Nepostojanje ministarskog premapotpisa u Ustavu Srbije od 2006. godine

Abstract

Неусловљеност председничких аката министарским премапотпи- сом у Уставу Србије од 2006. године представља крупну аномалију у сис- тему одговорности власти. У раду се разматрају њени домашаји у скло- пу уставних решења о одређивању мандатара и избору владе, гласању о неповерењу влади и распуштању скупштине и о поступку разрешења председника Републике. Указује се на порекло идеје о арбитражној уло- зи председничких прерогатива, на њене иманентне слабости и непос- тојање јемстава и санкција против злоупотреба.

The Constitution of 2006 took over from the previous constitution nonexistence of ministerial contra-signature. In that way has been removed the very foundation of parliamentary system without which there is no responsible government. According to the Constitution all acts and official deeds of the President of the Republic are his/her personal prerogatives. The President of the Republic not only performs traditional powers of the chief of the state but also disposes with influential means of power: the right to determine mandatary for the composition of the government, the right to dissolve the assembly and the right of suspensive veto. By disposing of the right to determine mandatary he/ she can substantially influence the composition of the government, and he/she can force it to resign by non-cooperation in guiding foreign policy or in case of nomination or dismissing in diplomacy or the military. By his/her discretion concerning government’s proposal for the dissolution of the assembly the President has become the arbiter who according to his/her own consideration decides on the destiny of ministry as well as on the destiny of parliamentary majority. By refusing to dissolve the assembly the President may overthrow the government for which the further co-operation with the parliament has become politically imposible, and remaining in power untenable; and would in that way be forced to resign. By accepting government’s proposal the President may by dissolving the assembly frustrate the creation of some other even more solid majority in the parliament able to establish more stable government. Along side with unlimited sphere of discretion which easily can glide into arbitrariness and cross into political misuse of powers, the presidential acts are released of any political responsibility. Within an extraordinary difficult procedure for the release, the legal responsibility of the President is set in a very strait form as a responsibility for acts counter some explicit constitutional provision. In that case if a proposal for a release would be accepted by absolute majority in the assembly, and later on be approved by the Constitutional Court, the Constitution provides even more bizarre solution – remaining of the President in power by the will of only one third of people’s representatives despite the fact that he/she as a chief of the state has violated the Constitution. The responsibility of executive power cannot be in fact solved by personal responsibility of the chief of the state, since so highly established it is mainly illusory. The prerogatives of the President can be brought into conformity with profound principle of government’s responsibility only if it is conditioned by a co-operation of parliamentary ministry through the institution of contra-signature.