Pretor ne štiti kukavice - o dvostrukom karakteru prinude u rimskom i savremenom domaćem pravu

Abstract

O prinudi, koja je, u našem pravnom sistemu, institut privatnog i javnog prava, definisana Zakonom o obligacionim odnosima i Krivičnim zakonikom Republike Srbije, u domaćim okvirima nije se dovoljno pisalo. U radu se nastoji da se pravnoistorijski, uporednopravno i socijalno-politički, ali i normativno, oslanjajući se na filološku analizu tekstova, osvetli i analizira ovaj prilično kontroverzan pravni institut. Pri tom, osnovna namera autora je dvojaka. Prvo, teži se detaljnom predstavljanju nastanka i razvoja ove pravne ustanove u rimskom pravu, uz neophodno isticanje društveno-političkih okolnosti koje su do toga dovele. Autor potom problematizuje pitanje konsenzusa, kao temeljnog elementa za nastanak ugovora i odnosa unutrašnje i izjavljene volje, kritikujući dominantan stav u romanistici da je u klasičnom rimskom pravu preovlađivalo načelo coactus voluit tamen voluit. Istovremeno, posebnu pažnju posvećuje uslovima pod kojima oštećena strana može koristiti instrumente zaštite. Pri tom insistira na objektiviziranoj ulozi straha kao jednog od najvažnijih uslova postojanja prinude i nudi argumente u prilog tezi da je već rimsko pravo uspostavilo načelo opravdanog straha, koje je savremeno pravo dosledno usvojilo. Autor nastoji i da ukaže na međusobni odnos mehanizama zaštite od prinude u rimskom pravu, ističući tezu da restitucije i tužba nisu funkcionisale odvojeno, već da je tužba imala restitutivnu ulogu. Drugo, u normativnoj analizi instituta prinude u savremenom domaćem pravu, autor pokušava da povuče liniju uticaja između rešenja rimske jurisprudencije i domaćeg zakonodavstva, ističući brojne i vidljive primere ove recepcije. Istovremeno se ukazuje na dvostruki karakter prinude, u rimskom pravu kao mane volje i privatnog pretorskog delikta, a u domaćem kao javnopravnog i privatnopravnog instituta. Rad predstavlja još jedan prilog autorovoj težnji da se rimsko pravo posmatra kao živ, dinamičan i aktuelan sistem, koji, u savremenim nastojanjima harmonizacije pravnog sistema Evropske unije, može još uvek biti od koristi.

It has not been written much about duress on the national level, which, in our legal system is the institution of private and public law, as defined by the Law of Obligations and the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia. The subject of this paper is an attempt to highlight and analyze one of the controversial legal institutions normatively, relying on a philological analysis of texts, historical legal, comparative and socio-political. In addition, the basic intention of the author is twofold. First, the tendency is to present in detail the origin and development of this legal institution in the Roman law, with the necessary emphasis on the socio-political circumstances that led to it. In the following analysis, the author tackles the issue of consensus, as a fundamental element for the development of contracts and relationships between inside and declared will, criticizing the dominant position in the Roman studies that in classical Roman law prevailed the principle coactus voluit tamen voluit. At the same time, special attention is paid to the conditions under which the injured party may use protection instruments. In this context, he insists on objectified role of fear as one of the most important conditions for the existence of duress and offers arguments supporting the thesis that the Roman law already established the principle of a reasonable fear that the modern law consistently adopted. The author tries to point out the relationship of mechanisms of protection against duress in the Roman law, noting the argument that the restitution and statement of claim did not function separately, but that the statement of claim had restitution role. Second, in the normative analysis of the legal duress institution in contemporary domestic law, the author tries to draw a line between the solution of the Roman jurisprudence and national legislators, pointing out the numerous and visible examples of this reception. At the same time the dual character is highlighted of duress, in the Roman law as shortcomings of will and private praetorian tort, and in domestic as public law and private law institution. It is in essence another contribution to the author's tendency to observe the Roman law as alive, dynamic and current system that in the modern efforts of harmonization of the EU legal system may be used worthily.