Princip akuzatornosti u krivičnom postupku

Abstract

U radu se izlažu osnovne specifičnosti principa akuzatornosti u krivičnom postupku. U članku se određuje opšte značenje i procesno dejstvo tog i drugih načela krivične procedure, uz isticanje da je princip akuzatornosti imanentan svim savremenim krivičnim postupcima, što se potom ilustruje i određenim primerima iz komparativnog prava. Prilikom definisanja principa akuzatornosti posebna se pažnja poklanja određivanju njegovog procesnog dejstva uz ukazivanje na njegovu povezanost sa principom oficijelnosti, te sa procesnom mogućnošću supsidijarne optužbe. Posebno se obrađuju izuzeci od principa akuzatornosti, koji se u našem krivičnom postupku prvenstveno sreću u skraćenom postupku, te u postupku prema maloletnicima, mada određenih inkvizicionih elemenata ima i u opštem krivičnom postupku, prvenstveno u istrazi. U radu je izložen i osvrt na skučenu primenu principa akuzatornosti u postupku pred 'Haškim tribunalom'. U radu se ističe da se osnovni ratio legis delovanja principa akuzatornosti u krivičnom postupku, temelji na potrebi stvaranja osnovnih normativnih uslova za vođenje pravičnog krivičnog postupka, što se omogućava i temeljnim pravilom striktnog odvajanja procesnih funkcija. U tome se ogleda i povezanost načela optužbe sa principom monofunkcionalnosti, a što u opštem smislu predstavlja i neophodni conditio sine qua non za korektno i nepristrasno odvijanje krivične procedure.

According to the provision of art. 17, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act, criminal proceedings shall be initiated by a regrets of the authorized prosecutor, which means establishing the accusatory principle, i.e. that there may be no criminal proceedings in the absence of an authorized prosecutor, according to the rule - nemo iudex sine autore. This makes possible the strict separation of the functions - of accusation, defense and trial, which were assimilated in the inquisitorial procedure. In case of officially prosecuted crimes, the accusatory principle includes the official principle, according to which criminal proceedings are initiated officially (provided that all the conditions established by the law are fulfilled) by the authorized prosecutor as a representative of the state authority in that domain - the public (state) prosecutor, regardless of the attitude of the person whose personal or proprietary rights have been violated or threatened by committal of a crime. The accusatory principle may be defined as a rule according to which proceedings may only be initiated on the basis of the appropriate request - the indictment (materialized accusation in a legally defined form), submitted according to legally defined conditions by the person having the quality of authorized prosecutor (initial effect), and that this prosecutor remains by his request, with the possibility of its modification according to the law (e.g. alteration or extension of accusation) until the end of criminal proceedings, with a procedural possibility in certain cases of a legally regulated succession of authorized prosecutors (subsidiary charge, as well as the possibility of certain persons to continue proceedings in case of death of the injured as a prosecutor or the private prosecutor). The existence of the authorized prosecutor (as the active party of the proceedings) and his indictment as regulated by the law (a procedural means enabling the initiating of proceedings) are also necessary procedural assumptions both for the initiating of proceedings and for its continuation. The very fact of the existence of indictment obliges the court to decide upon the request it contains and pass a corresponding judgement. In this case, which is implied by the fact that the existence of the accusation is a necessary procedural assumption, the court is officially obliged to take care during the proceedings whether the person acting as prosecutor in criminal proceedings is the authorized prosecutor, and whether the accusation still exists in procedural sense. The authorized prosecutor may during any phase of the proceedings withdraw the accusation, and the consequences of this withdrawal are, viewed from the aspect of the further course of the proceedings, always the same, preventing the further course of the proceedings. In the proceedings before 'The Hague Tribunal' ('International Tribunal for War Crimes Committed at the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991'), the prosecutor may according to the accusatory principle bring charges and thereby initiate proceedings. But when the proceedings are already in progress, which is manifested by confirmation of the indictment, the prosecutor no longer has the right of accusation in a full measure, because he is no longer authorized to withdraw, but instead may do this only with the approval of the judge who has previously confirmed the indictment (conditional sustaining effect of the accusatory principle). This practically introduces a unique system of a 'double key' for closure of trial due to withdrawal of the prosecutor, which is a clear example of departure from the accusatory principle, together with the assimilation of the functions of accusation and trial. The ratio legis of the accusatory principle is based upon the need for creating the basic normative conditions for carrying out fair criminal proceedings, which is also made possible by a fundamental rule of strict separation of the procedural functions in passing a judgement, i.e. carrying out of criminal proceedings for the purpose of passing a specific decision, (criminal court in appropriate functional forms) and in accusation (the authorized prosecutor, which in our law of criminal procedure may bees the public (state) prosecutor, the injured person as a prosecutor, and the private prosecutor). Practically this means respecting the well known postulates of the jurists of antiquity - Nemo iudex sine actore - No judge without a prosecutor - (No trial without a prosecutor), i.e. Nemo duobus utatur officials - No one may perform two duties.