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dc.creatorSpaić, Bojan
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-11T14:37:26Z
dc.date.available2024-03-11T14:37:26Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.issn0352-7875
dc.identifier.urihttps://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/799
dc.description.abstractThe article examines the inadequacies of different approaches in defining the concept of law in legal theory and suggests that by categorizing the concept of law as essentially contested we can account for permanent conceptual disputes in legal theory. The author argues that the concept of law fits five descriptive criteria for essential contestedness suggested by Walter Bryce Gallie. It is further suggested that by taking this point of view makes us deflate the value of definitions understood in terms of necessary and universally valid explanations of a concept, and emphasize the importance of different conceptions of key concepts in legal theory.en
dc.publisherCroatian Philosophical Soc, Zagreb
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.sourceSynthesis Philosophica
dc.subjectphilosophy of lawen
dc.subjectlegal theoryen
dc.subjectessential contestednessen
dc.subjectconcept of lawen
dc.titleOn the Essential Contestedness of the Concept of Law Gallie's Framework for Essentially Contested Concepts Applied to the Lawen
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.licenseBY-NC
dc.citation.epage189
dc.citation.issue1
dc.citation.other29(1): 175-189
dc.citation.spage175
dc.citation.volume29
dc.identifier.rcubconv_3330
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84929088292
dc.identifier.wos000354763000011
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion


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