Neustavnost Zakona o opštem upravnom postupku - Ustavni sud kao 'pozitivni zakonodavac'

Abstract

Ustavni sud je oglasio neustavnom odredbu čl. 178, st. 3 ZUP, kojom je određen objektivni rok za ponavljanje upravnog postupka. Ustavni sud je utvrdio da je postojanje pomenutog roka neustavno u odnosu na dva od 12 razloga za ponavljanje postupka, konkretno, kad do ponavljanja postupka dolazi usled toga što su Ustavni sud po ustavnoj žalbi ili Evropski sud po predstavci utvrdili da je rešenjem donetim u upravnom postupku povređeno neko Ustavom ili Evropskom konvencijom zajemčeno pravo. Nažalost, odredba čl. 178, st. 3 ZUP propisivala je objektivni rok za svih 12 razloga za ponavljanje postupka. Njenim uklanjanjem je Ustavni sud izašao iz svoje uloge 'negativnog zakonodavca', te umesto zakonodavca izvršio pravno-politički izbor, uklanjajući i delove norme koji nisu nesaglasni sa Ustavom. Autor kritički sagledava predmetnu odluku Ustavnog suda, sa stanovišta njenog obima, njene pravne osnovanosti i njenih posledica. Kritici je podvrgnuta i uloga zakonodavca, koji je propustio priliku da izmeni odnosnu odredbu tokom šest meseci koje mu je na raspolaganju ostavio Ustavni sud.

The Constitutional Court of Serbia declared Article 178(3) of the General Administra-tive Procedure Act (GAPA) unconstitutional. This provision sets an objective deadline for reopening of the administrative procedure. The Constitutional Court found that this deadline is unconstitutional when the procedure is reopened as a result of the Constitutional Court decision on constitutional appeal or the ECtHR judgment determining that a decision rendered in an administrative proceeding violated a right guaranteed by the Constitution or the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Unfortunately, the said GAPA provision prescribed an objective deadline for other 10 reasons for reopening of the procedure. By declaring this provision unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court stepped out of its role of the 'negative legislator' and made a legislative choice instead of the legislator, by removing par-ts of the norm that are not inconsistent with the Constitution. When making this decision, the Constitutional Court relied on its previous decisions, which removed the same provisions on the objective deadline for reopening of the civil litigation and misdemeanor proceedings. The Constitutional Court ignored the fact that this is an administrative procedure and, erroneously, referred to the inconsistency of the GAPA with the provisions of the Constitution and the ECHR, which guarantee the right to a fair trial, judicial protection and legal remedy. The second, equally unfounded, premise on which the Constitutional Court based its decision is the be-lief that the abolition of the objective deadline for reopening of the administrative procedure was necessary in order to enable the removal of the consequences of violations of the rights determined by the Constitutional Court or the ECtHR. By leaving only a subjective deadline, which is difficult to prove in practice, the level of legal certainty has been lowered. Finally, in its case law, the ECtHR considered that the existence of a limitless possibility of the official removal of final legal acts constituted a violation of Article 6 of the ECHR. The Constitutional Court's abolition of the objective deadline for reopening of the procedure has made this possible.