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dc.creatorSpaak, Torben
dc.date.accessioned2024-05-21T11:18:13Z
dc.date.available2024-05-21T11:18:13Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.issn0003-2565
dc.identifier.urihttps://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1809
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I argue that legal philosophers ought to focus more on problems of legal reasoning. This is a field with many philosophically interesting questions to consider, but also, a field in which legal philosophers can contribute the most to the study and the practice of law. Neither legal practitioners nor legal scholars reason with the same care and precision as philosophers do. Against this background, I suggest that the following three types of questions regarding legal reasoning are especially worthy of serious consideration. The first is that of the relevance of the theory of reasons holism to legal reasoning. The second is the question of how to analyze (first-order) legal statements in a way that does not undermine the rationality of legal reasoning. And the third is the question of whether legal arguments are to be understood as deductive arguments, inductive arguments, or both, and if so how.en
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.sourceAnali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
dc.subjectReasons holismen
dc.subjectNature of lawen
dc.subjectLegal statementsen
dc.subjectLegal reasoningen
dc.subjectConceptual engineeringen
dc.titleLegal philosophy and the study of legal reasoningen
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.licenseCC BY
dc.citation.epage811
dc.citation.issue4
dc.citation.other69(4): 795-811
dc.citation.spage795
dc.citation.volume69
dc.identifier.doi10.51204/Anali_PFBU_21405A
dc.identifier.fulltexthttps://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/2026/1802.pdf
dc.identifier.rcubconv_3374_6
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion


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