Promena poverioca ili novacija i zastarelost

Abstract

Primena opštih i na izgled stabilnih ustanova građanskog prava s vremena na vreme (ipak) dovede do novih i ozbiljnih kontroverzi u primeni prava. Takav slučaj često biva kada stare ustanove treba primeniti na odnose naknadno preuređene specijalnim zakonima donetim za neku posebnu situaciju. Nedovoljna usklađenost posebnih i opštih normi tada može dovesti do odstupanja od opšteusvojenih principa građanskog prava i sporne prakse koja prouzrokuje pravnu nesigurnost. Takav slučaj je nastao nakon što je država (Srbija odnosno SR Jugoslavija) sporazumom sa stranim poveriocima okupljenim u tzv. Londonski i Pariski klub poverilaca preuzela i počela da izmiruje dugove domaćih banaka za koje je bila garant. Po opštim pravilima obligacionog prava to je dovelo do subrogacije države u potraživanja stranih poverilaca prema tim bankama, a po posebnim zakonima tim povodom donetim i do i konverzije tako stečenih potraživanja države u kapital banaka čije je dugove platila, a zatim, naročito s obzirom na njihov stečaj, i do nastojanja da se zakonom uspostavi direktna pravnu veza sa krajnjim dužnicima, kojima su banke dalje plasirale sredstva u pitanju. Kada su docnije ova potraživanja (prema korisnicima) utužena, dužnici su se pozvali na zastarelost. Privredni sudovi su najčešće - u tom smislu je njihova praksa praktično jedinstvena - odbijali ovaj prigovor, pozivajući se na različite, međusobno isključujuće razloge: da je plaćanjem stranom poveriocu od strane države nastala sasvim nova obligacija, da je to obligacija iz pravno neosnovanog obogaćenja i da ona nije zastarela, da je plaćanjem došlo do novacije, da je nastupio prekid (prvobitnog) toka zastarelosti, da je u pitanju zakonska obligacija. Istovrsne meritorne odluke i potpuno različiti osnovi za njihovo donošenje pokazuju da je jedinstvenost prividna i da sudovi lutaju u primeni tako stare ustanove kao što je zastarelost. U tekstu su, iz ugla obligacionog prava kome ustanova zastarelosti pripada,, kritikovana rešenja odnosno razlozi na koje su se sudovi pozivali, pokazana je njihova nezakonitost, istovremeno i podržan stav Vrhovnog kasacionog suda koji je (u manjem broju odluka) našao da ustanovi zastarelosti ima mesta, jer promena poverioca, sama po sebi, ne može uticati na zastarelost potraživanja.

Application of general and seemingly well-established institutes of civil law is bound to provoke a controversy at some point in time. This is often so when the old institutes are to be applied to relationships which have been regulated by subsequently enacted special legislation. Lack of coordination and harmonization between the general and the special rules might result in departure from the generally accepted principle and bring about controversial practice, eroding legal certainty. One of such cases arose after Serbia (i.e. FR Yugoslavia) reached agreements with so-called Paris and London creditors clubs and took over debts of the domestic banks, the very debts it has guaranteed for. Pursuant to the general rules of the contract law this brought about subrogation of the State into the claims of the foreign banks vis-a-vis the banks. Pursuant to the legislation enacted subsequently and dealing specifically with this matter, the amount of the assumed debts was converted into shares of the State in the banks it has shielded from their creditors. Furthermore, given that the banks have ended in bankruptcy, the State has attempted to establish a direct legal link to the end users of the credits that the banks drew from the foreign creditors. When these claims were brought before the courts, the debtors invoked statute of limitations which has time-barred the original claims. Commercial courts were - on most ocassions, and almost uniformly - quick to reject such objection, offering widely different, and even contradictory, explanations: that payment to the foreign creditors resulted in a completely new obligation, that the obligation in question stems from unjust enrichment and is thus not time-barred, that the payment resulted in novatio, that the run of the original period of the statute of limitations was interrupted and paused, that the obligation in question stems from the statute itself. The discrepancy among the explanations shows that the uniformity of the final holdings (operative parts of the judgments) is deceptive and that the courts are at a loss when having to apply a well-known and established institute of statute of limitations. This paper offers detailed analysis of the case law and critique of the reasonings offered by the courts. At the same time, the paper offers reasons why a somewhat smaller number of decisions of the Supreme Court of Cassation arrived to a correct conclusion that the claims were time-barred, since the change of creditors cannot affect the run of the statute of limitations.