Show simple item record

dc.creatorIlić, Goran
dc.creatorMajić, Miodrag
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-11T14:27:00Z
dc.date.available2024-03-11T14:27:00Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.issn0003-2565
dc.identifier.urihttps://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/695
dc.description.abstractThe paper analyzes reasonable possibilities of finding the truth in modern criminal proceedings. Instead of the often uncritical, and sometimes even populist referring to the so-called principle of 'material truth' as the main objective of criminal proceedings in continental legal tradition, the authors point out that the nature, importance and limits of finding the truth in criminal proceedings must be perceived in relation to other values included in the modern procedure, such as the presumption of innocence, adversary principle, equality of arms, the rules in dubio pro reo etc. Therefore, in a brief overview of the relevant philosophical movements, the authors first point out that the very notion of truth, which is inevitably philosophical, is inaccessible and enigmatic. It is highlighted that referring to the truth as an objective which should be reached in criminal proceedings is often a specific alibi for many open issues inherent to the system of criminal justice coercion. It is specifically high­lighted that due to its 'normative ' nature, judicial truth inevitably differs from scientific, philosophical, ethical or aesthetic truth, and that under the modern circumstances it also has a number of 'rivals ' in the form of the value of criminal procedure it must be harmonized with. The authors believe that modern criminal procedure is most appropriately demonstrated in the so-called 'adversary' model of process which is a unique mixture of solutions taken from the two major legal systems. Instead of insisting on pure solutions taken from the continental or Anglo-American legal heritage, the authors propose a formula which includes adequate solutions of both systems. The obligation of the prosecutor to prove the allegations of indictment in discussion with the defense, together with the judicial restraint in the search for evidence supporting the indictment and the possibility to introduce evidence ex officio in favour of the defense could eliminate the most significant objections raised in both systems. Thus, adversary proceeding would be spared from the complaints regarding its lack of efficiency when it comes to the accused without the professional support, while the inquisitorial procedure would cease to be a mechanism in which the court, searching for truth, could call into question its own impartiality and the presumption of innocence of the accused.en
dc.publisherUniverzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.sourceAnali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
dc.subjectTruthen
dc.subjectObjective of criminal proceedingsen
dc.subjectInquisitorial proceedingsen
dc.subjectIn dubio pro reoen
dc.subjectEvidenceen
dc.subjectEquityen
dc.subjectEquality of armsen
dc.subjectAdversarial proceedingsen
dc.titleNature, importance and limits of finding the truth in criminal proceedingsen
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.licenseBY
dc.citation.epage100
dc.citation.issue3
dc.citation.other61(3): 82-100
dc.citation.rankM24
dc.citation.spage82
dc.citation.volume61
dc.identifier.fulltexthttps://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/432/692.pdf
dc.identifier.rcubconv_318
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record