Zastarelost potraživanja naknade štete prouzrokovane krivičnim delom

Abstract

Dva su pitanja u središtu ovoga rada. Prvo je važenje privilegovanog roka zastarelosti iz čl. 377, st. 1 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima. Da li produženi rok zastarelosti potraživanja naknade štete prouzrokovane krivičnim delom važi samo prema štetniku ili i prema licu koje za štetnika odgovara? Drugo se tiče mogućnosti da parnični sud, za potrebe primene pomenutog privilegovanog roka, rešava o postojanju krivičnog dela kao prethodnom pitanju. Autor navodi argumente u prilog tvrdnji da produženi rok zastarelosti prava na naknadu štete koja je pričinjena krivičnim delom važi prema štetniku, kao i prema svakom licu koje za štetu odgovara po pravilima o odgovornosti za drugoga, bez obzira na osnov te odgovornosti. I drugo, autor smatra da parnični sud može da utvrđuje postojanje krivičnog dela kao pravnog odnosa koji nije predmet spora, ali od kojeg zavisi meritorna odluka, izuzev ako je u krivičnom postupku protiv štetnika kao učinioca krivičnog dela doneta pravnosnažna osuđujuća ili oslobađajuća presuda. Domaći sudovi već šezdeset godina lutaju u potrazi za odgovorima na ova pitanja, a Komisija za izradu građanskog zakonika još uvek nije dala konačan predlog pravila o privilegovanom roku zastarelosti.

Two questions are in the main focus of this paper. Firstly, whether the prolonged prescription period in case of damage caused by a criminal act (Art. 377, para 1, Serbian Law on Obligations) runs solely against a wrongdoer, or also against a person who is vicariously liable for damage caused by the wrongdoer. Secondly, whether civil courts may decide on the existence of a criminal act as a preliminary issue or not, and if they may, under what conditions. The practice of national courts with respect to these issues is unsettled for the past sixty years, and the national Civil Code Drafting Commission has not, as yet, put out a final proposal of a rule on prolonged prescription period. On the first matter, the author offers linguistic, historical, functional, economic and other arguments supporting the idea that the extended prescription period should run both against the wrongdoer who has caused damage by performing a criminal act, and against person liable for the consequences of the wrongdoer's actions, irrespective of grounds of their civil liabilities. Furthermore, the author maintains that question of whether a criminal act was performed by the wrongdoer or not, may be resolved before civil courts as a preliminary issue, except for the case where criminal court has decided on the merits, i.e. handed down either a condemnatory, or a verdict of acquittal.