Izvršilaštvo i saučesništvo kroz nečinjenje

Abstract

Nečinjenje je strukturalno različito od činjenja, tako da se kod krivičnih dela izvršenih nečinjenjem dodatno otežava utvrđivanje radnje izvršenja i uzročnosti, a posebno je otežano razgraničenje izvršilaštva i sučesništva. Izvršilaštvo, kao i saučesništvo kod izvršenja dela nečinjenjem, je zakonska mogućnost (čl. 15 KZ), kojom se razlikuju prava i neprava krivična dela nečinjenja. Saučesništvo kroz nečinjenje može doći u obzir kod izvršenja krivičnog dela činjenjem i nečinjenjem i može se sagledavati u relacijama: prvo, saučesništvo činjenjem u delu nečinjenja; drugo, saučesništvo nečinjenjem u delu činjenja; i treće, saučesništvo nečinjenjem u delu nečinjenja. U prvom slučaju moguće je saučesništvo, kao i podstrekavanje i pomaganje, a u drugom i trećem isključeno je podstrekavanje, a moguće je pomaganje, kao i saizvršenje. Odgovornost garanta može biti utemeljena kako na imperativnim, tako i na prohibitivnim normama. Tako se, pored nespornih slučajeva koji se temelje na imperativnim normama, sve više proširuje odgovornosti garanta za pravne dužnosti, koje predstavljaju određene društvene dužnosti (zajednica života, krvno ili tazbinsko srodstvo i sl.), ali se ne može odrediti generalna obaveza na dužnosti činjenja, već to zavisi od okolnosti svakog konkretnog slučaja. Autor smatra da je razgraničenje izvršilaštva i saučesništva kod nečinjenja najadekvatnije prema socijalno-personalnoj teoriji.

Criminal offences committed by omission or failure to act duly are in many respects specific and distinct from offences committed by acts and are, therefore, considered structurally different and cannot be equaled. Commission by omission is stipulated as a criminal offence in Article 15 of the Criminal Code, while the law makes no mention of complicity by omission to act (instigating and aiding). Complicity by omission is, therefore, determined by theoretical considerations which are based on general and specific provisions of the Criminal Code and jurisprudence. Omission by an accomplice to act contributes to the commission of an offence through some form of failure to act duly. Legal duties are functionally associated with a specific guarantor of such duties and by omitting to act on any duties assumed or imposed by the law such guarantor becomes an offender. In this context, the guarantor as an accomplice by omission (explicitly abettor) may become relevant and contribute to the commission of an offence. The liability of the guarantor (offender or accomplice) may be based both on imperative and on prohibitive norms. Thus, in addition to the undisputed cases based on imperative norms, the liability of the guarantor is increasingly interpreted to also include duties based on prohibitive norms, i.e. legal duties which represent specific social duties (community of life, blood or in-law relationship, etc.). However, it is not possible to provide for a general obligation based on the duty to act; instead, this is defined according to the circumstances of each individual case. The Criminal Code incorporates the foundations for broader legal duties and broader grounds for liability and punishability of a guarantor (offender or accomplice) for omission. Complicity by omission is possible in committing an offence by acting and filing to act, explicitly in the form of aiding, while the possibility of instigation by omission is ruled out. While it is accepted that there are no general criteria for distinguishing commission from complicity, the most plausible ones appear to be those based on the social and personal theory. The latest scientific discussions of the distinctions between commission and complicity by omission have offered various opinions, rooted not in the theory of complicity, but in the unresolved core issues of the dogmatics of omission.