TY  - JOUR
AU  - Trajković, Marko
PY  - 2015
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1650
AB  - Moral values represent the binding force of human rights. They are primarily the binding force of norms of national legal systems, and then the binding force of legal norms of international law and international conventions and declarations on human rights. The very essence of moral values represents the primary issue for the creation of conventions and declarations which protect human rights. However, moral values are not merely that, they are also the source of human rights. If we start from the fact that the values were given and are, thus, indestructible by man, then they are the best possible foundations of human rights. Actually, all human rights are based upon the values given to people to exercise and protect them. As with any issue of binding force of legal norms of national legal systems, the issue of respecting declarations and conventions on human rights, the sanction is not and cannot be the source of the binding force of these norms and declarations. It must be something more durable, and these are just the values that are given to people. Therefore, we can assume that human rights are given and are independent of people, even when they are being oppressed and violated, human rights do not lose their value and its importance. Only an order of values does not allow human rights to be rejected and to enter into a vicious circle in which the man disappears. Distorted application of moral values, directly lead to the rejection of human rights. There is no establishment of human rights without accepting moral values, and they will then be a valid foundation of durable establishment of human rights. Only then and only in this way human rights will not remain a record on a piece of international paper.
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Moral values as the binding force of the human rights
EP  - 140
IS  - 3
SP  - 127
VL  - 63
DO  - 10.5937/AnaliPFB1503127T
UR  - conv_3290_6
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Trajković, Marko",
year = "2015",
abstract = "Moral values represent the binding force of human rights. They are primarily the binding force of norms of national legal systems, and then the binding force of legal norms of international law and international conventions and declarations on human rights. The very essence of moral values represents the primary issue for the creation of conventions and declarations which protect human rights. However, moral values are not merely that, they are also the source of human rights. If we start from the fact that the values were given and are, thus, indestructible by man, then they are the best possible foundations of human rights. Actually, all human rights are based upon the values given to people to exercise and protect them. As with any issue of binding force of legal norms of national legal systems, the issue of respecting declarations and conventions on human rights, the sanction is not and cannot be the source of the binding force of these norms and declarations. It must be something more durable, and these are just the values that are given to people. Therefore, we can assume that human rights are given and are independent of people, even when they are being oppressed and violated, human rights do not lose their value and its importance. Only an order of values does not allow human rights to be rejected and to enter into a vicious circle in which the man disappears. Distorted application of moral values, directly lead to the rejection of human rights. There is no establishment of human rights without accepting moral values, and they will then be a valid foundation of durable establishment of human rights. Only then and only in this way human rights will not remain a record on a piece of international paper.",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Moral values as the binding force of the human rights",
pages = "140-127",
number = "3",
volume = "63",
doi = "10.5937/AnaliPFB1503127T",
url = "conv_3290_6"
}

Trajković, M.. (2015). Moral values as the binding force of the human rights. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 63(3), 127-140.
https://doi.org/10.5937/AnaliPFB1503127T
conv_3290_6

Trajković M. Moral values as the binding force of the human rights. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2015;63(3):127-140.
doi:10.5937/AnaliPFB1503127T
conv_3290_6 .

Trajković, Marko, "Moral values as the binding force of the human rights" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 63, no. 3 (2015):127-140,
https://doi.org/10.5937/AnaliPFB1503127T .,
conv_3290_6 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Trajković, Marko
PY  - 2014
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1598
AB  - U ovom dobu tehnološki zahuktalog pozitivizma često se u pravnoj nauci mogu čuti tvrdnje da pravo treba da istisne vrednosti iz sebe i da postoji bez njih. Ta tvrdnja nije nova. Novo je samo objašnjenje zbog čega se to tvrdi. A ono glasi da se time pravo oslobađa ljudskih slabosti, postaje čisto naučno zasnovano i vrednosno neutralno kao jedna čisto realna pojava života. Kao da se zaboravilo da proglašena vrednosna neutralnost prava takođe predstavlja jednu vrednost. Zbog toga je umesnije govoriti o nužnoj vrednosnoj usmerenosti prava, zasnovanoj na tvrdnji da svako pravo teži ka vlastitom samousavršavanju. To samousavršavanje nužno ima kao krajnji cilj pretvaranje pozitivnog prava u idealno, prirodno pravo. U tom slučaju, odgovor na pitanje da li pravo može da postoji bez vrednosti postaje jasan - ne može. I ne samo da ne može, već se ne sme ni težiti ka pravu odvojenom od vrednosti. U protivnom, pokazala bi se kao tačna misao Tome Akvinskog da je pravo stvoreno samo zbog zlih i opakih. Vrednosti postojano utiču na pravo. One ga ustanovljavaju, omogućavaju stvaranje sve boljeg prava i preko njega se ostvaruju. Kao takve, one predstavljaju pouzdano polazište za razumevanje prava i određivanje njegovog pojma.
AB  - The law cannot squeeze out values. Thus, it comes as an imperative of our reality to set the place for the law in the world of values. The world of values is not apart from our reality. In our reality the world of values is the purpose of everything that exists. Actually, it is about the demand to bring values into our reality. The meaning of values is absolute. The eternity of values immediately points to the absolute order of values, which as such has its homeland in Creator. The issue of finding the place of the law in the world of values is a pre-legal issue. Thereby the world of values is becoming the assumption of the existence and development of the law. Legal norm then becomes the formulation of values. Legal norm is not precious in itself, but only if it expresses fundamental values. Legal norm has to be the logical formulation, that is to say, it has to deliver the contents of value correctly and appropriately. As an expression of the value dimension legal norm obtains the binding power. Keeping in mind the legal norm defined in such a way, nobody can deny its necessity in reality. The law then expresses the contents of value and proposes the model of the ideal behavior. The fact that values have creating power is thus proved to be true.
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Vrednosna usmerenost prava naspram pravnog pozitivizma
T1  - Value-orientation of the law vs. legal positivism
EP  - 113
IS  - 1
SP  - 102
VL  - 62
DO  - 10.5937/AnaliPFB1401102T
UR  - conv_3254_6
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Trajković, Marko",
year = "2014",
abstract = "U ovom dobu tehnološki zahuktalog pozitivizma često se u pravnoj nauci mogu čuti tvrdnje da pravo treba da istisne vrednosti iz sebe i da postoji bez njih. Ta tvrdnja nije nova. Novo je samo objašnjenje zbog čega se to tvrdi. A ono glasi da se time pravo oslobađa ljudskih slabosti, postaje čisto naučno zasnovano i vrednosno neutralno kao jedna čisto realna pojava života. Kao da se zaboravilo da proglašena vrednosna neutralnost prava takođe predstavlja jednu vrednost. Zbog toga je umesnije govoriti o nužnoj vrednosnoj usmerenosti prava, zasnovanoj na tvrdnji da svako pravo teži ka vlastitom samousavršavanju. To samousavršavanje nužno ima kao krajnji cilj pretvaranje pozitivnog prava u idealno, prirodno pravo. U tom slučaju, odgovor na pitanje da li pravo može da postoji bez vrednosti postaje jasan - ne može. I ne samo da ne može, već se ne sme ni težiti ka pravu odvojenom od vrednosti. U protivnom, pokazala bi se kao tačna misao Tome Akvinskog da je pravo stvoreno samo zbog zlih i opakih. Vrednosti postojano utiču na pravo. One ga ustanovljavaju, omogućavaju stvaranje sve boljeg prava i preko njega se ostvaruju. Kao takve, one predstavljaju pouzdano polazište za razumevanje prava i određivanje njegovog pojma., The law cannot squeeze out values. Thus, it comes as an imperative of our reality to set the place for the law in the world of values. The world of values is not apart from our reality. In our reality the world of values is the purpose of everything that exists. Actually, it is about the demand to bring values into our reality. The meaning of values is absolute. The eternity of values immediately points to the absolute order of values, which as such has its homeland in Creator. The issue of finding the place of the law in the world of values is a pre-legal issue. Thereby the world of values is becoming the assumption of the existence and development of the law. Legal norm then becomes the formulation of values. Legal norm is not precious in itself, but only if it expresses fundamental values. Legal norm has to be the logical formulation, that is to say, it has to deliver the contents of value correctly and appropriately. As an expression of the value dimension legal norm obtains the binding power. Keeping in mind the legal norm defined in such a way, nobody can deny its necessity in reality. The law then expresses the contents of value and proposes the model of the ideal behavior. The fact that values have creating power is thus proved to be true.",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Vrednosna usmerenost prava naspram pravnog pozitivizma, Value-orientation of the law vs. legal positivism",
pages = "113-102",
number = "1",
volume = "62",
doi = "10.5937/AnaliPFB1401102T",
url = "conv_3254_6"
}

Trajković, M.. (2014). Vrednosna usmerenost prava naspram pravnog pozitivizma. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 62(1), 102-113.
https://doi.org/10.5937/AnaliPFB1401102T
conv_3254_6

Trajković M. Vrednosna usmerenost prava naspram pravnog pozitivizma. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2014;62(1):102-113.
doi:10.5937/AnaliPFB1401102T
conv_3254_6 .

Trajković, Marko, "Vrednosna usmerenost prava naspram pravnog pozitivizma" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 62, no. 1 (2014):102-113,
https://doi.org/10.5937/AnaliPFB1401102T .,
conv_3254_6 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Mitrović, Dragan M.
AU  - Trajković, Marko S.
PY  - 2011
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1504
AB  - Postojanje pravne stvarnosti podrazumeva postojanje pravnih subjekata, kao tvorevina te stvarnosti. Pravo uopšte ne može da postoji bez svojih subjekata. Oni su conditio sine qua non prava. Prvo su fizička lica postala subjekti prava - iako ne sva i odjednom, a tek zatim i njihove tvorevine - pravna (moralna) lica. U oba slučaja radi se o tradicionalnim virtuelnim pravnim tvorevinama. Ali, budući da informatičko-tehnološki razvoj nije mogao da mimoiđe savremeno pravo, sve češće i sve više se razmišlja o trećoj vrsti subjekata prava - virtuelnim likovima kao novim pravnim subjektima (pravnim avatarima). To se danas ne čini iz radoznalosti, već iz veoma praktičnih razloga - zbog unapređivanja poslovnog saobraćaja koji se ubrzano preseljava u oblast računarske virtuelne stvarnosti. Takva promena nalaže preispitivanje tradicionalnih shvatanja i teorija o tome šta je subjekt prava. Ona zahteva i da se odredi moguća pravna priroda virtuelnih likova, nezavisno od toga da li se radi o virtuelnim fizičkim ili pravnim licima. Izgleda da je za objašnjenje njihove suštine u ovom trenutku prihvatljivija teorija fikcije nego teorija realnosti, koja će možda jednom prevagnuti, kako se svojevremeno u XVII veku dogodilo sa subjektivitetom pravnog lica.
AB  - Law cannot exist without subjects. They have always existed as conditio sine qua non of law. Firstly, natural persons became subjects of law, and thereafter also their creations - legal (moral) persons. Information and technological developments could not have bypassed contemporary law. As a result, more often and considerably more is being thought about a new, third type of the subjects of law - virtual characters (avatars). This is being done for the purpose of advancing and organising business communication, which is increasingly being translated from the traditional actual world into the new virtual computer world. This change requires the re-examination of traditional beliefs and theories concerned with what a subject of law is at all. It also requires at this moment to at least make an attempt to determine the legal nature of virtual characters. When it has to do with the explanation of their essence, it seems that at this moment fiction theory is more acceptible than reality theory, which may sometime prevail, as it had happened with the subjectivity of the legal person at some point in time in the 17th century. In additon to purely practical reasons, the appearance of virtual characters displays in a completely different light some of the incessant questions to which a valid answer has not yet been given, nor, it seems, will ever be: What is reality? What is the world at all? What is man (especially a telematic virtual man)? What is the place of man in reality and in the world? For how long can the world and man, as its constituent part, go on developing? Does virtual reality free or capture human will? Apparently, the essence is not in the conclusiveness of such answers, but rather in their usefulness.
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Može li virtuelni lik da bude subjekt prava?
T1  - Can a virtual character be a subject of law?
EP  - 42
IS  - 2
SP  - 28
VL  - 59
UR  - conv_3100
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Mitrović, Dragan M. and Trajković, Marko S.",
year = "2011",
abstract = "Postojanje pravne stvarnosti podrazumeva postojanje pravnih subjekata, kao tvorevina te stvarnosti. Pravo uopšte ne može da postoji bez svojih subjekata. Oni su conditio sine qua non prava. Prvo su fizička lica postala subjekti prava - iako ne sva i odjednom, a tek zatim i njihove tvorevine - pravna (moralna) lica. U oba slučaja radi se o tradicionalnim virtuelnim pravnim tvorevinama. Ali, budući da informatičko-tehnološki razvoj nije mogao da mimoiđe savremeno pravo, sve češće i sve više se razmišlja o trećoj vrsti subjekata prava - virtuelnim likovima kao novim pravnim subjektima (pravnim avatarima). To se danas ne čini iz radoznalosti, već iz veoma praktičnih razloga - zbog unapređivanja poslovnog saobraćaja koji se ubrzano preseljava u oblast računarske virtuelne stvarnosti. Takva promena nalaže preispitivanje tradicionalnih shvatanja i teorija o tome šta je subjekt prava. Ona zahteva i da se odredi moguća pravna priroda virtuelnih likova, nezavisno od toga da li se radi o virtuelnim fizičkim ili pravnim licima. Izgleda da je za objašnjenje njihove suštine u ovom trenutku prihvatljivija teorija fikcije nego teorija realnosti, koja će možda jednom prevagnuti, kako se svojevremeno u XVII veku dogodilo sa subjektivitetom pravnog lica., Law cannot exist without subjects. They have always existed as conditio sine qua non of law. Firstly, natural persons became subjects of law, and thereafter also their creations - legal (moral) persons. Information and technological developments could not have bypassed contemporary law. As a result, more often and considerably more is being thought about a new, third type of the subjects of law - virtual characters (avatars). This is being done for the purpose of advancing and organising business communication, which is increasingly being translated from the traditional actual world into the new virtual computer world. This change requires the re-examination of traditional beliefs and theories concerned with what a subject of law is at all. It also requires at this moment to at least make an attempt to determine the legal nature of virtual characters. When it has to do with the explanation of their essence, it seems that at this moment fiction theory is more acceptible than reality theory, which may sometime prevail, as it had happened with the subjectivity of the legal person at some point in time in the 17th century. In additon to purely practical reasons, the appearance of virtual characters displays in a completely different light some of the incessant questions to which a valid answer has not yet been given, nor, it seems, will ever be: What is reality? What is the world at all? What is man (especially a telematic virtual man)? What is the place of man in reality and in the world? For how long can the world and man, as its constituent part, go on developing? Does virtual reality free or capture human will? Apparently, the essence is not in the conclusiveness of such answers, but rather in their usefulness.",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Može li virtuelni lik da bude subjekt prava?, Can a virtual character be a subject of law?",
pages = "42-28",
number = "2",
volume = "59",
url = "conv_3100"
}

Mitrović, D. M.,& Trajković, M. S.. (2011). Može li virtuelni lik da bude subjekt prava?. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 59(2), 28-42.
conv_3100

Mitrović DM, Trajković MS. Može li virtuelni lik da bude subjekt prava?. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2011;59(2):28-42.
conv_3100 .

Mitrović, Dragan M., Trajković, Marko S., "Može li virtuelni lik da bude subjekt prava?" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 59, no. 2 (2011):28-42,
conv_3100 .