Prikaz osnovnih podataka o dokumentu
Dva poimanja pravnih principa
Two conceptions of legal principles
dc.creator | Spaić, Bojan | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-03-11T14:54:22Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-03-11T14:54:22Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0003-2565 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/982 | |
dc.description.abstract | Klasično shvatanje pravnih principa kao najopštijih normi pravnog poretka razmatra se u ovom radu kritički, iz perspektive Dvorkinovog i Aleksijevog shvatanja pravnih principa kao prima facie naloga za djelovanje. Za razliku od uvreženog stanovišta u teoriji prava na ovim prostorima, koje u krajnjoj liniji dovodi u pitanje pravne principe kao naloge za djelovanje, pokazuje se da je drugačije shvatanje pravnih principa značajno za pravnu praksu te sljedstveno i za pravnu dogmatiku. Heuristička plodnost razumijevanja principa kao optimizacionih komandi jasno se sagledava kada se oni povežu s analizom proporcionalnosti kao osnovnim načinom primjene pravnih principa. Taj se način razlikuje od supsumptivnog načina primjene pravnih pravila. Teorija principa koju izlažu Dvorkin i Aleksi pokazuje se u tom smislu kao normativno i deskriptivno bolja od drugačijih shvatanja, ali ima i manjkavosti, koje se, prije svega, ogledaju u tome što ne sadrži precizne upute za ex ante razlikovanje i klasifikaciju pravnih normi na pravila i principe. | sr |
dc.description.abstract | The paper discusses the classical understanding of legal principles as the most general norms of a legal order, confronting it with Dworkin's and Alexy's understanding of legal principles as prima facie, unconditional commands. The analysis shows that the common, classical conception brings into question the status of legal principles as norms, by disreguarding their usefulness in judicial reasoning, while, conversely, the latterhas significant import forlegal practice and consequently for legal dogmatics. It is argued that the heuristic fruitfulness of understanding principles as optimization commands thusbecomesapparent. When we understand the relation of priciples to the idea of proportionality, as thespecific mode of their application, which is different from the supsumtive mode of applying rules, the theory of legal principles advanced by Dworkin and Alexy appears therefore to be descriptively better than others, but not without its flaws. | en |
dc.publisher | Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd | |
dc.rights | openAccess | |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |
dc.source | Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu | |
dc.subject | Ronald Dvorkin | sr |
dc.subject | Robert Aleksi | sr |
dc.subject | proporcionalnost | sr |
dc.subject | pravno rasuđivanje | sr |
dc.subject | pravni principi | sr |
dc.subject | pravna pravila | sr |
dc.subject | balansiranje | sr |
dc.subject | Ronald Dworkin | en |
dc.subject | Robert Alexy | en |
dc.subject | proportionality | en |
dc.subject | legal rules | en |
dc.subject | legal reasoning | en |
dc.subject | legal principles | en |
dc.subject | balancing | en |
dc.title | Dva poimanja pravnih principa | sr |
dc.title | Two conceptions of legal principles | en |
dc.type | article | |
dc.rights.license | BY | |
dc.citation.epage | 130 | |
dc.citation.issue | 1 | |
dc.citation.other | 65(1): 109-130 | |
dc.citation.rank | M24 | |
dc.citation.spage | 109 | |
dc.citation.volume | 65 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.5937/AnaliPFB1701109S | |
dc.identifier.fulltext | https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/568/979.pdf | |
dc.identifier.rcub | conv_418 | |
dc.type.version | publishedVersion |