Epistemic Authority and Legal Interpretation

Abstract

The relations between epistemic authority and legal interpretation have been widely neglected in contemporary legal theory. In this paper I’ll lay out the grounds for the discussion about the sociological and philosophical conceptions of power and authority in order to access their relevance for the theory of legal interpretation. The main hypothesis is that the problems of the practice of legal interpretations in contemporary legal systems are by and large solved not by resorting to philosophies of language nor by doctrines of legal interpretation, but by relying on various kinds of authorities. The paper will present (1) an analysis of authority that will lead to the kinds of authority that are relevant for legal interpretation and argue that (2) the proper way to understand these authorities is by employing the concept of institutional control of legal interpretation. The analysis substantiates the conclusion that authority is a key component of understanding judicial interpretation as a volitive or stipulative enterprise, without implications of arbitrariness.