Prikaz osnovnih podataka o dokumentu
Justified epistemic authority (in legal interpretation)
dc.creator | Spaić, Bojan | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-03-11T15:00:56Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-03-11T15:00:56Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0003-2565 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1062 | |
dc.description.abstract | The paper analyzes one of the main influences on the results of legal interpretation - epistemic authority. An account of authority is given along with a distinction between two basic types of authority, followed by a brief explanation of practical authority. Epistemic authority and derivative epistemic authority in particular are explained, in order to propose the conditions under which the influence of epistemic authority on judicial interpretation is justified. The general conclusion of the paper is the following: A court or judge Y is rationally justified to defer to the ascription of meaning (interpretation) p to a legal text q of person X, if court or judge Y has good reasons to believe that X has more knowledge, skills, experience or training in ascribing meaning to (interpreting) q. | en |
dc.publisher | Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd | |
dc.rights | openAccess | |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |
dc.source | Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu | |
dc.subject | Practical Authority | en |
dc.subject | Legal interpretation | en |
dc.subject | Epistemic authority | en |
dc.subject | Authority | en |
dc.title | Justified epistemic authority (in legal interpretation) | en |
dc.type | article | |
dc.rights.license | BY | |
dc.citation.epage | 155 | |
dc.citation.issue | 4 | |
dc.citation.other | 66(4): 143-155 | |
dc.citation.rank | M24 | |
dc.citation.spage | 143 | |
dc.citation.volume | 66 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.5937/AnaliPFB1804143S | |
dc.identifier.fulltext | https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/49/1059.pdf | |
dc.identifier.rcub | conv_477 | |
dc.type.version | publishedVersion |