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Blasphemy and criminal law: Freedom of expression vs. offending religious feelings

dc.creatorVuković, Igor
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-11T15:00:22Z
dc.date.available2024-03-11T15:00:22Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.issn2217-219X
dc.identifier.urihttps://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1055
dc.description.abstractU uporednoj krivičnoj literaturi kažnjavanje blasfemije odbacuje se iz više razloga. Najveći broj teoretičara religiozna osećanja uopšte ne smatra podobnim objektom krivičnopravne zaštite, dok se, s druge strane, kažnjavanje po ovom osnovu smatra neprihvatljivim ograničavanjem slobode izražavanja. Autor iznosi najvažnije argumente u ovoj raspravi, zauzimajući stav da bitni sadržaj priznatih veroispovesti zaslužuje da predstavlja predmet ograničene krivičnopravne zaštite.sr
dc.description.abstractIn comparative criminal literature, punishment of blasphemy is being rejected for several reasons. The largest number of theorists point to the importance of freedom of speech, where in order to communicate and exchange ideas, it must be allowed that the manner of expression is sometimes provocative. This particularly refers to those forms of (artistic) expression characterized by the humorous processing of certain social and political themes (caricature, satire). Defining a crime of blasphemy as well encounters difficulties on the dogmatic plan, because of the undefined object of protection and the fact that it is not easy to distinguish the circle of religious systems that deserve protection. In addition, the question arises as to why similar protection would not enjoy beliefs in the sphere of culture, politics, sports, etc. A restrictive approach on this issue is also affected by radical criminal-law protection in this matter in Islamic states. On the other hand, it is not possible to dispute the particular interest of a society to protect certain values whose violation carries an increased risk for the functioning of the legal order, especially in multinational environments. The author presents the most important arguments in this discussion, taking the view that the essential content of the recognized religions deserves to be a subject of limited criminal protection.en
dc.publisherUniverzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd i Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd
dc.relationProjekat Pravnog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu: Identitetski preobražaj Srbije
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
dc.sourceCrimen (Beograd)
dc.subjectumetničko izražavanjesr
dc.subjectsloboda izražavanjasr
dc.subjectislamsr
dc.subjectblasfemijasr
dc.subjectIslamen
dc.subjectFreedom of Expressionen
dc.subjectBlasphemyen
dc.subjectArtistic Expressionen
dc.titleBlasfemija i krivično pravo - sloboda izražavanja naspram vređanja religioznih osećanjasr
dc.titleBlasphemy and criminal law: Freedom of expression vs. offending religious feelingsen
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.licenseBY-SA
dc.citation.epage266
dc.citation.issue3
dc.citation.other9(3): 247-266
dc.citation.rankM51
dc.citation.spage247
dc.citation.volume9
dc.identifier.fulltexthttps://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/42/1052.pdf
dc.identifier.rcubconv_2788
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion


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