Pluralizam ustava ili ustavnih činilaca? Konstitucionalizacija prava Evropske unije i podeljena suverenost

Abstract

Učenje o ustavnom pluralizmu smatra se podobnim za razumevanje i praćenje promena same EU i posebno njene pravne prirode. Izvan te specifične svrhe, ustavni pluralizam ima veoma ograničenu primenjivost za dublje razumevanje pravne prirode EU. U istorijskoj perspektivi je teško pronaći primer političke zajednice u kojoj je više ustavnih sistema postojalo naporedo. Razlikovanje evolutivne od revolucionarne ustavnosti izgleda veoma primenljivo na primeru Evropske unije, budući da je samo u slučaju evolutivne ustavnosti moguće postojanje jednog drugog pluralizma - pluralizma ustavnih činilaca. Imajući u vidu arhitekturu Evropske unije, primenljivost modela evolutivne ustavnosti čini se daleko većom od pojma ustavnog pluralizma. Evolutivna ustavnost takođe dozvoljava i podeljenu suverenost, što dalje znači i pojmovno razdvajanje suverenosti od države budući da se EU ne može smatrati državom. Podeljena suverenost ne znači odustajanje od vrednosti demokratske vladavine i odgovorne vlade.

The doctrine of constitutional pluralism is considered to be an appropriate method for understanding and monitoring changes of the EU itself and, particularly, of its legal nature. Apart from such specific use, constitutional pluralism as a concept has very limited applicability in describing the legal nature of the EU. From a historical perspective, it is difficult to identify a single political community in which several constitutional systems coexisted. The European Union is a fine example of the differentiation between evolutive and revolutionary constitutions, for only in the case of evolutive constitutions is it possible to recognize another type of pluralism - the pluralism of constitutional factors. Considering the overall picture of the European Union, the applicability of the model of evolutive constitutionality seems to be far greater than the usefulness of the concept of constitutional pluralism. The concept of evolutive constitutionality is capable of allowing for the possibility that sovereignty may be divisible. This would also entail a conceptual decoupling of the quality of sovereignty from the concept of state, for it is evident that the European Union may not be regarded as a state. Divisible sovereignty does not amount to abandonment of the values of democratic governance and an accountable government.