Ladislav Polić o Kraljevskoj sankciji

Abstract

U prvom delu rada izložena je Polićeva teorijska konstrukcija prava sankcije zakona. Samostalnost Polićevog duha ogleda se u postuliranju jednog primarnog imperativa, ustavne norme, u interpretaciji posve u duhu tada još neizgrađene teorije normativne škole. Sankcija zakona se po svojoj pravnoj prirodi iskazuje kao autoritativna deklaracija o egzistenciji zakonodavne volje koja je, predstavljajući u smislu ustava izražaj državnog imperija, kompetentna da ustanovljava zakonske imperative. Teorijsko razlučivanje pojmova kraljevske sankcije i veta Polić smatra neutemeljenim, argumentujući da je veto samo refleks ili naličje prava sankcije, koje pojmovno obuhvata i ovlast uskraćivanja. Drugi deo rada posvećen je Polićevom autorstvu prilikom normiranja instituta kraljevskog veta u nacrtima ustava vladine ekspertske komisije iz 1920. i Narodnog kluba iz 1921. godine. Težište razmatranja je u analizi konsekvenci ugrađivanja prava veta kao jednog stranog elementa, poreklom iz republikanskog idejnog okvira i ustavne logike predsedničkog sistema, u konstrukciju parlamentarne monarhije. Suštinski smisao ogleda se upravo u negiranju bitnog svojstva kraljevske prerogative kao ovlasti monarha koja se vrši u području slobodne ocene omeđenom konvencijama parlamentarne vlade. Kraljevski ukaz o odbacivanju zakona u normativnom sklopu ustavnih ovlašćenja predstavlja formu vršenja diskrecione vlasti predsednika vlade, primarno osmišljene kao rezervno sredstvo obuzdavanja prevlasti parlamenta kojim je egzekutiva snabdevena u ustavnom sukobu vlade i narodnog predstavništva povodom nekog važnog pitanja zakonodavne reforme.

In the first part of this article is presented Polić’s theoretical construction of royal assent founded on the presumption of one primary imperative, constitutional norm, entirely in the spirit of new theory of normative school. The royal assent is expressed in its legal nature as authoritative declaration of existence of legislative will, which is – representing in constitutional sense an expression of governmental imperium – competent to establish legal imperatives. Considering veto to be only reflex of the prerogative of royal assent, which conceptually includes power of rejecting, Polić negative essential theoretical differentiation of the right of veto. In the second part of this paper special attention was paid to Polić’s authorship in normative regulation of the mode in which the royal veto is to be exercised in two constitutional drafts made in 1920 and 1921. The gravity point of consideration is the analysis of consequences originated from including the right of veto as a foreign element descended from constitutional logic of presidential system in the construction of parliamentary monarchy. The essential sense of constitutional determinations is disavowal of principal feature of royal prerogative as a discretionary power exercised by the Crown in the sphere limited by conventions of parliamentary government. Within the normative catenation of constitutional powers, royal decrees on refusal bills passed through the houses of Parliament represents a form of exercising discretionary authority belonging to the prime minister. Discretion is conceived as a reserved executive power for restraining parliamentary supremacy, by which the government is empowered in case of conflict between the ministry and the Parliament concerning some important issue of legislative reform.