Blasfemija i krivično pravo - sloboda izražavanja naspram vređanja religioznih osećanja

Abstract

U uporednoj krivičnoj literaturi kažnjavanje blasfemije odbacuje se iz više razloga. Najveći broj teoretičara religiozna osećanja uopšte ne smatra podobnim objektom krivičnopravne zaštite, dok se, s druge strane, kažnjavanje po ovom osnovu smatra neprihvatljivim ograničavanjem slobode izražavanja. Autor iznosi najvažnije argumente u ovoj raspravi, zauzimajući stav da bitni sadržaj priznatih veroispovesti zaslužuje da predstavlja predmet ograničene krivičnopravne zaštite.

In comparative criminal literature, punishment of blasphemy is being rejected for several reasons. The largest number of theorists point to the importance of freedom of speech, where in order to communicate and exchange ideas, it must be allowed that the manner of expression is sometimes provocative. This particularly refers to those forms of (artistic) expression characterized by the humorous processing of certain social and political themes (caricature, satire). Defining a crime of blasphemy as well encounters difficulties on the dogmatic plan, because of the undefined object of protection and the fact that it is not easy to distinguish the circle of religious systems that deserve protection. In addition, the question arises as to why similar protection would not enjoy beliefs in the sphere of culture, politics, sports, etc. A restrictive approach on this issue is also affected by radical criminal-law protection in this matter in Islamic states. On the other hand, it is not possible to dispute the particular interest of a society to protect certain values whose violation carries an increased risk for the functioning of the legal order, especially in multinational environments. The author presents the most important arguments in this discussion, taking the view that the essential content of the recognized religions deserves to be a subject of limited criminal protection.