Coercive enforcement and a positivist theory of legal obligation

dc.creator	Himma, Einar Kenneth
dc.date.accessioned	2024-05-21T10:56:19Z
dc.date.available	2024-05-21T10:56:19Z
dc.date.issued	2012
dc.identifier.issn	0003-2565
dc.identifier.uri	https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1550
dc.description.abstract	The concept of legal obligation is utterly central to legal practice. But positivism lacks a comprehensive account of legal obligation, focusing only on the second-order recognition obligations of officials with no account of the first-order legal obligations of citizen. As legal obligations are conceptually related to legally valid norms, this failure calls into question positivism’s theory of legal validity. In this essay, I develop Hart’s account of social obligation and supplement his account of the second-order legal obligations of official qua official with an account of the first-order obligations of citizens. The latter is constituted, I argue, by social pressure in the form of the authorization of the state’s coercive machinery for non-compliance.	en
dc.rights	openAccess
dc.source	Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
dc.subject	legal positivism	en
dc.subject	legal obligation	en
dc.subject	enforcement	en
dc.subject	coercion	en
dc.title	Coercive enforcement and a positivist theory of legal obligation	en
dc.type	article
dc.rights.license	CC BY
dc.citation.epage	242
dc.citation.issue	3
dc.citation.other	60(3): 216-242
dc.citation.rank	M24
dc.citation.spage	216
dc.citation.volume	60
dc.identifier.rcub	conv_3101
dc.type.version	publishedVersion

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