TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvetković, Valentina
AU  - Vuletić, Vladimir
PY  - 2022
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1362
AB  - Ugovor o nalogu (mandatum) nastao je u rimskom pravu. Na temelju tog ugovora uređeno je posredno zastupanje. Prve moderne građanske kodifikacije priznaju neposredno zastupanje na osnovu punomoćja, ali ga vezuju za ugovor o nalogu. Samostalna ustanova punomoćja nastaje u nemačkom pravu u drugoj polovini XIX veka pri čemu je najveću zaslugu u osamostaljivanju punomoćja od mandata imalo učenje Paula Labanda. U slučaju neposrednog zastupanja pravna dejstva preduzetih pravnih radnji neposredno nastupaju za zastupanog. S obzirom na to da prilikom preduzimanja pravne radnje zastupnik izjavljuje volju, postavlja se pitanje da li izjavljenu volju treba shvatiti kao volju zastupnika ili volju zastupanog. Savremena literatura je u neposrednom zastupanju pre sklona da vidi zamenu volje zastupanog voljom zastupnika. Takvo shvatanje prirode zastupanja u privatnom pravu ima zanimljivo poreklo koje seže u XIII vek.
AB  - Mandate contract was created in Roman law, thanks to which was regulated indirect representation. The first modern civil codes have acknowledged direct representation based on a power-of-attorney but linked it to a mandate contract. The power-of-attorney as an independent institute emerged in the late 19th century under German law, with Paul Laband's theory taking the biggest credit in the separation of the power-of-attorney from the mandate contract In the case of the direct representation, the legal effects of undertaken legal acts directly occur for the represented person. Considering that when undertaking a legal act, the representative declares the will, the question arises whether the declared will should be understood as the will of the representative or the will of the represented. Answering the question, contemporary legal writers tend to see the replacement of the will of the represented by the will of the representative. Such an understanding of the nature of representation in private law has an interesting origin that dates back to the 13th century.
PB  - Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd
T2  - Strani pravni život
T1  - O zastupanju u privatnom pravu
T1  - On the institution of representation in private law
EP  - 490
IS  - 3
SP  - 477
DO  - 10.56461/SPZ_22308KJ
UR  - conv_1211
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Cvetković, Valentina and Vuletić, Vladimir",
year = "2022",
abstract = "Ugovor o nalogu (mandatum) nastao je u rimskom pravu. Na temelju tog ugovora uređeno je posredno zastupanje. Prve moderne građanske kodifikacije priznaju neposredno zastupanje na osnovu punomoćja, ali ga vezuju za ugovor o nalogu. Samostalna ustanova punomoćja nastaje u nemačkom pravu u drugoj polovini XIX veka pri čemu je najveću zaslugu u osamostaljivanju punomoćja od mandata imalo učenje Paula Labanda. U slučaju neposrednog zastupanja pravna dejstva preduzetih pravnih radnji neposredno nastupaju za zastupanog. S obzirom na to da prilikom preduzimanja pravne radnje zastupnik izjavljuje volju, postavlja se pitanje da li izjavljenu volju treba shvatiti kao volju zastupnika ili volju zastupanog. Savremena literatura je u neposrednom zastupanju pre sklona da vidi zamenu volje zastupanog voljom zastupnika. Takvo shvatanje prirode zastupanja u privatnom pravu ima zanimljivo poreklo koje seže u XIII vek., Mandate contract was created in Roman law, thanks to which was regulated indirect representation. The first modern civil codes have acknowledged direct representation based on a power-of-attorney but linked it to a mandate contract. The power-of-attorney as an independent institute emerged in the late 19th century under German law, with Paul Laband's theory taking the biggest credit in the separation of the power-of-attorney from the mandate contract In the case of the direct representation, the legal effects of undertaken legal acts directly occur for the represented person. Considering that when undertaking a legal act, the representative declares the will, the question arises whether the declared will should be understood as the will of the representative or the will of the represented. Answering the question, contemporary legal writers tend to see the replacement of the will of the represented by the will of the representative. Such an understanding of the nature of representation in private law has an interesting origin that dates back to the 13th century.",
publisher = "Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd",
journal = "Strani pravni život",
title = "O zastupanju u privatnom pravu, On the institution of representation in private law",
pages = "490-477",
number = "3",
doi = "10.56461/SPZ_22308KJ",
url = "conv_1211"
}

Cvetković, V.,& Vuletić, V.. (2022). O zastupanju u privatnom pravu. in Strani pravni život
Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd.(3), 477-490.
https://doi.org/10.56461/SPZ_22308KJ
conv_1211

Cvetković V, Vuletić V. O zastupanju u privatnom pravu. in Strani pravni život. 2022;(3):477-490.
doi:10.56461/SPZ_22308KJ
conv_1211 .

Cvetković, Valentina, Vuletić, Vladimir, "O zastupanju u privatnom pravu" in Strani pravni život, no. 3 (2022):477-490,
https://doi.org/10.56461/SPZ_22308KJ .,
conv_1211 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvetković, Valentina
PY  - 2020
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1238
AB  - Savremeno pravo ne može se zamisliti bez ustanove neposrednog za stupanja. Njeno doktrinarno utemeljenje tvorevina je moderne nauke. Prve moderne građanske kodifikacije, pod uticajem novovekovne prirodnopravne misli, ovlašćenje za zastupanje (punomoćje) regulišu u ugovoru o nalogu. U drugoj polovini 19. veka menja se shvatanje o odnosu punomoćja i ugovora o nalogu te, počev od nemačkog Građanskog zakonika, zakonski tekstovi, u koje spada i srpski Zakon o obligacionim odnosima, propisuju punomoćje odvojeno od ugovora o nalogu. Načelu savremenog prava o neposrednom zastupanju suprotstavlja se zabrana neposrednog zastupanja sačuvana u rimskim izvorima. Prema dominantnom stavu u pandektistici, čiji uticaj i danas postoji, rimsko pravo, usled te zabrane, nije omogućavalo neposredno zastupanje. U radu se analiziraju slučajevi u kojima se, zaslugom pretora i rimskih klasičnih pravnika, dozvoljava neposredno zastupanje. Izostanak pojmovnog definisanja i načelnog propisivanja neposrednog zastupanja ne opravdava tvrđenje da se u rimskom pravu ono nije primenjivalo.
AB  - The institute of direct representation is indispensable in contemporary law. The first modern civil codes acknowledged direct representation regulating power of attorney through a mandate contract. The second half of the 19th century saw a change in that perception. Starting with the German Civil Code, legal texts, including the Serbian Contract and Torts Act, prescribe power of attorney as a separate institute. The contemporary law principle of direct representation contrasts with the Roman law prohibition of direct representation contained in ancient Roman sources. Under the prevailing Pandectist view, it is due to this prohibition that Roman law did not permit direct representation. The article analyses the cases in which, courtesy of classical Roman jurists, direct representation was allowed despite formal prohibition. The absence of a direct representation concept definition and general prescribing does not justify the claim that it was not applied under Roman law.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Neposredno zastupanje u rimskom pravu s osvrtom na moderno pravo
T1  - Direct representation in Roman law with reference to modern law
EP  - 142
IS  - 2
SP  - 123
VL  - 68
DO  - 10.5937/AnaliPFB2002124C
UR  - conv_514
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Cvetković, Valentina",
year = "2020",
abstract = "Savremeno pravo ne može se zamisliti bez ustanove neposrednog za stupanja. Njeno doktrinarno utemeljenje tvorevina je moderne nauke. Prve moderne građanske kodifikacije, pod uticajem novovekovne prirodnopravne misli, ovlašćenje za zastupanje (punomoćje) regulišu u ugovoru o nalogu. U drugoj polovini 19. veka menja se shvatanje o odnosu punomoćja i ugovora o nalogu te, počev od nemačkog Građanskog zakonika, zakonski tekstovi, u koje spada i srpski Zakon o obligacionim odnosima, propisuju punomoćje odvojeno od ugovora o nalogu. Načelu savremenog prava o neposrednom zastupanju suprotstavlja se zabrana neposrednog zastupanja sačuvana u rimskim izvorima. Prema dominantnom stavu u pandektistici, čiji uticaj i danas postoji, rimsko pravo, usled te zabrane, nije omogućavalo neposredno zastupanje. U radu se analiziraju slučajevi u kojima se, zaslugom pretora i rimskih klasičnih pravnika, dozvoljava neposredno zastupanje. Izostanak pojmovnog definisanja i načelnog propisivanja neposrednog zastupanja ne opravdava tvrđenje da se u rimskom pravu ono nije primenjivalo., The institute of direct representation is indispensable in contemporary law. The first modern civil codes acknowledged direct representation regulating power of attorney through a mandate contract. The second half of the 19th century saw a change in that perception. Starting with the German Civil Code, legal texts, including the Serbian Contract and Torts Act, prescribe power of attorney as a separate institute. The contemporary law principle of direct representation contrasts with the Roman law prohibition of direct representation contained in ancient Roman sources. Under the prevailing Pandectist view, it is due to this prohibition that Roman law did not permit direct representation. The article analyses the cases in which, courtesy of classical Roman jurists, direct representation was allowed despite formal prohibition. The absence of a direct representation concept definition and general prescribing does not justify the claim that it was not applied under Roman law.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Neposredno zastupanje u rimskom pravu s osvrtom na moderno pravo, Direct representation in Roman law with reference to modern law",
pages = "142-123",
number = "2",
volume = "68",
doi = "10.5937/AnaliPFB2002124C",
url = "conv_514"
}

Cvetković, V.. (2020). Neposredno zastupanje u rimskom pravu s osvrtom na moderno pravo. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 68(2), 123-142.
https://doi.org/10.5937/AnaliPFB2002124C
conv_514

Cvetković V. Neposredno zastupanje u rimskom pravu s osvrtom na moderno pravo. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2020;68(2):123-142.
doi:10.5937/AnaliPFB2002124C
conv_514 .

Cvetković, Valentina, "Neposredno zastupanje u rimskom pravu s osvrtom na moderno pravo" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 68, no. 2 (2020):123-142,
https://doi.org/10.5937/AnaliPFB2002124C .,
conv_514 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvetković, Valentina
PY  - 2019
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1161
AB  - Rimski brak temeljio se na saglasnoj volji supružnika da budu u braku (affectio maritalis). Sve dok takva volja postoji, postojao je i brak. Zbog promenljivosti ljudske volje, rimski brakovi lako su se sklapali, ali su se isto tako lako i raskidali. Rimski hrišćanski imperatori ograničavaju razvod braka propisujući razloge iz kojih se brak može jednostrano razvesti.Sve do Justinijana bio je dozvoljen sporazumni razvod braka. On najpre izdaje 22. Novelu kojom dozvoljava sporazumni razvod, da bi ga sedam godina docnije 117. Novelom zabranio. Moguće je da je promena njegovog stava po pitanju sporazumnog razvoda braka prouzrokovana njegovim okretanjem papi i Zapadnoj crkvi koja je u odnosu na Istočnu crkvu bila stroža po pitanju mogućnosti razvoda braka.
AB  - The Romans did not consider marriage a legal act but rather a fact of social life with legal effects. An essential element of a Roman marriage was a will to be married (affectio maritalis). As long as such a will existed, marriage also existed. Due to change ability of such a human will, Roman marriages were also easily concluded and dissolved. Freedom of dissolution of marriage led to crisis of marital and family life. Therefore Octavian Augustus was forced to enact a set of laws (the Julian marriage laws) which were aimed at reestablishing marriage and family morality. By adopting these laws, the moral crisis of the Roman society did not end. On the contrary, it deepened. Under the influence of Christianity, Roman Christian emperors limited the freedom of dissolution of marriage by prescribing just causes which allowed dissolution of marriage (iustae causae repudii). However, divorce by mutual consent had been allowed by the time of Justinian. He himself did not lead consistent policy regarding dissolution of marriage. In 535 Justinian firstly enacted 22nd Novel in which allowed divorce by mutual consent. Only seven years later, Justinian prohibited divorce by mutual consent in the Novel 117. It is possible that a change in Justinian's attitude towards divorce by mutual consent was caused by his turning to Pope and the Western Church which, in a comparison to the Eastern Church, was more rigid concerning the possibility of divorce.
PB  - Centar za crkvene studije, Niš
T2  - Crkvene studije
T1  - Razvod braka u rimskom i Justinijanovom pravu
T1  - Dissolution of marriage according to the Roman law and the law of Justinian
EP  - 446
IS  - 16-2
SP  - 433
VL  - 16
UR  - conv_2704
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Cvetković, Valentina",
year = "2019",
abstract = "Rimski brak temeljio se na saglasnoj volji supružnika da budu u braku (affectio maritalis). Sve dok takva volja postoji, postojao je i brak. Zbog promenljivosti ljudske volje, rimski brakovi lako su se sklapali, ali su se isto tako lako i raskidali. Rimski hrišćanski imperatori ograničavaju razvod braka propisujući razloge iz kojih se brak može jednostrano razvesti.Sve do Justinijana bio je dozvoljen sporazumni razvod braka. On najpre izdaje 22. Novelu kojom dozvoljava sporazumni razvod, da bi ga sedam godina docnije 117. Novelom zabranio. Moguće je da je promena njegovog stava po pitanju sporazumnog razvoda braka prouzrokovana njegovim okretanjem papi i Zapadnoj crkvi koja je u odnosu na Istočnu crkvu bila stroža po pitanju mogućnosti razvoda braka., The Romans did not consider marriage a legal act but rather a fact of social life with legal effects. An essential element of a Roman marriage was a will to be married (affectio maritalis). As long as such a will existed, marriage also existed. Due to change ability of such a human will, Roman marriages were also easily concluded and dissolved. Freedom of dissolution of marriage led to crisis of marital and family life. Therefore Octavian Augustus was forced to enact a set of laws (the Julian marriage laws) which were aimed at reestablishing marriage and family morality. By adopting these laws, the moral crisis of the Roman society did not end. On the contrary, it deepened. Under the influence of Christianity, Roman Christian emperors limited the freedom of dissolution of marriage by prescribing just causes which allowed dissolution of marriage (iustae causae repudii). However, divorce by mutual consent had been allowed by the time of Justinian. He himself did not lead consistent policy regarding dissolution of marriage. In 535 Justinian firstly enacted 22nd Novel in which allowed divorce by mutual consent. Only seven years later, Justinian prohibited divorce by mutual consent in the Novel 117. It is possible that a change in Justinian's attitude towards divorce by mutual consent was caused by his turning to Pope and the Western Church which, in a comparison to the Eastern Church, was more rigid concerning the possibility of divorce.",
publisher = "Centar za crkvene studije, Niš",
journal = "Crkvene studije",
title = "Razvod braka u rimskom i Justinijanovom pravu, Dissolution of marriage according to the Roman law and the law of Justinian",
pages = "446-433",
number = "16-2",
volume = "16",
url = "conv_2704"
}

Cvetković, V.. (2019). Razvod braka u rimskom i Justinijanovom pravu. in Crkvene studije
Centar za crkvene studije, Niš., 16(16-2), 433-446.
conv_2704

Cvetković V. Razvod braka u rimskom i Justinijanovom pravu. in Crkvene studije. 2019;16(16-2):433-446.
conv_2704 .

Cvetković, Valentina, "Razvod braka u rimskom i Justinijanovom pravu" in Crkvene studije, 16, no. 16-2 (2019):433-446,
conv_2704 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvetković, Valentina
PY  - 2015
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/875
AB  - Kondikcija predstavlja tužbu koja je nastala u rimskom pravu koja je služila za povraćaj stvari koju je tuženi neosnovano stekao na teret tužioca. Formula kondikcije sadržala je tužiočevo tvrđenje da je tuženi dužan da da (dare oportere) koja pretpostavlja da je tuženi prethodno stekao stvar tako što mu je tužilac preneo u svojinu (datio). U radu se analiziraju fragmenti iz Digesta u kojima se formularna kondikcija primenjuje iako ne postoji datio to jest predaja stvari tužioca u svojinu tuženom. Zaključak do koga se dolazi jeste da su rimski pravnici u cilju sankcionisanja što većeg broja slučajeva neosnovanog sticanja na tuđ račun proširivali polje primene kondikcije. To proširenje ostvareno je na nekoliko načina. Jurisprudenti su dodeljivali kondikciju u određenim slučajevima u kojima prenos svojine nije bio punovažan (condictio de bene depensis). Pored toga oni su primenjivali kondikciju i kada je tužilac neosnovano izvršio neku drugu činidbu u korist tuženog koja nije bila usmerena na prenos svojine i tako proširivali pojam datio. Najposle, rimski pravnici su dodeljivali kondikciju i u određenim slučajevima u kojima neosnovano sticanje tuženog nije prouzrokovano činidbom tužioca (condictio sine datione). Sankcionisanje neosnovanog sticanja tuženog do koga je došlo ne samo činidbom tužioca već i radnjom tuženog, trećeg lica ili prirodnim događajem govori u prilog shvatanja kondikcije kao preteče savremenog instituta neosnovanog obogaćenja čija svrha je upravo sankcionisanje imovinske koristi neosnovano stečene na bilo koji način.
AB  - Condiction represents an action that was created in Roman law and was used for the restitution of a thing which the defendant had acquired without legal grounds at the plaintiff's expense. The formula of condiction contained a plaintiff's claim that the defendant was obliged to give (dare oportere), suggesting that the plaintiff had previously transferred the ownership of a thing to the defendant (datio). This paper analyzes the fragments from Digesta in which condiction applies even without datio, i.e. transfer of ownership to the defendant. The conclusion we arrived at stipulates that Roman jurists, in order to sanction as many cases as possible of acquisition without legal grounds at the expense of another, expanded the scope of condiction application. Such expansion was accomplished in several ways. Roman jurists granted condiction in certain cases where the transfer of ownership was not valid (the so-called condictio de bene depensis). In addition, they applied condiction when the plaintiff executed some other act other than the transfer of ownership at the benefit of the defendant. In that way they extended the concept of datio. Finally, Roman jurists granted condiction even in the cases when the defendant's acquisition was not caused by the performance of the plaintiff (the so-called condictio sine datione). Imposing sanctions on acquisition without legal grounds at the expense of another, which occurred not only by the act of the plaintiff but also by the act of the defendant, the third person, or a natural cause, speaks in favor of understanding condiction as a predecessor of the modern institution of unjust enrichment, whose purpose is exactly the prohibition of acquisition of an economic benefit without legal grounds at the detriment of another.
PB  - Univerzitet u Nišu, Niš
T2  - Teme
T1  - Datio kao pretpostavka primene kondikcije u rimskom pravu
T1  - Datio as an assumption of condiction application in Roman law
EP  - 1358
IS  - 4
SP  - 1341
VL  - 39
UR  - conv_1788
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Cvetković, Valentina",
year = "2015",
abstract = "Kondikcija predstavlja tužbu koja je nastala u rimskom pravu koja je služila za povraćaj stvari koju je tuženi neosnovano stekao na teret tužioca. Formula kondikcije sadržala je tužiočevo tvrđenje da je tuženi dužan da da (dare oportere) koja pretpostavlja da je tuženi prethodno stekao stvar tako što mu je tužilac preneo u svojinu (datio). U radu se analiziraju fragmenti iz Digesta u kojima se formularna kondikcija primenjuje iako ne postoji datio to jest predaja stvari tužioca u svojinu tuženom. Zaključak do koga se dolazi jeste da su rimski pravnici u cilju sankcionisanja što većeg broja slučajeva neosnovanog sticanja na tuđ račun proširivali polje primene kondikcije. To proširenje ostvareno je na nekoliko načina. Jurisprudenti su dodeljivali kondikciju u određenim slučajevima u kojima prenos svojine nije bio punovažan (condictio de bene depensis). Pored toga oni su primenjivali kondikciju i kada je tužilac neosnovano izvršio neku drugu činidbu u korist tuženog koja nije bila usmerena na prenos svojine i tako proširivali pojam datio. Najposle, rimski pravnici su dodeljivali kondikciju i u određenim slučajevima u kojima neosnovano sticanje tuženog nije prouzrokovano činidbom tužioca (condictio sine datione). Sankcionisanje neosnovanog sticanja tuženog do koga je došlo ne samo činidbom tužioca već i radnjom tuženog, trećeg lica ili prirodnim događajem govori u prilog shvatanja kondikcije kao preteče savremenog instituta neosnovanog obogaćenja čija svrha je upravo sankcionisanje imovinske koristi neosnovano stečene na bilo koji način., Condiction represents an action that was created in Roman law and was used for the restitution of a thing which the defendant had acquired without legal grounds at the plaintiff's expense. The formula of condiction contained a plaintiff's claim that the defendant was obliged to give (dare oportere), suggesting that the plaintiff had previously transferred the ownership of a thing to the defendant (datio). This paper analyzes the fragments from Digesta in which condiction applies even without datio, i.e. transfer of ownership to the defendant. The conclusion we arrived at stipulates that Roman jurists, in order to sanction as many cases as possible of acquisition without legal grounds at the expense of another, expanded the scope of condiction application. Such expansion was accomplished in several ways. Roman jurists granted condiction in certain cases where the transfer of ownership was not valid (the so-called condictio de bene depensis). In addition, they applied condiction when the plaintiff executed some other act other than the transfer of ownership at the benefit of the defendant. In that way they extended the concept of datio. Finally, Roman jurists granted condiction even in the cases when the defendant's acquisition was not caused by the performance of the plaintiff (the so-called condictio sine datione). Imposing sanctions on acquisition without legal grounds at the expense of another, which occurred not only by the act of the plaintiff but also by the act of the defendant, the third person, or a natural cause, speaks in favor of understanding condiction as a predecessor of the modern institution of unjust enrichment, whose purpose is exactly the prohibition of acquisition of an economic benefit without legal grounds at the detriment of another.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Nišu, Niš",
journal = "Teme",
title = "Datio kao pretpostavka primene kondikcije u rimskom pravu, Datio as an assumption of condiction application in Roman law",
pages = "1358-1341",
number = "4",
volume = "39",
url = "conv_1788"
}

Cvetković, V.. (2015). Datio kao pretpostavka primene kondikcije u rimskom pravu. in Teme
Univerzitet u Nišu, Niš., 39(4), 1341-1358.
conv_1788

Cvetković V. Datio kao pretpostavka primene kondikcije u rimskom pravu. in Teme. 2015;39(4):1341-1358.
conv_1788 .

Cvetković, Valentina, "Datio kao pretpostavka primene kondikcije u rimskom pravu" in Teme, 39, no. 4 (2015):1341-1358,
conv_1788 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvetković, Valentina
PY  - 2014
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/776
AB  - Kondikcija predstavlja tužbu koja je nastala u rimskom pravu koja je služila za povraćaj stvari koja se kod tuženog nalazi bez pravnog osnova (sine causa). Tuženi je, po pravilu, stvar stekao na osnovu činidbe tužioca kojom mu je ona neosnovano preneta u svojinu (datio). Na osnovu kondikcije tuženi odgovora za primljenu stvar pri čemu se obim njegove odgovornosti utvrđuje prema trenutku sticanja a ne prema trenutku pokretanja postupka. Tuženi se obavezuje da vrati ono što je primio a ne ono što od primljenog u trenutku utuženja poseduje. Za razliku od rimske kondikcione odgovornosti, u savremenom pravu obogaćeni odgovara za imovinsku korist koju je neosnovano stekao na bilo koji način pri čemu se obavezuje da izvrši povraćaj u obimu koji poseduje u trenutku utuženja. Iako se obim kondikcione i odgovornosti iz obogaćenja utvrđuje prema različitim merilima, uzimanje u obzir savesnost tuženog u određenim slučajevima vodi istim rešenjima. Savesno lice ne odgovara na osnovu kondikcije ukoliko u vreme pokretanja postupka više ne poseduje primljenu stvar niti njen surogat, dok se na temelju neosnovanog obogaćenja oslobađa odgovornosti ako u trenutku pokretanja postupka nije više obogaćeno. S druge strane, odgovornost iz obogaćenja nesavesnog lica izjednačava se sa kondikcionom odgovornošću jer tuženi odgovara za korist u obimu koji postoji u trenutku njenog sticanja a ne u trenutku otpočinjanja parnice.
AB  - Condiction refers to an action that originates in Roman Law and was used for the restitution of a thing found with the defendant unjustifiably (sine causa). The thing is commonly acquired by the defendant on the basis of plaintiff's action which had unjustifiably transferred ownership over the thing to the defendant (datio). Pursuant to condiction, the defendant is liable for the acquired thing and the scope of his liability is determined as of the time of acquisition and not of the time of raising the condiction. Hence, the defendant is obliged to restore what he initially acquired and not what he possesses at time the condiction is raised. As opposed to the Roman Law's condiction, in modern law of unjust enrichment the defendant is also liable for the property benefit that he sine causa acquired in any way, and he is obliged to compensate the quantum he possesses at the moment when the claim is raised. Although the scope of liability under Roman Law's condiction and under contemporary unjust enrichment is established according to different criteria sometimes the same solution may be reached if defendant's good faith (bona fides) is taken into account. The defendant who acquired a thing in good faith is not liable under condiction if at the time when the condiction is raised he does not possess the thing or he has not acquired its surrogate. Under unjust enrichment, on the other hand, the defendant would not be held liable if, at the moment the restitution claim is raised, he is not enriched any more. However, if the defendant acted in bad faith his liability is of the same scope as the one under the Roman Law's condiction because the defendant is liable for the quantum of benefit that has existed at the moment of acquisition and not at time the claim was raised.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Kondikciona odgovornost u rimskom pravu
T1  - Condictional liability in the Roman law
EP  - 243
IS  - 2
SP  - 229
VL  - 62
DO  - 10.5937/AnaliPFB1402229C
UR  - conv_343
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Cvetković, Valentina",
year = "2014",
abstract = "Kondikcija predstavlja tužbu koja je nastala u rimskom pravu koja je služila za povraćaj stvari koja se kod tuženog nalazi bez pravnog osnova (sine causa). Tuženi je, po pravilu, stvar stekao na osnovu činidbe tužioca kojom mu je ona neosnovano preneta u svojinu (datio). Na osnovu kondikcije tuženi odgovora za primljenu stvar pri čemu se obim njegove odgovornosti utvrđuje prema trenutku sticanja a ne prema trenutku pokretanja postupka. Tuženi se obavezuje da vrati ono što je primio a ne ono što od primljenog u trenutku utuženja poseduje. Za razliku od rimske kondikcione odgovornosti, u savremenom pravu obogaćeni odgovara za imovinsku korist koju je neosnovano stekao na bilo koji način pri čemu se obavezuje da izvrši povraćaj u obimu koji poseduje u trenutku utuženja. Iako se obim kondikcione i odgovornosti iz obogaćenja utvrđuje prema različitim merilima, uzimanje u obzir savesnost tuženog u određenim slučajevima vodi istim rešenjima. Savesno lice ne odgovara na osnovu kondikcije ukoliko u vreme pokretanja postupka više ne poseduje primljenu stvar niti njen surogat, dok se na temelju neosnovanog obogaćenja oslobađa odgovornosti ako u trenutku pokretanja postupka nije više obogaćeno. S druge strane, odgovornost iz obogaćenja nesavesnog lica izjednačava se sa kondikcionom odgovornošću jer tuženi odgovara za korist u obimu koji postoji u trenutku njenog sticanja a ne u trenutku otpočinjanja parnice., Condiction refers to an action that originates in Roman Law and was used for the restitution of a thing found with the defendant unjustifiably (sine causa). The thing is commonly acquired by the defendant on the basis of plaintiff's action which had unjustifiably transferred ownership over the thing to the defendant (datio). Pursuant to condiction, the defendant is liable for the acquired thing and the scope of his liability is determined as of the time of acquisition and not of the time of raising the condiction. Hence, the defendant is obliged to restore what he initially acquired and not what he possesses at time the condiction is raised. As opposed to the Roman Law's condiction, in modern law of unjust enrichment the defendant is also liable for the property benefit that he sine causa acquired in any way, and he is obliged to compensate the quantum he possesses at the moment when the claim is raised. Although the scope of liability under Roman Law's condiction and under contemporary unjust enrichment is established according to different criteria sometimes the same solution may be reached if defendant's good faith (bona fides) is taken into account. The defendant who acquired a thing in good faith is not liable under condiction if at the time when the condiction is raised he does not possess the thing or he has not acquired its surrogate. Under unjust enrichment, on the other hand, the defendant would not be held liable if, at the moment the restitution claim is raised, he is not enriched any more. However, if the defendant acted in bad faith his liability is of the same scope as the one under the Roman Law's condiction because the defendant is liable for the quantum of benefit that has existed at the moment of acquisition and not at time the claim was raised.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Kondikciona odgovornost u rimskom pravu, Condictional liability in the Roman law",
pages = "243-229",
number = "2",
volume = "62",
doi = "10.5937/AnaliPFB1402229C",
url = "conv_343"
}

Cvetković, V.. (2014). Kondikciona odgovornost u rimskom pravu. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 62(2), 229-243.
https://doi.org/10.5937/AnaliPFB1402229C
conv_343

Cvetković V. Kondikciona odgovornost u rimskom pravu. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2014;62(2):229-243.
doi:10.5937/AnaliPFB1402229C
conv_343 .

Cvetković, Valentina, "Kondikciona odgovornost u rimskom pravu" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 62, no. 2 (2014):229-243,
https://doi.org/10.5937/AnaliPFB1402229C .,
conv_343 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvetković, Valentina
PY  - 2014
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/793
AB  - Verziona tužba (actio de in rem verso) nastala je u rimskom pravu kao jedna od pretorskih adjekticionih tužbi (actiones adiecticiae qualitatis) na osnovu kojih je paterfamilijas odgovarao za kontraktne obaveze koje su preuzela njemu potčinjena lica. Verziona tužba primenjivala se i u vekovima koji su usledili nakon propasti rimske države ali u izmenjenom obliku. U srednjovekovnom opštem pravu (ius commune) ustalila se kao tužba koja se zasniva na upotrebi stvari u tuđu korist. Međutim, XIX vek doneo je nejedinstvenost u njenom regulisanju. Naime, u Pruskom i Austrijskom građanskom zakoniku propisana je u obliku koji je dobila u opštem pravu - kao tužba iz korisne upotrebe. S druge strane, Francuski i Nemački građanski zakonik uopšte nisu regulisali verzionu tužbu. Nemački građanski zakonik u čl. 812 regulisao je opštu tužbu iz neosnovanog obogaćenja koja je primenjiva na sve slučajeve pravno neosnovanog obogaćenja zbog čega je posebno uređivanje verzionih slučajeva postalo nepotrebno. U Francuskoj je opštu tužbu iz neosnovanog obogaćenja pod nazivom actio de in rem verso uvela sudska praksa. Zakon o obligacionim odnosima RS propisuje jedinstven institut pravno neosnovanog obogaćenja u čl. 210-219. Ukoliko se prihvati da je članom 210 st. 1 regulisana opšta tužba iz neosnovanog obogaćenja, posebno regulisanje upotrebe stvari u tuđu korist iz čl. 217 postaje suvišno stoga što se verzioni slučajevi mogu rešiti primenom opšteg pravila.
AB  - Actio de in rem verso originated in Roman law. It was one of the so called actiorns adiecticiae qualitatis which provided contract responsibility of paterfamilias under contracts concluded by his subordinates. Over the centuries the action has undergone many changes compared to its original concept. In ius commune, its concept was based on the use of objects for other person's benefit. The 19th century brought a different regulation of the action de in rem verso. Namely, the concept developed in ius commune continued to exist in Prussian and Austrian Civil Code. On the other hand, French Civil Code does not regulate this action but it was introduced by judical practice at the end of 19th century. German Civil Code in Art. 812 regulates general enrichment action which is applicable to all cases of unjust enrichment including also de in rem verso cases. Serbian Law of Contract and Torts uniformly regulates unjust enrichment in Articles 210-219. However, pursuant to Art. 217 actio de in rem verso has the same concept it had in ius commune which was not familiar with the general enrichment action. Bearing in mind that Serbian Law of Contracts and Torts regulates general enrichment action in Art. 210(1), there is no need to separately address the use of objects to others' benefit.
PB  - Udruženje pravnika u privredi Srbije, Beograd
T2  - Pravo i privreda
T1  - O potrebi postojanja verzione tužbe u srpskom pravu
T1  - Actio de in rem verso in Serbian Law
EP  - 353
IS  - 7-9
SP  - 339
VL  - 52
UR  - conv_2132
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Cvetković, Valentina",
year = "2014",
abstract = "Verziona tužba (actio de in rem verso) nastala je u rimskom pravu kao jedna od pretorskih adjekticionih tužbi (actiones adiecticiae qualitatis) na osnovu kojih je paterfamilijas odgovarao za kontraktne obaveze koje su preuzela njemu potčinjena lica. Verziona tužba primenjivala se i u vekovima koji su usledili nakon propasti rimske države ali u izmenjenom obliku. U srednjovekovnom opštem pravu (ius commune) ustalila se kao tužba koja se zasniva na upotrebi stvari u tuđu korist. Međutim, XIX vek doneo je nejedinstvenost u njenom regulisanju. Naime, u Pruskom i Austrijskom građanskom zakoniku propisana je u obliku koji je dobila u opštem pravu - kao tužba iz korisne upotrebe. S druge strane, Francuski i Nemački građanski zakonik uopšte nisu regulisali verzionu tužbu. Nemački građanski zakonik u čl. 812 regulisao je opštu tužbu iz neosnovanog obogaćenja koja je primenjiva na sve slučajeve pravno neosnovanog obogaćenja zbog čega je posebno uređivanje verzionih slučajeva postalo nepotrebno. U Francuskoj je opštu tužbu iz neosnovanog obogaćenja pod nazivom actio de in rem verso uvela sudska praksa. Zakon o obligacionim odnosima RS propisuje jedinstven institut pravno neosnovanog obogaćenja u čl. 210-219. Ukoliko se prihvati da je članom 210 st. 1 regulisana opšta tužba iz neosnovanog obogaćenja, posebno regulisanje upotrebe stvari u tuđu korist iz čl. 217 postaje suvišno stoga što se verzioni slučajevi mogu rešiti primenom opšteg pravila., Actio de in rem verso originated in Roman law. It was one of the so called actiorns adiecticiae qualitatis which provided contract responsibility of paterfamilias under contracts concluded by his subordinates. Over the centuries the action has undergone many changes compared to its original concept. In ius commune, its concept was based on the use of objects for other person's benefit. The 19th century brought a different regulation of the action de in rem verso. Namely, the concept developed in ius commune continued to exist in Prussian and Austrian Civil Code. On the other hand, French Civil Code does not regulate this action but it was introduced by judical practice at the end of 19th century. German Civil Code in Art. 812 regulates general enrichment action which is applicable to all cases of unjust enrichment including also de in rem verso cases. Serbian Law of Contract and Torts uniformly regulates unjust enrichment in Articles 210-219. However, pursuant to Art. 217 actio de in rem verso has the same concept it had in ius commune which was not familiar with the general enrichment action. Bearing in mind that Serbian Law of Contracts and Torts regulates general enrichment action in Art. 210(1), there is no need to separately address the use of objects to others' benefit.",
publisher = "Udruženje pravnika u privredi Srbije, Beograd",
journal = "Pravo i privreda",
title = "O potrebi postojanja verzione tužbe u srpskom pravu, Actio de in rem verso in Serbian Law",
pages = "353-339",
number = "7-9",
volume = "52",
url = "conv_2132"
}

Cvetković, V.. (2014). O potrebi postojanja verzione tužbe u srpskom pravu. in Pravo i privreda
Udruženje pravnika u privredi Srbije, Beograd., 52(7-9), 339-353.
conv_2132

Cvetković V. O potrebi postojanja verzione tužbe u srpskom pravu. in Pravo i privreda. 2014;52(7-9):339-353.
conv_2132 .

Cvetković, Valentina, "O potrebi postojanja verzione tužbe u srpskom pravu" in Pravo i privreda, 52, no. 7-9 (2014):339-353,
conv_2132 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvetković, Valentina
PY  - 2013
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/732
AB  - U radu se analizira viševekovni razvoj kondikcije kao jednog od najvažnijih sredstava za sprečavanje pravno neosnovanog obogaćenja. Kondikcija vodi poreklo iz rimskog prava u kome je u početku postojala samo jedna vrsta kondikcije koja se primenjivala uvek kada se tačno određena suma novca ili tačno određena stvar jednog lica nađe bez pravnog osnova u imovini drugog lica. Kreativnom delatnošću rimskih pravnika stvarane su dodatne pretpostavke za njenu primenu tako da je u Justinijanovoj kodifikaciji prisutan čitav spektar različitih vrsta kondikcija kojima su sankcionisani različiti slučajevi pravno neosnovanog obogaćenja. Ipak, rimsko pravo do kraja je ostalo u okvirima kazuističnog metoda, koji je isključivao stvaranje opšte kondikcije koja bi imala funkciju opšte tužbe iz obogaćenja. Zasluga glosatora ogleda se u tome što su izvršili sistematizaciju kondikcija i što su uvideli da ovo pravno sredstvo može imati širu primenu jer počiva na principu zabrane neosnovanog obogaćenja. Usled toga, neki od njih su se zalagali za primenu kondikcije u pojedinim slučajevima neosnovanog obogaćenja za koje je u Justinijanovoj kodifikaciji bila predviđena zaštita ali nije imenovano pravno sredstvo kojim se ona ostvaruje. Premda su u kondikciji prepoznali tužbu iz obogaćenja, glosatori su ostali u okvirima rešenja koje je nudilo rimsko pravo, zbog čega nisu ni mogli proširiti polje primene kondikcije na slučajeve neosnovanog obogaćenja koji nisu bili regulisani u rimskim izvorima. Iako je bilo ranijih nastojanja da se stvori opšta tužba iz obogaćenja, istaknuto učenje o kondikciji kao opštoj tužbi iz obogaćenja dao je tek osnivač nemačke istorijske pravne škole Savinji. On se zalagao za jedinstvenu kondikciju koja bi bila vrsta opšte tužbe jer bi se primenjivala uvek kada dođe do obogaćenja dužnika na račun imovine poverioca bez osnova ili kada je prvobitni osnov otpao. Imajući u vidu značajnu praktičnu primenu tužbe de in rem verso u opštem pravu (ius commune), pandektna nauka stvorila je poseban institut pravno neosnovanog obogaćenja koji predstavlja sublimaciju učenja o kondikcijama i verzionoj tužbi. Važeće srpsko pravo takođe predviđa poseban institut pravno neosnovanog obogaćenja u kome su pored opšte tužbe iz obogaćenja regulisane i neke posebne kondikcije kao i tužba de in rem verso.
AB  - The article is dealing with centuries' long development of condiction as one of the most efficient legal remedies for unjust enrichment. Condiction is derived, like many other institutes, from Roman law. At the beginning, Roman law had only one type of condiction which was applied when a certain amount of money or an individualized item was transferred from the possession of one to the possession of another, without a valid legal title. Due to a creative activity of roman jurists, its field of application was widened. Codex Iustiniana, therefore, has a wide spectrum of different types of condictions applied to various cases of unjust enrichment. Roman law, however, did not overcome casuistic approach which prevented formulating a general condiction which would have the function of general enrichment action. The merit of glossators is that they had sistematized condictions and noticed the underlying principle of condiction i.e. the prohibition of unjust enrichment. Hence, they suggested that condiction should apply in cases of unjust enrichment which were present in the sources but without assigned legal remedy. Even though glossators recognized enrichment action in condiction, their approach did not depart from that of Roman law. Consequently, they could not extend the application of condiction to the cases of unjust enrichment not known to Roman law sources. The first distinguished thought on condiction as general enrichment action was that of Savigny, the founder of the German Historical School. Savigny pleaded for one type of condiction which would be applied in every case of unjust enrichment i. e. when debtor is enriched to the detriment of creditor without a legal basis or on the legal basis which subsequently ceased to exist. Bearing in mind the application of actio de in rem verso in ius commune, pandectists created a separate institute of unjust enrichment which represented a sublimation of different thoughts on condiction and actio de in rem verso. Valid Serbian law also prescribes separate institute of unjust enrichment which, besides general enrichment action, deals with some particular types of condiction and actio de in rem verso.
PB  - Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd
T2  - Strani pravni život
T1  - Razvoj kondikcije od rimskog do savremenog prava
T1  - Development of condiction from roman to modern law
EP  - 215
IS  - 1
SP  - 198
UR  - conv_1152
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Cvetković, Valentina",
year = "2013",
abstract = "U radu se analizira viševekovni razvoj kondikcije kao jednog od najvažnijih sredstava za sprečavanje pravno neosnovanog obogaćenja. Kondikcija vodi poreklo iz rimskog prava u kome je u početku postojala samo jedna vrsta kondikcije koja se primenjivala uvek kada se tačno određena suma novca ili tačno određena stvar jednog lica nađe bez pravnog osnova u imovini drugog lica. Kreativnom delatnošću rimskih pravnika stvarane su dodatne pretpostavke za njenu primenu tako da je u Justinijanovoj kodifikaciji prisutan čitav spektar različitih vrsta kondikcija kojima su sankcionisani različiti slučajevi pravno neosnovanog obogaćenja. Ipak, rimsko pravo do kraja je ostalo u okvirima kazuističnog metoda, koji je isključivao stvaranje opšte kondikcije koja bi imala funkciju opšte tužbe iz obogaćenja. Zasluga glosatora ogleda se u tome što su izvršili sistematizaciju kondikcija i što su uvideli da ovo pravno sredstvo može imati širu primenu jer počiva na principu zabrane neosnovanog obogaćenja. Usled toga, neki od njih su se zalagali za primenu kondikcije u pojedinim slučajevima neosnovanog obogaćenja za koje je u Justinijanovoj kodifikaciji bila predviđena zaštita ali nije imenovano pravno sredstvo kojim se ona ostvaruje. Premda su u kondikciji prepoznali tužbu iz obogaćenja, glosatori su ostali u okvirima rešenja koje je nudilo rimsko pravo, zbog čega nisu ni mogli proširiti polje primene kondikcije na slučajeve neosnovanog obogaćenja koji nisu bili regulisani u rimskim izvorima. Iako je bilo ranijih nastojanja da se stvori opšta tužba iz obogaćenja, istaknuto učenje o kondikciji kao opštoj tužbi iz obogaćenja dao je tek osnivač nemačke istorijske pravne škole Savinji. On se zalagao za jedinstvenu kondikciju koja bi bila vrsta opšte tužbe jer bi se primenjivala uvek kada dođe do obogaćenja dužnika na račun imovine poverioca bez osnova ili kada je prvobitni osnov otpao. Imajući u vidu značajnu praktičnu primenu tužbe de in rem verso u opštem pravu (ius commune), pandektna nauka stvorila je poseban institut pravno neosnovanog obogaćenja koji predstavlja sublimaciju učenja o kondikcijama i verzionoj tužbi. Važeće srpsko pravo takođe predviđa poseban institut pravno neosnovanog obogaćenja u kome su pored opšte tužbe iz obogaćenja regulisane i neke posebne kondikcije kao i tužba de in rem verso., The article is dealing with centuries' long development of condiction as one of the most efficient legal remedies for unjust enrichment. Condiction is derived, like many other institutes, from Roman law. At the beginning, Roman law had only one type of condiction which was applied when a certain amount of money or an individualized item was transferred from the possession of one to the possession of another, without a valid legal title. Due to a creative activity of roman jurists, its field of application was widened. Codex Iustiniana, therefore, has a wide spectrum of different types of condictions applied to various cases of unjust enrichment. Roman law, however, did not overcome casuistic approach which prevented formulating a general condiction which would have the function of general enrichment action. The merit of glossators is that they had sistematized condictions and noticed the underlying principle of condiction i.e. the prohibition of unjust enrichment. Hence, they suggested that condiction should apply in cases of unjust enrichment which were present in the sources but without assigned legal remedy. Even though glossators recognized enrichment action in condiction, their approach did not depart from that of Roman law. Consequently, they could not extend the application of condiction to the cases of unjust enrichment not known to Roman law sources. The first distinguished thought on condiction as general enrichment action was that of Savigny, the founder of the German Historical School. Savigny pleaded for one type of condiction which would be applied in every case of unjust enrichment i. e. when debtor is enriched to the detriment of creditor without a legal basis or on the legal basis which subsequently ceased to exist. Bearing in mind the application of actio de in rem verso in ius commune, pandectists created a separate institute of unjust enrichment which represented a sublimation of different thoughts on condiction and actio de in rem verso. Valid Serbian law also prescribes separate institute of unjust enrichment which, besides general enrichment action, deals with some particular types of condiction and actio de in rem verso.",
publisher = "Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd",
journal = "Strani pravni život",
title = "Razvoj kondikcije od rimskog do savremenog prava, Development of condiction from roman to modern law",
pages = "215-198",
number = "1",
url = "conv_1152"
}

Cvetković, V.. (2013). Razvoj kondikcije od rimskog do savremenog prava. in Strani pravni život
Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd.(1), 198-215.
conv_1152

Cvetković V. Razvoj kondikcije od rimskog do savremenog prava. in Strani pravni život. 2013;(1):198-215.
conv_1152 .

Cvetković, Valentina, "Razvoj kondikcije od rimskog do savremenog prava" in Strani pravni život, no. 1 (2013):198-215,
conv_1152 .