| dc.description.abstract | Generative artificial intelligence in the form of chatbots based on
large language models (LLMs) has taken the world of law by storm. Philosophy of
law is struggling to catch up with the theoretical significance of the advent of
technological development and the way it may modify traditionally established
understanding of legal phenomena, such as law-creation and authority. In this
sense, for the most part, heated philosophical debates have circled around a
normative question: ‘Should AI create and interpret law?’. Much less attention has
been given to a different, albeit previous, question: ‘Can AI create and interpret law?’
That is, is AI capable of producing outputs that can be deemed as ‘law’ (at least, law as
we know it)? Can AI be a ‘legal author’? This paper explores this unattended question
and endeavours to provide some provisional answers. In the first part, we define legal
authority, legal authorship, and legal interpretation and claim that the intention of a
determinate authoritative author is often considered the condition of the possibility
of creating and interpreting contemporary legal texts. In the second part, we argue
that LLM AI, in general, and ChatGPT, in particular, generate legal texts without
having any intention. In the third part, we consider the positions of the authors that
downplay or even eliminate intention from the discussions about the legal character
of prescriptive texts. 4. Finally, we argue that there are good reasons to side with the
second group of authors. The ability of agents without intentions, like ChatGPT, to
create legal text is an argument in favour of the thesis that law can be created without
intention behind the creation and that nonintentional creation can be interpreted to
arrive at legal norms. | sr |
