Može li virtuelni lik da bude subjekt prava?

Abstract

Postojanje pravne stvarnosti podrazumeva postojanje pravnih subjekata, kao tvorevina te stvarnosti. Pravo uopšte ne može da postoji bez svojih subjekata. Oni su conditio sine qua non prava. Prvo su fizička lica postala subjekti prava - iako ne sva i odjednom, a tek zatim i njihove tvorevine - pravna (moralna) lica. U oba slučaja radi se o tradicionalnim virtuelnim pravnim tvorevinama. Ali, budući da informatičko-tehnološki razvoj nije mogao da mimoiđe savremeno pravo, sve češće i sve više se razmišlja o trećoj vrsti subjekata prava - virtuelnim likovima kao novim pravnim subjektima (pravnim avatarima). To se danas ne čini iz radoznalosti, već iz veoma praktičnih razloga - zbog unapređivanja poslovnog saobraćaja koji se ubrzano preseljava u oblast računarske virtuelne stvarnosti. Takva promena nalaže preispitivanje tradicionalnih shvatanja i teorija o tome šta je subjekt prava. Ona zahteva i da se odredi moguća pravna priroda virtuelnih likova, nezavisno od toga da li se radi o virtuelnim fizičkim ili pravnim licima. Izgleda da je za objašnjenje njihove suštine u ovom trenutku prihvatljivija teorija fikcije nego teorija realnosti, koja će možda jednom prevagnuti, kako se svojevremeno u XVII veku dogodilo sa subjektivitetom pravnog lica.

Law cannot exist without subjects. They have always existed as conditio sine qua non of law. Firstly, natural persons became subjects of law, and thereafter also their creations - legal (moral) persons. Information and technological developments could not have bypassed contemporary law. As a result, more often and considerably more is being thought about a new, third type of the subjects of law - virtual characters (avatars). This is being done for the purpose of advancing and organising business communication, which is increasingly being translated from the traditional actual world into the new virtual computer world. This change requires the re-examination of traditional beliefs and theories concerned with what a subject of law is at all. It also requires at this moment to at least make an attempt to determine the legal nature of virtual characters. When it has to do with the explanation of their essence, it seems that at this moment fiction theory is more acceptible than reality theory, which may sometime prevail, as it had happened with the subjectivity of the legal person at some point in time in the 17th century. In additon to purely practical reasons, the appearance of virtual characters displays in a completely different light some of the incessant questions to which a valid answer has not yet been given, nor, it seems, will ever be: What is reality? What is the world at all? What is man (especially a telematic virtual man)? What is the place of man in reality and in the world? For how long can the world and man, as its constituent part, go on developing? Does virtual reality free or capture human will? Apparently, the essence is not in the conclusiveness of such answers, but rather in their usefulness.