EncroChat i SKY ECC komunikacija kao dokaz u krivičnom postupku

Abstract

U radu se razmatra problematika pravne prirode i dokaznog značaja podataka pribavljenih nadzorom i dekodiranjem kriptovanih komunikacionih platformi EncroChat i Sky ECC. Prvi deo rada bavi se načinom na koji je sproveden nadzor nad ovim platformama, pravnom uporištu takvih radnji, pravnom osnovu za dostavljanje pribavljenih podataka drugim državama, njihovoj oceni i daljoj upotrebi u krivičnom postupku. U drugom delu bavimo se pravnom prirodom pribavljenih podataka kroz dilemu da li se radilo o ciljanom nadzoru u krivičnom postupku ili masovnom nadzoru sprovedenom od strane obaveštajnih službi kao i praksom ESLJP vezanom za ova pitanja i zaštitu člana 8 EKLJP. Imajući u vidu da mnogi podaci vezani za otkrivanje i obelodanjivanje ovih platformi još uvek nisu dostupni javnosti, analiza je mahom rađena na osnovu raspoloživih izveštaja pojedinih organizacija i odluka donetih od strane sudova u Nemačkoj i Velikoj Britaniji.

Technological development and new forms of crime require redefinition of existing legal frameworks at domestic and international level. EncroChat and SkyEcc cases highlighted these problems, throwing the courts before the old Packer's dilemma, whether to give priority to crime control or due process model. While the protection of citizens' rights prevailed for many years, guided by the maxims that "the democracy of a society is measured by the provisions of its criminal procedure" and that "it is better 100 guilty persons to escape than that one innocent person suffer" it seems that in the era of information technologies, another model prevails, legitimizing almost unimaginable concepts such as mass surveillance of communications with derogation of the principle of territorial sovereignty. The "problem" escalated and came to the attention of many European countries after the "breaking" of the communication platforms EncroChat and SKY Ecc, which certainly contributed to the detection (and prevention) of numerous criminal acts by criminal groups, while at the same time opened many questions, starting from the method of discovering communication, delivering material to other countries and using it in criminal proceedings, the validity and admissibility of the so-called of "mass surveillance" that affects not only "criminals" but also "ordinary citizens", i.e. all users of certain communication platforms. The first part of the paper deals with the issues how these networks were break down, the legal basis for such actions, the legal basis for providing the obtained data to other countries, their evaluation and further use in criminal proceedings. As different countries have different procedural rules, the question is whether a domestic judge is authorized to evaluate the legality of evidence obtained abroad and according to what criteria? In this regard, a distinction is made between EU member states where European investigative orders and the principle of mutual recognition apply and other countries in the system of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. In the second part, we deal with the legal nature of the obtained data through the dilemma of whether it was targeted surveillance in criminal proceedings, or mass surveillance carried out by the intelligence services, as well as the ECtHR's practice related to these issues. Bearing in mind that these investigations are still under the "veil of silence", the study was based on Europol/Eurojust data and few publicly available decisions of courts in Germany and the United Kingdom about the admissibility of these evidence.