| dc.description.abstract | Th e relationship between law and coercion is perhaps one of the most controversial
topics in legal philosophy – a topic that has made quite a comeback in legal discussion
in recent decades aft er a period of apparent abandonment. 1 On the basis of various
analytical criteria, a broad, complex spectrum of positions on this relationship can be
reconstructed. For example, if one analyses the necessary or essential conditions of
concepts, positions on the question of whether ‘ coercion ’ is an essential or necessary
element of ‘ law ’ range from a strong affi rmative 2 to a strong negative, 3 including positions
that question the way the question is posed. 4 Furthermore, if one analyses the
nature or type of element, the positions range from coercion as an instrumental element
(function or use) 5 to coercion as a substantive element (content or object) 6 of law.
Finally, leaving aside the analysis in terms of essential or necessary conditions, the positions
include law as a type of coercion, coercion as the distinctive feature of law qua
social normative order, coercion as the most prominent or salient feature of law qua
social normative order, 7 and coercion as one of the central or paradigmatic features
of law. | sr |
