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dc.creatorSpaić, Bojan
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-11T15:00:56Z
dc.date.available2024-03-11T15:00:56Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.issn0003-2565
dc.identifier.urihttps://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1062
dc.description.abstractThe paper analyzes one of the main influences on the results of legal interpretation - epistemic authority. An account of authority is given along with a distinction between two basic types of authority, followed by a brief explanation of practical authority. Epistemic authority and derivative epistemic authority in particular are explained, in order to propose the conditions under which the influence of epistemic authority on judicial interpretation is justified. The general conclusion of the paper is the following: A court or judge Y is rationally justified to defer to the ascription of meaning (interpretation) p to a legal text q of person X, if court or judge Y has good reasons to believe that X has more knowledge, skills, experience or training in ascribing meaning to (interpreting) q.en
dc.publisherUniverzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.sourceAnali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
dc.subjectPractical Authorityen
dc.subjectLegal interpretationen
dc.subjectEpistemic authorityen
dc.subjectAuthorityen
dc.titleJustified epistemic authority (in legal interpretation)en
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.licenseBY
dc.citation.epage155
dc.citation.issue4
dc.citation.other66(4): 143-155
dc.citation.rankM24
dc.citation.spage143
dc.citation.volume66
dc.identifier.doi10.5937/AnaliPFB1804143S
dc.identifier.fulltexthttps://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/49/1059.pdf
dc.identifier.rcubconv_477
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion


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