Kako se manjinski identiteti mogu priznati pomoću kolektivnih prava

Abstract

Autor u tekstu razmatra pravne, političke i filozofske sporove koji se danas vode oko prirode kolektivnih prava, političkih zajednica i kulturne posebnosti. Autor smatra da se radi zadovoljenja specifičnih kulturno definisanih interesa mora prihvatiti pojam kolektivnih prava, i nastoji da skicira opštu pravnu teoriju kolektivnih prava. Tekst se završava ukazivanjem na više teškoća sa kojima bi takva teorija morala da se suoči ukoliko bi bila dalje razvijana.

This paper should be understood as a brief sketch, or at best as a prolegomena to one comprehensive legal theory of collective rights. I would subscribe to Varady's opinion that "the acceptance of the notion of collective rights would not solve all problems automatically. However, if we are to comply with reality, and to acknowledge what was up until now largely "unacknowledged presence, we need to develop such theory. This certainly would not be an easy task, concerning the fact that besides its genuine objectives, the precise classification of all collective rights being just one of them, this theory will also have to deal with issues from sociology or cultural anthropology. For instance, it will have to address the problem of group membership, which "can be fluid and uncertain". Accordingly, it will have to answer "how to define the boundaries of the collectivity in a non-arbitrary and non-coercive way. Furthermore, legal theory of collective rights should face the problem of manipulation or coercive imposition of collective identities. Similarly collective rights may fix collective identities too rigidly and, thus oppressively. And finally, "communities and cultures are not static, so that the interplay of identity, difference and rights should not be arbitrarily terminated for the sake of some hegemonic interpretation of community. The fact that legal theory of collective rights should have particular philosophical basis, and that it should lean on the methodological tools of other disciplines, as well, implies that such theory can not be the Reine Rechtslehre, but, quite contrary, one integral theory about the concept of collective rights.