Govor mržnje kao osnov ograničenja slobode izražavanja

Abstract

U praksi Evropskog suda za ljudska prava sloboda izražavanja uživa posebnu zaštitu. Ona je, prema mišljenju Suda, ugrađena u temelje demokratskog društva i jedan je od osnovnih uslova za njegov napredaka i za razvoj svakog čoveka. Pri tome, sloboda izražavanja važi ne samo za 'informacije' i 'ideje' koje se povoljno primaju, ili koje ne vređaju ili na koje se gleda sa ravnodušnošću, već i za one koje vređaju, šokiraju i uznemiravaju državu, ili deo stanovništva, jer su to zahtevi pluralizma, tolerancije i širine duha bez kojih nema 'demokratskog društva'. Ovo visoko vrednovanje slobode izražavanja naročito dolazi do izražaja kada je reč o političkom govoru, budući da je slobodna politička rasprava važno obeležje demokratskog društva. Ipak, Evropski sud, stoji i na stanovištu da kogod se služi slobodom izražavanja preuzima 'dužnosti' i 'odgovornosti' i da sloboda političke rasprave nesumnjivo nije apsolutne prirode. Sasvim konkretno, kada je reč o govoru mržnje,Sud podvlači da su tolerancija i poštovanje jednakog dostojanstva svih ljudskih bića osnov demokratskog i pluralističkog društva i da se u demokratskim društvima, u načelu, može smatrati neophodnim da se kazne, pa čak i da se spreče, svi oblici izražavanja koji zagovaraju, podstiču, promovišu ili opravdavaju mržnju zasnovanu na netoleranciji. Polazeći od pojma zabrane govora mržnje u ustavnom sistemu Srbije, i mesta Evropske konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava u njegovoj hijerarhiji izvora prava, u ovom radu se prati evolucija jurisprudencije Evropskog suda u pogledu razumevanja i definisanja uslova pod kojima se može smatrati neophodnim da se zbog govora mržnje ograniči sloboda izražavanja u demokratskom društvu. Taj pravni standard - neophodnosti ograničenja u demokratskom društvu, se potom poredi sa standardom jasne i postojeće opasnosti, koji se gotovo čitav vek razvija u praksi Vrhovnog suda Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, i čija primena se ponekada zagovara i u Evropi.

Freedom of expression enjoys a particular protection in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. According to the Court, freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man. Moreover, it is applicable not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favorably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population, since these are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no 'democratic society'. This high valuing of freedom of expression is particularly striking when it comes to the political speech, the free political debate being a distinctive feature of a democratic society. Nevertheless, the European Court considers that whoever exercises his freedom of expression undertakes 'duties and responsibilities', and that the freedom of political debate is undoubtedly not absolute in nature. More concretely, when the hate speech is at issue the Court underlines that the tolerance and respect of equal dignity of all human beings constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic and pluralist society, and that in a democratic society, in principle, it may be considered necessary to punish and even to prevent all forms of expression which propagate, incite, promote, or justify the hate based on intolerance. Taking into account the notion of prohibition of hate speech in the constitutional system of the Republic of Serbia, and the place of the European Convention on Human Rights in its hierarchy of legal sources, this paper follows the evolution of the European Court’s case-law as to the understanding and definition of conditions under which it may be considered necessary in a democratic society to restrict freedom of expression because of hate speech. This legal standard - necessary in a democratic society, is then compared to the clear and present danger test, which has been developed for almost a century in the case-law of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, and which application is sometimes recommended in Europe.