Odmeravanje naknade štete prema vrednosti koju je stvar imala za oštećenika

Abstract

Prema odredbi čl. 189, st. 4 srpskog Zakona o obligacionim odnosima, ako je neka oštećenikova stvar uništena ili oštećena krivičnim delom učinjenim sa umišljajem, sud može da odredi visinu naknade štete prema vrednosti koju je stvar imala za oštećenika. Neka pitanja u vezi sa primenom tog pravila ostala su sporna u pravnoj teoriji i praksi domaćih sudova. Prvo pitanje tiče se prirode pravila o odmeravanju naknade prema vrednosti koju je stvar imala za oštećenika. Da li je reč o subjektivnom merilu naknade imovinske štete ili o afekcionoj vrednosti oštećene ili uništene stvari kao obliku moralne štete? Drugo, da li se pomenuta norma primenjuje kada, prema pravilima o građanskoj odgovornosti za drugoga, neko drugi, a ne sam štetnik, odgovara za štetu pričinjenu umišljajnim krivičnim delom? I treće, može li, za potrebe primene posebnog pravila o odmeravanju naknade štete, parnični sud da rešava o postojanju umišljajnog krivičnog dela kao o prethodnom pitanju?.

Under Art. 189, para. 4 of Serbian Law on Obligations (LoO), if a thing is damaged or destroyed by an intentional criminal act, the court may calculate and award damages according to the value the thing had for the damaged party. Some issues regarding understanding and application of this rule remained unresolved both in the Serbian legal doctrine, and in the practice of Serbian courts. The first question is whether the aforesaid rule relates to (1) a special, subjective method of calculation of damages in case of patrimonial damage, more precisely damage to, or destruction of a corporeal thing, or to (2) pain and suffering due to damage to, or loss of a thing, which may only qualify as a type of moral, non-patrimonial damage. Secondly, there is no conclusive answer as to the question of applicability of Art. 189, para. 4 LoO in the event of vicarious liability. And thirdly, there is an open question of whether civil courts may decide on the existence of an intentional criminal act as a preliminary issue or not, and if they may, then under what conditions. Firstly, the author maintains that there are strong arguments to uphold the idea that Art. 189, para. 4 LoO lays down a special, subjective method of calculation of patrimonial damage, but doubts the need of keeping such rule in the context of principle of integral compensation, which is one of the fundamental principles of Serbian tort law. On the second matter, the author supports the idea that the aforesaid rule should also apply in the event of vicarious liability, that is against a person liable for the consequences of the wrongdoer's actions, irrespective of grounds of their civil liabilities. In the end, the author maintains that question of whether an intentional criminal act was performed by the wrongdoer or not, may be resolved before civil courts as a preliminary issue, except for the case where criminal court has already decided on the merits, i.e. handed down either a condemnatory, or a verdict of acquittal.