O dozvoljenosti ugovaranja troškova obrade kredita u pravu Srbije

Abstract

Banke su od izbijanja svetske ekonomske krize opterećene negativnom reputacijom u javnosti, i taj trend postoji i u Srbiji. Posledice ovakve reputacije su brojni sporovi protiv banaka, uključujući i sporove za proglašenje odredbe ugovora o kreditu o obavezi korisnika da banci naknadi troškove obrade kredita ništavom, uz obavezu vraćanja naplaćene naknade s kamatom. Uporednopravno, u Nemačkoj je od 2014. godine zastupljen stav Saveznog suda (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) da nije dozvoljeno ugovarati naknadu troškova obrade kredita putem opštih uslova poslovanja. Taj stav nemačkih sudova imao je odjeka i van Nemačke, ali su uprkos tome sudovi u nekim drugim zemljama, poput Austrije, stali na stanovište da je ovakvo ugovaranje dozvoljeno. U Srbiji je, posle tranzicije s početka dvehiljaditih, postojala jedinstvena sudska praksa o dozvoljenosti ove odredbe sve do marta 2017. godine, kada je Viši sud u Somboru doneo odluku da je ovo ugovaranje ništavo s pozivom na član 1065. Zakona o obligacionim odnosima (ZOO), posle čega je praksa sudova postala nejedinstvena. Razlozi navedeni u domaćoj sudskoj praksi nisu dovoljni da bi se mogao braniti stav da je ugovaranje obaveze naknade troškova obrade kredita ništavo. Dodatna analiza primenjivosti rezonovanja nemačkih sudova u okvirima srpskog prava takođe pokazuje da nema mesta zaključku o tome da je ovakvo ugovaranje ništavo, ni kad je saugovarač banke potrošač ni kad nije, ni kad je odredba deo opštih uslova poslovanja ni kad je individualno ugovorena. Najposle, autor navodi pravne i ekonomske posledice koje bi prouzrokovao drugačiji stav Vrhovnog kasacionog suda po ovom pitanju, te zaključuje da bi sem pozitivnih posledica za jednu i negativnih za drugu stranu u sporu, posledice po opšti interes bile vrlo negativne i ozbiljne, kako s pravnog tako i s ekonomskog stanovišta.

Ever since the outbreak of the world economic crisis the banks have been burdened by a negative public image, which is a trend existing in Serbia as well. One of the consequences of such reputation are numerous lawsuits against the banks, including the ones requesting that the clause on loan processing fee be declared null and void, accompanied by the request for a refund of the amount paid with interest. Comparatively, in Germany, since 2014, a position has been taken by the Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) that contracting the payment of the loan processing fee by means of general terms and conditions of banks is null and void. This position of German courts resonated outside Germany as well, but nevertheless, the courts in some other countries, such as Austria, took the position that such contracting is allowed. In Serbia, after the transition commenced in the early 2000s, the case law was unified in the position that such contracting is allowed and valid until March 2017, when the Higher Court in Sombor passed a decision that such contracting is invalid, invoking Article 1065 of the Law on Contracts and Torts (ZOO), after which the case law started to meander. The reasons put forward in the domestic case law do not suffice for the successful defense of the position that contracting the clause on loan processing fee is null and void. Additional analysis of applicability of the reasoning of German courts within the framework of the Serbian law also demonstrates that the conclusion of such contracting being invalid is out of place, irrespective of whether the other contracting party is a consumer or not, and irrespective of whether the clause is a part of general terms and conditions or is individually agreed. Lastly, the author highlights the legal and economic consequences should the Supreme Court of Cessation take a different position regarding this issue, concluding that, apart from the favorable consequences for one party to the dispute and adverse consequences for the other, there would be severe negative consequences for the common interest, both from the legal and economic point of view.