he was disgusted and turned away. For a time, he struggled with himself and covered his face, but, finally, overpowered by the appetite, he pushed his eyes wide open and rushed towards the corpses, saying, ‘Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight! I’ve heard that story myself. It certainly proves that anger sometimes makes war against the appetites, as one thing against another. Besides, don’t we often notice in other cases that when appetite forces someone contrary to rational calculation, the person reproaches himself and gets angry with that in him that’s doing the forcing, so that of the two factions that are fighting a civil war, so to speak, spirit allies itself with reason?’”

no place in their statesmanship, but each thought it his duty to further the common weal. And so by their good faith towards their fellow Greeks, **their piety towards the gods**, and their equality among themselves, they deserved and won a great prosperity (emphasis by the author).

As argued elsewhere by the author, Demosthenes makes a tacit yet skillful association between religion and politics: one of the praiseworthy qualities that the two prominent Athenians share, beyond their integrity, honesty, love for the *polis* and care for Hellas as a whole, and sense of justice, is reverence for the gods. “By choosing to refer specifically to these two historical Athenian statesmen, Demosthenes invites the Athenians to identify themselves with Aristides and Miltiades and all they represent, including piety” (Serafim 2021, 134–135). Religion is closely connected with patriotism and politics, an association that is succinctly described in theory as *polis*-religion (see Sourvinou-Inwood 1988, 259–274; 1990, 295–322). The reference to *Ἑλληνικά*, fellow Greeks or Greek affairs, is also important in the context of 3.26, where Demosthenes’ aim is to persuade his fellow Athenians to stand up to Philip and protect Olynthus. Two of the exemplified and ideal personages of the glorious ancestral past cared for Hellas – and so should the Athenians. The message of the speaker becomes, in context, crystal clear: to become as *kaloï kagathoi* as Aristides and Miltiades were, encapsulating the glory of Athens, they should stand up for their allies and the entire Greek world.

3.2.3. Hypocrisy

The transmitted symbouleutic speeches of Demosthenes contain specific textual markers that give us clues to the likely use of gestures and vocal ploys (such as the elevation of tone and volume to give emphasis to his arguments). Unfortunately, we cannot be more assertive, given the lack of any visual records of what was said and happened on the Pnyx. The markers that point to *hypocrisy* include direct speech, questions (either rhetorical or followed by immediate answers, which is known as *hypophora*), figures of speech (such as repetition, as in 2.10, 3.33, 4.46, and antithesis, as in 2.5 and 10.70), ritualistic dicta, such as prayers and invocations to the gods and oaths (as in Demosthenes 3.17; 9.54; 10.7, 20, 25), which would have been accompanied, according to sources, by gesticulation and sonorous vocal recitation (on *hypocrisy* that accompanies ritualistic dicta in Attic

oratory see Serafim 2021, 83–95),³⁹ and the use of words that have strong emotional value and point to the vehemence and forcefulness of the oration. The purpose of *hypocrisis*, as already recognized in ancient rhetorical theory, is to emphasize the arguments and maximize the persuasive potential of orations. As Aristotle, for example, notes in *Rhetoric* 1404a1–5, “since the whole business of rhetoric is to influence opinion, we must pay attention to it, not as being right, but necessary. Now, when *hypocrisis* comes into fashion, it will have the same effect as acting. Wherefore people who excel in this in their turn obtain prizes, just as orators who excel in delivery; for written speeches owe their effect not so much to the sense as to the style.” Several other sources also highlight the significant persuasive potential of *hypocrisis* in public speaking, e.g., Plutarch, *Lives of the Ten Orators* 845b1–5; *Demosthenes* 11.2–3 (on the potential of *hypocrisis* to add verve to the features of an oration and maximize its persuasive impact upon the audience see Serafim 2017; 2021, 83–84).

A notable feature of the seven Assembly speeches of Demosthenes that are examined in this paper is that they are full of questions, which are used evenly, from exordium to peroration.⁴⁰ This is evidently because questions, as has already been argued, introduce a sense of liveliness and immediacy to the speech; their use is a signal by the speaker of his will to communicate with the audience. This communicative approach to the audience is rather artificial, of course, as there was no institutional provision for the speakers and audience on the Pnyx to formally engage in conversation during an oration. Questions are also a means of highlighting important arguments by grasping the attention of the audience: interrupting the narrative to ask a question indicates that the point that follows, due to the change in the mode of expression, is “special”, noteworthy and important, especially when questions accumulate in the narrow space of a few sections (as in 3.16–17 and 4.43–44, where nine and six questions respectively are used in a row, and 9.32–35 where twelve questions are used). It is Demosthenes 4.43–44

³⁹ According to Demosthenes 18.259–260, in praying, the performer would have raised his voice, while also raising his hands to the heavens. Pseudo-Aristotle says that people in antiquity raised their hands to the sky when praying (*On the Universe* 400a16), a reference that is also made in Demosthenes 43.66. In *Laws* 717a, Plato also informs us that whenever someone called on the Olympian gods he would raise his right hand, whereas when he prayed to chthonian gods, such as Earth, he would raise his left hand.

⁴⁰ Questions can be found in the following sections of Demosthenes’ seven symbouleutic speeches, which are examined in this paper: 1.15, 24; 3.6, 16–17, 19, 22, 29, 27, 30; 4.10, 26, 43–44; 6.20; 9.27; 10.65–66.

that Longinus discusses in *On the Sublime* 18 to illustrate the vehemence that *hypophora*, a pattern of asking and answering questions,⁴¹ injects into an Assembly (or any other) oration.⁴²

A superb example of rhetoric in action through *hypophora* – or *pathētikē*, to borrow the Longinus’ expression in *On the Sublime* 18 – i.e., its aim to stir up emotions in the Athenians and urge them to take action, can be found in Demosthenes 10.64–66:

§64: [1] What do you imagine is his motive in **outraging** [ὕβριζειν] you now—I think no other term describes his conduct—or why is it that, in deceiving the others, he at least confers benefits upon them, but in your case he is resorting to threats? For example, the Thessalians were beguiled by his generosity into their present state of servitude; no words can describe how he formerly deceived the miserable Olynthians by his gift of Potidaea and many other places; the Thebans he is now misleading, having handed over Boeotia to them and relieved them of a long and trying war.

§65: So each of these states has reaped some benefit from him, but while some have already paid the price by their sufferings, the others have yet to suffer whatever shall fall to their lot. As for you, I do not say how far you have been robbed, but in the actual making of the peace, how completely you were deceived, how grievously you were robbed! [2] Were you not deceived about Phocis, Thermopylae, the Thrace-ward districts, Doriscus, Serrium, Cersobleptes himself? [3] Is not Philip now holding the city of the Cardians, and admitting that he holds it?

⁴¹ Examples of *hypophora* can be found in Demosthenes 1.25; 2.3, 26; 4.2, 11, 25, 20, 22, 27, 34; 6.7, 31; 9.15, 18, 56, 70; 10.44, 51, 58, 61, 64–66.

⁴² Longinus notes in *On the Sublime* 18: “The impassioned rapidity of question and answer and the device of self-objection have made the remark, in virtue of its figurative form, not only more sublime but more credible. For emotion (τὰ παθητικὰ) carries us away more easily when it seems to be generated by the occasion rather than deliberately assumed by the speaker, and the self-directed question and its answer represent precisely this momentary quality of emotion (μιμνῆται τοῦ πάθους τὸ ἐπίκαιρον). Just as people who are unexpectedly plied with questions become annoyed and reply to the point with vigor and exact truth, so the figure of question and answer arrests the hearer and cheats him into believing that all the points made were raised and are being put into words on the spur of the moment.”

§66: [4] Why then does he deal in that way with the other Greeks, but with you in this way? Because yours is the one city in the world where immunity is granted to plead on behalf of our enemies, and where a man who has been bribed can safely address you in person, even when you have been robbed of your own. It would not have been safe in Olynthus to plead Philip's cause, unless the Olynthian democracy had shared in the enjoyment of the revenues of Potidaea (emphasis by the author).

Four questions (numbered) can be found in the three sections that are cited above: they function, in context, as repeated “punches” to the audience, an incessant stimulus of the mind, conscience, and collective civic/cultural ego of the Athenians. Demosthenes, calculatedly, starts by levelling a heavy accusation against Philip – that he is insulting the Athenians in an outrageous way (*hybris*), which leads to infamy and humiliation. Then, to maximize the effect of the question that will almost certainly trigger anger and exasperation among the Athenians, he claims that Philip is crueler toward them than toward the other Hellenes. But instead of making this point by means of narrative, he exploits the surprise element of the first question in §64, while also enhancing the vehemence of the accusation and inviting the audience to get involved in the game of negatively evaluating Philip's hostile behavior toward Athens. The answer to the first question is not given in the next section, §65, but rather Demosthenes prolongs the excruciation of the audience by continuing to ask upsetting questions about Philip's stance toward the Athenians. These questions are designed to incite anger and direct it against the enemy. The final blow to the audience is given in §66: it is here that the question of §64 is repeated and answered. In other words, the *hypophora* starts in §64 and is concluded two sections later. Extending the emotional pressure that is placed on the audience from section to section, asking questions that force the Athenians to think and feel – putting them, in other words, in a sort of inescapable cognitive “corner” – Demosthenes aims to elicit a reaction, which in fact is an action against Philip. To keep up the forcefulness of *hypophora* from the first to the last section of this part of his oration, and to thus maximize its effect on the audience, it is likely that Demosthenes would have used vocal ploys – such as raising his tone of voice – when he asked the four questions and when he gave his answer.

In addition to questions, direct speech is also ubiquitous in all the parts of Demosthenic symbouleutic orations: exordium, main part (*pistis/apodeixis* and narrative), and peroration.⁴³ The combined use of direct speech and questions (as in 3.19, 22, 29) aims to maximize the liveliness of the speech and its communicative efficacy. A possible reason why Demosthenes uses direct speech so frequently throughout his speeches could be because it has the effect of surprising and engaging the audience, in the sense that it breaks up the “normal”, and perhaps also “dull”, succession of narrative sections, adding to the verve and immediacy that a speech delivered before a live audience should have. It is very likely that, to strengthen the sense of immediacy, the speaker would have used vocal ploys, inasmuch as it appears that some instances of direct speech invite sarcastic or playful mimicry, especially when the alleged utterances of enemies or excuses of the Athenians – which the speaker considers petty – should be emphasized. A caveat is necessary here: the examination of the markers that oratorical (and any other) texts contain as indicators of mimicry (and, more broadly, *hypocrisy*) is mostly based on the intuition of individual or group readers (known in theory as *interpretative communities*). The textual markers that point to aspects of *hypocrisy* can, arguably, be of two kinds: “objective”, i.e., those that give us unambiguous clues as to what aspects of gesticulation and vocality are used by speakers (e.g., *deixis*, manifested usually by pronouns, almost certainly requires the use of hand or head gestures to direct people’s gaze toward the intended target); and “subjective”, i.e., those that take meaning from the ways in which readers understand the text.

Mimicry belongs to the second category. It is my view that it is the context, not every instance of direct speech independently of it, that creates the need for mimicry. One such context is in Demosthenes 3.22:

But ever since this breed of orators appeared who ply you with such questions as “**What would you like? What shall I propose? How can I oblige you?**” [“τί βούλεσθε; τί γράψω; τί ὑμῖν χαρίσωμαι;”] the interests of the state have been frittered away for a momentary popularity. The natural consequences follow, and the orators profit by your **disgrace** [αἰσχρῶς] (emphasis by the author).

⁴³ Instances of direct speech can be found in 1.14; 3.10, 19, 22, 29; 4.44; 9.27, 42; 10.11, 27, 70.

Not only does the text contains three staccato questions that are placed in direct speech, it is also that the context is adversarial, in the sense that the speaker is accusing his opponents – whom he deems irresponsible – of bringing disgrace upon the Athenians because they are cajoling their fellows to gain temporary popularity, despite the dire consequences this behavior may have for the *polis*. The severe accusation that is levelled against his opponents – enhanced by the use of the strong moral term *αἰσχρῶς*, which aims to incite anger and indignation toward the alleged perpetrators – arguably demands the use of vocal emphasis. To undermine the public/political status and authority of the orators to whom he scathingly refers, he would surely have delivered the utterance he calculatedly attributes to them in a such a way as to highlight their boldness and shamelessness. After all, it is highly unlikely that the adverb *αἰσχρῶς* was delivered deadpan, either here or elsewhere, as in 10.25,⁴⁴ where there is an accumulation of strong moral terms – *αἰσχρόν* and *ἀνάξιον*. The expression of emotion can become authentic through *hypocrisis*, as Plutarch's *Demosthenes* 11.2–3 clearly indicates.⁴⁵

4. PHYSICAL CONDITIONS AND SOCIOCULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE

This section raises two questions that have not been satisfactorily answered, despite having been addressed in some works of modern scholarship. The first is how the physical setting of the Pnyx affected the political workings of the Assembly. It has been argued by Johnstone (1996, 127) that speeches were passed from the front to the rear of the auditorium, and those Athenians who could not hear the speakers adequately because of the distance and noise, made their judgments based on “the speaker’s name and reputation”. Enos (1998, 331) opines that the speakers delivered

⁴⁴ Demosthenes 10.25: “By Zeus and all the other gods, it would be disgraceful [*αἰσχρόν*] and unworthy [*ἀνάξιον*] of you and of the resources of your city and the record of your ancestors to abandon all the other Greeks to enslavement for the sake of your own ease, and I for one would rather die than be guilty of proposing such a policy.”

⁴⁵ In *Demosthenes* 11.2–3, Plutarch says that “there is a story about Demosthenes, that he was approached by a man asking him to help him plead in court. When the man explained how he had been beaten by someone, Demosthenes said ‘But you haven’t at all suffered what you say you have suffered.’ The man raised his voice and screamed ‘Have I, Demosthenes, not at all suffered?!’ and then Demosthenes said, ‘Oh yes, now I do hear the voice of someone who has been wronged and suffered.’ This shows how important for persuasion he considered the pitch (of voice) and delivery to be of those who speak.”

their pieces to “rotating audiences”. This topic is examined further, together with the second question: what sociocultural qualities of the Pnyx made the hill the center of political speech-making and, in fact, the cradle of Athenian democracy?

4.1. The Physical Setting of the Pnyx: Construction and Acoustics

Before going further into the two questions – especially the first one about the acoustic conditions in the auditorium – it is necessary to depict the setting. The Pnyx is a well-designed platform, theater-like in shape, which was carved into the rocky heights in the western part of the city of Athens. There were three phases of construction and architectural development. None of the three phases altered the main structure of the site: the Assembly area was unroofed and roughly semi-circular in form. Each of the three phases did, however, have its own unique features. During the first, around 500 BC, the auditorium followed the natural slope of the hillside, but this was thought not to have been completely practical, because the auditorium, approximately 40 meters deep and 60 meters wide, would have probably been exposed to wind.⁴⁶ The second phase of construction took place in 404–403 BC, when the auditorium was moved from the north to the southwest slope, in order for the seats to be protected from strong winds. Johnstone (1996, 116) argues that the acoustics improved on Pnyx II because of the reorientation of the auditorium and the speaker’s platform, with northeast winds blowing from behind the *bēma*. The third and final structural phase probably occurred around 330 BC (see Rotroff, Camp 1996, 263–294), when the auditorium were enlarged considerably (to 60 m deep and almost 120 m wide) by the addition of stoas that were never fully constructed (Figures 1 and 3).⁴⁷ The landmark of the site, which is still visible on the hill, is the stone *bēma* (the platform or “the stone”, ὁ λίθος, as it is known; cf.

⁴⁶ The speech of Andocides, *On His Return*, is perhaps the only transmitted piece of political oratory that was performed on Pnyx I (possibly delivered between 410 and 406 BC).

⁴⁷ If Pnyx III is to be dated around 330 BC, contrary to the argument that it was constructed around 340 BC, it is possible that none of the transmitted symbouleutic speeches of Demosthenes were actually delivered there. The speech dated most closely to 330 BC is the spurious *On the Treaty with Alexander* (speech 17), which, according to Hitchings (2017, 194) would have been delivered between late 334 and late 333 BC.

Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 683) for the speaker (Figure 4a-b-c; for the dating of the site on the slope of the Pnyx and detailed descriptions of the place see Kourouniotes, Thompson 1932, 90–217; Moysey 1981, 31–37).

The issue of the acoustics of the Pnyx and the practical, non-verbal arrangements in the *ecclesia* has relatively recently attracted the interest of scholars. Johnstone, though with somewhat impromptu and methodologically faulty fieldwork, attempted to reconstruct the acoustics of the site, concluding rather dishearteningly that, even in ideal physical and meteorological circumstances, the speeches, passing from the rear of the auditorium to the front, would have been heard by three-quarters of the audience members only, requiring the remainder to base their decisions upon the reputation of the speakers rather than the essence of their argumentation. A strong voice would be a fundamental prerequisite for speakers to be able to deliver orations in the Assembly, which is why Demosthenes supposedly tried hard to overcome the vocal shortcomings which both he himself and the late textual tradition attribute to him.⁴⁸

Johnstone notes that not even a strong voice would make a speech fully audible and comprehensible to the audience on the Pnyx. What Johnstone does not consider, however, is that environmental circumstances in today's Athens, especially the level of noise, are vastly different from those of the ancient city, and this difference almost certainly has a significant impact on audibility on the Pnyx (as indeed in every precinct of Athens). Therefore, any conclusions that can be drawn will always remain merely conjectural, even if by revisiting the political arena of the Pnyx, we use modern climatological, architectural, and topographical evaluations of the setting. This is what the Academy of Athens intends to do. It should also be underlined that the ancients were more performatively competent than we are, not least because of their education and high level of knowledge of performative matters, especially sound, as texts indicate (e.g., Aristophanes, *Clouds* 961–972).⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Demosthenes, referring apparently to his vocal shortcomings, calls himself *Βάτταλος*, “lisper” or “stammerer” (18.180). Demetrius of Phalerum claims, as reported by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*On the Style of Demosthenes* 53) and Plutarch (*Demosthenes* 11.1-3), that he was personally aware of Demosthenes' vocal shortcomings. The validity, factuality, and reliability of these reports are doubted; even if there is any truth in the tradition, it may have been derived from the credulous taking of Demosthenes' own comments at face value.

⁴⁹ Aristophanes, *Clouds* 961–972: “I will, therefore, describe the ancient system of education, how it was ordered, when I flourished in the advocacy of justice, and temperance was the fashion. In the first place it was incumbent that no one should hear the voice of a boy uttering a syllable; and next, that those from the same quarter of the town should march in good order through the streets to the school of the harp-master, naked, and in a body, even if it were to snow as thick as meal.

Therefore, even if you have the voice of Luciano Pavarotti, whom Johnstone thought of when delivering Demosthenes 4 (the first of the *Philippics*) with strained vocal cords (see Johnstone 1996, 131), this does not mean that one has the speaking skills of the ancients, nor the audience's listening skills.

But what do the transmitted texts say about the acoustics on the Pnyx? The answer to this question is relatively disheartening because ancient texts are largely silent on this topic. Given that texts and material evidence are the only ways we have to try to reconstruct an impression of what happened in the past, our knowledge and understanding of audibility in the amphitheater on the Pnyx will perpetually be fragmentary and uncertain. The texts, unfortunately, do not tell us anything about the acoustics on the Pnyx, and not much about the acoustics in theaters or other sites of public speaking, but there are some limited, and hitherto largely under-discussed, sources that are worthy of (re)examination. The correlation between the theatrical and the political space on the Pnyx is methodologically pertinent: if theatergoers at the Asklepeion of Epidaurus, who could number as many as 14,000 (not to mention larger theaters such as the one in Megalopolis in Arcadia, with a capacity of 20,000 spectators), can listen to unamplified voices in the back row, about 60 meters from the *skēnē* and the broader scenic building (Figure 5), then it is possible that audience members in the Assembly crowd of 6,000 on the hill of Pnyx also could. Both the theater and the Assembly are – to use the expression from Hall (2002, 7) – “a palette of vocal techniques”: voice was of paramount importance for the activity in both settings, and one is justified in arguing, as modern scholars do, that performers were trained as to vocally perform their roles as effectively as possible (see Pickard-Cambridge 1968, 167–171; Csapo, Slater 1995, 256–258 and 265–268; MacDowell 2000, 352; Hall 2002, 22–23; Ley 2006, 54; on voice in law court speaking see Serafim 2017, 28–32 and 114–136).⁵⁰

The theoretical foundations of the systematic science of sound in Greek antiquity, especially concerning the interrelation between pitch and the length of the vibrating string, were laid by Pythagoras (6th century BC).

Then again, their master would teach them, not sitting cross-legged, to learn by rote a song, either ‘pallada persepolin deinan’ or ‘teleporon ti boama’ raising to a higher pitch the harmony which our fathers transmitted to us. But if any of them were to play the buffoon, or to turn any quavers, like these difficult turns the present artists make after the manner of Phrynis, he used to be thrashed, being beaten with many blows, as banishing the Muses.”

⁵⁰ On the importance of voice for actors see Plato, *Republic* 568c3; Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1403b26–33; 1413b14–28; Aristotle, *Problems* 11.22; Demetrius, *On Style* 193-5; Demosthenes 18.308–309; Diodorus Siculus 15.7, 16.42; Plutarch, *Life of Ten Orators* 848b.

Later, in the 4th century, Archytas described the production of sound as a phenomenon of having two objects strike each other, while also examining the conditions of sound propagation in a physically designated scenery (Guthrie 1962, 371). Nearly a century later, Aristoxenus, one of Aristotle's disciples, discussed the principles of auditory matters in the performative settings of the ancient *polis*. Burkert (1972) also refers to the theories of Plato and Aristotle (mainly in *Poetics* on music, a form of sound in the theater, and in *Problems*, presuming that this treatise can credibly be assigned to him) about sound propagation, with the former arguing that the movement of sound is a matter of pitch (higher pitch leads to faster propagation),⁵¹ a topic that is also examined by Theophrastus of Eresus (see Hunt 1978). Matters pertaining to the propagation of sound waves were also examined by the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus and the Roman architect and engineer Marcus Vitruvius Pollio (born ca. 80 BC). Selected passages from his treatise *On Architecture* (which is dedicated to Augustus and was probably composed between 16 and 13 BC) are discussed extensively below. Perhaps the earliest examination of acoustics in ancient literature is the account of Herodotus, in Book 4 of the *Histories*, about the underground passageways that the Persians dug to get underneath the walls of the city Barce during their siege of it.⁵²

Vitruvius' remark in 5.3.4, about theater architecture that allows sound to travel unimpeded, is useful in shedding light on how the height of the Pnyx and its onsite structures would have helped the propagation of sound as well:

The number of passages must be regulated by the height of the theatre, and are not to be higher than their width, because if made higher, they will reflect and obstruct the voice in its passage upwards, so that it will not reach the upper seats above the passages, and the last syllables of words will escape.

⁵¹ This idea about the pitch of the voice playing a role in determining the speed and the quality of the sound is rejected by Vitruvius: "Herein the ear does not perceive any difference of tone between the beginning and ending, by the voice rising higher or descending lower; neither that from a high pitch it becomes lower, nor the contrary" (5.4.2).

⁵² Herodotus 4.200: "As for the tunnels, a blacksmith discovered them by the means of a bronze shield, and this is how he found them: carrying the shield around the inner side of the walls, he struck it against the ground of the city; all the other places which he struck returned a dull sound; but where there were tunnels, the bronze of the shield rang clear. Here the Barceans made a counter-tunnel and killed those Persians who were digging underground. Thus, the tunnels were discovered, and the assaults were repelled by the townsfolk."

In short, the building should be so contrived, that a line drawn from the first to the last step should touch the front angle of the tops of all the seats; in which case the voice meets with no impediment.

In 5.3.7, Vitruvius also makes a comment that applies indirectly to the acoustics on the Pnyx, even if this is not the subject of his transmitted treatise on architecture:

In the same manner the voice spreads in a circular direction. But, whereas the circles in water only spread horizontally, the voice, on the contrary, extends vertically as well as horizontally. Wherefore, as is the case with the motion of water, so with the voice, if no obstacle disturbs the first undulation, not only the second and following one, but all of them will, without reverberation, reach the ears of those at bottom and those at top.

The analogy between the acoustics of the theater, described by Vitruvius, and the acoustics of the Pnyx is clear: the site of the *ecclēsia* does not present any architectural hindrance to the easy diffusion of sound, and this, in combination with the height of the hill, would allow sound to reach the ears of the audience members at the top and the bottom. This conclusion may seem speculative, since there is no direct reference to the Pnyx in Vitruvius' treatise, but the similarities between theater architecture and the Pnyx make any assumption about the properties of sound in the latter more than reasonable. The Pnyx, according to its physical description, is not a dissonant place, i.e., one of those "in which the voice, rising first upwards, is obstructed by some hard bodies above" (5.8.1). Its openness and the minimal structure of the buildings allow for optimal propagation of sound.

The wide span of the auditorium (as seen in Figure 1, the auditorium space steadily grew from phase I to phase III) and the distance that separates the speaker and the pulpit on the Pnyx from the audience seating, are key factors that allow sound to travel better. As Chourmouziadou (2007, 80) argues, "the more the actor approached the audience, the smaller the part of the audience that received the direct sound, due to the propagation of sound at nearly grazing incidence". Another architectural feature of the site of the *ecclēsia* on the Pnyx appears to be relevant to the discussion about the propagation of sound: as seen in Figures 1, 2a and 2, the platform of the speaker is placed at a lower level than that of the auditorium, allowing its rear to function as a sound reflector, exactly like the rear of the raised stage in the theater (Camp 1996, 45 offers a different approach regarding

the level of the auditorium on Pnyx III, arguing that it was either level with or sloping downward away from the raised speaker's platform. This cannot be the case if one accepts the presentation of Pnyx III in Figure 1). This contributes to increased reverberation (see Wiles 1997). This suggestion is corroborated by Lucretius (1st century BC), who points out that "among solitary places the very rocks give back the counterparts of words each in due order, when we see our comrades wondering amid the dark hills, and with loud voice summon them scattered here and there. [...] So does hill to hill buffet the words and repeat the reverberation [...] no one can see beyond a wall although he can hear voices through it" (*On the Nature of Things* 4.522–721, translated by Sinker 1937; on reverberation not worsening sound or impeding intelligibility see Manzetti 2019, 434–443). Modern interdisciplinary acoustic experiments also suggest that ground-level or low theatrical platforms are more efficient than higher platforms, in terms of sound propagation (see Izenour 1977; Barkas 1994, 39–56), while also indicating that the gradual raising of the platform, mostly in Roman times, had a negative impact on the intelligibility of the theatrical performance (see Canac 1957; Athanasopoulos 1976; Barkas 1994, 39–56). The same principles can be applied to the sites of the *ecclēsia* on the Pnyx.

Beyond architectural features, the effectiveness of speech projection and the quality of sound propagation are also determined by other onsite measurements: the number of audience members (a maximum of 6,000, in the case of the Pnyx), their seating and clothing, and other aspects of the physical scenery, such as wind and heat. The Pnyx, as has been previously stated, was likely windy, therefore, the meetings of the Assembly would not have taken place during the winter.⁵³ But the "windy character" of the physical setting on the Pnyx, which can reasonably be assumed to have hindered the audience, preventing them from comfortably attending the Assembly due to low temperatures and humidity, is thought to have increased and facilitated the propagation of sound. Goularas (1995) argues that the open-air theater design where the wind blows toward the audience, in combination with a minimum temperature of 8°C, is superior, a conclusion that is not unopposed

⁵³ Cf. Thucydides 8.97, on the use of the Pnyx as the place of the meetings of the Assembly. The Pnyx was not the only place where the meetings of the Assembly were held; sources also indicate that the Theatre of Dionysus was also used, though not for environmental reasons, but rather for religious. Both Aeschines 2.61 and Demosthenes 21.8 mention that the Assembly was moved to the theatre after specific festivals: Aeschines speaks about the celebration of the City Dionysia (when it is reasonable for the meetings to be held nearer the precinct of Dionysus) and Demosthenes about the Pandia (festival of Zeus).

by other modern research studies (see Declercq, Dekeyser 2007, 2012; Johnstone 1996, 124, which presented the opinion that wind reduced intelligibility in the Assembly amphitheater).

The strengthening of acoustics is accomplished by a specific type of paraphernalia called *ήχηϊα*, a bronze vessel that acts as a megaphone, on the principle that sound propagates by setting air in movement. The functioning of these vessels is known in archaeoacoustics as “the Vitruvian secret” (in 1.1.9):

So, the vessels, called *ήχηϊα* by the Greeks, which are placed in certain recesses under the seats of theatres, are fixed and arranged with a due regard to the laws of harmony and physics, their tones being fourths, fifths, and octaves; so that when the voice of the actor is in unison with the pitch of these instruments, its power is increased and mellowed by impinging thereon. He would, moreover, be at a loss in constructing hydraulic and other engines, if ignorant of music.

These vessels work, specifically, as a technical means of improving the clarity of the voice, not its strength. In Vitruvius’ words (5.5.3):

The voice which issues from the scene, expanding as from a centre, and striking against the cavity of each vase, will sound with increased clearness and harmony, from its unison with one or other of them.

In 5.3.8, Vitruvius also claims that the bronze loudspeakers were tuned to correspond with the voices of the actors (“since in bronze or horn wind instruments, by a regulation of the genus, their tones are rendered as clear as those of stringed instruments, so by the application of the laws of harmony, the ancients discovered a method of increasing the power of the voice in a theatre”). That the material of Vitruvius’ vessels, bronze, is a good reflector and radiator of sound and was known to the Ancient Greeks, as indicated in Aristotle’s *On the Soul* 2.8, where it is remarked that “not all bodies can by impact on one another produce sound; impact on wool makes no sound, while the impact on bronze or other body which is smooth and hollow does. Bronze gives out a sound when struck because it is smooth; bodies which are hollow owing to reflection repeat the original impact over and over again, the body originally set in movement being unable to escape from the concavity.” Something similar about the capacity of bronze to produce strong sound is mentioned in Pollux, *Onomasticon* 4.70, in a description of the “watery aulos”, a musical instrument consisting of bronze pipes that

are blown from below, with water compressing air upward. Pollux says, specifically, that “the bronze gives the aulos a bolder sound” (*Onomasticon* 4.70: *καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς ἔχει τὸ φθέγμα ἰταμώτερον*; cf. comments in 4.85–86, on the material of the salpinx, another musical instrument made of bronze and iron).

The existence of bronze sound vessels and their use are still uncertain and vastly controversial issues. Vitruvius refers, in *On Architecture* 5.5.8, to Roman General Lucius Mummius, who, upon returning to Rome from Corinth (perhaps in 146 BC), “brought [...] some of its bronze vases, and dedicated them as spoils at the temple of Luna.” It is indeed argued that there were niches in theaters, beneath the *diazōma* (the corridor that separates the upper and lower tiers of the theater and facilitates the circulation of spectators), that held the bronze loudspeakers – this seems to be so in the case of the theater at Aizanoi, a Phrygian city in western Anatolia (1st century AD), despite scholarly dissent (see Dilke 1948, 137). “The ‘bell’ is inserted in the cavity and is supported by wedges of half a foot, which is the same height as the neck. The niche must thus be higher, about two or three feet (60–90 cm) what [sic] makes the internal volume larger than the volume of the neck” (see Valière *et al.* 2013, 72). An attempt has been made by scholars to reconstruct the placement of Vitruvius’ bronze vessels based on his writings (Figure 6): they are evenly distributed in all *diazōmata* and rows (13 in each) in the theater (see Sevillano *et al.* 2008); it is perhaps this even distribution that makes the acoustics effective. Izenour (1977) has also described the existence of nine cavities behind the *diazōma* in the ruins of a Roman theater in Beit She’an, Israel (expressing doubts about the effectiveness of the use of bronze vessels). The fact, however, that similar technology has been used extensively throughout history to strengthen the acoustic potential of places of spectatorship is enough to indicate that the acoustic pots would have been effective in fulfilling the purpose they were designed for. Similar vessels dating from the 10th to the 16th centuries have been used all across Europe (Figure 7)⁵⁴ and in the Ottoman Empire, inside the walls of churches and mosques (on the use of acoustic pots in Irish churches see Fitzgerald 1855, 303–310; on the use of vessels in Danish churches from 1100–1300 AD see Bruel 2002; Valière *et al.* 2013, 70–81; on the use of acoustic pots in the Ottoman Empire see Atay, Gül 2021, 1–12).

There are two caveats to bear in mind when reading Vitruvius’ intriguing treatise: first, we do not know whether this technology was used in 4th century BC classical Athens (it may not have been used until Vitruvius’

⁵⁴ Figure 7 presents an acoustic (or resonance) pot incorporated in the wall of the church at the Chartreuse du Val de Benediction, Villeneuve-lès-Avignon, France.

time, or only in other areas of the Roman Empire); and second, if it was used, whether it was used in the auditorium of the Assembly on the Pnyx, or only in the theater. Given that Vitruvius' treatise draws information from earlier treatises on construction, especially Aristoxenus (5.5.6; see Valière *et al.* 2013, 73), it should not be considered impossible that his description applies to Ancient Greek theaters of the 4th century. There is no reason why the vessels, if used in the Greek theaters, would not have also been used in the Athenian Assembly, unlike other paraphernalia, such as masks, which were strictly confined to the theatrical space, where it is argued that they had a voice-enhancing function (on the use of dramatic masks as a means of amplifying the voices of actors see Vovolis, Zamboulakis 2007, 1–7).⁵⁵ It is the placement of the pots on the site of the Pnyx that poses the most difficult question. They may have been placed beneath the floor, as in the Hazine-I Evrak Building in İstanbul (Figure 8); this possibility should be explored (by archaeologists).

Another intriguing remark by Vitruvius is that there was no need for sounding vessels in wooden auditoriums that were built in Rome, because the boarding itself was resonant.⁵⁶ Assuming that the reference in Aristophanes' *Acharnians* 23–26 is correct, the Pnyx would have had the same acoustic potential as Roman auditoriums because it had wooden seats in the pit, the main area of the auditorium. Stone seats were hewn out in the wall of the terrace, but the other benches would probably have been made of wood: “οὐδ’ οἱ πρυτάνεις ἤκουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἄωρίαν/ ἤκοντες εἶτα δ’ ὥστιοῦνται πῶς δοκεῖς/ ἐλθόντες ἀλλήλοισι περὶ πρώτου ξύλου,/ ἀθρόοι καταρρέοντες” (“The Prytanen even do not come; they will be late, but when they come they will push and fight each other for a seat in the front row”). There is, then, considerable ancient evidence and steadily growing modern interdisciplinary knowledge which both point to the function of physical scenery and the construction of Greek theatrical spaces – and thus also on the Pnyx – as natural amplifiers of the voices of performers (whether actors

⁵⁵ On the acoustic capacity of musical instruments, such as the trumpet, see Julius Pollux, *Onomasticon* 4.88, where it is mentioned that the instrument could be heard at a distance of 10 km (or 50 stades).

⁵⁶ Vitruvius 5.5.7: “Someone may perchance urge, that many theatres are yearly built in Rome, without any regard to these matters. But let him not be herein mistaken, inasmuch as all public theatres which are constructed of wood, have many floors, which are necessarily conductors of sound. This circumstance may be illustrated, by consideration of the practice of those that sing to the harp, who when they wish to produce a loud effect, turn themselves to the doors of the scene, by the aid of which their voice is thrown out. But when theatres are constructed of solid materials, that is of rubble, squared stones, or marble, which are not conductors of sound, it is necessary to build them according to the rules in question.”

or public speakers), which would compensate for the energy loss due to the open-air setting and the seasonal adversities this causes (see Barkas 2019, 337–353). Declercq, Dekeyser (2007) even argues that the “geometry of the theatre”, i.e., the benches and the limestone *cavea* (audience area), would boost the sound while muffling the background audience noise. There is, therefore, no reason for classicists to assume that speeches in the Assembly were delivered before rotating audiences, or that the audience members based their decisions on the name and the authority of the speakers in front of them. Rumor could, arguably, be thought of as having divine status, at least according to Aeschines 1.127–130 (see Serafim 2021, 34–36, 73–74),⁵⁷ but it would be sheer speculation to argue that it was a key factor in political decision-making in Athens.

4.2. The Sociocultural Importance of the Pnyx

In answering the second question about the sociocultural reasons for choosing the Pnyx as the meeting place of the Assembly, scholars refer with puzzlement to Aeschines 1.82, where it has been argued that the poor reputation of the place by 346/5 BC (when the speech was delivered) is underlined (Harrison 1890, 107; Judeich 1931, 86; Kourouniotes, Thompson

⁵⁷ Aeschines 1.127–130: “But in the case of the life and conduct of men, a common report which is unerring does of itself spread abroad throughout the city; it causes the private deed to become matter of public knowledge, and many a time it even prophesies what is about to be. [...] **You will find that both our city and our forefathers dedicated an altar to Common Report, as one of the greatest gods;** and you will find that Homer again and again in the *Iliad* says, of a thing that has not yet come to pass, ‘Common Report came to the host’; and again you will find **Euripides declaring that this god** is able not only to make known the living, revealing their true characters, but the dead as well, when he says, ‘Common Report shows forth the good man, even though he be in the bowels of the earth’; and Hesiod expressly represents her as a goddess, speaking in words that are very plain to those who are willing to understand, for he says, ‘**But Common Report dies never, the voice that tongues of many men do utter. She, too, then, is divine.**’ You will find that all men whose lives have been decorous praise these verses of the poets. For all who are ambitious for honour from their fellows believe that it is from good report that fame will come to them. **But men whose lives are shameful pay no honour to this god,** for they believe that in her they have a deathless accuser. Call to mind, therefore, fellow citizens, what common report you have been accustomed to hear in the case of Timarchus. The instant the name is spoken you ask, do you not, ‘What Timarchus do you mean? The prostitute?’ Furthermore, if I had presented witnesses concerning any matter, you would believe me; **if then I present the god as my witness, will you refuse to believe?** But she is a witness against whom it would be impiety even to bring complaint of false testimony” (emphasis by the author).

1932, 186. Fisher (2001, 217) argues that “we can glean only that specific proposals concerned areas around the Pnyx itself: unbuilt-up, secluded areas, *erēmiai*, deserted house-sites, cisterns, all places of inactivity or seclusion.” There are arguments for the opposite, in line with the concerns in Thompson, Scranton (1943, 361), as well as about the validity and the factuality of what Aeschines says. The passage in 1.82 is as follows:

ἐπειδὴ δὲ που προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου εἶπεν ὅτι τό γε εἰσήγημα τὸ Τιμάρχου ἀποδοκιμάζει ἢ βουλή, ‘καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐρημίας ταύτης καὶ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐν τῇ Πυκνὶ μὴ θαυμάσητε, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ Τιμάρχος ἐμπειροτέρως ἔχει τῆς βουλῆς τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου,’ ἀνεθορυβήσατε ὑμεῖς ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἔφατε τὸν Αὐτόλυκον ἀληθῆ λέγειν: εἶναι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐμπειρον.

When, in the course of his speech, he [Autolykos] said that the Areopagos council was opposing Timarchos’ motion and he added “on the subject of that deserted spot and the place on the Pnyx, you should not be surprised, Athenians, if Timarchos is more experienced than the Council of the Areopagos,” at that moment you burst into uproar and said that Autolykos was telling the truth: you said that he was certainly experienced with those places (translation: Fisher 2001, 90).

It is not only that we cannot trust what Aeschines says about Timarchus, as Thompson and Scranton rightly remark, not least because used every opportunity to attack his adversary at the trial and undermine his public (speaking) credentials. Carey (2000, 52 n. 90) and Rydberg-Cox (2000, 426) are correct in suggesting that Aeschines makes, in 1.82, a clever innuendo about Timarchus engaging in prostitution, which could only be fully practiced in the secrecy of desolate places.⁵⁸ It has recently also been argued that the physiognomic details that are attributed to Timarchus, especially about his stature, are fake (see Serafim, forthcoming). Therefore, a speaker who would dare distort details about the body of his adversary, while he was present in

⁵⁸ I would like, however, to take issue with the expression of Carey, when he claims that Aeschines accuses Timarchus of “grubby sexual encounters.” If this is a reference to prostitution, as it should be, it is not fully clear – and that is a problem. “Sexual encounters” may, arguably, be an insinuation of homosexual encounters, which were not, however, considered “grubby” at the time. Carey could have been clearer about the point he is making here. The point made by Fisher (2001, 220) is more coherent.

court, would not hesitate to accuse him of grubby actions, inasmuch as he would not credibly expect the audience members to fully remember actions from the past.

It is also the case that Aeschines never refers to the Pnyx as being desolate and, thus, ill-reputed. The text contains two prepositional phrases: the first is clear, *καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐρημίας ταύτης*; the second is unseen, but we can find it by adding the preposition *περὶ*, which is missing because it is, in context, syntactically and semantically self-explicable, *καὶ [περὶ] τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐν τῇ Πυκνί*. The conjunction *καὶ* indicates a distinction between the two prepositional phrases: “this deserted spot and the area of the Pnyx.” So it is possible that “the deserted spot” may not refer to the Pnyx, the place where the *ecclesia* took place, but to another, unidentified place, perhaps one that is adjacent to the meeting place of the Assembly, or to a specific spot on the hill – neither the Pnyx as a whole nor the central part of it.⁵⁹ This is all the more likely bearing in mind that the delivery of Aeschines 1 almost coincides with the start of the enlargement of the Pnyx, which may have improved accessibility. The unidentified spot to which Aeschines 1.82 points may or may not be the same place as that in Xenophon’s *Ways and Means* 2.6; the ancient “complaint” about the housing policy of Athens, made in Xenophon’s account, indicates that there were other deserted places in the broader territory of the *polis*.⁶⁰

Pushing aside I stigma Aeschines attaches to the physical place of the Pnyx, the ancient texts are marked by a surprising paucity of information about why the hill was preferred as the meeting place of the Assembly. To combat this textual silence, the following section will explore the criteria of theater- and temple-building. There are two interrelated aspects of the cultural identity of the ancient *polis*, since many theaters were built around sanctuaries (e.g., the theater in Epidaurus, which is located on the west side of mount Kynortio, was erected as part of the general development of the sanctuary of Asklepios) to decode the rationale behind the choice of the places where activities important for democracy were carried out. It is not coincidental that “the layout and orientation of the Pnyx borrowed the

⁵⁹ This suggestion is evident in the translation of the text in Rydberg-Cox (2000, 426): “During his speech, Autolykus said that the council did not approve of the proposition and said, ‘Do not be surprised if Timarchus has more knowledge than the Areopagus council **about this isolated spot on the Pnyx**’” (emphasis by the author).

⁶⁰ Xenophon, *Ways and Means* 2.6: “Then again, since there are many vacant sites for houses within the walls, if the state allowed approved applicants to erect houses on these and granted them the freehold of the land, I think that we should find a larger and better class of persons desiring to live at Athens.”

theatrical innovations that took place under the tyrants, including the layout of the agora and the rise of the single actor, or *protagonist[ē]s*, facing and answering the chorus and audience, attributed to poets like Thespis in the sixth century” (see Fredal 2006, 123).

The Pnyx was not protected from the wind and other natural pestilential causes of health problems, as described in ancient literature. An invaluable source of information is Vitruvius’ *On Architecture*, despite this being significantly late and thus not fully relevant to the reasoning behind choosing a specific natural scenery for constructing important sites in democratic Athens. In 1.6.3, Vitruvius refers to the topographical reasons for choosing a specific place to erect public edifices, which mostly have to do with the observation of natural effects (in addition to other sociocultural reasons, including religiously laden ones, such as soothsaying,⁶¹ or even the gods themselves choosing the place to erect their temples, as, for example, in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* 244–304):⁶²

In a place sheltered from the winds, those who are in health preserve it, those who are ill soon convalesce, though in other, even healthy places, they would require different treatment, and this entirely on account of their shelter from the winds. The disorders difficult to cure in exposed situations are colds, gout, coughs, phthisis, pleurisy, spitting of blood, and those diseases which are treated by replenishment instead of exhaustion of the natural forces. Such disorders are cured with

⁶¹ Vitruvius, *On Architecture* 1.4.9: “The precepts of the ancients, in this respect, should ever be observed. They always, after sacrifice, carefully inspected the livers of those animals fed on that spot whereon the city was to be built, or whereon a stative encampment was intended. If the livers were diseased and livid, they tried others, in order to ascertain whether accident or disease was the cause of the imperfection; but if the greater part of the experiments proved, by the sound and healthy appearance of the livers, that the water and food of the spot were wholesome, they selected it for the garrison. If the reverse, they inferred, as in the case of cattle, so in that of the human body, the water and food of such a place would become pestiferous; and they therefore abandoned it, in search of another, valuing health above all other considerations.”

⁶² In the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* 244–304 there are details of the physical scenery that beguiled Apollo to choose it for the construction of his temple, as, for example, in 267–274 (Telphousa, the Boeotian Naiad-nymph of the Telphousian spring on Mount Tilphousios, talks to Apollo): “Lord, you are than I am, yours surely the strength that is greatest— do you in Krisa erect it, below a ravine of Parnassos. There will no beautiful chariots ever be dashing, or swift-hoofed horses be clattering loudly, surrounding your well-built altar; rather, to you great gifts will the glorious nations of mankind bring, as *Iēpaíán*, Hail Healer; delighting in mind you then will receive fine victims from all of the neighboring peoples.”

difficulty. First, because they are the effect of cold; secondly, because the strength of the patient being greatly diminished by the disorder; the air agitated by the action of the winds becomes poor and exhausts the body's moisture, tending to make it low and feeble; whereas, that air which from its soft and thick nature is not liable to great agitation, nourishes and refreshes its strength.

And again, in 5.3.1–2:

When the forum is placed, a spot as healthy as possible is to be chosen for the theatre, for the exhibition of games on the festival days of the immortal gods, according to the instructions given in the first book respecting the healthy disposition of the walls of a city. For the spectators, with their wives and children, delighted with the entertainment, sit out the whole of the games, and the pores of their bodies being opened by the pleasure they enjoy, are easily affected by the air, which, if it blows from marshy or other noisome places, infuses its bad qualities into the system. These evils are avoided by the careful choice of a situation for the theatre, taking especial precaution that it be not exposed to the south; for when the sun fills the cavity of the theatre, the air confined in that compass being incapable of circulating, by its stoppage therein, is heated, and burns up, extracts, and diminishes the moisture of the body. On these accounts, those places where bad air abounds are to be avoided, and wholesome spots to be chosen.

At another point, 5.9.9, Vitruvius points out there are two reasons for the choice of the locations for public edifices: "they are conducive to two good purposes; to health in time of peace, and to preservation in time of war." The Pnyx may satisfy the second reason, providing protection to the Athenians in times of war because it sits above the city, but it certainly does not fulfil the first reason, to protect against natural causes of ill health. As mentioned above, on Pnyx I, when the edifices followed the natural slope, the challenge was that the pulpit and the seats were stricken by north winds. This problem has already been stated in Kourouniotes, Thompson (1932, 136), when arguing that "there must have been many days when it would have been utterly impossible to hold a public meeting on the place unless some protection [was] available against the whistling, piercing wind. On such days, however, the Theater of Dionysus would lie in perfect calm and comparative warmth as a result of the shelter afforded by the Acropolis to the north."

Therefore, there may be other reasons why the *ecclēsia* took place on the slope of the Pnyx, specifically three. The first is the hill's central location in Athens. Theatrical performances, which attracted the interest of vast Athenian and non-Athenian audiences, were held in the Theater of Dionysus, on the south slope of the Acropolis, and near two other key areas of the ancient *polis*: the agora, the center of political, economic, and other public activities, and the Pnyx. In *Acharnians* 1–42, Aristophanes commented on the behavior of the presiding officers in the Assembly, saying that they came to the meetings late because “they are gossiping in the marketplace, slipping hither and thither to avoid the vermilioned rope.” All the important activities of democratic Athens took place in the broad political area, with Fredal noting that “the Pnyx is not located in the *physical center* of the city, but as the site for collective deliberation among the entire demos, it constituted the *political center*, signified by the fact that it ‘centered’ upon the *agora*” (see Fredal 2006, 121, emphasis by the author). In 1.7.1 Vitruvius corroborates the idea that sacred edifices, “if inland, should be in the centre of the town.” Therefore, given that the Pnyx is close to the other important precincts, it is reasonable to presume that its centrality made it a good choice for the place where the Athenians took decisions about the city.

The second reason is the height of the hill and the views it offers. In 4.5.2 Vitruvius points out that “the temple is to be turned as much as possible, so that the greater part of the city may be seen from it” (cf. 1.7.1, “the temples of the gods, protectors of the city, also those of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva, should be on some eminence which commands a view of the greater part of the city”). This appears to be the case with the Pnyx: the physical setting where the Assembly held its meetings should face the *polis*, functioning as a proper and (cognitively/emotionally) effective reminder to the decision-making Athenians of their sacred duty to cast their vote to the advantage of the city. The location of the *ecclēsia* on the Pnyx, therefore, acquires a symbolic dimension: the Athenians climbed the hill to see what they must protect by their vote – the city below. Their decision was not, therefore, driven by an abstract idea of their land, but by a very concrete one, which may have functioned as a source of inspiration for the speakers (see Wordsworth 1855, 55; Fredal 2006, 121–122), while also creating a sense of magnitude and solemnity that enhanced the allure of the place where important decisions about the city were taken (cf. Aristotle, *Poetics* 1451a).⁶³

⁶³ Aristotle, *Poetics* 1451a: “As then creatures and other organic structures must have a certain magnitude and yet be easily taken in by the eye, so too with plots: they must have length but must be easily taken in by the memory.”

The third architectural and topographical reason why the Pnyx was selected for Assembly meetings is suggested by Fredal, who argues that “[u]nlike the bema on a plain (the *agora*), which would raise the speaker above his audience, the Pnyx (period 1) placed the speaker below his audience, who looked down upon him. [...] [T]he whole audience was kept before him so that they could be seen easily at a glance” (Fredal 2006, 122–123, emphasis by the author). To add to Fredal’s reasoning, the setting allows the audience members to appear before the speaker as a seamless decision-making body – and this enhances the sense of unity among them, reminding them pertinently that, despite their argumentative and rhetorical clashes, which underline the stark differences between political factions, they are united on the hill, as they should be, for the benefit of the *polis*. The Pnyx promotes somatic unity to harness its symbolic, civic meaning; after all, it is civic unity that guarantees that Athens will function properly and prosper unequivocally.

5. CONCLUSION

Despite its extensive length this study is but a modest step forward in the direction of researching and further understanding the topographical, rhetorical, and other cultural workings on the Pnyx. The aims of this study were threefold. The first was to prepare an annotated compendium of references in Attic oratory to two words that most often describe the place and the political workings there: *Πνύξ* and *ἐκκλησία*. The second aim was to offer an analysis of performance as it is incorporated into and indicated by the text of seven symbouleutic speeches of Demosthenes – three *Olynthiacs* and seven *Philippics*. Analysis of performance in the Assembly is compared with that in the law court, with some overarching conclusions being drawn about how much of a difference the etiquette of specific institutional settings truly makes in sustaining a lively presentation of the speech and in achieving persuasion. The third and final aim of this study was to explore aspects that have to do with topography: the physical setting, the construction of the Assembly and its acoustics, and the impact that topography may have had on determining the character of the political processes in the Assembly. Another aim has been to answer the question of why the hill was chosen as the meeting place for the Athenians when they sought to make decisions about crucial matters that regulated the internal functioning of the *polis* and its relationship with other *poleis*. The arguments that this paper puts forward have the potential to ignite further interdisciplinary work and help

scholars better and more adequately understand what happened in the hill whose name is synonymous with democracy and political deliberation in classical Athens.

REFERENCES

- [1] Adolphs, Ralph. 2013. The Biology of Fear. *Current Biology* 23: R79–R93.
- [2] Arena, Valentina. 2007. Roman Oratorical Invective. 149–160 in *A Companion to Roman Rhetoric*, edited by W. Dominik, J. Hall. London: Wiley-Blackwell.
- [3] Athanasopoulos, Christos. 1976. *Problems in Contemporary Theatrical Developments*. Athens: Edition Sideris.
- [4] Barkas, Nicolaos. 1994. *The Acoustical Parameter of Ancient Greek Theater Design*. Thessaloniki Greece: Monument & Environment.
- [5] Barkas, Nikos. 2019. The Contribution of the Stage Design to the Acoustics of Ancient Greek Theatres. *Acoustics* 1: 337–353.
- [6] Bauman, Richard A. 1990. *Political Trials in Ancient Greece*. London and New York: Routledge.
- [7] Bers, Victor. 1985. Dikastic Thorubos. 1–15 in *CruX: Essays Presented to G. E. M. de Ste Croix on his 75th Birthday*, edited by Paul A. Cartledge and David Harvey. Devon: Duckworth.
- [8] Bers, Victor. 2013. Performing the Speech in Athenian Courts and Assembly Adjusting the Act to Fit the Bēma? *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 123: 27–40.
- [9] Bicknell, Peter J. 1987. Voting in Tribal Groups in the Athenian Assembly. *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies* 28: 51–92.
- [10] Bicknell, Peter J. 1989. Athenians Politically Active in Pnyx II. *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies* 30: 98–100.
- [11] Bruel, Per V. 2002. Models of Ancient Sound Vases. *Journal of the Acoustical Society of America* 112: 2333.
- [12] Burke, Kenneth. 1969. *A Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- [13] Burkert, Walter. 1972. *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- [14] Camp, John M. 1986. *The Athenian Agora: Excavations in the Heart of Classical Athens*. New York: Thames and Hudson.
- [15] Canac, François. 1957. *L'acoustique des Theatres Antiques, ses enseignements*. France: Centre national de la recherche scientifique.
- [16] Carey, Christopher. 2000. *Aeschines*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- [17] Chourmouziadou, Kalliopi. 2007. *Ancient and Contemporary Use of Open-air Theatres: Evolution and Acoustic Effect on Scenery Design*. Diss. The University of Sheffield.
- [18] Conover, Pamela Johnston. 1984. The Influence of Group Identifications on Political Perception and Evaluation. *The Journal of Politics* 46: 760–785.
- [19] Csapo, Eric, William J. Slater. 1995. *The Context of Ancient Drama*. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.
- [20] Declercq, Nico F., Cindy S. A. Dekeyser. 2007. Acoustic diffraction effects at the Hellenistic amphitheater of Epidaurus: Seat rows responsible for the marvelous acoustics. *The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America* 121: 2011–2022.
- [21] Deonna, Julien A., Raffaele Rodogno, Fabrice Teroni. 2011. *In Defence of Shame*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [22] Dilke, Oswald Ashton Wentworth. 1948. The Greek Theatre Cavea. *The Annual of the British School at Athens* 43:125–192.
- [23] Ellsworth, P. C., E. M. W. Tong. 2006. What Does it Mean to be Angry at Yourself? Categories, Appraisals, and the Problem of Language. *Emotion* 6: 572–586.
- [24] Enos, Richard Leo. 1998. Review of *Theory, Text, Context: Issues in Greek Rhetoric and Oratory*, by C. L. Johnstone. *Rhetoric Review* 16: 327–334.
- [25] Fisher, Nick. 2001. *Aeschines, Against Timarchos: Introduction, Translation and Commentary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [26] Fitzgerald, E. 1855. On Acoustic Vases and Other Relics Discovered in Restorations Lately Made in the Church of St. Mary, Youghal. *Proceedings and Transactions of the Kilkenny and South-East of Ireland Archaeological Society* 3: 303–310.
- [27] Forsén, Björn, Greg Stanton. 1996. *The Pnyx in the History of Athens. Proceedings of an International Colloquium Organised by the Finnish Institute at Athens, 7–9 October, 1994*. Athens: Finnish Institute at Athens.

- [28] Fredal, James. 2006. *Rhetorical Action in Ancient Athens: Persuasive Artistry from Solon to Demosthenes*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
- [29] Gilbert, Paul, Julie Pehl, Steven Allan. 1994. The Phenomenology of Shame and Guilt: An Empirical Investigation. *British Journal of Medical Psychology* 67: 23–36.
- [30] Goularas, Dionysis. 1995. *Acoustics of Ancient Theatres*. Diss. Aristotle University of Thessaloniki.
- [31] Gülnihan, Atay, Zühre Sü Gül. 2021. Clay Pots of Ottoman Architecture: Acoustics, Structure, and Ventilation. *Proceedings of Meetings on Acoustics* 42: 015003.
- [32] Guthrie, William Keith Chambers. 1962. *A History of Greek Philosophy: Volume 1, The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- [33] Hall, Edith. 1995. Lawcourt Dramas: The Power of Performance in Greek Forensic Oratory. *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 40: 39–58.
- [34] Hall, Edith. 2002. The Singing Actors of Antiquity. 3–38 in *Greek and Roman Actors, Aspects of an Ancient Profession*, edited by Patricia Easterling, Edith Hall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- [35] Hall, Edith. 2006. *The Theatrical Cast of Athens. Interactions between Ancient Greek Drama and Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [36] Hall, Edith. 2022. Some Functions of Rhetorical Questions in Lysias' Forensic Orations. TBA in *Style and the City: Form and Functions of Language in Attic Oratory* (special issue in *Trends in Classics*), edited by Alessandro Vatri and Andreas Serafim.
- [37] Hansen, Mogens Herman. 1976. *Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Atimoi and Pheugontes*. Odense: Odense University Press.
- [38] Hansen, Mogens Herman. 1982. The Athenian Ecclesia and the Assembly-Place on the Pnyx. *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies* 23: 246–248.
- [39] Hansen, Mogens Herman. 1983 *The Athenian Ecclesia: A Collection of Articles 1976–83*. Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press.
- [40] Hansen, Mogens Herman. 1985. *Demography and Democracy: The Number of Athenian Citizens in the Fourth Century BC*. Herning: Systime.
- [41] Hansen, Mogens Herman. 1989. *The Athenian Ecclesia II, A Collection of Articles, 1983–1989*. Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press.

- [42] Hansen, Mogens Herman. 1991. *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology*. Oxford and Cambridge/MA: B. Blackwell.
- [43] Harrison, Evelyn B. 1890. *The Athenian Agora*. Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens.
- [44] Hitching, Sam. 2017. The Date of [Demosthenes] 17, On the Treaty with Alexander. *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 109: 167–197.
- [45] Huddy, Leonie. 2003. Group Identity and Political Cohesion. 511–558 in *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, edited by David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [46] Hunt, Lester H. 1978. Character and Thought. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 15: 177–186.
- [47] Izenour, George C. 1977. *Theater Design*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- [48] Jimenez, Marta. 2020. Plato on the Role of Anger in Our Intellectual and Moral Development. 285–307 in *Emotions in Plato*, edited by Laura Candiotta, Olivier Renaut. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- [49] Johnstone, Christopher Lyle, Richard J. Graff. 2018. Situating Deliberative Rhetoric in Ancient Greece: The Bouleutêrion as a Venue for Oratorical Performance. *Advances in the History of Rhetoric* 21: 2–88.
- [50] Johnstone, Christopher Lyle. 1996. Greek Oratorical Settings and the Problem of the Pnyx: Rethinking the Athenian Political Process. 97–127 in *Theory, Text, Context: Issues in Greek Rhetoric and Oratory*, edited by Christopher Lyle Johnstone. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- [51] Johnstone, Christopher Lyle. 2001. Communicating in Classical Contexts: The Centrality of Delivery. *Quarterly Journal Speech* 87: 121–143.
- [52] Judeich, Walter. 1931. *Topographie von Athen*. 2d ed. Munich: Beck.
- [53] Kim, Kyungyoon, Bret Jackson, Ioannis Karamouzas, Moses Adeagbo, Stephen J. Guy, Richard Graff. 2015. Bema: A multimodal interface for expert experiential analysis of political assemblies at the Pnyx in ancient Greece, *2015 IEEE Symposium on 3D User Interfaces (3DUI)*, 19–26.
- [54] Kourouniotes, Konstantinos, Homer A. Thompson. 1932. The Pnyx in Athens. *Hesperia* 1: 90–217.
- [55] Lau, Ronald Siu Man. 1989. Individual and Contextual Influences on Group Identification. *Social Psychology Quarterly* 52: 220–231.

- [56] Ley, Graham. 2006. *A Short Introduction to the Ancient Greek Theater*. Rev. ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- [57] MacDowell, Douglas. 2000. *Demosthenes, On the False Embassy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [58] Manzetti, Maria Cristina. 2019. The Performances at the Theatre of the Pythion in Gortyna, Crete. Virtual Acoustics Analysis as a Support for Interpretation. *Open Archaeology* 5: 434–443.
- [59] Martin, Gunther. 2006. Forms of Address in Athenian Courts. *Museum Helveticum* 63: 75–88.
- [60] Mayer, James. 2011. Mythological History, Identity Formation, and the Many Faces of Alexander the Great. https://digitalcommons.maclester.edu/classics_honors/11/ (last visited 16 February 2023).
- [61] Michalopoulos, Andreas, Andreas Serafim, Alessandro Vatri, Flaminia Beneventano della Corte (eds.). 2021. *The Rhetoric of Unity and Division in Ancient Literature*. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.
- [62] Miller, Arthur H., Patricia Gurin, Gerald Gurin, Oksana Malanchuk. 1981. Group Consciousness and Political Participation. *American Journal of Political Science* 25: 494–511.
- [63] Moysey, Robert A. 1981. The Thirty and the Pnyx. *American Journal of Archaeology* 85: 31–37.
- [64] Pickard-Cambridge, Arthur Wallace. 1968. *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens*. Oxford: Clarendon University Press.
- [65] Roseman, Ira J. 1991. Appraisal determinants of discrete emotions. *Cognition and Emotion* 5: 161–200.
- [66] Rosenwein, B. 2002. Worrying about Emotions in History. *American Historical Review* 107: 821–845.
- [67] Rosenwein, B. 2006. *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- [68] Rotroff, Susan I., John McK. Camp. 1996. The Date of the Third Period of the Pnyx. *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 65: 263–294.
- [69] Rubinstein, Lene. 2004. Stirring up Dicastic Anger. 187–203 in *Law, Rhetoric, and Comedy in Classical Athens. Essays in honour of Douglas M. MacDowell*, edited by Douglas L. Cairns and Ronald Arbuthnott Knox. Wales: Classical Press of Wales.

- [70] Rubinstein, Lene. 2005. Differentiated Rhetorical Strategies in the Athenian Courts. 129–145 in *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law*, edited by Michael Gagarin and David Cohen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- [71] Scherer, K. R. 2005. Unconscious Processes in Emotion: The Bulk of the Iceberg. 312–334 in *Emotion and Consciousness*, edited by Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal, Piotr Winkielman. London and New York: The Guilford Press.
- [72] Serafim, Andreas. 2015. Making the Audience: Ekphrasis and Rhetorical Strategy in Demosthenes 18 and 19. *Classical Quarterly* 65: 96–108.
- [73] Serafim, Andreas. 2017. *Attic Oratory and Performance*. London and New York: Routledge.
- [74] Serafim, Andreas. 2020. ΕΡΩΤΗΣΕΩΝ ΑΥΤΟΥΣ: Questions, Rhetorical Purpose, and Hypocrisis in Attic Forensic Oratory. 229–248 in *Law, Magic, and Oratory*, edited by Gerhard Thür, Sima Avramović, Andreja Katančević. Belgrade: University of Belgrade Faculty of Law.
- [75] Serafim, Andreas. 2021. “I, He, We, You, They”: Addresses to the Audience as a Means of Unity/Division in Attic Forensic Oratory. 71–98 in *The Rhetoric of Unity and Division in Ancient Literature*, edited by Andreas Michalopoulos, Andreas Serafim, Alessandro Vatri, Flaminia Beneventano della Corte. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.
- [76] Serafim, Andreas. 2021. *Religious Discourse in Attic Oratory and Politics*. London and New York: Routledge.
- [77] Serafim, Andreas. 2022. The Mood of Persuasion: Imperatives and Subjunctives in Attic Oratory. 299–317 in *Style and the City: Form and Functions of Language in Attic Oratory* (special issue in *Trends in Classics*), edited by Alessandro Vatri and Andreas Serafim.
- [78] Serafim, Andreas. Forthcoming. As in a Game of Minesweeper: Fakeness, Imprecision, and Truth about the Body in Attic Oratory. TBA in *Fake News in und aus der Antike: Formen und Funktionen von “Falschmeldungen” in der antiken griechischen Literatur und ihre Auswirkungen auf das moderne Verständnis*, edited by Amphilochos Papatomas, Diego De Brasi and Theofanis Tsiampokalos. *Mnemosyne Supplements*.
- [79] Sevillano, Arturo Barba, Radu Lacatis, Alicia Giménez, José Romero. 2008. Acoustics Vases in Ancient Theatres: Disposition, Analysis from the Ancient Tetracordal Musical System. *The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America* 123: 3604.

- [80] Sicking, Christiaan Marie Jan. 1991. The Distribution of Aorist and Present Tense Stem Forms in Greek, Especially in the Imperative. *Glotta* 69: 14–43, 154–170.
- [81] Silva, Laura. 2022. On Being Angry at Oneself. *Ratio* 35: 236–244.
- [82] Sinker, A.P. 1937. *A Verse-Translation of Lucretius Lucretius, De Rerutn Natura*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- [83] Sommerstein, Alan H. 1981. *The Comedies of Aristophanes*. Warminster: Aris & Phillips.
- [84] Sourvinou-Inwood, Christiane. 1988. Further Aspects of Polis Religion. *AION* 10: 259–274.
- [85] Sourvinou-Inwood, Christiane. 1990. What is Polis Religion? 295–322 in *The Greek City: From Homer to Alexander*, edited by Oswyn Murray and Simon Price. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [86] Tajfel, Henri, John. C. Turner. 1979. An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. 33–37 in *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, edited by William G. Austin, Stephen Worchel. Michigan: Brooks Cole Publishing.
- [87] Taplin, Oliver. 1999. Spreading the Word Through Performance. 33–57 in *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy*, edited by Simon Goldhill and Robin Osborne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- [88] Thomas, Rosalind. 2011. And You, the Dēmos, Made an Uproar: Performance, Mass Audiences, and Text in the Athenian Democracy. 161–187 in *Sacred Words: Orality, Literacy, and Religion*, edited by André P. M. H. Lardinois, Josine H. Blok and Marc G. M. van der Poel. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- [89] Thompson, Homer A., R. L. Scranton. 1943. Stoas and City Walls on the Pnyx. *Hesperia* 12: 269–383.
- [90] Valière, Jean-Christophe, Bénédicte Palazzo-Bertholon, Jean-Dominique Polack, Pauline Carvalho. 2013. Acoustic Pots in Ancient and Medieval Buildings: Literary Analysis of Ancient Texts and Comparison with Recent Observations in French Churches. *Acta Acustica united with Acustica* 99: 70–81.
- [91] Vovolis, Thanos, Giorgos Zamboulakis. 2007. The Acoustical Mask of Greek Tragedy. *Didaskalia* 7: 1–7.
- [92] Wiles, David. 1997. *Theatre and Citizenship: The History of a Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- [93] Wordsworth, Christopher. 1855. *Athens and Attica: Notes of a Tour*. London: John Murray.
- [94] Worthington, Ian. 2020. 'Fake News': The Greek Orators' Rhetorical Presentation of The Past. *Roda da Fortuna: Electronic Journal about Antiquity and Middle Ages* 9: 15–31.

FIGURES







Figure 1. The three phases of the Pnyx. Drawing by John Travlos. http://www.agathe.gr/democracy/the_eklesia.html (last visited: 20 February 2023).



(a) Pnyx I



(b) Pnyx II



(c) Pnyx III

Figure 2 (a-b-c). 3D models showing the evolution of the Pnyx assembly area and relative size of the three phases. Kim, Kyungyoon *et al.* 2015.



Figure 3. The Pnyx, about 500 BC. Model by C. Mammelis. Athens, Agora Museum. http://www.agathe.gr/democracy/the_ekklesia.html (last visited: 20 February 2023).



Figure 4a. The remnants of the *bēma*, the speaker's platform, on the Pnyx. Source: the author.



Figure 4b. The *diateichisma* – a new fortification wall behind the stoas, built in the 4th century BC. Source: the author.



Figure 4c. Remains of the retaining wall built during the third phase of the Pnyx's development. Source: the author.




Figure 5. The reconstruction of Vitruvius' *ēcheia* by R. Floriot (after Panckoucke's 1847 publication of Vitruvius). Source: Valière *et al.* 2013, 70–81.




Figure 6. Reconstruction of Vitruvius' information about the distribution of bronze acoustic pots in an ancient theatre. Source: Sevillano *et al.* 2008.



Figure 7. Acoustic pot that is embedded in the wall of the church of the Chartreuse Notre-Dame-du-Val-de-Bénédiction, Villeneuve-lès-Avignon, France. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acoustic_jar (last visited: 20 February 2023).



Figure 8. Clay pots used in the flooring system of the Hazine-i Evrak Building in Constantinople. Source: Atay, Gül (2021, 1–12, on p. 8).

Article history:
Received: 14. 10. 2022.
Accepted: 3. 3. 2023.