dc.creator | Spaić, Bojan | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-03-11T14:37:26Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-03-11T14:37:26Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0352-7875 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/799 | |
dc.description.abstract | The article examines the inadequacies of different approaches in defining the concept of law in legal theory and suggests that by categorizing the concept of law as essentially contested we can account for permanent conceptual disputes in legal theory. The author argues that the concept of law fits five descriptive criteria for essential contestedness suggested by Walter Bryce Gallie. It is further suggested that by taking this point of view makes us deflate the value of definitions understood in terms of necessary and universally valid explanations of a concept, and emphasize the importance of different conceptions of key concepts in legal theory. | en |
dc.publisher | Croatian Philosophical Soc, Zagreb | |
dc.rights | openAccess | |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ | |
dc.source | Synthesis Philosophica | |
dc.subject | philosophy of law | en |
dc.subject | legal theory | en |
dc.subject | essential contestedness | en |
dc.subject | concept of law | en |
dc.title | On the Essential Contestedness of the Concept of Law Gallie's Framework for Essentially Contested Concepts Applied to the Law | en |
dc.type | article | |
dc.rights.license | BY-NC | |
dc.citation.epage | 189 | |
dc.citation.issue | 1 | |
dc.citation.other | 29(1): 175-189 | |
dc.citation.spage | 175 | |
dc.citation.volume | 29 | |
dc.identifier.rcub | conv_3330 | |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-84929088292 | |
dc.identifier.wos | 000354763000011 | |
dc.type.version | publishedVersion | |