Hartova teorija prava - osnovne crte

Abstract

Ove godine se navršilo pola veka od objavljivanja knjige The Concept of Law engleskog pravnog filozofa Herberta Harta. To je bio povod da se u ovom članku predstave i analiziraju neke od glavnih ideja u toj knjizi, ideja koje su izvršile ogroman uticaj na pravnu filozofiju i teoriju tokom nekoliko poslednjih decenija. Među tim idejama naročito su važne i dalekosežne dve: jedna prema kojoj se pravo i njegova normativnost ne mogu razumeti ukoliko se u obzir ne uzme takozvana interna tačka gledišta, tj. ono stajalište koje prema pravu zauzimaju zvaničnici pravnog sistema i oni koji pravo 'shvataju ozbiljno'; i druga, ideja po kojoj u osnovi pravnog sistema stoji jedno konvecionalno pravilo, koje je Hart nazvao pravilom priznanja. Autor članka ističe kako je naročito ova druga ideja svojom snagom, originalnošću ali i kontroverznošću izazvala ogromnu pažnju i da zapravo predstavlja najvažniji Hartov supstancijalni doprinos savremenoj jurisprudenciji.

One of the key insights of Hart's jurisprudence is the idea that legal systems are not only comprised of rules, but also grounded on them. Instead of Austin's idea of an unlimited Sovereign who makes all of the legal rules, Hart proposed a thesis that the rules actually make the Sovereign. Consistent with this 'fresh start', he also proposed a concept he described as the Rule of Recognition. This rule is a special sort of social rule which determines the status of every other rule as a part of a particular legal system. According to this, the article mainly deals with three questions: Hart's critic of Austin's imperative theory of law and afterwards, with two central tenets of Hart's theory. First of all, it is his theory of social rules (so-called practice theory of rules). In the core of this theory is the idea of internal point of view or acceptance of social rules. The internal point with regard to a certain constant pattern of behavior makes this pattern not only regular, but regulated as well (by the accepted social rule). The internal point makes a difference between two widespread social practices: social habit and social normative practice, exhibited in the social rule. Secondly, author analysis the concept of Rule of recognition. The Rule of recognition is the master rule that exists by virtue of the fact of social acceptance (it is a kind of social rule) and it establishes criteria of validity for all other legal rules. Some of the essential properties of the Rule of recognition as a theoretical concept are listed. In the conclusion, author points out that Hart's crucial theoretical achievement, i.e. his conventional explication of legal system via the concept of the Rule of recognition is still viable and fruitful ground for debates in modern jurisprudence about the nature of law.