TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2023
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1398
AB  - The Harvard Law Review recently, for the first time, published Hart’s essay titled “Discretion”. It is a carefully arranged version of the lecture which he gave at Harvard in 1956. This essay fills significant gap in Hart's work concerning judicial reasoning. In my paper attention is devoted to his conception of judicial discretion, its two main types (express and tacit), and his understanding of interpretation and rationality related to Hartian discretion. According to Hart, discretion is a form of decision-making in hard cases, which is rational and to some extent constrained by law. However, because no combination of legal rules and principles, properly interpreted, will always give only one legally right answer, the judge in some cases must resort to non-legal reasons, i.e. exercise discretion. Hart’s insight that the law is not the sole ground for (judicial) decisions suggests that there is something “out there” (in our “practical universe”) that plays a role in the legal “earthly” world, and consequently, in the judicial world as well.
T2  - Revus
T1  - Hartʼs judicial discretion revisited
IS  - 50
VL  - 2023
DO  - 10.4000/revus.9735
UR  - conv_3312
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2023",
abstract = "The Harvard Law Review recently, for the first time, published Hart’s essay titled “Discretion”. It is a carefully arranged version of the lecture which he gave at Harvard in 1956. This essay fills significant gap in Hart's work concerning judicial reasoning. In my paper attention is devoted to his conception of judicial discretion, its two main types (express and tacit), and his understanding of interpretation and rationality related to Hartian discretion. According to Hart, discretion is a form of decision-making in hard cases, which is rational and to some extent constrained by law. However, because no combination of legal rules and principles, properly interpreted, will always give only one legally right answer, the judge in some cases must resort to non-legal reasons, i.e. exercise discretion. Hart’s insight that the law is not the sole ground for (judicial) decisions suggests that there is something “out there” (in our “practical universe”) that plays a role in the legal “earthly” world, and consequently, in the judicial world as well.",
journal = "Revus",
title = "Hartʼs judicial discretion revisited",
number = "50",
volume = "2023",
doi = "10.4000/revus.9735",
url = "conv_3312"
}

Dajović, G.. (2023). Hartʼs judicial discretion revisited. in Revus, 2023(50).
https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9735
conv_3312

Dajović G. Hartʼs judicial discretion revisited. in Revus. 2023;2023(50).
doi:10.4000/revus.9735
conv_3312 .

Dajović, Goran, "Hartʼs judicial discretion revisited" in Revus, 2023, no. 50 (2023),
https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9735 .,
conv_3312 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2022
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1320
AB  - Rasprava se sastoji iz dva dela. U njima se, respektivno, zastupaju dve osnovne teze. Prva je da sudske presude u razvijenim pravnim sistemima mogu da budu "izvori" opštih pravila koja na obavezujući način regulišu odlučivanje sudova, a onda, sledstveno, i drugih pravnih subjekata, čak i ako nisu formalno priznate kao izvori prava. Druga je d a one to treba da budu iz više razloga, od kojih su najvažniji predvidljivost i jednakost. U prvom delu rasprave se razmatraju koncepti podele vlasti, vrsta državnih funkcija i sudske vlasti. Zatim se izlažu ra zlozi zbog kojih sudska vlast može da vrši regulativnu funkciju i u pravnom sistemu u kojem joj ona nije formalno priznata. Najzad, kao ilustracija kako funkcioniše sistem u kojem sudovi vrše regulativnu funkciju, opisuje se primena doktrine stare decisis u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama, a u dodatku se analizira nekoliko odluka Ustavnog suda Srbije koje ukazuju na postojanja slične prakse u našem pravnom sistemu.
AB  - The article presents two theses. The first is that previous court judgments can be "sources" of general rules and standards that will constraint the courts, as decision-makers, even if they are not formally established as legally binding. The second is that it should be so for several reasons - the most important being predictability and equality. In this part of the article the concepts of separation of powers, types of state functions, and judicial power are explained. The reasons why the judicial power can perform the law-making function in a legal system in which it is not formally established are presented. As an illustration of how the system in which courts perform a law-making function works, the application of the doctrine of stare decisis in the USA is described. Finally, several decisions of the Constitutional Court of Serbia that indicate similar practice in Serbian legal system are analyzed.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Mogućnost regulativne funkcije sudske vlasti
T1  - The possibility of regulatory function of judicial power
EP  - 269
IS  - 1
SP  - 225
VL  - 70
DO  - 10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22108A
UR  - conv_571
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2022",
abstract = "Rasprava se sastoji iz dva dela. U njima se, respektivno, zastupaju dve osnovne teze. Prva je da sudske presude u razvijenim pravnim sistemima mogu da budu "izvori" opštih pravila koja na obavezujući način regulišu odlučivanje sudova, a onda, sledstveno, i drugih pravnih subjekata, čak i ako nisu formalno priznate kao izvori prava. Druga je d a one to treba da budu iz više razloga, od kojih su najvažniji predvidljivost i jednakost. U prvom delu rasprave se razmatraju koncepti podele vlasti, vrsta državnih funkcija i sudske vlasti. Zatim se izlažu ra zlozi zbog kojih sudska vlast može da vrši regulativnu funkciju i u pravnom sistemu u kojem joj ona nije formalno priznata. Najzad, kao ilustracija kako funkcioniše sistem u kojem sudovi vrše regulativnu funkciju, opisuje se primena doktrine stare decisis u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama, a u dodatku se analizira nekoliko odluka Ustavnog suda Srbije koje ukazuju na postojanja slične prakse u našem pravnom sistemu., The article presents two theses. The first is that previous court judgments can be "sources" of general rules and standards that will constraint the courts, as decision-makers, even if they are not formally established as legally binding. The second is that it should be so for several reasons - the most important being predictability and equality. In this part of the article the concepts of separation of powers, types of state functions, and judicial power are explained. The reasons why the judicial power can perform the law-making function in a legal system in which it is not formally established are presented. As an illustration of how the system in which courts perform a law-making function works, the application of the doctrine of stare decisis in the USA is described. Finally, several decisions of the Constitutional Court of Serbia that indicate similar practice in Serbian legal system are analyzed.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Mogućnost regulativne funkcije sudske vlasti, The possibility of regulatory function of judicial power",
pages = "269-225",
number = "1",
volume = "70",
doi = "10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22108A",
url = "conv_571"
}

Dajović, G.. (2022). Mogućnost regulativne funkcije sudske vlasti. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 70(1), 225-269.
https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22108A
conv_571

Dajović G. Mogućnost regulativne funkcije sudske vlasti. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2022;70(1):225-269.
doi:10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22108A
conv_571 .

Dajović, Goran, "Mogućnost regulativne funkcije sudske vlasti" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 70, no. 1 (2022):225-269,
https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22108A .,
conv_571 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2022
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1317
AB  - Rasprava se sastoji iz dva dela i u njima se, respektivno, zastupaju dve osnovne teze. Prva je da sudske presude u svim razvijenim pravnim sistemima mogu da budu "izvori" opštih pravila koja će ubuduće na obavezujući način regulisati ponašanje sudova, a onda, sledstveno, i drugih pravnih subjekata, čak i ako nisu formalno priznate kao izvori prava. A druga je da one to treba da budu iz više razloga, od kojih su najvažniji predvidljivost i jednakost. U ovom delu rasprave najpre se izlažu upravo ti normativni razlozi u prilog vršenja regulativne funkcije sudske vlasti, a zatim se pokazuje u kojem pravcu bi sudska vlast mogla da vrši regulativnu funkciju u jednom tipičnom kontinentalnom sistemu, ako sudska vlast, kao celina, prihvata da je vrši.
AB  - The article presents the follow-up to a previous article which expounds the thesis that in all developed legal systems court judgments can be sources of general rules and standards that will constraint the courts, as decisionmakers, and then, consequently, other legal subjects, even if they are not formally recognized as sources of law. In this article, the normative reasons in favor of performing the regulative function of the judiciary are first presented, with the most important ones being predictability and equ ality. It is then shown in which direction the regulative function could be performed by the judicial power of a typical continental system, if the judiciary, as a whole, accepts to perform it.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Poželjnost regulativne funkcije sudske vlasti
T1  - Desirability of regulative function of judicial power
EP  - 495
IS  - 2
SP  - 469
VL  - 70
DO  - 10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22204A
UR  - conv_576
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2022",
abstract = "Rasprava se sastoji iz dva dela i u njima se, respektivno, zastupaju dve osnovne teze. Prva je da sudske presude u svim razvijenim pravnim sistemima mogu da budu "izvori" opštih pravila koja će ubuduće na obavezujući način regulisati ponašanje sudova, a onda, sledstveno, i drugih pravnih subjekata, čak i ako nisu formalno priznate kao izvori prava. A druga je da one to treba da budu iz više razloga, od kojih su najvažniji predvidljivost i jednakost. U ovom delu rasprave najpre se izlažu upravo ti normativni razlozi u prilog vršenja regulativne funkcije sudske vlasti, a zatim se pokazuje u kojem pravcu bi sudska vlast mogla da vrši regulativnu funkciju u jednom tipičnom kontinentalnom sistemu, ako sudska vlast, kao celina, prihvata da je vrši., The article presents the follow-up to a previous article which expounds the thesis that in all developed legal systems court judgments can be sources of general rules and standards that will constraint the courts, as decisionmakers, and then, consequently, other legal subjects, even if they are not formally recognized as sources of law. In this article, the normative reasons in favor of performing the regulative function of the judiciary are first presented, with the most important ones being predictability and equ ality. It is then shown in which direction the regulative function could be performed by the judicial power of a typical continental system, if the judiciary, as a whole, accepts to perform it.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Poželjnost regulativne funkcije sudske vlasti, Desirability of regulative function of judicial power",
pages = "495-469",
number = "2",
volume = "70",
doi = "10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22204A",
url = "conv_576"
}

Dajović, G.. (2022). Poželjnost regulativne funkcije sudske vlasti. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 70(2), 469-495.
https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22204A
conv_576

Dajović G. Poželjnost regulativne funkcije sudske vlasti. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2022;70(2):469-495.
doi:10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22204A
conv_576 .

Dajović, Goran, "Poželjnost regulativne funkcije sudske vlasti" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 70, no. 2 (2022):469-495,
https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22204A .,
conv_576 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2021
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1286
AB  - U knjizi "The Nature of International Law", Miodrag Jovanović nastoji da objasni prirodu međunarodnog prava tako što analizira tipične karakteristike prototipskog pojma prava (institucionalnost, normativnost, prinudnost i podobnost za pravednost), a zatim sagledava savremeno međunarodno pravo kroz prizmu tih karakteristika. U članku se posebna pažnja posvećuje njegovoj analizi normativnosti (međunarodnog) prava. Osnovna intencija ovog članka nije da kritikuje Jovanovićeve teze o normativnosti prava kao takvog, već da ukaže da one nisu najbolji mogući okvir za objašnjenje normativnosti međunarodnog prava. Stoga se izlaže drugačiji konceptualni okvir od onog koji je on ponudio u ključu Razove ideje pravnih normi kao isključujućih razloga za delanje i praktičke racionalnosti. Taj okvir čini dobro poznata Hartova ideja internog stajališta ili interne tačke gledišta. Izložena argumentacija pokazuje da bi, unutar takvog okvira, normativnost međunarodnog prava mogla bolje da se objasni i razume, a u njega se, čini se, dobro uklapaju i pojedine uvrežene intuicije o međunarodnom pravu.
AB  - In The Nature of International Law, Miodrag Jovanović, generally speaking, tries to explain the concept of international law. He analyzes few typical characteristics of the prototype concept of law (institutionality, normativity, coercion and justice-aptness), and then he looks at contemporary international law through "the lenses" of these characteristics. The article pays special attention to his analysis of the normativity of (international) law. The main intention is not to criticize Jovanović's theses about the normativity of law, as such, but to point out that they are not the best possible framework for explaining the normativity of international law. Therefore, a different and more appropriate conceptual framework is presented than the one he offered in the key of Raz's idea of legal norms as exclusionary reasons for action and practical rationality. This framework is grounded on Hart's well-known idea of an internal point of view. The presented argumentation shows that within such a framework, the normativity of international law could be better explained and understood, and also it seems that certain ingrained intuitions about international law fit well into it.
PB  - Univerzitet Union - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Pravni zapisi
T1  - Normativnost međunarodnog prava
T1  - Normativity of international law
EP  - 522
IS  - 2
SP  - 488
VL  - 12
DO  - 10.5937/pravzap0-33820
UR  - conv_2819
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2021",
abstract = "U knjizi "The Nature of International Law", Miodrag Jovanović nastoji da objasni prirodu međunarodnog prava tako što analizira tipične karakteristike prototipskog pojma prava (institucionalnost, normativnost, prinudnost i podobnost za pravednost), a zatim sagledava savremeno međunarodno pravo kroz prizmu tih karakteristika. U članku se posebna pažnja posvećuje njegovoj analizi normativnosti (međunarodnog) prava. Osnovna intencija ovog članka nije da kritikuje Jovanovićeve teze o normativnosti prava kao takvog, već da ukaže da one nisu najbolji mogući okvir za objašnjenje normativnosti međunarodnog prava. Stoga se izlaže drugačiji konceptualni okvir od onog koji je on ponudio u ključu Razove ideje pravnih normi kao isključujućih razloga za delanje i praktičke racionalnosti. Taj okvir čini dobro poznata Hartova ideja internog stajališta ili interne tačke gledišta. Izložena argumentacija pokazuje da bi, unutar takvog okvira, normativnost međunarodnog prava mogla bolje da se objasni i razume, a u njega se, čini se, dobro uklapaju i pojedine uvrežene intuicije o međunarodnom pravu., In The Nature of International Law, Miodrag Jovanović, generally speaking, tries to explain the concept of international law. He analyzes few typical characteristics of the prototype concept of law (institutionality, normativity, coercion and justice-aptness), and then he looks at contemporary international law through "the lenses" of these characteristics. The article pays special attention to his analysis of the normativity of (international) law. The main intention is not to criticize Jovanović's theses about the normativity of law, as such, but to point out that they are not the best possible framework for explaining the normativity of international law. Therefore, a different and more appropriate conceptual framework is presented than the one he offered in the key of Raz's idea of legal norms as exclusionary reasons for action and practical rationality. This framework is grounded on Hart's well-known idea of an internal point of view. The presented argumentation shows that within such a framework, the normativity of international law could be better explained and understood, and also it seems that certain ingrained intuitions about international law fit well into it.",
publisher = "Univerzitet Union - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Pravni zapisi",
title = "Normativnost međunarodnog prava, Normativity of international law",
pages = "522-488",
number = "2",
volume = "12",
doi = "10.5937/pravzap0-33820",
url = "conv_2819"
}

Dajović, G.. (2021). Normativnost međunarodnog prava. in Pravni zapisi
Univerzitet Union - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 12(2), 488-522.
https://doi.org/10.5937/pravzap0-33820
conv_2819

Dajović G. Normativnost međunarodnog prava. in Pravni zapisi. 2021;12(2):488-522.
doi:10.5937/pravzap0-33820
conv_2819 .

Dajović, Goran, "Normativnost međunarodnog prava" in Pravni zapisi, 12, no. 2 (2021):488-522,
https://doi.org/10.5937/pravzap0-33820 .,
conv_2819 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2020
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1183
AB  - U članku se analizira analogija, kao način rasuđivanja, a naročito u pravu. Analogija uopšte se određuje kroz svoju argumentativnu formu i kroz kognitivno-psihološku sadržinu. Kada je reč o analogiji u pravu, tradicionalna podela na analogia legis i analogia iuris se potiskuje kao nepotpuna i nedovoljno rasvetljujuća za ono što se zaista događa u pravnoj praksi. Umesto nje, u tekstu se, kao početna, postulira podela analogija u pravu na kazuističku i zakonsku. I dok se u common law sistemima više primenjuje i proučava ova prva, u kontinentalnim sistemima je, zbog primata pisanih izvora prava, interesantnije razmotriti drugu. Zakonska analogija se razmatra, takođe, s aspekta njene forme i sadržine, a zatim se izlažu njene osnovne vrste, da bi se na kraju, kroz nekoliko primera iz domaće sudske prakse, ilustrovalo kako se zakonska analogija u našoj praksi primenjuje samo intuitivno, shodno tome i nedovoljno obrazloženo a, na kraju krajeva, i neispravno.
AB  - In the article, author analyzes analogy generally and analogy in law, as a way of reasoning. The traditional division of the application of analogy in law into analogia legis and analogia iuris is perceived as incomplete and insufficiently clarifying for what is really happening in the practice of law. Instead, as a starting point, it emphasizes the division of analogies in law into casuistic and statutory analogy. While in common law systems the former is more applied and studied, in continental legal systems, due to the primacy of written sources of law, it is more interesting to consider the latter. The statutory analogy is firstly analyzed from the aspect of its form and content (retrieval and mapping). After that, its basic types are described. The first is the analogy extra legem, which serves to fill legal gaps, or more precisely, which attributes legal consequences to facts that are not explicitly described in the applicable legal provision. The second type of statutory analogy is analogy intra legem, in which the argument of analogy is used to interpret legal norms. In the article are particularly depicted the two "incarnations" of analogy intra legem, extensive interpretation and systemic interpretative argument of analogy. Finally, through several cases from judicial practice of Serbian courts, it is illustrated how the statutory analogy is applied in this practice only intuitively, and therefore insufficiently explained, and, after all, incorrect.
PB  - Univerzitet Union - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Pravni zapisi
T1  - Shvatiti analogiju ozbiljno - uloga zakonske analogije u stvaranju i tumačenju prava
T1  - Taking analogy seriously: Statutory analogy in creation and interpretation of law
EP  - 503
IS  - 2
SP  - 461
VL  - 11
DO  - 10.5937/pravzap0-29531
UR  - conv_2816
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2020",
abstract = "U članku se analizira analogija, kao način rasuđivanja, a naročito u pravu. Analogija uopšte se određuje kroz svoju argumentativnu formu i kroz kognitivno-psihološku sadržinu. Kada je reč o analogiji u pravu, tradicionalna podela na analogia legis i analogia iuris se potiskuje kao nepotpuna i nedovoljno rasvetljujuća za ono što se zaista događa u pravnoj praksi. Umesto nje, u tekstu se, kao početna, postulira podela analogija u pravu na kazuističku i zakonsku. I dok se u common law sistemima više primenjuje i proučava ova prva, u kontinentalnim sistemima je, zbog primata pisanih izvora prava, interesantnije razmotriti drugu. Zakonska analogija se razmatra, takođe, s aspekta njene forme i sadržine, a zatim se izlažu njene osnovne vrste, da bi se na kraju, kroz nekoliko primera iz domaće sudske prakse, ilustrovalo kako se zakonska analogija u našoj praksi primenjuje samo intuitivno, shodno tome i nedovoljno obrazloženo a, na kraju krajeva, i neispravno., In the article, author analyzes analogy generally and analogy in law, as a way of reasoning. The traditional division of the application of analogy in law into analogia legis and analogia iuris is perceived as incomplete and insufficiently clarifying for what is really happening in the practice of law. Instead, as a starting point, it emphasizes the division of analogies in law into casuistic and statutory analogy. While in common law systems the former is more applied and studied, in continental legal systems, due to the primacy of written sources of law, it is more interesting to consider the latter. The statutory analogy is firstly analyzed from the aspect of its form and content (retrieval and mapping). After that, its basic types are described. The first is the analogy extra legem, which serves to fill legal gaps, or more precisely, which attributes legal consequences to facts that are not explicitly described in the applicable legal provision. The second type of statutory analogy is analogy intra legem, in which the argument of analogy is used to interpret legal norms. In the article are particularly depicted the two "incarnations" of analogy intra legem, extensive interpretation and systemic interpretative argument of analogy. Finally, through several cases from judicial practice of Serbian courts, it is illustrated how the statutory analogy is applied in this practice only intuitively, and therefore insufficiently explained, and, after all, incorrect.",
publisher = "Univerzitet Union - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Pravni zapisi",
title = "Shvatiti analogiju ozbiljno - uloga zakonske analogije u stvaranju i tumačenju prava, Taking analogy seriously: Statutory analogy in creation and interpretation of law",
pages = "503-461",
number = "2",
volume = "11",
doi = "10.5937/pravzap0-29531",
url = "conv_2816"
}

Dajović, G.. (2020). Shvatiti analogiju ozbiljno - uloga zakonske analogije u stvaranju i tumačenju prava. in Pravni zapisi
Univerzitet Union - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 11(2), 461-503.
https://doi.org/10.5937/pravzap0-29531
conv_2816

Dajović G. Shvatiti analogiju ozbiljno - uloga zakonske analogije u stvaranju i tumačenju prava. in Pravni zapisi. 2020;11(2):461-503.
doi:10.5937/pravzap0-29531
conv_2816 .

Dajović, Goran, "Shvatiti analogiju ozbiljno - uloga zakonske analogije u stvaranju i tumačenju prava" in Pravni zapisi, 11, no. 2 (2020):461-503,
https://doi.org/10.5937/pravzap0-29531 .,
conv_2816 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
AU  - Spaić, Bojan
PY  - 2019
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1085
AB  - Pravo na obrazloženu presudu koje je Evropski sud za ljudska prava stvorio u sopstvenoj praksi, zasnivajući ga na pravu na pravično suđenje, u nekim slučajevima služi strazburškom Sudu da se upusti u instanciono odlučivanje povodom predstavki u vezi s članom 6 Konvencije. To pitanje je i praktično i teorijski relevantno jer taj Sud, u skladu s doktrinom "četvrte instance" po pravilu ne postupa kao instancioni sud. U analizi nekoliko temeljnih slučajeva, autori u članku pokazuju pod kojim uslovima i na koji način se Sud u Strazburu upušta u meritorno rešavanje sporova između građana i država članica. Zaključak je da nije reč o tome da ESLJP, kada utvrđuje da li je došlo do povrede prava na obrazloženu presudu, slučajno ili nesmotreno odstupi od doktrine "četvrte instance" već o tome da je u nizu presuda ESLJP sâmo pravo na obrazloženu presudu formulisao tako da ono po sebi odstupa od te doktrine.
AB  - Right to a reasoned judgement, created by the European Court of Human Rights is used in some cases by the Court in Strasbourg to justify acting as a court of higher instance in relation to national courts regarding the article 6 of the Convention. This issue is relevant both for legal theory and legal practice, because the Court, according to the fourth instance doctrine, does not act as an instance court. By analyzing key cases, the authors show under which conditions and in what way the Strasbourg Court rules on the substance of cases. It is concluded that ECHR, in the case of the right to a reasoned judgement, does not stray from the fourth instance doctrine occasionally or by chance. A series of decisions show that the ECHR formulated the right to a reasoned judgement in such a way that the right itself deviates from the fourth instance doctrine.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Doktrina "četvrte instance" i pravo na obrazloženu presudu u praksi Evropskog suda za ljudska prava
T1  - Fourth instance doctrine and the right to a reasoned judgement in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights
EP  - 185
IS  - 3
SP  - 158
VL  - 67
DO  - 10.5937/AnaliPFB1903166D
UR  - conv_499
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran and Spaić, Bojan",
year = "2019",
abstract = "Pravo na obrazloženu presudu koje je Evropski sud za ljudska prava stvorio u sopstvenoj praksi, zasnivajući ga na pravu na pravično suđenje, u nekim slučajevima služi strazburškom Sudu da se upusti u instanciono odlučivanje povodom predstavki u vezi s članom 6 Konvencije. To pitanje je i praktično i teorijski relevantno jer taj Sud, u skladu s doktrinom "četvrte instance" po pravilu ne postupa kao instancioni sud. U analizi nekoliko temeljnih slučajeva, autori u članku pokazuju pod kojim uslovima i na koji način se Sud u Strazburu upušta u meritorno rešavanje sporova između građana i država članica. Zaključak je da nije reč o tome da ESLJP, kada utvrđuje da li je došlo do povrede prava na obrazloženu presudu, slučajno ili nesmotreno odstupi od doktrine "četvrte instance" već o tome da je u nizu presuda ESLJP sâmo pravo na obrazloženu presudu formulisao tako da ono po sebi odstupa od te doktrine., Right to a reasoned judgement, created by the European Court of Human Rights is used in some cases by the Court in Strasbourg to justify acting as a court of higher instance in relation to national courts regarding the article 6 of the Convention. This issue is relevant both for legal theory and legal practice, because the Court, according to the fourth instance doctrine, does not act as an instance court. By analyzing key cases, the authors show under which conditions and in what way the Strasbourg Court rules on the substance of cases. It is concluded that ECHR, in the case of the right to a reasoned judgement, does not stray from the fourth instance doctrine occasionally or by chance. A series of decisions show that the ECHR formulated the right to a reasoned judgement in such a way that the right itself deviates from the fourth instance doctrine.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Doktrina "četvrte instance" i pravo na obrazloženu presudu u praksi Evropskog suda za ljudska prava, Fourth instance doctrine and the right to a reasoned judgement in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights",
pages = "185-158",
number = "3",
volume = "67",
doi = "10.5937/AnaliPFB1903166D",
url = "conv_499"
}

Dajović, G.,& Spaić, B.. (2019). Doktrina "četvrte instance" i pravo na obrazloženu presudu u praksi Evropskog suda za ljudska prava. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 67(3), 158-185.
https://doi.org/10.5937/AnaliPFB1903166D
conv_499

Dajović G, Spaić B. Doktrina "četvrte instance" i pravo na obrazloženu presudu u praksi Evropskog suda za ljudska prava. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2019;67(3):158-185.
doi:10.5937/AnaliPFB1903166D
conv_499 .

Dajović, Goran, Spaić, Bojan, "Doktrina "četvrte instance" i pravo na obrazloženu presudu u praksi Evropskog suda za ljudska prava" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 67, no. 3 (2019):158-185,
https://doi.org/10.5937/AnaliPFB1903166D .,
conv_499 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2017
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/981
AB  - U članku se analizira odnos dva koncepta: koncepta pravednog delanja i koncepta prava. Pri tome se sledi uvid savremenih pravnih filozofa, i to onih s obe strane 'borbene linije' u jurisprudenciji (i pozitivista i jusnaturalista), koji smatraju da je pogrešno da se taj odnos svodi na pitanje da li je nepravedno (ili nemoralno) pravo, to jest da li je važeće pravo ili nije. Ipak, to ne znači da ne postoje nužne ili značajne veze između pravde i prava koje jurisprudencija treba da utvrdi i koje će nam pomoći da bolje razumemo 'naš' pravni sistem i vlastitu socijalnu praksu. Nakon analize dva koncepta, dolazi se do zaključka, prvo, da su dve ključne veze između pravde (pravednog delanja) i prava u tome da je pravo podobno da bude procenjivano kao pravedno ili nepravedno i, drugo, da pravo treba da ostvaruje pravdu. Iz te dve nužne veze proističe da pravo koje ne ostvaruje formalnu pravdu i proceduralnu pravdu, konceptualno gledano, ne može da bude posmatrano kao tipičan pravni sistem već kao 'defektno' ili izopačeno pravo.
AB  - In the article, the author analyzes the relationship between two concepts: the concept of a just action and the concept of the law. In doing so, he follows insight of contemporary legal philosophers, those on both sides of the 'front lines' in the jurisprudence (positivists as well as natural law theorists), according to which it is wrong to confine that relationship to the question of whether Lex injusta has legal validity or not. However, this does not mean that there are no essential or significant relationships between the two concepts. The task of jurisprudence is to deal with these questions and in that respect help us to better understand of 'our' own legal system and social practices. After analyzing the two concepts, it can be concluded, first, that the two key links between justice (just action), and the law is that the law is 'justice-apt', and second, that the law is the kind of thing that ought to be just. From these two necessary connections, it follows that the law which does not succeed to actualize so-called formal 'justice' and procedural justice, conceptually speaking, can not be recognized as a typical legal system, but can be regarded as the 'defective' or perverted law.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Pravda i pravo - novi odgovori na staro pitanje
T1  - The relationship between the justice and the law in the passive offside of jurisprudence
EP  - 108
IS  - 1
SP  - 82
VL  - 65
DO  - 10.5937/AnaliPFB1701082D
UR  - conv_417
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2017",
abstract = "U članku se analizira odnos dva koncepta: koncepta pravednog delanja i koncepta prava. Pri tome se sledi uvid savremenih pravnih filozofa, i to onih s obe strane 'borbene linije' u jurisprudenciji (i pozitivista i jusnaturalista), koji smatraju da je pogrešno da se taj odnos svodi na pitanje da li je nepravedno (ili nemoralno) pravo, to jest da li je važeće pravo ili nije. Ipak, to ne znači da ne postoje nužne ili značajne veze između pravde i prava koje jurisprudencija treba da utvrdi i koje će nam pomoći da bolje razumemo 'naš' pravni sistem i vlastitu socijalnu praksu. Nakon analize dva koncepta, dolazi se do zaključka, prvo, da su dve ključne veze između pravde (pravednog delanja) i prava u tome da je pravo podobno da bude procenjivano kao pravedno ili nepravedno i, drugo, da pravo treba da ostvaruje pravdu. Iz te dve nužne veze proističe da pravo koje ne ostvaruje formalnu pravdu i proceduralnu pravdu, konceptualno gledano, ne može da bude posmatrano kao tipičan pravni sistem već kao 'defektno' ili izopačeno pravo., In the article, the author analyzes the relationship between two concepts: the concept of a just action and the concept of the law. In doing so, he follows insight of contemporary legal philosophers, those on both sides of the 'front lines' in the jurisprudence (positivists as well as natural law theorists), according to which it is wrong to confine that relationship to the question of whether Lex injusta has legal validity or not. However, this does not mean that there are no essential or significant relationships between the two concepts. The task of jurisprudence is to deal with these questions and in that respect help us to better understand of 'our' own legal system and social practices. After analyzing the two concepts, it can be concluded, first, that the two key links between justice (just action), and the law is that the law is 'justice-apt', and second, that the law is the kind of thing that ought to be just. From these two necessary connections, it follows that the law which does not succeed to actualize so-called formal 'justice' and procedural justice, conceptually speaking, can not be recognized as a typical legal system, but can be regarded as the 'defective' or perverted law.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Pravda i pravo - novi odgovori na staro pitanje, The relationship between the justice and the law in the passive offside of jurisprudence",
pages = "108-82",
number = "1",
volume = "65",
doi = "10.5937/AnaliPFB1701082D",
url = "conv_417"
}

Dajović, G.. (2017). Pravda i pravo - novi odgovori na staro pitanje. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 65(1), 82-108.
https://doi.org/10.5937/AnaliPFB1701082D
conv_417

Dajović G. Pravda i pravo - novi odgovori na staro pitanje. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2017;65(1):82-108.
doi:10.5937/AnaliPFB1701082D
conv_417 .

Dajović, Goran, "Pravda i pravo - novi odgovori na staro pitanje" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 65, no. 1 (2017):82-108,
https://doi.org/10.5937/AnaliPFB1701082D .,
conv_417 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2017
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/986
AB  - U radu se analizira tema koja je relativno zapostavljena u domaćoj pravnoj teoriji a to su načini proučavanja prava. U našoj pravnoj kulturi uobičajeno je da se discipline koje se bave proučavanjem prava dele na pravnu nauku (dogmatika i empirijske pravne discipline), pravnu teoriju i pravnu filozofiju i ta podela se uzima kao početni okvir analize. U članku se ispituju osnovna svojstva svakog od ovih pristupa proučavanju prava, uz prethodno objašnjenje šireg disciplinarnog i epistemološkog okvira unutar kojeg se oni mogu svrstati. Nakon preduzete analize svakog pojedinačnog pristupa, dolazi se do zaključka da je bavljenje prvom vrstom proučavanja prava nužno povezano s drugim (teorijskim), a da se drugi naslanja na treći (filozofski). To, drugim rečima, znači da je svaki uspešan i plodotvoran pravnik naučnik (doktrinar ili empirista) u isto vreme i pravni teoretičar, a ponekad i pravni filozof. I obrnuto. To, međutim, ne znači da uvrežena disciplinarna podela proučavanja prava nije opravdana niti da je treba zanemariti (naročito ne iz didaktičkih razloga), već samo da je ona pre pitanje fokusa pravnog istraživača na određeni problem koji rešava, a ne pitanje neprelazne i nepremostive disciplinarne barijere.
AB  - In the paper the author analyzes a topic that is relatively neglected in domestic legal theory, namely which are the ways of study of the law. In our legal culture, it is customary for disciplines dealing with the study of the law to be divided into legal science (legal doctrine, doctrinal study of law), empirical legal disciplines, legal theory and legal philosophy, and this division is taken as an initial framework of the analysis. The article examines the basic characteristics of each of these approaches to study of the law, with a previous explanation of the wider disciplinary and epistemological framework within which they can be classified. After analyzing each individual approach to law research, it comes to the conclusion that dealing with the first and second kind of research (doctrinal and empirical) is necessarily related to the third (theoretical) and that the third relies on the fourth (philosophical). In other words, every successful and fruitful legal scholar (doctrinal or empiricist) at the same time is a legal theorist and sometimes a legal philosopher. And vice versa. This, however, does not mean that the existing disciplinary division of study of the law is not justified, nor should it be neglected (especially for didactic reasons), but only that it is a question of the focus of the legal researcher on a particular problem that he solves, and not the question of an intransigent and insurmountable disciplinary barriers.
PB  - Univerzitet Union - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Pravni zapisi
T1  - Proučavanje prava - pravna nauka, teorija i filozofija
T1  - Study of the law: Legal science, legal theory and philosophy of law
EP  - 248
IS  - 2
SP  - 222
VL  - 8
DO  - 10.5937/pravzap0-16070
UR  - conv_2812
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2017",
abstract = "U radu se analizira tema koja je relativno zapostavljena u domaćoj pravnoj teoriji a to su načini proučavanja prava. U našoj pravnoj kulturi uobičajeno je da se discipline koje se bave proučavanjem prava dele na pravnu nauku (dogmatika i empirijske pravne discipline), pravnu teoriju i pravnu filozofiju i ta podela se uzima kao početni okvir analize. U članku se ispituju osnovna svojstva svakog od ovih pristupa proučavanju prava, uz prethodno objašnjenje šireg disciplinarnog i epistemološkog okvira unutar kojeg se oni mogu svrstati. Nakon preduzete analize svakog pojedinačnog pristupa, dolazi se do zaključka da je bavljenje prvom vrstom proučavanja prava nužno povezano s drugim (teorijskim), a da se drugi naslanja na treći (filozofski). To, drugim rečima, znači da je svaki uspešan i plodotvoran pravnik naučnik (doktrinar ili empirista) u isto vreme i pravni teoretičar, a ponekad i pravni filozof. I obrnuto. To, međutim, ne znači da uvrežena disciplinarna podela proučavanja prava nije opravdana niti da je treba zanemariti (naročito ne iz didaktičkih razloga), već samo da je ona pre pitanje fokusa pravnog istraživača na određeni problem koji rešava, a ne pitanje neprelazne i nepremostive disciplinarne barijere., In the paper the author analyzes a topic that is relatively neglected in domestic legal theory, namely which are the ways of study of the law. In our legal culture, it is customary for disciplines dealing with the study of the law to be divided into legal science (legal doctrine, doctrinal study of law), empirical legal disciplines, legal theory and legal philosophy, and this division is taken as an initial framework of the analysis. The article examines the basic characteristics of each of these approaches to study of the law, with a previous explanation of the wider disciplinary and epistemological framework within which they can be classified. After analyzing each individual approach to law research, it comes to the conclusion that dealing with the first and second kind of research (doctrinal and empirical) is necessarily related to the third (theoretical) and that the third relies on the fourth (philosophical). In other words, every successful and fruitful legal scholar (doctrinal or empiricist) at the same time is a legal theorist and sometimes a legal philosopher. And vice versa. This, however, does not mean that the existing disciplinary division of study of the law is not justified, nor should it be neglected (especially for didactic reasons), but only that it is a question of the focus of the legal researcher on a particular problem that he solves, and not the question of an intransigent and insurmountable disciplinary barriers.",
publisher = "Univerzitet Union - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Pravni zapisi",
title = "Proučavanje prava - pravna nauka, teorija i filozofija, Study of the law: Legal science, legal theory and philosophy of law",
pages = "248-222",
number = "2",
volume = "8",
doi = "10.5937/pravzap0-16070",
url = "conv_2812"
}

Dajović, G.. (2017). Proučavanje prava - pravna nauka, teorija i filozofija. in Pravni zapisi
Univerzitet Union - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 8(2), 222-248.
https://doi.org/10.5937/pravzap0-16070
conv_2812

Dajović G. Proučavanje prava - pravna nauka, teorija i filozofija. in Pravni zapisi. 2017;8(2):222-248.
doi:10.5937/pravzap0-16070
conv_2812 .

Dajović, Goran, "Proučavanje prava - pravna nauka, teorija i filozofija" in Pravni zapisi, 8, no. 2 (2017):222-248,
https://doi.org/10.5937/pravzap0-16070 .,
conv_2812 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2013
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/746
AB  - Na osnovno pitanje jurisprudencije 'Šta je pravo?' Dvorkinova pravna teorija pokušava da odgovori na pomalo neobičan način. Naime, Dvorkin smatra da se pravo ne zasniva na konvencionalnom pravilu (koje Hart naziva pravilom priznanja), nego da je ono mešavina pravila i principa, te (na osnovu njih donetih) institucionalnih odluka koje su zasnovane ne specifičnom načinu interpretacije tih pravila i principa od strane sudova. Izgled ove teorije i njen odgovor na pitanje šta je pravo je upravo i neobičan zbog Dvorkinovog shvatanja da je teorija prava (jurisprudencija) zapravo 'opšti deo sudskog odlučivanja, tihi prolog svakoj pravnoj odluci,' dakle jedna vrsta uvoda u teoriju sudskog odlučivanja i da s druge strane svrha prava - shvaćena na sasvim određen način kao opravdanje državne prinude - 'diktira' način tog odlučivanja. Otuda su i sve idiosinkrazije njegove teorije (njena parohijalnost, njena normativna usmerenost i njene osnovne postavke o tome šta je pravo) ukorenjene upravo u ovom Dvorkinovom osnovnom stavu o funkciji pravne teorije i svrsi samog prava. Za njega pravna teorija ne služi da bolje razumemo (objasnimo) pravo, nego da ga što bolje primenimo, a to znači da donosimo odluke na osnovu prava 'shvaćenog u najboljem svetlu ' a imajući na umu da je svrha prava da pruži opšte opravdanje za upotrebu državne prinude. Ipak, ovakav prilaz ulozi teorije i uopšte, objašnjenju prava, te svrsi prava kao takvog, dovodi u Dvorkinovom slučaju do iskrivljene slike o pravu kakvo ono jeste (u stanju mirovanja). Služeći se jezikom kvantne fizike, može se reći da pogled na pravo kao ' talas' ne dovodi do ispravnog prikaza ' prava kao čestice'.
AB  - Ronald Dworkin has given the significant impetus to contemporary jurisprudence, with his original and comprehensive critics of the modern legal positivism. As an alternative to the positivism, he offered one specific kind of legal theory which is widely known as 'interpretivism'. However, Dworkin's substantive theoretical tenets are strongly influenced and 'colored' by his fundamental epistemological belief that one legal theory is only 'general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law' and that jurisprudents essentially have the same task as the courts of justice (and vice versa): to justify the exercise of coercive power by the state. Consequently, according to Dworkin's view, this ultimate purpose of law plays important role in resolving particular legal disputes. Since the justification of state coercion is the purpose of legal practice, then the interpretation of past legal decisions (statutes, precedents, etc) must be as morally good as possible. Because it is the common task of jurisprudents and judges as well this viewpoint actually turned Dworkin's theory of law into the theory of judicial decision-making. And all idiosyncrasies of his theory (normativity, rejection of the rule of recognition, parochialism, etc) stem from this peculiar account about the general role of legal theory.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Priroda pravne teorije Ronalda Dvorkina
T1  - The nature of Dworkin's legal theory
EP  - 179
IS  - 2
SP  - 166
VL  - 61
UR  - conv_303
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2013",
abstract = "Na osnovno pitanje jurisprudencije 'Šta je pravo?' Dvorkinova pravna teorija pokušava da odgovori na pomalo neobičan način. Naime, Dvorkin smatra da se pravo ne zasniva na konvencionalnom pravilu (koje Hart naziva pravilom priznanja), nego da je ono mešavina pravila i principa, te (na osnovu njih donetih) institucionalnih odluka koje su zasnovane ne specifičnom načinu interpretacije tih pravila i principa od strane sudova. Izgled ove teorije i njen odgovor na pitanje šta je pravo je upravo i neobičan zbog Dvorkinovog shvatanja da je teorija prava (jurisprudencija) zapravo 'opšti deo sudskog odlučivanja, tihi prolog svakoj pravnoj odluci,' dakle jedna vrsta uvoda u teoriju sudskog odlučivanja i da s druge strane svrha prava - shvaćena na sasvim određen način kao opravdanje državne prinude - 'diktira' način tog odlučivanja. Otuda su i sve idiosinkrazije njegove teorije (njena parohijalnost, njena normativna usmerenost i njene osnovne postavke o tome šta je pravo) ukorenjene upravo u ovom Dvorkinovom osnovnom stavu o funkciji pravne teorije i svrsi samog prava. Za njega pravna teorija ne služi da bolje razumemo (objasnimo) pravo, nego da ga što bolje primenimo, a to znači da donosimo odluke na osnovu prava 'shvaćenog u najboljem svetlu ' a imajući na umu da je svrha prava da pruži opšte opravdanje za upotrebu državne prinude. Ipak, ovakav prilaz ulozi teorije i uopšte, objašnjenju prava, te svrsi prava kao takvog, dovodi u Dvorkinovom slučaju do iskrivljene slike o pravu kakvo ono jeste (u stanju mirovanja). Služeći se jezikom kvantne fizike, može se reći da pogled na pravo kao ' talas' ne dovodi do ispravnog prikaza ' prava kao čestice'., Ronald Dworkin has given the significant impetus to contemporary jurisprudence, with his original and comprehensive critics of the modern legal positivism. As an alternative to the positivism, he offered one specific kind of legal theory which is widely known as 'interpretivism'. However, Dworkin's substantive theoretical tenets are strongly influenced and 'colored' by his fundamental epistemological belief that one legal theory is only 'general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law' and that jurisprudents essentially have the same task as the courts of justice (and vice versa): to justify the exercise of coercive power by the state. Consequently, according to Dworkin's view, this ultimate purpose of law plays important role in resolving particular legal disputes. Since the justification of state coercion is the purpose of legal practice, then the interpretation of past legal decisions (statutes, precedents, etc) must be as morally good as possible. Because it is the common task of jurisprudents and judges as well this viewpoint actually turned Dworkin's theory of law into the theory of judicial decision-making. And all idiosyncrasies of his theory (normativity, rejection of the rule of recognition, parochialism, etc) stem from this peculiar account about the general role of legal theory.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Priroda pravne teorije Ronalda Dvorkina, The nature of Dworkin's legal theory",
pages = "179-166",
number = "2",
volume = "61",
url = "conv_303"
}

Dajović, G.. (2013). Priroda pravne teorije Ronalda Dvorkina. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 61(2), 166-179.
conv_303

Dajović G. Priroda pravne teorije Ronalda Dvorkina. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2013;61(2):166-179.
conv_303 .

Dajović, Goran, "Priroda pravne teorije Ronalda Dvorkina" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 61, no. 2 (2013):166-179,
conv_303 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2012
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/625
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Miodrag Jovanović: Collective rights: A legal theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012
EP  - 344
IS  - 3
SP  - 339
VL  - 60
UR  - conv_282
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2012",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Miodrag Jovanović: Collective rights: A legal theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012",
pages = "344-339",
number = "3",
volume = "60",
url = "conv_282"
}

Dajović, G.. (2012). Miodrag Jovanović: Collective rights: A legal theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 60(3), 339-344.
conv_282

Dajović G. Miodrag Jovanović: Collective rights: A legal theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2012;60(3):339-344.
conv_282 .

Dajović, Goran, "Miodrag Jovanović: Collective rights: A legal theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 60, no. 3 (2012):339-344,
conv_282 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2011
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/584
AB  - Ove godine se navršilo pola veka od objavljivanja knjige The Concept of Law engleskog pravnog filozofa Herberta Harta. To je bio povod da se u ovom članku predstave i analiziraju neke od glavnih ideja u toj knjizi, ideja koje su izvršile ogroman uticaj na pravnu filozofiju i teoriju tokom nekoliko poslednjih decenija. Među tim idejama naročito su važne i dalekosežne dve: jedna prema kojoj se pravo i njegova normativnost ne mogu razumeti ukoliko se u obzir ne uzme takozvana interna tačka gledišta, tj. ono stajalište koje prema pravu zauzimaju zvaničnici pravnog sistema i oni koji pravo 'shvataju ozbiljno'; i druga, ideja po kojoj u osnovi pravnog sistema stoji jedno konvecionalno pravilo, koje je Hart nazvao pravilom priznanja. Autor članka ističe kako je naročito ova druga ideja svojom snagom, originalnošću ali i kontroverznošću izazvala ogromnu pažnju i da zapravo predstavlja najvažniji Hartov supstancijalni doprinos savremenoj jurisprudenciji.
AB  - One of the key insights of Hart's jurisprudence is the idea that legal systems are not only comprised of rules, but also grounded on them. Instead of Austin's idea of an unlimited Sovereign who makes all of the legal rules, Hart proposed a thesis that the rules actually make the Sovereign. Consistent with this 'fresh start', he also proposed a concept he described as the Rule of Recognition. This rule is a special sort of social rule which determines the status of every other rule as a part of a particular legal system. According to this, the article mainly deals with three questions: Hart's critic of Austin's imperative theory of law and afterwards, with two central tenets of Hart's theory. First of all, it is his theory of social rules (so-called practice theory of rules). In the core of this theory is the idea of internal point of view or acceptance of social rules. The internal point with regard to a certain constant pattern of behavior makes this pattern not only regular, but regulated as well (by the accepted social rule). The internal point makes a difference between two widespread social practices: social habit and social normative practice, exhibited in the social rule. Secondly, author analysis the concept of Rule of recognition. The Rule of recognition is the master rule that exists by virtue of the fact of social acceptance (it is a kind of social rule) and it establishes criteria of validity for all other legal rules. Some of the essential properties of the Rule of recognition as a theoretical concept are listed. In the conclusion, author points out that Hart's crucial theoretical achievement, i.e. his conventional explication of legal system via the concept of the Rule of recognition is still viable and fruitful ground for debates in modern jurisprudence about the nature of law.
PB  - Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd
T2  - Strani pravni život
T1  - Hartova teorija prava - osnovne crte
T1  - Hart's theory of law: Basic account
EP  - 28
IS  - 3
SP  - 9
UR  - conv_1143
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2011",
abstract = "Ove godine se navršilo pola veka od objavljivanja knjige The Concept of Law engleskog pravnog filozofa Herberta Harta. To je bio povod da se u ovom članku predstave i analiziraju neke od glavnih ideja u toj knjizi, ideja koje su izvršile ogroman uticaj na pravnu filozofiju i teoriju tokom nekoliko poslednjih decenija. Među tim idejama naročito su važne i dalekosežne dve: jedna prema kojoj se pravo i njegova normativnost ne mogu razumeti ukoliko se u obzir ne uzme takozvana interna tačka gledišta, tj. ono stajalište koje prema pravu zauzimaju zvaničnici pravnog sistema i oni koji pravo 'shvataju ozbiljno'; i druga, ideja po kojoj u osnovi pravnog sistema stoji jedno konvecionalno pravilo, koje je Hart nazvao pravilom priznanja. Autor članka ističe kako je naročito ova druga ideja svojom snagom, originalnošću ali i kontroverznošću izazvala ogromnu pažnju i da zapravo predstavlja najvažniji Hartov supstancijalni doprinos savremenoj jurisprudenciji., One of the key insights of Hart's jurisprudence is the idea that legal systems are not only comprised of rules, but also grounded on them. Instead of Austin's idea of an unlimited Sovereign who makes all of the legal rules, Hart proposed a thesis that the rules actually make the Sovereign. Consistent with this 'fresh start', he also proposed a concept he described as the Rule of Recognition. This rule is a special sort of social rule which determines the status of every other rule as a part of a particular legal system. According to this, the article mainly deals with three questions: Hart's critic of Austin's imperative theory of law and afterwards, with two central tenets of Hart's theory. First of all, it is his theory of social rules (so-called practice theory of rules). In the core of this theory is the idea of internal point of view or acceptance of social rules. The internal point with regard to a certain constant pattern of behavior makes this pattern not only regular, but regulated as well (by the accepted social rule). The internal point makes a difference between two widespread social practices: social habit and social normative practice, exhibited in the social rule. Secondly, author analysis the concept of Rule of recognition. The Rule of recognition is the master rule that exists by virtue of the fact of social acceptance (it is a kind of social rule) and it establishes criteria of validity for all other legal rules. Some of the essential properties of the Rule of recognition as a theoretical concept are listed. In the conclusion, author points out that Hart's crucial theoretical achievement, i.e. his conventional explication of legal system via the concept of the Rule of recognition is still viable and fruitful ground for debates in modern jurisprudence about the nature of law.",
publisher = "Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd",
journal = "Strani pravni život",
title = "Hartova teorija prava - osnovne crte, Hart's theory of law: Basic account",
pages = "28-9",
number = "3",
url = "conv_1143"
}

Dajović, G.. (2011). Hartova teorija prava - osnovne crte. in Strani pravni život
Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd.(3), 9-28.
conv_1143

Dajović G. Hartova teorija prava - osnovne crte. in Strani pravni život. 2011;(3):9-28.
conv_1143 .

Dajović, Goran, "Hartova teorija prava - osnovne crte" in Strani pravni život, no. 3 (2011):9-28,
conv_1143 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2010
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/490
AB  - In this article the author deals with two concepts and with their relationship to each other. These are the Rule of Recognition and the written Constitution. One of the key concepts of Hart's jurisprudence is the idea that all legal rules are interconnected in a unified whole - a system of primary and secondary norms. The status of one rule as a part of that system is determined by a special category of social rules, called Rules of Recognition. The rule of recognition is the master rule that exists by virtue of the fact of social acceptance and which establishes criteria of validity for other legal rules. In the first part of this article, some of the essential properties of the rule of recognition as a theoretical concept are listed. The second part of the article outlines an account of the most important features of the concept of a written Constitution. Among these the most significant are supremacy, judicial protection, durability and rigidity. Finally the author offers a summary analysis of possible and necessary relations between the two concepts. Some concluding remarks refer to the problems concerning the validity of laws, the legitimacy and authority of a Constitution and to the overarching explanatory power of theoretical concepts.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - The rule of recognition and the written constitution
EP  - 264
IS  - 3
SP  - 248
VL  - 58
UR  - conv_212
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2010",
abstract = "In this article the author deals with two concepts and with their relationship to each other. These are the Rule of Recognition and the written Constitution. One of the key concepts of Hart's jurisprudence is the idea that all legal rules are interconnected in a unified whole - a system of primary and secondary norms. The status of one rule as a part of that system is determined by a special category of social rules, called Rules of Recognition. The rule of recognition is the master rule that exists by virtue of the fact of social acceptance and which establishes criteria of validity for other legal rules. In the first part of this article, some of the essential properties of the rule of recognition as a theoretical concept are listed. The second part of the article outlines an account of the most important features of the concept of a written Constitution. Among these the most significant are supremacy, judicial protection, durability and rigidity. Finally the author offers a summary analysis of possible and necessary relations between the two concepts. Some concluding remarks refer to the problems concerning the validity of laws, the legitimacy and authority of a Constitution and to the overarching explanatory power of theoretical concepts.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "The rule of recognition and the written constitution",
pages = "264-248",
number = "3",
volume = "58",
url = "conv_212"
}

Dajović, G.. (2010). The rule of recognition and the written constitution. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 58(3), 248-264.
conv_212

Dajović G. The rule of recognition and the written constitution. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2010;58(3):248-264.
conv_212 .

Dajović, Goran, "The rule of recognition and the written constitution" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 58, no. 3 (2010):248-264,
conv_212 .

TY  - CONF
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2008
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/393
PB  - Udruženje pravnika Srbije, Beograd
C3  - Pravni život
T1  - O 'Jedinstvenosti' kosovskog slučaja - beleška o jednom teorijskom argumentu
T1  - 'Uniqueness' of the Kosovo case: A jurisprudential argument
EP  - 671
IS  - 13
SP  - 663
VL  - 57
UR  - conv_1452
ER  - 

@conference{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2008",
publisher = "Udruženje pravnika Srbije, Beograd",
journal = "Pravni život",
title = "O 'Jedinstvenosti' kosovskog slučaja - beleška o jednom teorijskom argumentu, 'Uniqueness' of the Kosovo case: A jurisprudential argument",
pages = "671-663",
number = "13",
volume = "57",
url = "conv_1452"
}

Dajović, G.. (2008). O 'Jedinstvenosti' kosovskog slučaja - beleška o jednom teorijskom argumentu. in Pravni život
Udruženje pravnika Srbije, Beograd., 57(13), 663-671.
conv_1452

Dajović G. O 'Jedinstvenosti' kosovskog slučaja - beleška o jednom teorijskom argumentu. in Pravni život. 2008;57(13):663-671.
conv_1452 .

Dajović, Goran, "O 'Jedinstvenosti' kosovskog slučaja - beleška o jednom teorijskom argumentu" in Pravni život, 57, no. 13 (2008):663-671,
conv_1452 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2007
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/343
AB  - U anglosaksonskoj filozofiji i teoriji prava od Harta na ovamo nesporna je dominacija pravnog pozitivizma. Ona se ogleda kako u broju i značaju autora koji se deklarišu kao pozitivisti, tako i u nametanju tema koje zaokupljaju tamošnju pravničku naučnu zajednicu. Međutim, i u tom periodu bilo je značajnih osporavanja osnovnih postulata pravnog pozitivizma. Najpoznatiji antipozitivisti, poput Fulera (Fuller), Dvorkina (Dworkin) i Finisa (Finnis) svojim su kritikama izazvali u pozitivističkom taboru znatne reakcije i čak i reformulacije nekih pozitivističkih postavki. Neke od njih su dovele do oštrih podela unutar samog pozitivizma (recimo do podele, na "ekskluzivne" i "inkluzivne" pozitiviste). Druge kritike i to pre svega one metodološke uzdrmale su i same temelje pravno-pozitivističkog projekta kao teorijske paradigme. O tim kritikama će u ovom članku biti nešto vise govora. Odgovori koji su, međutim, na te kritike pruženi čini se da pokazuju održivost osnovnih teza pravnog pozitivizma, ipak svagda imajući na umu i njegova imanentna ograničenja.
AB  - In Anglo-Saxon philosophy and theory of law starting with Hurt, the domination of legal positivism is doubtless. It is visible in both, in a number and importance of authors, who declare them selves as positivist and in the imposition of topics towards the legal, scholar community. Even during the above mentioned period of time, there was significant contesting of the basic postulates of legal positivism. The most famous anti-positivists, such as Fuller, Dworkin and Finnis, by their criticism gave rise to significant reactions even reformulations of certain postulates among the positivist proponents. Certain critics made sharp divisions within positivism (for instance, the division between 'exclusive' and 'inclusive' positivists). Other critics, predominantly methodological one, undermined even the cornerstones of the positivism as theoretical paradigm. This paper will examine in more detailed manner these critics. It seems that responses to these critics prove capability of legal positivism to overcome any criticism despite of having in mind its limitations.
PB  - Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd
T2  - Strani pravni život
T1  - Pravni pozitivizam u 'krizi srednjih godina'
T1  - Legal positivism in the 'middle age crisis'?
EP  - 38
IS  - 1-2
SP  - 25
UR  - conv_1134
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2007",
abstract = "U anglosaksonskoj filozofiji i teoriji prava od Harta na ovamo nesporna je dominacija pravnog pozitivizma. Ona se ogleda kako u broju i značaju autora koji se deklarišu kao pozitivisti, tako i u nametanju tema koje zaokupljaju tamošnju pravničku naučnu zajednicu. Međutim, i u tom periodu bilo je značajnih osporavanja osnovnih postulata pravnog pozitivizma. Najpoznatiji antipozitivisti, poput Fulera (Fuller), Dvorkina (Dworkin) i Finisa (Finnis) svojim su kritikama izazvali u pozitivističkom taboru znatne reakcije i čak i reformulacije nekih pozitivističkih postavki. Neke od njih su dovele do oštrih podela unutar samog pozitivizma (recimo do podele, na "ekskluzivne" i "inkluzivne" pozitiviste). Druge kritike i to pre svega one metodološke uzdrmale su i same temelje pravno-pozitivističkog projekta kao teorijske paradigme. O tim kritikama će u ovom članku biti nešto vise govora. Odgovori koji su, međutim, na te kritike pruženi čini se da pokazuju održivost osnovnih teza pravnog pozitivizma, ipak svagda imajući na umu i njegova imanentna ograničenja., In Anglo-Saxon philosophy and theory of law starting with Hurt, the domination of legal positivism is doubtless. It is visible in both, in a number and importance of authors, who declare them selves as positivist and in the imposition of topics towards the legal, scholar community. Even during the above mentioned period of time, there was significant contesting of the basic postulates of legal positivism. The most famous anti-positivists, such as Fuller, Dworkin and Finnis, by their criticism gave rise to significant reactions even reformulations of certain postulates among the positivist proponents. Certain critics made sharp divisions within positivism (for instance, the division between 'exclusive' and 'inclusive' positivists). Other critics, predominantly methodological one, undermined even the cornerstones of the positivism as theoretical paradigm. This paper will examine in more detailed manner these critics. It seems that responses to these critics prove capability of legal positivism to overcome any criticism despite of having in mind its limitations.",
publisher = "Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd",
journal = "Strani pravni život",
title = "Pravni pozitivizam u 'krizi srednjih godina', Legal positivism in the 'middle age crisis'?",
pages = "38-25",
number = "1-2",
url = "conv_1134"
}

Dajović, G.. (2007). Pravni pozitivizam u 'krizi srednjih godina'. in Strani pravni život
Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd.(1-2), 25-38.
conv_1134

Dajović G. Pravni pozitivizam u 'krizi srednjih godina'. in Strani pravni život. 2007;(1-2):25-38.
conv_1134 .

Dajović, Goran, "Pravni pozitivizam u 'krizi srednjih godina'" in Strani pravni život, no. 1-2 (2007):25-38,
conv_1134 .

TY  - CONF
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2007
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/327
PB  - Udruženje pravnika Srbije, Beograd
C3  - Pravni život
T1  - Jusnaturalizam i pravni pozitivizam - u čemu je razlika
T1  - Natural law theory and legal positivism: Are the differences
EP  - 506
IS  - 14
SP  - 491
VL  - 56
UR  - conv_1424
ER  - 

@conference{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2007",
publisher = "Udruženje pravnika Srbije, Beograd",
journal = "Pravni život",
title = "Jusnaturalizam i pravni pozitivizam - u čemu je razlika, Natural law theory and legal positivism: Are the differences",
pages = "506-491",
number = "14",
volume = "56",
url = "conv_1424"
}

Dajović, G.. (2007). Jusnaturalizam i pravni pozitivizam - u čemu je razlika. in Pravni život
Udruženje pravnika Srbije, Beograd., 56(14), 491-506.
conv_1424

Dajović G. Jusnaturalizam i pravni pozitivizam - u čemu je razlika. in Pravni život. 2007;56(14):491-506.
conv_1424 .

Dajović, Goran, "Jusnaturalizam i pravni pozitivizam - u čemu je razlika" in Pravni život, 56, no. 14 (2007):491-506,
conv_1424 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2006
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/304
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Janez Kranjc (editor): Slovenian Law Review, Pravna fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani, 2004-2005
EP  - 217
IS  - 1
SP  - 214
VL  - 54
UR  - conv_73
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2006",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Janez Kranjc (editor): Slovenian Law Review, Pravna fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani, 2004-2005",
pages = "217-214",
number = "1",
volume = "54",
url = "conv_73"
}

Dajović, G.. (2006). Janez Kranjc (editor): Slovenian Law Review, Pravna fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani, 2004-2005. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 54(1), 214-217.
conv_73

Dajović G. Janez Kranjc (editor): Slovenian Law Review, Pravna fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani, 2004-2005. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2006;54(1):214-217.
conv_73 .

Dajović, Goran, "Janez Kranjc (editor): Slovenian Law Review, Pravna fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani, 2004-2005" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 54, no. 1 (2006):214-217,
conv_73 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2005
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/246
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Jovanović Miodrag: Kolektivna prava u multikulturnim zajednicama, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2004
T1  - Jovanović Miodrag: Collective rights in multicultural societies, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2004
EP  - 238
IS  - 1
SP  - 235
VL  - 53
UR  - conv_51
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2005",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Jovanović Miodrag: Kolektivna prava u multikulturnim zajednicama, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2004, Jovanović Miodrag: Collective rights in multicultural societies, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2004",
pages = "238-235",
number = "1",
volume = "53",
url = "conv_51"
}

Dajović, G.. (2005). Jovanović Miodrag: Kolektivna prava u multikulturnim zajednicama, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2004. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 53(1), 235-238.
conv_51

Dajović G. Jovanović Miodrag: Kolektivna prava u multikulturnim zajednicama, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2004. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2005;53(1):235-238.
conv_51 .

Dajović, Goran, "Jovanović Miodrag: Kolektivna prava u multikulturnim zajednicama, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2004" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 53, no. 1 (2005):235-238,
conv_51 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2003
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/195
AB  - U članku se analiziraju najvažnije sekvence iz istorijata ideje osnovne norme kao pozitivističkog odgovora na pitanje o osnovu obaveznosti pozitivnog prava. Radi će o teorijskim idejama Salmonda, Kelzena u Harša, s jedne, a Digija u Onorea, s druge strane. Na taj način analiza obuhvata veći deo spektra mogućih rešenja ovog pitanja. Ipak, zaključak o domašajima njihovih postavki nije ohrabrujući: u ovom pitanju pozitivizam ima strateške deficite u odnosu na konkurentske pravno-filozofske pristupe.
AB  - The idea of the basic norm, described as positivist's response to the problem of normotivity of positive law, is the main subject of the article. Author analyses this concept from the very beginning (Salmond's ultimate principles), through the famous and controversial Grundnorm (Kelsen) to the much more practical and mundane account of the so-called rule of recognition (Hart). On the other side of the positivist's camp are located the authors (like Duguit or Honore), also devoted to the basic tenets of positivism (separation between law and morals), who understands the law as founded firmly on some empirical facts. They have been striving to reveal the basic norm of law in some kind of social necessity, i.e. in a feet of social cooperation between the members of a society. However, in both versions mere is, besides many differences, one common intention - founding the validity of positive law qua normative, binding system without having recourse to ethics or natural law. In concluding remarks the author makes a point that positivism, otherwise powerful in explanation of internal structure of normative positive legal system, weakens in the attempt to explain why the legal system as a whole should be obeyed.
PB  - Savez udruženja pravnika Srbije, Beograd
T2  - Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke
T1  - Ideja osnovne norme
T1  - The idea of the basic norm
EP  - 456
IS  - 4
SP  - 437
VL  - 89
UR  - conv_821
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2003",
abstract = "U članku se analiziraju najvažnije sekvence iz istorijata ideje osnovne norme kao pozitivističkog odgovora na pitanje o osnovu obaveznosti pozitivnog prava. Radi će o teorijskim idejama Salmonda, Kelzena u Harša, s jedne, a Digija u Onorea, s druge strane. Na taj način analiza obuhvata veći deo spektra mogućih rešenja ovog pitanja. Ipak, zaključak o domašajima njihovih postavki nije ohrabrujući: u ovom pitanju pozitivizam ima strateške deficite u odnosu na konkurentske pravno-filozofske pristupe., The idea of the basic norm, described as positivist's response to the problem of normotivity of positive law, is the main subject of the article. Author analyses this concept from the very beginning (Salmond's ultimate principles), through the famous and controversial Grundnorm (Kelsen) to the much more practical and mundane account of the so-called rule of recognition (Hart). On the other side of the positivist's camp are located the authors (like Duguit or Honore), also devoted to the basic tenets of positivism (separation between law and morals), who understands the law as founded firmly on some empirical facts. They have been striving to reveal the basic norm of law in some kind of social necessity, i.e. in a feet of social cooperation between the members of a society. However, in both versions mere is, besides many differences, one common intention - founding the validity of positive law qua normative, binding system without having recourse to ethics or natural law. In concluding remarks the author makes a point that positivism, otherwise powerful in explanation of internal structure of normative positive legal system, weakens in the attempt to explain why the legal system as a whole should be obeyed.",
publisher = "Savez udruženja pravnika Srbije, Beograd",
journal = "Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke",
title = "Ideja osnovne norme, The idea of the basic norm",
pages = "456-437",
number = "4",
volume = "89",
url = "conv_821"
}

Dajović, G.. (2003). Ideja osnovne norme. in Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke
Savez udruženja pravnika Srbije, Beograd., 89(4), 437-456.
conv_821

Dajović G. Ideja osnovne norme. in Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke. 2003;89(4):437-456.
conv_821 .

Dajović, Goran, "Ideja osnovne norme" in Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke, 89, no. 4 (2003):437-456,
conv_821 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 2001
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/152
AB  - U članku se analizira jedan od ključnih pojmova Rosove jurispntdencije - pojam 'važećeg prava'. Analiza počinje prikazom opštih metodološko-epistemoloških polazišta Rosove teorije, nastavlja se detaljnim opisom njegove ideje 'važećeg prava'da bise okončala poređenjem Rosovih postavki sa sličnim postavkama američkih realista. To poređenje je ipak u Rosovu korist, makar se i određeni imanentni nedostaci redukcionističkog realizma nisu mogli izbeći ni u njegovoj teoriji.
AB  - The present article is an analysis of key concepts of Ross' jurisprudence i.e. of the concept of valid law. First elaborated are the methodological principles of Ross' theory, which is followed by detailed treatment of his ideas about valid law and by a comparison between his postulates and those of the American realists. That comparison is favoring Ross' ideas, although some immanent shortcomings of reductionism realism still remain inevitable in his theory.
PB  - Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd
T2  - Strani pravni život
T1  - 'Važeće pravo' u pravnoj teoriji Alfa Rosa
T1  - 'Valid law ' in the legal theory of Alf Ross
EP  - 68
IS  - 1-3
SP  - 51
UR  - conv_1123
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "2001",
abstract = "U članku se analizira jedan od ključnih pojmova Rosove jurispntdencije - pojam 'važećeg prava'. Analiza počinje prikazom opštih metodološko-epistemoloških polazišta Rosove teorije, nastavlja se detaljnim opisom njegove ideje 'važećeg prava'da bise okončala poređenjem Rosovih postavki sa sličnim postavkama američkih realista. To poređenje je ipak u Rosovu korist, makar se i određeni imanentni nedostaci redukcionističkog realizma nisu mogli izbeći ni u njegovoj teoriji., The present article is an analysis of key concepts of Ross' jurisprudence i.e. of the concept of valid law. First elaborated are the methodological principles of Ross' theory, which is followed by detailed treatment of his ideas about valid law and by a comparison between his postulates and those of the American realists. That comparison is favoring Ross' ideas, although some immanent shortcomings of reductionism realism still remain inevitable in his theory.",
publisher = "Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd",
journal = "Strani pravni život",
title = "'Važeće pravo' u pravnoj teoriji Alfa Rosa, 'Valid law ' in the legal theory of Alf Ross",
pages = "68-51",
number = "1-3",
url = "conv_1123"
}

Dajović, G.. (2001). 'Važeće pravo' u pravnoj teoriji Alfa Rosa. in Strani pravni život
Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd.(1-3), 51-68.
conv_1123

Dajović G. 'Važeće pravo' u pravnoj teoriji Alfa Rosa. in Strani pravni život. 2001;(1-3):51-68.
conv_1123 .

Dajović, Goran, "'Važeće pravo' u pravnoj teoriji Alfa Rosa" in Strani pravni život, no. 1-3 (2001):51-68,
conv_1123 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 1995
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/87
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Raskršća pravne nauke i pravne metodologije - naučna koncepcija Stevana K. Vračara
T1  - Crossroads of jurisprudence and methodology of law: Scientific conception of Stevan K. Vračar
EP  - 450
IS  - 4
SP  - 436
VL  - 43
UR  - conv_760
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "1995",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Raskršća pravne nauke i pravne metodologije - naučna koncepcija Stevana K. Vračara, Crossroads of jurisprudence and methodology of law: Scientific conception of Stevan K. Vračar",
pages = "450-436",
number = "4",
volume = "43",
url = "conv_760"
}

Dajović, G.. (1995). Raskršća pravne nauke i pravne metodologije - naučna koncepcija Stevana K. Vračara. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 43(4), 436-450.
conv_760

Dajović G. Raskršća pravne nauke i pravne metodologije - naučna koncepcija Stevana K. Vračara. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 1995;43(4):436-450.
conv_760 .

Dajović, Goran, "Raskršća pravne nauke i pravne metodologije - naučna koncepcija Stevana K. Vračara" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 43, no. 4 (1995):436-450,
conv_760 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 1995
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/82
AB  - U ovom članku autor analizira poznato učenje Hansa Kelzena o osnovnoj normi: najpre se analizira metodološka osnova Kelzenove teorije, da bi nakon toga bilo ukazano na ograničenja Kelzenove teorije, kao i na mogućnosti koje ova teorija pruža u proučavanju prava.
AB  - In this article the author analyses the well-known teaching of Hans Kelsen on the hypothesis of the Basic norm. The methodological basis of Kelsen's theory of law is analyzed first. Kelsen understands law as a norm and he separates the norm from reality. Therefore, one norm can be based only on another norm. Furthermore, he separates the form of the norm from the contents of the norm (different from morality) and he thinks that jurisprudence should study only the formal structure of the legal norm. All this is where the causes of his errors are hidden. The author points out to the possibility that this teaching, if some of its methodological extremes were avoided, can be used for studying the basic validity of the law. It is not good to sacrifice facts for methodological 'purity' but at the end there is a dilemma whether it is possible to coordinate reality with the demands of methodology.
PB  - Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd
T2  - Strani pravni život
T1  - O Kelzenovoj osnovnoj normi
T1  - On Kelsen's basic norm
EP  - 118
IS  - 1
SP  - 113
UR  - conv_1224
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "1995",
abstract = "U ovom članku autor analizira poznato učenje Hansa Kelzena o osnovnoj normi: najpre se analizira metodološka osnova Kelzenove teorije, da bi nakon toga bilo ukazano na ograničenja Kelzenove teorije, kao i na mogućnosti koje ova teorija pruža u proučavanju prava., In this article the author analyses the well-known teaching of Hans Kelsen on the hypothesis of the Basic norm. The methodological basis of Kelsen's theory of law is analyzed first. Kelsen understands law as a norm and he separates the norm from reality. Therefore, one norm can be based only on another norm. Furthermore, he separates the form of the norm from the contents of the norm (different from morality) and he thinks that jurisprudence should study only the formal structure of the legal norm. All this is where the causes of his errors are hidden. The author points out to the possibility that this teaching, if some of its methodological extremes were avoided, can be used for studying the basic validity of the law. It is not good to sacrifice facts for methodological 'purity' but at the end there is a dilemma whether it is possible to coordinate reality with the demands of methodology.",
publisher = "Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd",
journal = "Strani pravni život",
title = "O Kelzenovoj osnovnoj normi, On Kelsen's basic norm",
pages = "118-113",
number = "1",
url = "conv_1224"
}

Dajović, G.. (1995). O Kelzenovoj osnovnoj normi. in Strani pravni život
Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd.(1), 113-118.
conv_1224

Dajović G. O Kelzenovoj osnovnoj normi. in Strani pravni život. 1995;(1):113-118.
conv_1224 .

Dajović, Goran, "O Kelzenovoj osnovnoj normi" in Strani pravni život, no. 1 (1995):113-118,
conv_1224 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dajović, Goran
PY  - 1995
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/81
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Pojam važenja i obaveznosti prava u teoriji prava Radomira D. Lukića
T1  - The notion of validity and of binding element of law in the theory of law of Radomir D. Lukić
EP  - 109
IS  - 1-2
SP  - 99
VL  - 43
UR  - conv_745
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dajović, Goran",
year = "1995",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Pojam važenja i obaveznosti prava u teoriji prava Radomira D. Lukića, The notion of validity and of binding element of law in the theory of law of Radomir D. Lukić",
pages = "109-99",
number = "1-2",
volume = "43",
url = "conv_745"
}

Dajović, G.. (1995). Pojam važenja i obaveznosti prava u teoriji prava Radomira D. Lukića. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 43(1-2), 99-109.
conv_745

Dajović G. Pojam važenja i obaveznosti prava u teoriji prava Radomira D. Lukića. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 1995;43(1-2):99-109.
conv_745 .

Dajović, Goran, "Pojam važenja i obaveznosti prava u teoriji prava Radomira D. Lukića" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 43, no. 1-2 (1995):99-109,
conv_745 .