Pravda i pravo - novi odgovori na staro pitanje

Abstract

U članku se analizira odnos dva koncepta: koncepta pravednog delanja i koncepta prava. Pri tome se sledi uvid savremenih pravnih filozofa, i to onih s obe strane 'borbene linije' u jurisprudenciji (i pozitivista i jusnaturalista), koji smatraju da je pogrešno da se taj odnos svodi na pitanje da li je nepravedno (ili nemoralno) pravo, to jest da li je važeće pravo ili nije. Ipak, to ne znači da ne postoje nužne ili značajne veze između pravde i prava koje jurisprudencija treba da utvrdi i koje će nam pomoći da bolje razumemo 'naš' pravni sistem i vlastitu socijalnu praksu. Nakon analize dva koncepta, dolazi se do zaključka, prvo, da su dve ključne veze između pravde (pravednog delanja) i prava u tome da je pravo podobno da bude procenjivano kao pravedno ili nepravedno i, drugo, da pravo treba da ostvaruje pravdu. Iz te dve nužne veze proističe da pravo koje ne ostvaruje formalnu pravdu i proceduralnu pravdu, konceptualno gledano, ne može da bude posmatrano kao tipičan pravni sistem već kao 'defektno' ili izopačeno pravo.

In the article, the author analyzes the relationship between two concepts: the concept of a just action and the concept of the law. In doing so, he follows insight of contemporary legal philosophers, those on both sides of the 'front lines' in the jurisprudence (positivists as well as natural law theorists), according to which it is wrong to confine that relationship to the question of whether Lex injusta has legal validity or not. However, this does not mean that there are no essential or significant relationships between the two concepts. The task of jurisprudence is to deal with these questions and in that respect help us to better understand of 'our' own legal system and social practices. After analyzing the two concepts, it can be concluded, first, that the two key links between justice (just action), and the law is that the law is 'justice-apt', and second, that the law is the kind of thing that ought to be just. From these two necessary connections, it follows that the law which does not succeed to actualize so-called formal 'justice' and procedural justice, conceptually speaking, can not be recognized as a typical legal system, but can be regarded as the 'defective' or perverted law.