Jedna novija debata o ljudskom dostojanstvu i problem tragičnog i apsurdnog u pravu

Abstract

Dominanatno tumačenje garancije ljudskog dostojanstva u Osnovnom zakonu Nemačke u drugoj polovini XX veka poticalo je od nemačkog pravnika Gintera Diriga. Središte Dirigove interpretacije pojma digniteta smeštenog na čelo Bonskog ustava predstavljalo je poistovećenje dostojanstva sa suštinom ljudskih prava i tvrdnja da ono predstavlja njihovu bit koja mora imati trajnu i neprikosnovenu zaštitu. Novi milenijum donosi i jedan radikalniji zaokret u tumačenju nemačke ustavne garancije ljudskog dostojanstva. Matijas Herdegen, iako ne bez značajnih prethodnika koji su kritikovali ili čak odbacivali Dirigovu interpretaciju, objavljuje novo tumačenje digniteta na mestu dotada paradigmatičnih Dirigovih objašnjenja. U ovom radu se analizira Herdegenovo tumačenje garancije neprikosnovenosti dostojanstva i poredi se sa njemu rivalskom Dirigovom interpretacijom. Komparacija Herdegenovog i Dirigovog stanovišta je stavljena u širi kontekst i dodatno osvetljena uzimanjem u obzir dva slučaja koji stoje u uskoj vezi s razumevanjem ideje neprikosnovenosti i garancije dostojanstva (slučaj Zakona o vazdušnoj bezbednosti i slučaj pretnje mučenjem otmičaru dečaka u Frankfurtu) i koji su u nemačkom govornom području izazvali zvučne polemike. Promišljanjem složenosti ovih slučajeva i filozofskopravnih i etičkih osnova i konsekvenci rivalskih koncepcija neprikosnovenosti dostojanstva, zaključuje se da bez obzira na valjanost pojedinačnih rešenja, ova alternativa pravo nužno ostavlja osuđeno na izvesnu meru tragičnog i apsurdnog.

The author of the leading interpretation of the guarantee of human dignity in German constitution of the second half of the twentieth century was German lawyer Gunter Durig. At the core of his analysis of the concept of dignity, placed on the top of the Bonn constitution, was the equalization of dignity with the essence of human rights alongside with his statement that dignity understood as their untouchable (unantastbar) substance should be ultimately and infinitely protected. The new millennium brought a more radical turn from this influential legal understanding of human dignity. Although not isolated in his venture of critique of Durigs analysis, Matthias Herdegens new interpretation of the first article was even more distinct for its clear abandon of the basic ideas of his predecessor as well as for the fact that it actually replaced the Durigs paradigmatic commentary. The author of this article analyses Herdegens interpretation of the concept of human dignity and compares it to the preceding but also rival Durigs understanding. The comparison of Durigs and Herdegens standpoint is further illuminated and put in a wider context by taking into consideration two cases largely debated in Germany whose interpretation showed to be dependant on the understanding of the ideas of untouchableness and human dignity (Luftsichercheitsgesetz-case and Rettungsfolter-case). As result of examination of the complex nature of these cases and the legalphilosophical and ethical presuppositions and consequences of the two rival theories of untouchableness and human dignity, it is concluded that notwithstanding their different success in responding to the particular problems, this alternative necessarily leaves law condemned to some degree of tragedy and absurdity.