TY  - CHAP
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2399
AB  - Th e relationship between law and coercion is perhaps one of the most controversial
topics in legal philosophy – a topic that has made quite a comeback in legal discussion
in recent decades aft er a period of apparent abandonment. 1 On the basis of various
analytical criteria, a broad, complex spectrum of positions on this relationship can be
reconstructed. For example, if one analyses the necessary or essential conditions of
concepts, positions on the question of whether ‘ coercion ’ is an essential or necessary
element of ‘ law ’ range from a strong affi rmative 2 to a strong negative, 3 including positions
that question the way the question is posed. 4 Furthermore, if one analyses the
nature or type of element, the positions range from coercion as an instrumental element
(function or use) 5 to coercion as a substantive element (content or object) 6 of law.
Finally, leaving aside the analysis in terms of essential or necessary conditions, the positions
include law as a type of coercion, coercion as the distinctive feature of law qua
social normative order, coercion as the most prominent or salient feature of law qua
social normative order, 7 and coercion as one of the central or paradigmatic features
of law.
PB  - London : Hart Publishing
T2  - Kelsen's Legacy : Legal Normativity, International Law and Democracy
T1  - On Force, Effectiveness, and Law in Kelsen
EP  - 199
SP  - 181
DO  - 10.5040/9781509965830.ch-006
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2025",
abstract = "Th e relationship between law and coercion is perhaps one of the most controversial
topics in legal philosophy – a topic that has made quite a comeback in legal discussion
in recent decades aft er a period of apparent abandonment. 1 On the basis of various
analytical criteria, a broad, complex spectrum of positions on this relationship can be
reconstructed. For example, if one analyses the necessary or essential conditions of
concepts, positions on the question of whether ‘ coercion ’ is an essential or necessary
element of ‘ law ’ range from a strong affi rmative 2 to a strong negative, 3 including positions
that question the way the question is posed. 4 Furthermore, if one analyses the
nature or type of element, the positions range from coercion as an instrumental element
(function or use) 5 to coercion as a substantive element (content or object) 6 of law.
Finally, leaving aside the analysis in terms of essential or necessary conditions, the positions
include law as a type of coercion, coercion as the distinctive feature of law qua
social normative order, coercion as the most prominent or salient feature of law qua
social normative order, 7 and coercion as one of the central or paradigmatic features
of law.",
publisher = "London : Hart Publishing",
journal = "Kelsen's Legacy : Legal Normativity, International Law and Democracy",
booktitle = "On Force, Effectiveness, and Law in Kelsen",
pages = "199-181",
doi = "10.5040/9781509965830.ch-006"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2025). On Force, Effectiveness, and Law in Kelsen. in Kelsen's Legacy : Legal Normativity, International Law and Democracy
London : Hart Publishing., 181-199.
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509965830.ch-006

Rabanos JA. On Force, Effectiveness, and Law in Kelsen. in Kelsen's Legacy : Legal Normativity, International Law and Democracy. 2025;:181-199.
doi:10.5040/9781509965830.ch-006 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "On Force, Effectiveness, and Law in Kelsen" in Kelsen's Legacy : Legal Normativity, International Law and Democracy (2025):181-199,
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509965830.ch-006 . .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2383
AB  - This chapter highlights the relevance of coercion to both the existence and the function(s) of law. Julieta A. Rabanos argues that if law is seen as a tool or artefact, the fulfilment of its function(s) depends on both its existence and its possession of a certain property that enables the achievement of that end. Following that she shows how coercion can be understood as necessary for the existence of law by analysing two main arguments for coercion-dependent existence: that coercion is motivationally necessary to ensure conformity to the law, and that coercion is necessary to guarantee the existence of a community. Finally, even if this argument fails, she shows that coercion can nevertheless be understood as the particular property that law has to fulfil its function(s); especially those related to behaviour-guidance and coordination-solving.
PB  - Springer
T2  - Sanctions : an essential element of law?
T1  - On Coercion and the (Functions of) Law
EP  - 35
SP  - 13
DO  - 10.1007/978-3-031-88512-9_3
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2025",
abstract = "This chapter highlights the relevance of coercion to both the existence and the function(s) of law. Julieta A. Rabanos argues that if law is seen as a tool or artefact, the fulfilment of its function(s) depends on both its existence and its possession of a certain property that enables the achievement of that end. Following that she shows how coercion can be understood as necessary for the existence of law by analysing two main arguments for coercion-dependent existence: that coercion is motivationally necessary to ensure conformity to the law, and that coercion is necessary to guarantee the existence of a community. Finally, even if this argument fails, she shows that coercion can nevertheless be understood as the particular property that law has to fulfil its function(s); especially those related to behaviour-guidance and coordination-solving.",
publisher = "Springer",
journal = "Sanctions : an essential element of law?",
booktitle = "On Coercion and the (Functions of) Law",
pages = "35-13",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-031-88512-9_3"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2025). On Coercion and the (Functions of) Law. in Sanctions : an essential element of law?
Springer., 13-35.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-88512-9_3

Rabanos JA. On Coercion and the (Functions of) Law. in Sanctions : an essential element of law?. 2025;:13-35.
doi:10.1007/978-3-031-88512-9_3 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "On Coercion and the (Functions of) Law" in Sanctions : an essential element of law? (2025):13-35,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-88512-9_3 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2379
AB  - En el marco de la conmemoración de Latinoamérica a Joseph Raz, en este trabajo propongo analizar con detenimiento su postura acerca del así llamado “deber de obedecer al derecho”. En la sección 2, elaboraré con cierta profundidad cuál es el contenido que Raz le asigna al “deber de obediencia al derecho”. En la sección 3, exploraré su rechazo a la existencia de un “deber general de obediencia al derecho”, para luego explorar lo que Raz llama “actitudes morales permisibles en relación con el derecho” en la sección 4. En la sección 5, realizaré algunas consideraciones críticas a la posición de Raz, proponiendo reflexionar sobre si en última instancia no termina reconociendo la existencia de un deber general de obediencia en el marco de un Estado razonablemente justo (5.1), si una actitud de “respeto por el derecho” puede ser realmente voluntaria en el marco de su particular concepción de la autonomía (5.2), y si el rechazo de la existencia de este deber puede sostenerse también si la legitimidad de la autoridad se justifica con base en el argumento de la coordinación (5.3).
AB  - In the context of the Latin American commemoration of Joseph Raz, I propose in this paper to analyse in detail his position on the so-called “duty to obey the law”. In section 2, I will elaborate on the content Raz assigns to the “duty to obey the law”. In section 3, I will address his rejection of the existence of a “general duty to obey the law” and then, in section 4, explore what Raz calls “permissible moral attitudes in relation to the law”. In section 5, I will offer some critical reflections on Raz’s position and suggest reflecting on whether he does not ultimately acknowledge the existence of a general duty to obey in the context of a reasonably just state (5.1), whether an attitude of “respect for the law” can be truly voluntary in the context of his particular conception of autonomy (5.2), and whether the rejection of the existence of this duty can be sustained if the legitimacy of authority is justified on the basis of the coordination argument (5.3).
PB  - Bueno Aires : Centro de Investigaciones Filosoficas
T2  - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política, 13, 4
T1  - Joseph Raz y el deber de obedecer al derecho
EP  - 78
SP  - 40
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2379
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2025",
abstract = "En el marco de la conmemoración de Latinoamérica a Joseph Raz, en este trabajo propongo analizar con detenimiento su postura acerca del así llamado “deber de obedecer al derecho”. En la sección 2, elaboraré con cierta profundidad cuál es el contenido que Raz le asigna al “deber de obediencia al derecho”. En la sección 3, exploraré su rechazo a la existencia de un “deber general de obediencia al derecho”, para luego explorar lo que Raz llama “actitudes morales permisibles en relación con el derecho” en la sección 4. En la sección 5, realizaré algunas consideraciones críticas a la posición de Raz, proponiendo reflexionar sobre si en última instancia no termina reconociendo la existencia de un deber general de obediencia en el marco de un Estado razonablemente justo (5.1), si una actitud de “respeto por el derecho” puede ser realmente voluntaria en el marco de su particular concepción de la autonomía (5.2), y si el rechazo de la existencia de este deber puede sostenerse también si la legitimidad de la autoridad se justifica con base en el argumento de la coordinación (5.3)., In the context of the Latin American commemoration of Joseph Raz, I propose in this paper to analyse in detail his position on the so-called “duty to obey the law”. In section 2, I will elaborate on the content Raz assigns to the “duty to obey the law”. In section 3, I will address his rejection of the existence of a “general duty to obey the law” and then, in section 4, explore what Raz calls “permissible moral attitudes in relation to the law”. In section 5, I will offer some critical reflections on Raz’s position and suggest reflecting on whether he does not ultimately acknowledge the existence of a general duty to obey in the context of a reasonably just state (5.1), whether an attitude of “respect for the law” can be truly voluntary in the context of his particular conception of autonomy (5.2), and whether the rejection of the existence of this duty can be sustained if the legitimacy of authority is justified on the basis of the coordination argument (5.3).",
publisher = "Bueno Aires : Centro de Investigaciones Filosoficas",
journal = "Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política, 13, 4",
title = "Joseph Raz y el deber de obedecer al derecho",
pages = "78-40",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2379"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2025). Joseph Raz y el deber de obedecer al derecho. in Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política, 13, 4
Bueno Aires : Centro de Investigaciones Filosoficas., 40-78.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2379

Rabanos JA. Joseph Raz y el deber de obedecer al derecho. in Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política, 13, 4. 2025;:40-78.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2379 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "Joseph Raz y el deber de obedecer al derecho" in Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política, 13, 4 (2025):40-78,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2379 .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2378
PB  - London : Hart Publishing
T2  - Law and the Unity of Practical Reasoning
T1  - On the Concept of Authority and the Unity of Practical Reason
EP  - 220
SP  - 201
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2378
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2025",
publisher = "London : Hart Publishing",
journal = "Law and the Unity of Practical Reasoning",
booktitle = "On the Concept of Authority and the Unity of Practical Reason",
pages = "220-201",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2378"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2025). On the Concept of Authority and the Unity of Practical Reason. in Law and the Unity of Practical Reasoning
London : Hart Publishing., 201-220.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2378

Rabanos JA. On the Concept of Authority and the Unity of Practical Reason. in Law and the Unity of Practical Reasoning. 2025;:201-220.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2378 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "On the Concept of Authority and the Unity of Practical Reason" in Law and the Unity of Practical Reasoning (2025):201-220,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2378 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
AU  - Spaić, Bojan
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2180
AB  - Generative artificial intelligence in the form of chatbots based on
large language models (LLMs) has taken the world of law by storm. Philosophy of
law is struggling to catch up with the theoretical significance of the advent of
technological development and the way it may modify traditionally established
understanding of legal phenomena, such as law-creation and authority. In this
sense, for the most part, heated philosophical debates have circled around a
normative question: ‘Should AI create and interpret law?’. Much less attention has
been given to a different, albeit previous, question: ‘Can AI create and interpret law?’
That is, is AI capable of producing outputs that can be deemed as ‘law’ (at least, law as
we know it)? Can AI be a ‘legal author’? This paper explores this unattended question
and endeavours to provide some provisional answers. In the first part, we define legal
authority, legal authorship, and legal interpretation and claim that the intention of a
determinate authoritative author is often considered the condition of the possibility
of creating and interpreting contemporary legal texts. In the second part, we argue
that LLM AI, in general, and ChatGPT, in particular, generate legal texts without
having any intention. In the third part, we consider the positions of the authors that
downplay or even eliminate intention from the discussions about the legal character
of prescriptive texts. 4. Finally, we argue that there are good reasons to side with the
second group of authors. The ability of agents without intentions, like ChatGPT, to
create legal text is an argument in favour of the thesis that law can be created without
intention behind the creation and that nonintentional creation can be interpreted to
arrive at legal norms.
PB  - Springer Nature
T2  - Law and Philosophy
T1  - The Death of the Legal Author: Authority, Intention, and Law-Creation in the Advent of GenAI
DO  - 10.1007/s10982-025-09524-9
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A. and Spaić, Bojan",
year = "2025",
abstract = "Generative artificial intelligence in the form of chatbots based on
large language models (LLMs) has taken the world of law by storm. Philosophy of
law is struggling to catch up with the theoretical significance of the advent of
technological development and the way it may modify traditionally established
understanding of legal phenomena, such as law-creation and authority. In this
sense, for the most part, heated philosophical debates have circled around a
normative question: ‘Should AI create and interpret law?’. Much less attention has
been given to a different, albeit previous, question: ‘Can AI create and interpret law?’
That is, is AI capable of producing outputs that can be deemed as ‘law’ (at least, law as
we know it)? Can AI be a ‘legal author’? This paper explores this unattended question
and endeavours to provide some provisional answers. In the first part, we define legal
authority, legal authorship, and legal interpretation and claim that the intention of a
determinate authoritative author is often considered the condition of the possibility
of creating and interpreting contemporary legal texts. In the second part, we argue
that LLM AI, in general, and ChatGPT, in particular, generate legal texts without
having any intention. In the third part, we consider the positions of the authors that
downplay or even eliminate intention from the discussions about the legal character
of prescriptive texts. 4. Finally, we argue that there are good reasons to side with the
second group of authors. The ability of agents without intentions, like ChatGPT, to
create legal text is an argument in favour of the thesis that law can be created without
intention behind the creation and that nonintentional creation can be interpreted to
arrive at legal norms.",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
journal = "Law and Philosophy",
title = "The Death of the Legal Author: Authority, Intention, and Law-Creation in the Advent of GenAI",
doi = "10.1007/s10982-025-09524-9"
}

Rabanos, J. A.,& Spaić, B.. (2025). The Death of the Legal Author: Authority, Intention, and Law-Creation in the Advent of GenAI. in Law and Philosophy
Springer Nature..
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-025-09524-9

Rabanos JA, Spaić B. The Death of the Legal Author: Authority, Intention, and Law-Creation in the Advent of GenAI. in Law and Philosophy. 2025;.
doi:10.1007/s10982-025-09524-9 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., Spaić, Bojan, "The Death of the Legal Author: Authority, Intention, and Law-Creation in the Advent of GenAI" in Law and Philosophy (2025),
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-025-09524-9 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2385
AB  - Raz’s Legacy. The Law Between Legitimate Authority and Protected Reasons. The work of Joseph
Raz has exerted an undoubted influence on discussions in the field of the philosophy of law
in recent decades. One of the points of particular influence is his position regarding the philosophy
of law as a branch of practical philosophy, alongside moral philosophy and political
philosophy, and therefore necessarily focused on the analysis of the practical reasoning of the
addressees of legal norms. In this short contribution, I will show the originality and depth of
the Razian work in the framework of legal philosophy by focusing on two points: the idea of
legal norms as protected reasons for action and the Razian concept of legitimate authority. I
will also show how these theses can be understood as the product of a conceptually and chronologically
concatenated elaboration in response to one of the greatest challenges concerning
law and authority: the so-called anarchist challenge – that is, the idea that it is impossible to
find compatibility between authority and autonomy, and between authority and rationality.
PB  - Palermo : Università di Palermo
T2  - Rivista di filosofia del diritto e cultura giuridica, 2/2024
T1  - L’eredità di Raz: il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette
EP  - 282
SP  - 265
DO  - 10.4477/115507
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2024",
abstract = "Raz’s Legacy. The Law Between Legitimate Authority and Protected Reasons. The work of Joseph
Raz has exerted an undoubted influence on discussions in the field of the philosophy of law
in recent decades. One of the points of particular influence is his position regarding the philosophy
of law as a branch of practical philosophy, alongside moral philosophy and political
philosophy, and therefore necessarily focused on the analysis of the practical reasoning of the
addressees of legal norms. In this short contribution, I will show the originality and depth of
the Razian work in the framework of legal philosophy by focusing on two points: the idea of
legal norms as protected reasons for action and the Razian concept of legitimate authority. I
will also show how these theses can be understood as the product of a conceptually and chronologically
concatenated elaboration in response to one of the greatest challenges concerning
law and authority: the so-called anarchist challenge – that is, the idea that it is impossible to
find compatibility between authority and autonomy, and between authority and rationality.",
publisher = "Palermo : Università di Palermo",
journal = "Rivista di filosofia del diritto e cultura giuridica, 2/2024",
title = "L’eredità di Raz: il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette",
pages = "282-265",
doi = "10.4477/115507"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2024). L’eredità di Raz: il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette. in Rivista di filosofia del diritto e cultura giuridica, 2/2024
Palermo : Università di Palermo., 265-282.
https://doi.org/10.4477/115507

Rabanos JA. L’eredità di Raz: il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette. in Rivista di filosofia del diritto e cultura giuridica, 2/2024. 2024;:265-282.
doi:10.4477/115507 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "L’eredità di Raz: il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette" in Rivista di filosofia del diritto e cultura giuridica, 2/2024 (2024):265-282,
https://doi.org/10.4477/115507 . .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2384
AB  - The ideas that law is (or can be regarded as) a legal system, and that law evolves over time in adaptation to its context, are two of the most widely shared and presupposed ideas in contemporary legal theory. However, even if much interest has been dedicated in legal theory and legal dogmatics to the evolution of specific legal concepts or institutions, as well as legal norms in particular, not so much attention has been dedicated to the evolution of legal systems in themselves. In this chapter, I will try to offer an overview of the evolution of the concept of legal system and critically analyse whether an evolutionary theory of legal systems - i.e., a theory about the evolution of legal systems - can be reconstructed and laid down for the analysis both of the past, the present, and the future of legal systems.
PB  - Cheltenham :  Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
T2  - Research Handbook on Legal Evolution
T1  - On An ‘Evolutionary’ Theory of Legal Systems
EP  - 148
SP  - 130
DO  - 10.4337/9781803921822.00019
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2024",
abstract = "The ideas that law is (or can be regarded as) a legal system, and that law evolves over time in adaptation to its context, are two of the most widely shared and presupposed ideas in contemporary legal theory. However, even if much interest has been dedicated in legal theory and legal dogmatics to the evolution of specific legal concepts or institutions, as well as legal norms in particular, not so much attention has been dedicated to the evolution of legal systems in themselves. In this chapter, I will try to offer an overview of the evolution of the concept of legal system and critically analyse whether an evolutionary theory of legal systems - i.e., a theory about the evolution of legal systems - can be reconstructed and laid down for the analysis both of the past, the present, and the future of legal systems.",
publisher = "Cheltenham :  Edward Elgar Publishing Limited",
journal = "Research Handbook on Legal Evolution",
booktitle = "On An ‘Evolutionary’ Theory of Legal Systems",
pages = "148-130",
doi = "10.4337/9781803921822.00019"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2024). On An ‘Evolutionary’ Theory of Legal Systems. in Research Handbook on Legal Evolution
Cheltenham :  Edward Elgar Publishing Limited., 130-148.
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781803921822.00019

Rabanos JA. On An ‘Evolutionary’ Theory of Legal Systems. in Research Handbook on Legal Evolution. 2024;:130-148.
doi:10.4337/9781803921822.00019 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "On An ‘Evolutionary’ Theory of Legal Systems" in Research Handbook on Legal Evolution (2024):130-148,
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781803921822.00019 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2376
AB  - Raz’s Legacy. The Law Between Legitimate Authority and Protected Reasons. The work of Joseph
Raz has exerted an undoubted influence on discussions in the field of the philosophy of law
in recent decades. One of the points of particular influence is his position regarding the philosophy
of law as a branch of practical philosophy, alongside moral philosophy and political
philosophy, and therefore necessarily focused on the analysis of the practical reasoning of the
addressees of legal norms. In this short contribution, I will show the originality and depth of
the Razian work in the framework of legal philosophy by focusing on two points: the idea of
legal norms as protected reasons for action and the Razian concept of legitimate authority. I
will also show how these theses can be understood as the product of a conceptually and chronologically
concatenated elaboration in response to one of the greatest challenges concerning
law and authority: the so-called anarchist challenge – that is, the idea that it is impossible to
find compatibility between authority and autonomy, and between authority and rationality.
PB  - Bologna : Società editrice il Mulino
T2  - Rivista di filosofia del diritto, 12 , 2/2024
T1  - L’eredità di Raz : Il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette
EP  - 282
SP  - 265
DO  - 10.4477/115507
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2024",
abstract = "Raz’s Legacy. The Law Between Legitimate Authority and Protected Reasons. The work of Joseph
Raz has exerted an undoubted influence on discussions in the field of the philosophy of law
in recent decades. One of the points of particular influence is his position regarding the philosophy
of law as a branch of practical philosophy, alongside moral philosophy and political
philosophy, and therefore necessarily focused on the analysis of the practical reasoning of the
addressees of legal norms. In this short contribution, I will show the originality and depth of
the Razian work in the framework of legal philosophy by focusing on two points: the idea of
legal norms as protected reasons for action and the Razian concept of legitimate authority. I
will also show how these theses can be understood as the product of a conceptually and chronologically
concatenated elaboration in response to one of the greatest challenges concerning
law and authority: the so-called anarchist challenge – that is, the idea that it is impossible to
find compatibility between authority and autonomy, and between authority and rationality.",
publisher = "Bologna : Società editrice il Mulino",
journal = "Rivista di filosofia del diritto, 12 , 2/2024",
title = "L’eredità di Raz : Il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette",
pages = "282-265",
doi = "10.4477/115507"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2024). L’eredità di Raz : Il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette. in Rivista di filosofia del diritto, 12 , 2/2024
Bologna : Società editrice il Mulino., 265-282.
https://doi.org/10.4477/115507

Rabanos JA. L’eredità di Raz : Il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette. in Rivista di filosofia del diritto, 12 , 2/2024. 2024;:265-282.
doi:10.4477/115507 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "L’eredità di Raz : Il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette" in Rivista di filosofia del diritto, 12 , 2/2024 (2024):265-282,
https://doi.org/10.4477/115507 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2005
AB  - On 14 July, 2023, a tribute seminar was held at the University of Genoa for
the late John Gardner (1965-2019). The aim was to honour and celebrate his life
by discussing some of the many topics he addressed in his extensive, diverse and
influential academic works. This section collects the contributions of six of the ten
key speakers at the seminar.
PB  - Pisa : Edizioni ETS
T2  - Analisi e diritto 24(1)
T1  - The Jurisprudence of John Gardner and the Fundamentals of Law
EP  - 15
IS  - 1
SP  - 9
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2005
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2024",
abstract = "On 14 July, 2023, a tribute seminar was held at the University of Genoa for
the late John Gardner (1965-2019). The aim was to honour and celebrate his life
by discussing some of the many topics he addressed in his extensive, diverse and
influential academic works. This section collects the contributions of six of the ten
key speakers at the seminar.",
publisher = "Pisa : Edizioni ETS",
journal = "Analisi e diritto 24(1)",
title = "The Jurisprudence of John Gardner and the Fundamentals of Law",
pages = "15-9",
number = "1",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2005"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2024). The Jurisprudence of John Gardner and the Fundamentals of Law. in Analisi e diritto 24(1)
Pisa : Edizioni ETS.(1), 9-15.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2005

Rabanos JA. The Jurisprudence of John Gardner and the Fundamentals of Law. in Analisi e diritto 24(1). 2024;(1):9-15.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2005 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "The Jurisprudence of John Gardner and the Fundamentals of Law" in Analisi e diritto 24(1), no. 1 (2024):9-15,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2005 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2023
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2382
AB  - El presente trabajo surge como una reflexión a partir de la lectura del reciente libro de Francesca Poggi, "Il modello conversazionale. Sulla differenza tra comprensione ordinaria e interpretazione giuridica", en el cual la autora se propone esclarecer algunos aspectos de la comunicación ordinaria y de la interpretación jurídica, poniendo en evidencia sus similitudes y diferencias. En §2, plantearé el interrogante de si una concepción de norma jurídica como la de los imperativos independientes de Karl Olivecrona, basada en un imperativismo no voluntarista, podría ser de utilidad para una posición acerca de la interpretación jurídica que prescinde de la intención del legislador, estableciendo una separación tajante entre la autoridad legislativa y el texto que resulta aprobado. En §3, plantearé el interrogante de si no sería más provechoso realizar ulteriores diferenciaciones entre los contextos jurídicos en los cuales Poggi analiza la aplicación y aplicabilidad de la teoría de Grice. Intentaré mostrar cómo esas diferenciaciones se vuelven necesarias, especialmente para evaluar la posibilidad de que sí existan contextos cooperativos en el ámbito jurídico y situaciones donde podrían coexistir contemporáneamente contextos cooperativos y no cooperativos. Finalmente, en §4 ofreceré una breve conclusión.
AB  - This paper is based on a reflection on the reading of Francesca Poggi’s recent
book, Il modello conversazionale. Sulla differenza tra comprensione ordinaria e interpretazione
giuridica, in which the author intends to clarify some aspects of ordinary
communication and legal interpretation, highlighting similarities and differences. In
§2 I will raise the question whether a conception of a legal norm such as Karl Olivecrona’s
independent imperatives, based on non-voluntaristic imperativism, could
be a category of independent imperatives of interest to a position on legal interpretation
that dispenses with legislative intent, thus establishing a neat separation
between legislative authority and the approved text. In §3, I will raise the question
whether it would not be more profitable to make further distinctions between the
legal contexts in which Poggi analyses the application and applicability of Grice’s
theory. I will try to show how these distinctions become necessary, in particular to
assess the possibility that there are cooperative contexts in the legal field and situations
where cooperative and non-cooperative contexts might exist simultaneously.
Finally, I will draw a brief conclusion in §4.
PB  - Madrid :  Marcial Pons
T2  - Analisi e diritto 23(2)
T1  - Dos comentarios a Il modello conversazionale, de Francesca Poggi
EP  - 58
SP  - 41
DO  - 10.4454/analisiediritto.v23i1.621
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2023",
abstract = "El presente trabajo surge como una reflexión a partir de la lectura del reciente libro de Francesca Poggi, "Il modello conversazionale. Sulla differenza tra comprensione ordinaria e interpretazione giuridica", en el cual la autora se propone esclarecer algunos aspectos de la comunicación ordinaria y de la interpretación jurídica, poniendo en evidencia sus similitudes y diferencias. En §2, plantearé el interrogante de si una concepción de norma jurídica como la de los imperativos independientes de Karl Olivecrona, basada en un imperativismo no voluntarista, podría ser de utilidad para una posición acerca de la interpretación jurídica que prescinde de la intención del legislador, estableciendo una separación tajante entre la autoridad legislativa y el texto que resulta aprobado. En §3, plantearé el interrogante de si no sería más provechoso realizar ulteriores diferenciaciones entre los contextos jurídicos en los cuales Poggi analiza la aplicación y aplicabilidad de la teoría de Grice. Intentaré mostrar cómo esas diferenciaciones se vuelven necesarias, especialmente para evaluar la posibilidad de que sí existan contextos cooperativos en el ámbito jurídico y situaciones donde podrían coexistir contemporáneamente contextos cooperativos y no cooperativos. Finalmente, en §4 ofreceré una breve conclusión., This paper is based on a reflection on the reading of Francesca Poggi’s recent
book, Il modello conversazionale. Sulla differenza tra comprensione ordinaria e interpretazione
giuridica, in which the author intends to clarify some aspects of ordinary
communication and legal interpretation, highlighting similarities and differences. In
§2 I will raise the question whether a conception of a legal norm such as Karl Olivecrona’s
independent imperatives, based on non-voluntaristic imperativism, could
be a category of independent imperatives of interest to a position on legal interpretation
that dispenses with legislative intent, thus establishing a neat separation
between legislative authority and the approved text. In §3, I will raise the question
whether it would not be more profitable to make further distinctions between the
legal contexts in which Poggi analyses the application and applicability of Grice’s
theory. I will try to show how these distinctions become necessary, in particular to
assess the possibility that there are cooperative contexts in the legal field and situations
where cooperative and non-cooperative contexts might exist simultaneously.
Finally, I will draw a brief conclusion in §4.",
publisher = "Madrid :  Marcial Pons",
journal = "Analisi e diritto 23(2)",
title = "Dos comentarios a Il modello conversazionale, de Francesca Poggi",
pages = "58-41",
doi = "10.4454/analisiediritto.v23i1.621"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2023). Dos comentarios a Il modello conversazionale, de Francesca Poggi. in Analisi e diritto 23(2)
Madrid :  Marcial Pons., 41-58.
https://doi.org/10.4454/analisiediritto.v23i1.621

Rabanos JA. Dos comentarios a Il modello conversazionale, de Francesca Poggi. in Analisi e diritto 23(2). 2023;:41-58.
doi:10.4454/analisiediritto.v23i1.621 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "Dos comentarios a Il modello conversazionale, de Francesca Poggi" in Analisi e diritto 23(2) (2023):41-58,
https://doi.org/10.4454/analisiediritto.v23i1.621 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2023
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2381
AB  - The aim of this paper is to critically reconsider some of the main tenets underlying
Karl Olivecrona’s works. The first two sections are devoted to a brief reconstruction
of his position on methodology for the study of legal phenomena, including
the endorsement of philosophical realism and the enterprise of demystifying legal
language through linguistic therapy (§ 2), as well as his particular conception of
legal notions as hollow words (§ 3). I will then provide a brief analysis of a central
legal concept – that of “authority” – to show how Olivecrona’s methodological
framework can be applied (§ 4). The last two sections are devoted to the analysis
and evaluation of three possible criticisms of Olivecrona’s claims as a legal realist (§
5) and some brief concluding remarks on the usefulness of Olivecrona’s approach
for contemporary legal philosophy (§ 6).
PB  - Bologna :  Il Mulino
T2  - Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, 1/2023
T1  - Back to (Law as) Fact: Some Remarks on Olivecrona, Scandinavian Legal Realism, and Legal Notions as Hollow Words
EP  - 231
SP  - 205
DO  - 10.1436/107089
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2023",
abstract = "The aim of this paper is to critically reconsider some of the main tenets underlying
Karl Olivecrona’s works. The first two sections are devoted to a brief reconstruction
of his position on methodology for the study of legal phenomena, including
the endorsement of philosophical realism and the enterprise of demystifying legal
language through linguistic therapy (§ 2), as well as his particular conception of
legal notions as hollow words (§ 3). I will then provide a brief analysis of a central
legal concept – that of “authority” – to show how Olivecrona’s methodological
framework can be applied (§ 4). The last two sections are devoted to the analysis
and evaluation of three possible criticisms of Olivecrona’s claims as a legal realist (§
5) and some brief concluding remarks on the usefulness of Olivecrona’s approach
for contemporary legal philosophy (§ 6).",
publisher = "Bologna :  Il Mulino",
journal = "Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, 1/2023",
title = "Back to (Law as) Fact: Some Remarks on Olivecrona, Scandinavian Legal Realism, and Legal Notions as Hollow Words",
pages = "231-205",
doi = "10.1436/107089"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2023). Back to (Law as) Fact: Some Remarks on Olivecrona, Scandinavian Legal Realism, and Legal Notions as Hollow Words. in Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, 1/2023
Bologna :  Il Mulino., 205-231.
https://doi.org/10.1436/107089

Rabanos JA. Back to (Law as) Fact: Some Remarks on Olivecrona, Scandinavian Legal Realism, and Legal Notions as Hollow Words. in Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, 1/2023. 2023;:205-231.
doi:10.1436/107089 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "Back to (Law as) Fact: Some Remarks on Olivecrona, Scandinavian Legal Realism, and Legal Notions as Hollow Words" in Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, 1/2023 (2023):205-231,
https://doi.org/10.1436/107089 . .