Dvorkinova kritika Hartove verzije pozitivizma

Abstract

Kao dominantan pravac proučavanja pravne pojave, pravni pozitivizam je trpeo kritike prvenstveno od strane predstavnika prirodnopravne škole. Ipak, najsloženija kritika pravnog pozitivizma došla je od strane Ronalda Dvorkina. Dvorkin je za glavnu metu svoje kritike odabrao Hartovu verziju pozitivizma, budući da Hartova teorija i nakon više od pedeset godina od kako je nastala, predstavlja paradigmu pozitivističkog pristupa proučavanju prava, dok se Hart smatra najuglednijim i najuticajnijim predstavnikom tog pravca. Dvorkin je svoju kritiku Hartove verzije pozitivizma razvijao više od dvadeset godina, da bi na osnovu te kritike konačno postavio sopstvenu teoriju prava. Već sama ta činjenica ukazuje na izuzetnu kompleksnost Dvorkinove kritike Hartove verzije pozitivizma. Zbog toga je ona u glavnom delu ove doktorske disertacije podeljena na dva dela: deskriptivnu i metodološku kritiku. U deskriptivnoj kritici koja je predstavljena u Dvokinovom prvom velikom delu pod nazivom „Taking Rights Seriously“ (1977. god.), Dvorkin tvrdi da pravni pozitivizam opisuje pravo uzimajući u obzir samo pravna pravila, ali ne i pravne principe. Po Dvorkinu, uticaj pravnih principa posebno je vidljiv u tzv. teškim slučajevima koji se presuđuju ne na osnovu pravnih pravila, već na osnovu pravnih principa. Zbog toga Dvorkin iznosi tvrdnju da pravni pozitivizam nije sposoban da odgovori na glavni zadatak koji pred njim stoji – da pravilno opiše pravnu praksu. Dvorkinova deskriptivna kritika podelila je pravne pozitiviste u dva tabora – one koji zastupaju inkluzivnu i one koji zastupaju ekskluzivnu varijantu pravnog pozitivizma. Ona predstavlja izuzetan doprinos u okviru moderne jurisprudencije pošto su njome otvorena neka od najznačajnijih pitanja pravne teorije i filozofije. Drugom vrstom kritike koja je uobličena u „Law’s Empire“ (1986. god.), napadnute su same osnove pravnog pozitivizma, tj. njegove glavne metodološke postavke. Pozivajući se na prvi nauk pozitivizma koji pravo shvata kao činjenicu, Dvorkin tvrdi da, ako je to shvatanje tačno, među pravnicima ne može biti sporenja oko prava, osim ako neko od njih čini empirijsku grešku prilikom utvrđivanja činjenica. Pošto to nije slučaj, Dvorkin dokazuje da je u pitanju teorijsko neslaganje koje nije neslaganje oko samog prava, već oko njegove moralnosti.

As the dominant way of examination of the legal phenomenon, legal positivism was exposed to criticism, primarily by natural law theorists. However, the most complex criticism of positivism came by Ronald Dworkin. Тhe main target of his criticism is Hart's version of positivism, because after more than fifty years since it was created, Hart's theory is still a paradigm of positivistic approach to examining of law, while Hart is considered as the most prestigious and influential representative of that approach. Dworkin’s critique of Hart's version of positivism was developing more than twenty years, and on the basis of this critique, Dworkin finally set his own theory of law. That fact alone indicates the extraordinary complexity of Dworkin’s critique of Hart's version of positivism. Therefore, in the main part of this dissertation that critique is divided into two parts: descriptive and methodological critique. In descriptive critique which is represented in Dworkin’s first major work “Taking Rights Seriously” (1977), he claims that legal positivism describing the law taking into account only legal rules, but not legal principles. Influence of the legal principles can be seen in so called hard cases, which are settled not on the basis of legal rules, but on the basis of legal principles. In this way, Dworkin argues that legal positivism is unable to properly respond to the main task – to describe the legal practice. Dworkin’s descriptive critique divided positivists into two groups – those who represent an exclusive, and those who represent an inclusive variant of positivism. This critique was a significant improvement in jurisprudence, because that critique launched one of the most important issues in modern theory and philosophy of law. Methodological critique come later and was formulated in Dworkin’s most famous book "Law's Empire" (1986). In this critique he attacked the very foundations of legal positivism, i.e. his major methodological preferences. Referring to the first doctrine of positivism that law is understood as fact, Dworkin argues that if it is true, among lawyers may not be disagreements about law, unless one of them makes a mistake in determining the empirical facts. Since this is not the case, Dworkin argues that it is theoretical disagreement.