Blasfemija i krivično pravo - uporedno zakonodavstvo i judikatura

Abstract

Iako se dostojanstvo božanstva u uporednom zakonodavstvu više uglavnom ne smatra podobnim objektom krivično pravne zaštite, u savremenim pravnim sistemima se i danas sreću krivična dela kojima se štite verska osećanja građana. Međutim, nalik drugim krivičnim delima koja povređuju čast i ugled, protivpravnost takvih ponašanja često se dovodi u pitanje ako je uvredljivo izlaganje imalo kritičku notu, naročito ukoliko je bilo izneto u okviru nekog književnog ili umetničkog dela. U radu se prikazuje vrlo bogata uporedna sudska praksa nacionalnih sudova i Evropskog suda za ljudska prava koja se odnosi na blasfemno izražavanje, kao i relevantni međunarodni dokumenti.

Although the dignity of the deity is in comparative legislation no longer considered as an adequate object of criminal law protection, contemporary legal systems still contain crimes that protect the religious feelings of citizens. However, like other offenses that violate honor and reputation, the unlawfulness of such behavior is often called into question if offensive exposure has had a critical note, especially if it was revealed in a literary or artistic work. The paper presents a very rich comparative case law of the national courts and the European Court of Human Rights concerning blasphemous expression, as well as relevant international documents. Despite the strong efforts to promote the absolute inviolability of freedom of expression, at the cost of offending the religious feelings of citizens, existing international documents and current case-law show some caution in defining the limits of this freedom. If the European Convention on Human Rights already allows a number of restrictions on the freedom of expression, including the interests of public security, the prevention of disorder, protection of morals or the protection of reputation, it would be completely unreasonable if legislative bodies in one society, often multi confessional and vulnerable to incidents that shake religious feelings and the fragile stability of the community, would completely ignore the mockery of the essential content of a religious belief. On the other hand, one can not argue that the need for criminal justice protection of such values is less and less felt in modern irreligious European societies, where possible incriminations are more related to the potential consequences to the public order and peace. An extreme approach, which would ignore the existing normative framework, advocating for unlimited freedom of expression, would certainly not be a good starting point.