TY  - JOUR
AU  - Đorđević, Mila
AU  - Zdravković, Ana
AU  - Vojnović, Sava
PY  - 2025-11
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2375
AB  - The debates on access to justice emerged from the historical contexts of post-industrial Western countries, and the concept gained prominence in the 1960s, during the rise of the welfare state (Maranlou, 2014: 17).1 A major turning point in the discourse was the Florence Access to Justice Project, led by Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth (1981). In October 1979, a conference at the European University Institute examined the prospects for further action, and participants sought to identify the most pressing issues, evaluate key insights, and assess the broader significance of what they termed the “access to justice” movement (Cappelletti, Garth, 1981: 3).
Cappelletti and Garth discuss three “waves” of access to justice. The first wave was concerned primarily with access to courts, and the emphasis was on the problems faced by poor and marginalized groups in accessing expensive legal services and complex legal systems. The second wave related to access to justice gaps that arise not predominantly because of socio-economic factors, but as a result of the nature of the problems people experience in particular contexts. For example, so-called “diffuse interests” include consumer problems, where large groups are affected by similar issues, but there are difficulties in launching individual claims and, as a result, a significant access to justice gap. The third wave, while continuing to incorporate the concerns of the first and second waves, broadened the concern of access to justice even further, so that a host of procedural innovations that might allow access to justice began to be discussed. This included alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and other means by which people might resolve their problems without accessing the courts (Garth, Cappelletti, 1981: 9-25).
PB  - Lisboa : Lisbon Public Law Research Centre, Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa
T2  - e-Publica: revista electrónica de direito público, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1-8)
T1  - Access to justice and enforcement of rights – an introduction
EP  - 8
SP  - 1
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2375
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Đorđević, Mila and Zdravković, Ana and Vojnović, Sava",
year = "2025-11",
abstract = "The debates on access to justice emerged from the historical contexts of post-industrial Western countries, and the concept gained prominence in the 1960s, during the rise of the welfare state (Maranlou, 2014: 17).1 A major turning point in the discourse was the Florence Access to Justice Project, led by Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth (1981). In October 1979, a conference at the European University Institute examined the prospects for further action, and participants sought to identify the most pressing issues, evaluate key insights, and assess the broader significance of what they termed the “access to justice” movement (Cappelletti, Garth, 1981: 3).
Cappelletti and Garth discuss three “waves” of access to justice. The first wave was concerned primarily with access to courts, and the emphasis was on the problems faced by poor and marginalized groups in accessing expensive legal services and complex legal systems. The second wave related to access to justice gaps that arise not predominantly because of socio-economic factors, but as a result of the nature of the problems people experience in particular contexts. For example, so-called “diffuse interests” include consumer problems, where large groups are affected by similar issues, but there are difficulties in launching individual claims and, as a result, a significant access to justice gap. The third wave, while continuing to incorporate the concerns of the first and second waves, broadened the concern of access to justice even further, so that a host of procedural innovations that might allow access to justice began to be discussed. This included alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and other means by which people might resolve their problems without accessing the courts (Garth, Cappelletti, 1981: 9-25).",
publisher = "Lisboa : Lisbon Public Law Research Centre, Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa",
journal = "e-Publica: revista electrónica de direito público, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1-8)",
title = "Access to justice and enforcement of rights – an introduction",
pages = "8-1",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2375"
}

Đorđević, M., Zdravković, A.,& Vojnović, S.. (2025-11). Access to justice and enforcement of rights – an introduction. in e-Publica: revista electrónica de direito público, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1-8)
Lisboa : Lisbon Public Law Research Centre, Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa., 1-8.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2375

Đorđević M, Zdravković A, Vojnović S. Access to justice and enforcement of rights – an introduction. in e-Publica: revista electrónica de direito público, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1-8). 2025;:1-8.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2375 .

Đorđević, Mila, Zdravković, Ana, Vojnović, Sava, "Access to justice and enforcement of rights – an introduction" in e-Publica: revista electrónica de direito público, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1-8) (2025-11):1-8,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2375 .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2399
AB  - Th e relationship between law and coercion is perhaps one of the most controversial
topics in legal philosophy – a topic that has made quite a comeback in legal discussion
in recent decades aft er a period of apparent abandonment. 1 On the basis of various
analytical criteria, a broad, complex spectrum of positions on this relationship can be
reconstructed. For example, if one analyses the necessary or essential conditions of
concepts, positions on the question of whether ‘ coercion ’ is an essential or necessary
element of ‘ law ’ range from a strong affi rmative 2 to a strong negative, 3 including positions
that question the way the question is posed. 4 Furthermore, if one analyses the
nature or type of element, the positions range from coercion as an instrumental element
(function or use) 5 to coercion as a substantive element (content or object) 6 of law.
Finally, leaving aside the analysis in terms of essential or necessary conditions, the positions
include law as a type of coercion, coercion as the distinctive feature of law qua
social normative order, coercion as the most prominent or salient feature of law qua
social normative order, 7 and coercion as one of the central or paradigmatic features
of law.
PB  - London : Hart Publishing
T2  - Kelsen's Legacy : Legal Normativity, International Law and Democracy
T1  - On Force, Effectiveness, and Law in Kelsen
EP  - 199
SP  - 181
DO  - 10.5040/9781509965830.ch-006
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2025",
abstract = "Th e relationship between law and coercion is perhaps one of the most controversial
topics in legal philosophy – a topic that has made quite a comeback in legal discussion
in recent decades aft er a period of apparent abandonment. 1 On the basis of various
analytical criteria, a broad, complex spectrum of positions on this relationship can be
reconstructed. For example, if one analyses the necessary or essential conditions of
concepts, positions on the question of whether ‘ coercion ’ is an essential or necessary
element of ‘ law ’ range from a strong affi rmative 2 to a strong negative, 3 including positions
that question the way the question is posed. 4 Furthermore, if one analyses the
nature or type of element, the positions range from coercion as an instrumental element
(function or use) 5 to coercion as a substantive element (content or object) 6 of law.
Finally, leaving aside the analysis in terms of essential or necessary conditions, the positions
include law as a type of coercion, coercion as the distinctive feature of law qua
social normative order, coercion as the most prominent or salient feature of law qua
social normative order, 7 and coercion as one of the central or paradigmatic features
of law.",
publisher = "London : Hart Publishing",
journal = "Kelsen's Legacy : Legal Normativity, International Law and Democracy",
booktitle = "On Force, Effectiveness, and Law in Kelsen",
pages = "199-181",
doi = "10.5040/9781509965830.ch-006"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2025). On Force, Effectiveness, and Law in Kelsen. in Kelsen's Legacy : Legal Normativity, International Law and Democracy
London : Hart Publishing., 181-199.
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509965830.ch-006

Rabanos JA. On Force, Effectiveness, and Law in Kelsen. in Kelsen's Legacy : Legal Normativity, International Law and Democracy. 2025;:181-199.
doi:10.5040/9781509965830.ch-006 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "On Force, Effectiveness, and Law in Kelsen" in Kelsen's Legacy : Legal Normativity, International Law and Democracy (2025):181-199,
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509965830.ch-006 . .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2383
AB  - This chapter highlights the relevance of coercion to both the existence and the function(s) of law. Julieta A. Rabanos argues that if law is seen as a tool or artefact, the fulfilment of its function(s) depends on both its existence and its possession of a certain property that enables the achievement of that end. Following that she shows how coercion can be understood as necessary for the existence of law by analysing two main arguments for coercion-dependent existence: that coercion is motivationally necessary to ensure conformity to the law, and that coercion is necessary to guarantee the existence of a community. Finally, even if this argument fails, she shows that coercion can nevertheless be understood as the particular property that law has to fulfil its function(s); especially those related to behaviour-guidance and coordination-solving.
PB  - Springer
T2  - Sanctions : an essential element of law?
T1  - On Coercion and the (Functions of) Law
EP  - 35
SP  - 13
DO  - 10.1007/978-3-031-88512-9_3
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2025",
abstract = "This chapter highlights the relevance of coercion to both the existence and the function(s) of law. Julieta A. Rabanos argues that if law is seen as a tool or artefact, the fulfilment of its function(s) depends on both its existence and its possession of a certain property that enables the achievement of that end. Following that she shows how coercion can be understood as necessary for the existence of law by analysing two main arguments for coercion-dependent existence: that coercion is motivationally necessary to ensure conformity to the law, and that coercion is necessary to guarantee the existence of a community. Finally, even if this argument fails, she shows that coercion can nevertheless be understood as the particular property that law has to fulfil its function(s); especially those related to behaviour-guidance and coordination-solving.",
publisher = "Springer",
journal = "Sanctions : an essential element of law?",
booktitle = "On Coercion and the (Functions of) Law",
pages = "35-13",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-031-88512-9_3"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2025). On Coercion and the (Functions of) Law. in Sanctions : an essential element of law?
Springer., 13-35.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-88512-9_3

Rabanos JA. On Coercion and the (Functions of) Law. in Sanctions : an essential element of law?. 2025;:13-35.
doi:10.1007/978-3-031-88512-9_3 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "On Coercion and the (Functions of) Law" in Sanctions : an essential element of law? (2025):13-35,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-88512-9_3 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2379
AB  - En el marco de la conmemoración de Latinoamérica a Joseph Raz, en este trabajo propongo analizar con detenimiento su postura acerca del así llamado “deber de obedecer al derecho”. En la sección 2, elaboraré con cierta profundidad cuál es el contenido que Raz le asigna al “deber de obediencia al derecho”. En la sección 3, exploraré su rechazo a la existencia de un “deber general de obediencia al derecho”, para luego explorar lo que Raz llama “actitudes morales permisibles en relación con el derecho” en la sección 4. En la sección 5, realizaré algunas consideraciones críticas a la posición de Raz, proponiendo reflexionar sobre si en última instancia no termina reconociendo la existencia de un deber general de obediencia en el marco de un Estado razonablemente justo (5.1), si una actitud de “respeto por el derecho” puede ser realmente voluntaria en el marco de su particular concepción de la autonomía (5.2), y si el rechazo de la existencia de este deber puede sostenerse también si la legitimidad de la autoridad se justifica con base en el argumento de la coordinación (5.3).
AB  - In the context of the Latin American commemoration of Joseph Raz, I propose in this paper to analyse in detail his position on the so-called “duty to obey the law”. In section 2, I will elaborate on the content Raz assigns to the “duty to obey the law”. In section 3, I will address his rejection of the existence of a “general duty to obey the law” and then, in section 4, explore what Raz calls “permissible moral attitudes in relation to the law”. In section 5, I will offer some critical reflections on Raz’s position and suggest reflecting on whether he does not ultimately acknowledge the existence of a general duty to obey in the context of a reasonably just state (5.1), whether an attitude of “respect for the law” can be truly voluntary in the context of his particular conception of autonomy (5.2), and whether the rejection of the existence of this duty can be sustained if the legitimacy of authority is justified on the basis of the coordination argument (5.3).
PB  - Bueno Aires : Centro de Investigaciones Filosoficas
T2  - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política, 13, 4
T1  - Joseph Raz y el deber de obedecer al derecho
EP  - 78
SP  - 40
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2379
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2025",
abstract = "En el marco de la conmemoración de Latinoamérica a Joseph Raz, en este trabajo propongo analizar con detenimiento su postura acerca del así llamado “deber de obedecer al derecho”. En la sección 2, elaboraré con cierta profundidad cuál es el contenido que Raz le asigna al “deber de obediencia al derecho”. En la sección 3, exploraré su rechazo a la existencia de un “deber general de obediencia al derecho”, para luego explorar lo que Raz llama “actitudes morales permisibles en relación con el derecho” en la sección 4. En la sección 5, realizaré algunas consideraciones críticas a la posición de Raz, proponiendo reflexionar sobre si en última instancia no termina reconociendo la existencia de un deber general de obediencia en el marco de un Estado razonablemente justo (5.1), si una actitud de “respeto por el derecho” puede ser realmente voluntaria en el marco de su particular concepción de la autonomía (5.2), y si el rechazo de la existencia de este deber puede sostenerse también si la legitimidad de la autoridad se justifica con base en el argumento de la coordinación (5.3)., In the context of the Latin American commemoration of Joseph Raz, I propose in this paper to analyse in detail his position on the so-called “duty to obey the law”. In section 2, I will elaborate on the content Raz assigns to the “duty to obey the law”. In section 3, I will address his rejection of the existence of a “general duty to obey the law” and then, in section 4, explore what Raz calls “permissible moral attitudes in relation to the law”. In section 5, I will offer some critical reflections on Raz’s position and suggest reflecting on whether he does not ultimately acknowledge the existence of a general duty to obey in the context of a reasonably just state (5.1), whether an attitude of “respect for the law” can be truly voluntary in the context of his particular conception of autonomy (5.2), and whether the rejection of the existence of this duty can be sustained if the legitimacy of authority is justified on the basis of the coordination argument (5.3).",
publisher = "Bueno Aires : Centro de Investigaciones Filosoficas",
journal = "Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política, 13, 4",
title = "Joseph Raz y el deber de obedecer al derecho",
pages = "78-40",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2379"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2025). Joseph Raz y el deber de obedecer al derecho. in Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política, 13, 4
Bueno Aires : Centro de Investigaciones Filosoficas., 40-78.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2379

Rabanos JA. Joseph Raz y el deber de obedecer al derecho. in Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política, 13, 4. 2025;:40-78.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2379 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "Joseph Raz y el deber de obedecer al derecho" in Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política, 13, 4 (2025):40-78,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2379 .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2378
PB  - London : Hart Publishing
T2  - Law and the Unity of Practical Reasoning
T1  - On the Concept of Authority and the Unity of Practical Reason
EP  - 220
SP  - 201
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2378
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2025",
publisher = "London : Hart Publishing",
journal = "Law and the Unity of Practical Reasoning",
booktitle = "On the Concept of Authority and the Unity of Practical Reason",
pages = "220-201",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2378"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2025). On the Concept of Authority and the Unity of Practical Reason. in Law and the Unity of Practical Reasoning
London : Hart Publishing., 201-220.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2378

Rabanos JA. On the Concept of Authority and the Unity of Practical Reason. in Law and the Unity of Practical Reasoning. 2025;:201-220.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2378 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "On the Concept of Authority and the Unity of Practical Reason" in Law and the Unity of Practical Reasoning (2025):201-220,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2378 .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Aleš, Novak
AU  - 
AU  - 
AU  - 
AU  - 
AU  - 
AU  - 
AU  - 
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2184
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
T1  - Some cursory remarks on the history of slovenian legal theory and philosophy of law
EP  - 80
SP  - 45
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2184
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Aleš, Novak and  and  and  and  and  and  and ",
year = "2025",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država",
booktitle = "Some cursory remarks on the history of slovenian legal theory and philosophy of law",
pages = "80-45",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2184"
}

Aleš, N., , , , , , ,& . (2025). Some cursory remarks on the history of slovenian legal theory and philosophy of law. in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 45-80.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2184

Aleš N, , , , , , , . Some cursory remarks on the history of slovenian legal theory and philosophy of law. in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država. 2025;:45-80.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2184 .

Aleš, Novak, , , , , , , , "Some cursory remarks on the history of slovenian legal theory and philosophy of law" in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država (2025):45-80,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2184 .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Dajović, Goran
AU  - Dragosavac, Branka
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2190
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
T1  - Istorija i razvoj temeljnih pravnih znanja u XX i XXI veku na prostoru Srbije
T1  - Reč bibliotekarske struke
EP  - 107
SP  - 82
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2190
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Dajović, Goran and Dragosavac, Branka",
year = "2025",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država",
booktitle = "Istorija i razvoj temeljnih pravnih znanja u XX i XXI veku na prostoru Srbije, Reč bibliotekarske struke",
pages = "107-82",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2190"
}

Dajović, G.,& Dragosavac, B.. (2025). Istorija i razvoj temeljnih pravnih znanja u XX i XXI veku na prostoru Srbije. in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 82-107.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2190

Dajović G, Dragosavac B. Istorija i razvoj temeljnih pravnih znanja u XX i XXI veku na prostoru Srbije. in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država. 2025;:82-107.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2190 .

Dajović, Goran, Dragosavac, Branka, "Istorija i razvoj temeljnih pravnih znanja u XX i XXI veku na prostoru Srbije" in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država (2025):82-107,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2190 .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Tucak, Ivana
AU  - Rešetar Čulo, Ivana
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2187
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
T1  - Pregled razvoja hrvatske filozofije i teorije prava
EP  - 43
SP  - 27
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2187
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Tucak, Ivana and Rešetar Čulo, Ivana",
year = "2025",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država",
booktitle = "Pregled razvoja hrvatske filozofije i teorije prava",
pages = "43-27",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2187"
}

Tucak, I.,& Rešetar Čulo, I.. (2025). Pregled razvoja hrvatske filozofije i teorije prava. in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 27-43.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2187

Tucak I, Rešetar Čulo I. Pregled razvoja hrvatske filozofije i teorije prava. in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država. 2025;:27-43.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2187 .

Tucak, Ivana, Rešetar Čulo, Ivana, "Pregled razvoja hrvatske filozofije i teorije prava" in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država (2025):27-43,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2187 .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Rožajac-Zulčić, Mirela
AU  - Banović, Damir
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2185
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
T1  - Razvoj pravnoteorijske misli u Bosni i Hercegovini
EP  - 25
SP  - 7
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2185
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Rožajac-Zulčić, Mirela and Banović, Damir",
year = "2025",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država",
booktitle = "Razvoj pravnoteorijske misli u Bosni i Hercegovini",
pages = "25-7",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2185"
}

Rožajac-Zulčić, M.,& Banović, D.. (2025). Razvoj pravnoteorijske misli u Bosni i Hercegovini. in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 7-25.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2185

Rožajac-Zulčić M, Banović D. Razvoj pravnoteorijske misli u Bosni i Hercegovini. in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država. 2025;:7-25.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2185 .

Rožajac-Zulčić, Mirela, Banović, Damir, "Razvoj pravnoteorijske misli u Bosni i Hercegovini" in Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država (2025):7-25,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2185 .

TY  - BOOK
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2186
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T1  - Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2186
ER  - 

@book{
year = "2025",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
title = "Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2186"
}

(2025). Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država. 
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2186

Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država. 2025;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2186 .

"Bibliografija radova iz oblasti temeljnih pravnih znanja na prostoru južnoslovenskih država" (2025),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2186 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
AU  - Spaić, Bojan
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2180
AB  - Generative artificial intelligence in the form of chatbots based on
large language models (LLMs) has taken the world of law by storm. Philosophy of
law is struggling to catch up with the theoretical significance of the advent of
technological development and the way it may modify traditionally established
understanding of legal phenomena, such as law-creation and authority. In this
sense, for the most part, heated philosophical debates have circled around a
normative question: ‘Should AI create and interpret law?’. Much less attention has
been given to a different, albeit previous, question: ‘Can AI create and interpret law?’
That is, is AI capable of producing outputs that can be deemed as ‘law’ (at least, law as
we know it)? Can AI be a ‘legal author’? This paper explores this unattended question
and endeavours to provide some provisional answers. In the first part, we define legal
authority, legal authorship, and legal interpretation and claim that the intention of a
determinate authoritative author is often considered the condition of the possibility
of creating and interpreting contemporary legal texts. In the second part, we argue
that LLM AI, in general, and ChatGPT, in particular, generate legal texts without
having any intention. In the third part, we consider the positions of the authors that
downplay or even eliminate intention from the discussions about the legal character
of prescriptive texts. 4. Finally, we argue that there are good reasons to side with the
second group of authors. The ability of agents without intentions, like ChatGPT, to
create legal text is an argument in favour of the thesis that law can be created without
intention behind the creation and that nonintentional creation can be interpreted to
arrive at legal norms.
PB  - Springer Nature
T2  - Law and Philosophy
T1  - The Death of the Legal Author: Authority, Intention, and Law-Creation in the Advent of GenAI
DO  - 10.1007/s10982-025-09524-9
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A. and Spaić, Bojan",
year = "2025",
abstract = "Generative artificial intelligence in the form of chatbots based on
large language models (LLMs) has taken the world of law by storm. Philosophy of
law is struggling to catch up with the theoretical significance of the advent of
technological development and the way it may modify traditionally established
understanding of legal phenomena, such as law-creation and authority. In this
sense, for the most part, heated philosophical debates have circled around a
normative question: ‘Should AI create and interpret law?’. Much less attention has
been given to a different, albeit previous, question: ‘Can AI create and interpret law?’
That is, is AI capable of producing outputs that can be deemed as ‘law’ (at least, law as
we know it)? Can AI be a ‘legal author’? This paper explores this unattended question
and endeavours to provide some provisional answers. In the first part, we define legal
authority, legal authorship, and legal interpretation and claim that the intention of a
determinate authoritative author is often considered the condition of the possibility
of creating and interpreting contemporary legal texts. In the second part, we argue
that LLM AI, in general, and ChatGPT, in particular, generate legal texts without
having any intention. In the third part, we consider the positions of the authors that
downplay or even eliminate intention from the discussions about the legal character
of prescriptive texts. 4. Finally, we argue that there are good reasons to side with the
second group of authors. The ability of agents without intentions, like ChatGPT, to
create legal text is an argument in favour of the thesis that law can be created without
intention behind the creation and that nonintentional creation can be interpreted to
arrive at legal norms.",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
journal = "Law and Philosophy",
title = "The Death of the Legal Author: Authority, Intention, and Law-Creation in the Advent of GenAI",
doi = "10.1007/s10982-025-09524-9"
}

Rabanos, J. A.,& Spaić, B.. (2025). The Death of the Legal Author: Authority, Intention, and Law-Creation in the Advent of GenAI. in Law and Philosophy
Springer Nature..
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-025-09524-9

Rabanos JA, Spaić B. The Death of the Legal Author: Authority, Intention, and Law-Creation in the Advent of GenAI. in Law and Philosophy. 2025;.
doi:10.1007/s10982-025-09524-9 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., Spaić, Bojan, "The Death of the Legal Author: Authority, Intention, and Law-Creation in the Advent of GenAI" in Law and Philosophy (2025),
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-025-09524-9 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2385
AB  - Raz’s Legacy. The Law Between Legitimate Authority and Protected Reasons. The work of Joseph
Raz has exerted an undoubted influence on discussions in the field of the philosophy of law
in recent decades. One of the points of particular influence is his position regarding the philosophy
of law as a branch of practical philosophy, alongside moral philosophy and political
philosophy, and therefore necessarily focused on the analysis of the practical reasoning of the
addressees of legal norms. In this short contribution, I will show the originality and depth of
the Razian work in the framework of legal philosophy by focusing on two points: the idea of
legal norms as protected reasons for action and the Razian concept of legitimate authority. I
will also show how these theses can be understood as the product of a conceptually and chronologically
concatenated elaboration in response to one of the greatest challenges concerning
law and authority: the so-called anarchist challenge – that is, the idea that it is impossible to
find compatibility between authority and autonomy, and between authority and rationality.
PB  - Palermo : Università di Palermo
T2  - Rivista di filosofia del diritto e cultura giuridica, 2/2024
T1  - L’eredità di Raz: il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette
EP  - 282
SP  - 265
DO  - 10.4477/115507
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2024",
abstract = "Raz’s Legacy. The Law Between Legitimate Authority and Protected Reasons. The work of Joseph
Raz has exerted an undoubted influence on discussions in the field of the philosophy of law
in recent decades. One of the points of particular influence is his position regarding the philosophy
of law as a branch of practical philosophy, alongside moral philosophy and political
philosophy, and therefore necessarily focused on the analysis of the practical reasoning of the
addressees of legal norms. In this short contribution, I will show the originality and depth of
the Razian work in the framework of legal philosophy by focusing on two points: the idea of
legal norms as protected reasons for action and the Razian concept of legitimate authority. I
will also show how these theses can be understood as the product of a conceptually and chronologically
concatenated elaboration in response to one of the greatest challenges concerning
law and authority: the so-called anarchist challenge – that is, the idea that it is impossible to
find compatibility between authority and autonomy, and between authority and rationality.",
publisher = "Palermo : Università di Palermo",
journal = "Rivista di filosofia del diritto e cultura giuridica, 2/2024",
title = "L’eredità di Raz: il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette",
pages = "282-265",
doi = "10.4477/115507"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2024). L’eredità di Raz: il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette. in Rivista di filosofia del diritto e cultura giuridica, 2/2024
Palermo : Università di Palermo., 265-282.
https://doi.org/10.4477/115507

Rabanos JA. L’eredità di Raz: il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette. in Rivista di filosofia del diritto e cultura giuridica, 2/2024. 2024;:265-282.
doi:10.4477/115507 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "L’eredità di Raz: il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette" in Rivista di filosofia del diritto e cultura giuridica, 2/2024 (2024):265-282,
https://doi.org/10.4477/115507 . .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2384
AB  - The ideas that law is (or can be regarded as) a legal system, and that law evolves over time in adaptation to its context, are two of the most widely shared and presupposed ideas in contemporary legal theory. However, even if much interest has been dedicated in legal theory and legal dogmatics to the evolution of specific legal concepts or institutions, as well as legal norms in particular, not so much attention has been dedicated to the evolution of legal systems in themselves. In this chapter, I will try to offer an overview of the evolution of the concept of legal system and critically analyse whether an evolutionary theory of legal systems - i.e., a theory about the evolution of legal systems - can be reconstructed and laid down for the analysis both of the past, the present, and the future of legal systems.
PB  - Cheltenham :  Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
T2  - Research Handbook on Legal Evolution
T1  - On An ‘Evolutionary’ Theory of Legal Systems
EP  - 148
SP  - 130
DO  - 10.4337/9781803921822.00019
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2024",
abstract = "The ideas that law is (or can be regarded as) a legal system, and that law evolves over time in adaptation to its context, are two of the most widely shared and presupposed ideas in contemporary legal theory. However, even if much interest has been dedicated in legal theory and legal dogmatics to the evolution of specific legal concepts or institutions, as well as legal norms in particular, not so much attention has been dedicated to the evolution of legal systems in themselves. In this chapter, I will try to offer an overview of the evolution of the concept of legal system and critically analyse whether an evolutionary theory of legal systems - i.e., a theory about the evolution of legal systems - can be reconstructed and laid down for the analysis both of the past, the present, and the future of legal systems.",
publisher = "Cheltenham :  Edward Elgar Publishing Limited",
journal = "Research Handbook on Legal Evolution",
booktitle = "On An ‘Evolutionary’ Theory of Legal Systems",
pages = "148-130",
doi = "10.4337/9781803921822.00019"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2024). On An ‘Evolutionary’ Theory of Legal Systems. in Research Handbook on Legal Evolution
Cheltenham :  Edward Elgar Publishing Limited., 130-148.
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781803921822.00019

Rabanos JA. On An ‘Evolutionary’ Theory of Legal Systems. in Research Handbook on Legal Evolution. 2024;:130-148.
doi:10.4337/9781803921822.00019 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "On An ‘Evolutionary’ Theory of Legal Systems" in Research Handbook on Legal Evolution (2024):130-148,
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781803921822.00019 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Spaić, Bojan
AU  - Jovanović, Miodrag A.
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2380
AB  - Despite the widespread adoption of generative transformer large language 
models and the interest of the global legal community, discussions about the 
models in philosophy of law mainly have been focusing on what LLMs cannot 
do. In making the first steps towards a philosophical analysis of the capabilities 
of AI models in the field of law, we follow the basic idea of Turing’s „imitation 
game“. Proceeding from the frequently raised characterization of legal 
reasoning as „artificial“, the paper identifies the undisputed minimum core of 
the „artificiality“ thesis and asks to what extent it can be imitated by artificial 
intelligence. To answer this question, we test the legal reasoning capabilities of 
ChatGPT, the most advanced, up-to-date LLM version of artificial intelligence. 
The conclusion is that in all relevant types of activities usually associated 
with legal reasoning – fact-finding, interpretation, qualification, and decision
making – ChatGPT can generate outcomes as if it reasons legally.
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, God. 72, br. 3, 2024
T1  - Artificial Reason and Artificial Intelligence: the Legal Reasoning Capabilities of GPT-4
EP  - 422
SP  - 383
DO  - 10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24302A
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Spaić, Bojan and Jovanović, Miodrag A.",
year = "2024",
abstract = "Despite the widespread adoption of generative transformer large language 
models and the interest of the global legal community, discussions about the 
models in philosophy of law mainly have been focusing on what LLMs cannot 
do. In making the first steps towards a philosophical analysis of the capabilities 
of AI models in the field of law, we follow the basic idea of Turing’s „imitation 
game“. Proceeding from the frequently raised characterization of legal 
reasoning as „artificial“, the paper identifies the undisputed minimum core of 
the „artificiality“ thesis and asks to what extent it can be imitated by artificial 
intelligence. To answer this question, we test the legal reasoning capabilities of 
ChatGPT, the most advanced, up-to-date LLM version of artificial intelligence. 
The conclusion is that in all relevant types of activities usually associated 
with legal reasoning – fact-finding, interpretation, qualification, and decision
making – ChatGPT can generate outcomes as if it reasons legally.",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, God. 72, br. 3, 2024",
title = "Artificial Reason and Artificial Intelligence: the Legal Reasoning Capabilities of GPT-4",
pages = "422-383",
doi = "10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24302A"
}

Spaić, B.,& Jovanović, M. A.. (2024). Artificial Reason and Artificial Intelligence: the Legal Reasoning Capabilities of GPT-4. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, God. 72, br. 3, 2024
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje., 383-422.
https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24302A

Spaić B, Jovanović MA. Artificial Reason and Artificial Intelligence: the Legal Reasoning Capabilities of GPT-4. in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, God. 72, br. 3, 2024. 2024;:383-422.
doi:10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24302A .

Spaić, Bojan, Jovanović, Miodrag A., "Artificial Reason and Artificial Intelligence: the Legal Reasoning Capabilities of GPT-4" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, God. 72, br. 3, 2024 (2024):383-422,
https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24302A . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2376
AB  - Raz’s Legacy. The Law Between Legitimate Authority and Protected Reasons. The work of Joseph
Raz has exerted an undoubted influence on discussions in the field of the philosophy of law
in recent decades. One of the points of particular influence is his position regarding the philosophy
of law as a branch of practical philosophy, alongside moral philosophy and political
philosophy, and therefore necessarily focused on the analysis of the practical reasoning of the
addressees of legal norms. In this short contribution, I will show the originality and depth of
the Razian work in the framework of legal philosophy by focusing on two points: the idea of
legal norms as protected reasons for action and the Razian concept of legitimate authority. I
will also show how these theses can be understood as the product of a conceptually and chronologically
concatenated elaboration in response to one of the greatest challenges concerning
law and authority: the so-called anarchist challenge – that is, the idea that it is impossible to
find compatibility between authority and autonomy, and between authority and rationality.
PB  - Bologna : Società editrice il Mulino
T2  - Rivista di filosofia del diritto, 12 , 2/2024
T1  - L’eredità di Raz : Il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette
EP  - 282
SP  - 265
DO  - 10.4477/115507
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2024",
abstract = "Raz’s Legacy. The Law Between Legitimate Authority and Protected Reasons. The work of Joseph
Raz has exerted an undoubted influence on discussions in the field of the philosophy of law
in recent decades. One of the points of particular influence is his position regarding the philosophy
of law as a branch of practical philosophy, alongside moral philosophy and political
philosophy, and therefore necessarily focused on the analysis of the practical reasoning of the
addressees of legal norms. In this short contribution, I will show the originality and depth of
the Razian work in the framework of legal philosophy by focusing on two points: the idea of
legal norms as protected reasons for action and the Razian concept of legitimate authority. I
will also show how these theses can be understood as the product of a conceptually and chronologically
concatenated elaboration in response to one of the greatest challenges concerning
law and authority: the so-called anarchist challenge – that is, the idea that it is impossible to
find compatibility between authority and autonomy, and between authority and rationality.",
publisher = "Bologna : Società editrice il Mulino",
journal = "Rivista di filosofia del diritto, 12 , 2/2024",
title = "L’eredità di Raz : Il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette",
pages = "282-265",
doi = "10.4477/115507"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2024). L’eredità di Raz : Il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette. in Rivista di filosofia del diritto, 12 , 2/2024
Bologna : Società editrice il Mulino., 265-282.
https://doi.org/10.4477/115507

Rabanos JA. L’eredità di Raz : Il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette. in Rivista di filosofia del diritto, 12 , 2/2024. 2024;:265-282.
doi:10.4477/115507 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "L’eredità di Raz : Il diritto tra autorità legittima e ragioni protette" in Rivista di filosofia del diritto, 12 , 2/2024 (2024):265-282,
https://doi.org/10.4477/115507 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Zdravković, Ana M.
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2004
AB  - The paper aims to map elements for a legal definition of structural discrimination as a complex form of discrimination with far-reaching implications across various societal domains. By drawing on sociological theories, it elucidates the relationship between structural inequalities and entrenched social processes and argues that structural discrimination arises from historically established social structures that perpetuate disadvantage for certain groups. The analysis investigates whether the concept of indirect discrimination is an appropriate answer to this challenge. Finally, it seeks to clarify the relationship between structural discrimination and substantive equality, ultimately contributing to a more nuanced understanding of how far we can go in using legal tools to combat discrimination and achieve a greater level of societal equality.
AB  - L’articolo mira a mappare gli elementi per una definizione legale di discriminazione strutturale come forma complessa di discriminazione con implicazioni di vasta portata in vari ambiti sociali. Basandosi su teorie sociologiche, l’articolo chiarisce la relazione tra disuguaglianze strutturali e processi sociali radicati e sostiene che la discriminazione strutturale deriva da strutture sociali storicamente stabilite che perpetuano lo svantaggio per determinati gruppi. L'analisi si concentra sul quesito se il concetto di discriminazione indiretta sia una risposta appropriata a questa sfida. Infine, la ricerca ambisce a chiarire la relazione tra discriminazione strutturale e uguaglianza sostanziale, contribuendo in ultima analisi a una comprensione più sfumata sui limiti dell'uso di strumenti legali per combattere la discriminazione e per raggiungere un livello maggiore di uguaglianza sociale.
PB  - Milano : Franco Angeli
T2  - Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza Fascicolo n. 3/2024
T1  - BREAKING THE INVISIBLE CAGE: LIMITS OF LAW IN STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATION
EP  - 18
IS  - 3
SP  - 1
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2004
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Zdravković, Ana M.",
year = "2024",
abstract = "The paper aims to map elements for a legal definition of structural discrimination as a complex form of discrimination with far-reaching implications across various societal domains. By drawing on sociological theories, it elucidates the relationship between structural inequalities and entrenched social processes and argues that structural discrimination arises from historically established social structures that perpetuate disadvantage for certain groups. The analysis investigates whether the concept of indirect discrimination is an appropriate answer to this challenge. Finally, it seeks to clarify the relationship between structural discrimination and substantive equality, ultimately contributing to a more nuanced understanding of how far we can go in using legal tools to combat discrimination and achieve a greater level of societal equality., L’articolo mira a mappare gli elementi per una definizione legale di discriminazione strutturale come forma complessa di discriminazione con implicazioni di vasta portata in vari ambiti sociali. Basandosi su teorie sociologiche, l’articolo chiarisce la relazione tra disuguaglianze strutturali e processi sociali radicati e sostiene che la discriminazione strutturale deriva da strutture sociali storicamente stabilite che perpetuano lo svantaggio per determinati gruppi. L'analisi si concentra sul quesito se il concetto di discriminazione indiretta sia una risposta appropriata a questa sfida. Infine, la ricerca ambisce a chiarire la relazione tra discriminazione strutturale e uguaglianza sostanziale, contribuendo in ultima analisi a una comprensione più sfumata sui limiti dell'uso di strumenti legali per combattere la discriminazione e per raggiungere un livello maggiore di uguaglianza sociale.",
publisher = "Milano : Franco Angeli",
journal = "Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza Fascicolo n. 3/2024",
title = "BREAKING THE INVISIBLE CAGE: LIMITS OF LAW IN STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATION",
pages = "18-1",
number = "3",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2004"
}

Zdravković, A. M.. (2024). BREAKING THE INVISIBLE CAGE: LIMITS OF LAW IN STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATION. in Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza Fascicolo n. 3/2024
Milano : Franco Angeli.(3), 1-18.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2004

Zdravković AM. BREAKING THE INVISIBLE CAGE: LIMITS OF LAW IN STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATION. in Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza Fascicolo n. 3/2024. 2024;(3):1-18.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2004 .

Zdravković, Ana M., "BREAKING THE INVISIBLE CAGE: LIMITS OF LAW IN STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATION" in Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza Fascicolo n. 3/2024, no. 3 (2024):1-18,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2004 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Zdravković, Miloš
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2001
AB  - The historical phenomenon of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH)
is subjected to a basic legal theory analysis, which showed that this Nazi
creation, at least to a minimal extent, possessed all the elements of statehood.
On a large part of its territory, the Ustasha regime had a monopoly of physical
force and was able to implement its basic political purposes. In this regard,
the organization of terror against a large number of its inhabitants, which
implied a completely new legislation, the formation of new judicial, police and
other authorities, the organization of the camp system and railway transport,
etc., proves a sufficient measure of the efficiency and regularity of the actions
of the NDH state government. Such action produced wartime chaos, which
eventually resulted in the loss of elements of statehood, with the creation of a
new Yugoslav state in its territory.
AB  - U ovom tekstu, istorijski fenomen Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH)
podvrgnut je bazičnoj pravnoteorijskoj analizi koja je pokazala da je ta
tvorevina, makar u minimalnom obimu, posedovala sve elemente državnosti.
Na velikom delu svoje teritorije od oko 100.000 kvadratnih kilometara,
koju je naseljavalo oko šest miliona stanovnika, ustaški režim je raspolagao
monopolom fizičke sile i bio je sposoban da sprovodi svoje osnovne političke
ciljeve, prvenstveno stvaranje etnički čiste hrvatske države. Organizovanje
terora prema velikom broju svojih stanovnika, što je podrazumevalo jedno
sasvim novo zakonodavstvo, formiranje novih sudskih, policijskih i drugih
organa, ustrojavanje logorskog sistema i železničkog prevoza itd. dokazuje
dovoljnu meru efikasnosti i pravilnosti delovanja državne vlasti NDH. Takvo
delovanje proizvelo je ratni haos, stanje suprotno onom koje bi trebalo da
osigurava državna vlast, što je za konačnu posledicu imalo gubitak državnosti
NDH i stvaranje nove jugoslovenske države na njenoj teritoriji.
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu
T2  - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, God. 72, br. 3
T1  - Elements of Statehood of the Independent State of Croatia (1941–1945)
T1  - Elementi državnosti Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (1941–1945)
EP  - 530
IS  - 3
SP  - 495
VL  - 72
DO  - 10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24305A
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Zdravković, Miloš",
year = "2024",
abstract = "The historical phenomenon of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH)
is subjected to a basic legal theory analysis, which showed that this Nazi
creation, at least to a minimal extent, possessed all the elements of statehood.
On a large part of its territory, the Ustasha regime had a monopoly of physical
force and was able to implement its basic political purposes. In this regard,
the organization of terror against a large number of its inhabitants, which
implied a completely new legislation, the formation of new judicial, police and
other authorities, the organization of the camp system and railway transport,
etc., proves a sufficient measure of the efficiency and regularity of the actions
of the NDH state government. Such action produced wartime chaos, which
eventually resulted in the loss of elements of statehood, with the creation of a
new Yugoslav state in its territory., U ovom tekstu, istorijski fenomen Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH)
podvrgnut je bazičnoj pravnoteorijskoj analizi koja je pokazala da je ta
tvorevina, makar u minimalnom obimu, posedovala sve elemente državnosti.
Na velikom delu svoje teritorije od oko 100.000 kvadratnih kilometara,
koju je naseljavalo oko šest miliona stanovnika, ustaški režim je raspolagao
monopolom fizičke sile i bio je sposoban da sprovodi svoje osnovne političke
ciljeve, prvenstveno stvaranje etnički čiste hrvatske države. Organizovanje
terora prema velikom broju svojih stanovnika, što je podrazumevalo jedno
sasvim novo zakonodavstvo, formiranje novih sudskih, policijskih i drugih
organa, ustrojavanje logorskog sistema i železničkog prevoza itd. dokazuje
dovoljnu meru efikasnosti i pravilnosti delovanja državne vlasti NDH. Takvo
delovanje proizvelo je ratni haos, stanje suprotno onom koje bi trebalo da
osigurava državna vlast, što je za konačnu posledicu imalo gubitak državnosti
NDH i stvaranje nove jugoslovenske države na njenoj teritoriji.",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu",
journal = "Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, God. 72, br. 3",
title = "Elements of Statehood of the Independent State of Croatia (1941–1945), Elementi državnosti Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (1941–1945)",
pages = "530-495",
number = "3",
volume = "72",
doi = "10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24305A"
}

Zdravković, M.. (2024). Elements of Statehood of the Independent State of Croatia (1941–1945). in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, God. 72, br. 3
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu., 72(3), 495-530.
https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24305A

Zdravković M. Elements of Statehood of the Independent State of Croatia (1941–1945). in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, God. 72, br. 3. 2024;72(3):495-530.
doi:10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24305A .

Zdravković, Miloš, "Elements of Statehood of the Independent State of Croatia (1941–1945)" in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, God. 72, br. 3, 72, no. 3 (2024):495-530,
https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24305A . .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Zdravković, Miloš
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2002
AB  - Determining the morality of a legal order, in the end, is not an immediate subject of legal science, but of ethics. Therefore, it is possible to analyze the legality of the Ustasha order without questioning its moral assumptions, ex-clusively on the basis of generally accepted, strictly legal values, that is, from a purely legal point of view. Without resorting to the methods and results of other scientific disciplines such as historiography, sociology, ethics, psychol-ogy, political science, etc., but only on the basis of the concepts and values that the legal profession has been building since its existence, it is possible to determine quite precisely how a specific order corresponds to the legal concept. In this regard, a very useful and therefore very widely ac-cepted concept was offered by the famous American legal theorist, Lon Fuller, and it will be used as the basis of the analysis. Fuller made a departure from basing the validity of law on its substantive compliance with morality, accord-ing to the formula lex iniusta non est lex. The impossibility of determining indisputable moral criteria for assessing the content of law, as well as the fact that such an assessment is performed externally, outside the framework of legal science, prompted Fuller to find the criteria of the moral correctness of law within himself. Fuller argues that the internal morality of law is embodied in eight requirements (generality of legal rules, prohibition of retroactivity, clarity, efficiency and non-contradiction of rules, etc.) that a normative order must fulfill in order to be recognized as legal. The conducted analysis shows that the system of rules that was valid in the Independent State of Croatia does not meet any of the criteria of Fuller's theory, and its character of legality must be contested.
AB  - Утврђивање моралности неког правног поретка, у крајњој линији, није непосредан предмет правне науке, већ етике. Анализу правности усташког поретка могуће је зато спровести без преиспитивања њего-вих моралних претпоставки, искључиво на основу општеприхваће-них, строго правних вредности, дакле, са једног, чисто правничког становишта. Без посезања за методама и резултатима других дисци-плина попут историографије, социологије, етике, психологије, поли-тикологије итд, већ само на основу појмова и вредности које је прав-ничка струка изграђивала од када и сама постоји, може се прилично прецизно одредити колико неки конкретан поредак одговара појму правног. У том погледу, веома употребљиву и зато веома широко прихваћену концепцију, понудио је чувени амерички теоретичар пра-ва, Лон Фулер и она ће ове бити искоришћена као основ анализе. Фулер је извршио отклон од заснивања важења права у његовој садр-жинској усклађености с моралом, према формули lex iniusta non est lex. Немогућност одређивања неспорних моралних критеријума про-цене садржине права, као и чињеница да се таква процена врши спо-ља, ван оквира правне науке, понукала је Фулера да критеријуме моралне исправности права пронађе у њему самом. Фулер аргументу-је да је унутрашња моралност права оличена у осам услова (општост правних правила, забрана ретроактивности, јасност, ефикасност и неротивречност правила итд.) које неки нормативни поредак мора да испуни да би уопште могао да му се призна правни квалитет. Спрове-дена анализа показује да систем правила који је важио у Независној Држави Хрватској не задовољава ниједан критеријум Фулерове тео-рије, те му се мора оспорити карактер правности.
PB  - Istočno Sarajevo : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Istočnom Sarajevu
T2  - Правне празнине и пуноћа права
T1  - Fuller’s theory in use - The Independent State Of Croatia legislation analysis
T1  - Фулерова теорија на делу – анализа законодавства Независне Државе Хрватске
EP  - 539
SP  - 521
VL  - 1
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2002
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Zdravković, Miloš",
year = "2024",
abstract = "Determining the morality of a legal order, in the end, is not an immediate subject of legal science, but of ethics. Therefore, it is possible to analyze the legality of the Ustasha order without questioning its moral assumptions, ex-clusively on the basis of generally accepted, strictly legal values, that is, from a purely legal point of view. Without resorting to the methods and results of other scientific disciplines such as historiography, sociology, ethics, psychol-ogy, political science, etc., but only on the basis of the concepts and values that the legal profession has been building since its existence, it is possible to determine quite precisely how a specific order corresponds to the legal concept. In this regard, a very useful and therefore very widely ac-cepted concept was offered by the famous American legal theorist, Lon Fuller, and it will be used as the basis of the analysis. Fuller made a departure from basing the validity of law on its substantive compliance with morality, accord-ing to the formula lex iniusta non est lex. The impossibility of determining indisputable moral criteria for assessing the content of law, as well as the fact that such an assessment is performed externally, outside the framework of legal science, prompted Fuller to find the criteria of the moral correctness of law within himself. Fuller argues that the internal morality of law is embodied in eight requirements (generality of legal rules, prohibition of retroactivity, clarity, efficiency and non-contradiction of rules, etc.) that a normative order must fulfill in order to be recognized as legal. The conducted analysis shows that the system of rules that was valid in the Independent State of Croatia does not meet any of the criteria of Fuller's theory, and its character of legality must be contested., Утврђивање моралности неког правног поретка, у крајњој линији, није непосредан предмет правне науке, већ етике. Анализу правности усташког поретка могуће је зато спровести без преиспитивања њего-вих моралних претпоставки, искључиво на основу општеприхваће-них, строго правних вредности, дакле, са једног, чисто правничког становишта. Без посезања за методама и резултатима других дисци-плина попут историографије, социологије, етике, психологије, поли-тикологије итд, већ само на основу појмова и вредности које је прав-ничка струка изграђивала од када и сама постоји, може се прилично прецизно одредити колико неки конкретан поредак одговара појму правног. У том погледу, веома употребљиву и зато веома широко прихваћену концепцију, понудио је чувени амерички теоретичар пра-ва, Лон Фулер и она ће ове бити искоришћена као основ анализе. Фулер је извршио отклон од заснивања важења права у његовој садр-жинској усклађености с моралом, према формули lex iniusta non est lex. Немогућност одређивања неспорних моралних критеријума про-цене садржине права, као и чињеница да се таква процена врши спо-ља, ван оквира правне науке, понукала је Фулера да критеријуме моралне исправности права пронађе у њему самом. Фулер аргументу-је да је унутрашња моралност права оличена у осам услова (општост правних правила, забрана ретроактивности, јасност, ефикасност и неротивречност правила итд.) које неки нормативни поредак мора да испуни да би уопште могао да му се призна правни квалитет. Спрове-дена анализа показује да систем правила који је важио у Независној Држави Хрватској не задовољава ниједан критеријум Фулерове тео-рије, те му се мора оспорити карактер правности.",
publisher = "Istočno Sarajevo : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Istočnom Sarajevu",
journal = "Правне празнине и пуноћа права",
booktitle = "Fuller’s theory in use - The Independent State Of Croatia legislation analysis, Фулерова теорија на делу – анализа законодавства Независне Државе Хрватске",
pages = "539-521",
volume = "1",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2002"
}

Zdravković, M.. (2024). Fuller’s theory in use - The Independent State Of Croatia legislation analysis. in Правне празнине и пуноћа права
Istočno Sarajevo : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Istočnom Sarajevu., 1, 521-539.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2002

Zdravković M. Fuller’s theory in use - The Independent State Of Croatia legislation analysis. in Правне празнине и пуноћа права. 2024;1:521-539.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2002 .

Zdravković, Miloš, "Fuller’s theory in use - The Independent State Of Croatia legislation analysis" in Правне празнине и пуноћа права, 1 (2024):521-539,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2002 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Spaić, Bojan
AU  - Đorđević, Mila
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1992
AB  - This paper (1) analyzes the existing theoretical framework for under standing the relationship between the judicial performance and judicial efficiency,
(2) compares the judicial performances in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, France, Austria, 
and Norway for the year 2020, (3) compares the judicial performances in different 
instances in Serbia for the same year, and (4) examines the performance standards 
that are set by law for Serbian judges. The authors conclude that in 2020 Serbian 
judges resolved more cases in all instances (there is a higher number of resolved cas es per judge only in Austria, in first instance), while at the same time falling short of 
the caseload standards set in Serbian law. Also, the study found excessive difference 
in the performance of Serbian courts, but that does not affect the evaluation of judges, since 485 evaluated judges out of 505 got the rating “exceptionally successfully 
performs the function of judge” for the year 2020.
AB  - U ovom radu (1) analiziramo postojeć i teorijski okvir za razumeva nje relacije između sudijske produktivnosti i sudske efikasnosti, (2) upo ređujemo sudijsku produktivnost u različitim instancama u Srbiji tokom 
2020. godine, (3) upoređujemo sudijsku produktivnost u Srbiji sa produk tivnošću sudija u Hrvatskoj, Sloveniji, Francuskoj, Austriji i Norveškoj za 
istu godinu, (4) ispitujemo sudijsku normu koja je predviđena zakonom 
za srpske sudije. Autori zaključuju da su srpske sudije rešile više pred meta u svim instancama u 2020. godini (samo Austrija u prvom stepenu 
ima već i broj rešenih predmeta po sudiji), dok istovremeno ne ispunjavaju 
sudijsku normu koja je postavljena zakonom. Takođe, autori konstatuju 
veliku razliku u broju rešenih predmeta po sudiji u sudovima u Srbiji, ali 
se to ne odražava na ocenjivanje sudija u Srbiji, jer je 485 ocenjenih sudija 
od ukupno 505 sudija dobilo ocenu „izuzetno uspešno obavljaju funkciju 
sudije” za 2020. godinu.
PB  - Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta Union
T2  - Pravni zapisi, br. 1/2024
T1  - Who works more, and who works smarter? Comparing judicial performance in Europe
T1  - Ko radi više, a ko pametnije? Poređenje sudijske produktivnosti u evropskim zemljama
EP  - 150
IS  - 1
SP  - 121
VL  - 15
DO  - 10.5937/pravzap0-49148
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Spaić, Bojan and Đorđević, Mila",
year = "2024",
abstract = "This paper (1) analyzes the existing theoretical framework for under standing the relationship between the judicial performance and judicial efficiency,
(2) compares the judicial performances in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, France, Austria, 
and Norway for the year 2020, (3) compares the judicial performances in different 
instances in Serbia for the same year, and (4) examines the performance standards 
that are set by law for Serbian judges. The authors conclude that in 2020 Serbian 
judges resolved more cases in all instances (there is a higher number of resolved cas es per judge only in Austria, in first instance), while at the same time falling short of 
the caseload standards set in Serbian law. Also, the study found excessive difference 
in the performance of Serbian courts, but that does not affect the evaluation of judges, since 485 evaluated judges out of 505 got the rating “exceptionally successfully 
performs the function of judge” for the year 2020., U ovom radu (1) analiziramo postojeć i teorijski okvir za razumeva nje relacije između sudijske produktivnosti i sudske efikasnosti, (2) upo ređujemo sudijsku produktivnost u različitim instancama u Srbiji tokom 
2020. godine, (3) upoređujemo sudijsku produktivnost u Srbiji sa produk tivnošću sudija u Hrvatskoj, Sloveniji, Francuskoj, Austriji i Norveškoj za 
istu godinu, (4) ispitujemo sudijsku normu koja je predviđena zakonom 
za srpske sudije. Autori zaključuju da su srpske sudije rešile više pred meta u svim instancama u 2020. godini (samo Austrija u prvom stepenu 
ima već i broj rešenih predmeta po sudiji), dok istovremeno ne ispunjavaju 
sudijsku normu koja je postavljena zakonom. Takođe, autori konstatuju 
veliku razliku u broju rešenih predmeta po sudiji u sudovima u Srbiji, ali 
se to ne odražava na ocenjivanje sudija u Srbiji, jer je 485 ocenjenih sudija 
od ukupno 505 sudija dobilo ocenu „izuzetno uspešno obavljaju funkciju 
sudije” za 2020. godinu.",
publisher = "Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta Union",
journal = "Pravni zapisi, br. 1/2024",
title = "Who works more, and who works smarter? Comparing judicial performance in Europe, Ko radi više, a ko pametnije? Poređenje sudijske produktivnosti u evropskim zemljama",
pages = "150-121",
number = "1",
volume = "15",
doi = "10.5937/pravzap0-49148"
}

Spaić, B.,& Đorđević, M.. (2024). Who works more, and who works smarter? Comparing judicial performance in Europe. in Pravni zapisi, br. 1/2024
Beograd : Pravni fakultet Univerziteta Union., 15(1), 121-150.
https://doi.org/10.5937/pravzap0-49148

Spaić B, Đorđević M. Who works more, and who works smarter? Comparing judicial performance in Europe. in Pravni zapisi, br. 1/2024. 2024;15(1):121-150.
doi:10.5937/pravzap0-49148 .

Spaić, Bojan, Đorđević, Mila, "Who works more, and who works smarter? Comparing judicial performance in Europe" in Pravni zapisi, br. 1/2024, 15, no. 1 (2024):121-150,
https://doi.org/10.5937/pravzap0-49148 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2024
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2005
AB  - On 14 July, 2023, a tribute seminar was held at the University of Genoa for
the late John Gardner (1965-2019). The aim was to honour and celebrate his life
by discussing some of the many topics he addressed in his extensive, diverse and
influential academic works. This section collects the contributions of six of the ten
key speakers at the seminar.
PB  - Pisa : Edizioni ETS
T2  - Analisi e diritto 24(1)
T1  - The Jurisprudence of John Gardner and the Fundamentals of Law
EP  - 15
IS  - 1
SP  - 9
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2005
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2024",
abstract = "On 14 July, 2023, a tribute seminar was held at the University of Genoa for
the late John Gardner (1965-2019). The aim was to honour and celebrate his life
by discussing some of the many topics he addressed in his extensive, diverse and
influential academic works. This section collects the contributions of six of the ten
key speakers at the seminar.",
publisher = "Pisa : Edizioni ETS",
journal = "Analisi e diritto 24(1)",
title = "The Jurisprudence of John Gardner and the Fundamentals of Law",
pages = "15-9",
number = "1",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2005"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2024). The Jurisprudence of John Gardner and the Fundamentals of Law. in Analisi e diritto 24(1)
Pisa : Edizioni ETS.(1), 9-15.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2005

Rabanos JA. The Jurisprudence of John Gardner and the Fundamentals of Law. in Analisi e diritto 24(1). 2024;(1):9-15.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2005 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "The Jurisprudence of John Gardner and the Fundamentals of Law" in Analisi e diritto 24(1), no. 1 (2024):9-15,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ralf_2005 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2023
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2382
AB  - El presente trabajo surge como una reflexión a partir de la lectura del reciente libro de Francesca Poggi, "Il modello conversazionale. Sulla differenza tra comprensione ordinaria e interpretazione giuridica", en el cual la autora se propone esclarecer algunos aspectos de la comunicación ordinaria y de la interpretación jurídica, poniendo en evidencia sus similitudes y diferencias. En §2, plantearé el interrogante de si una concepción de norma jurídica como la de los imperativos independientes de Karl Olivecrona, basada en un imperativismo no voluntarista, podría ser de utilidad para una posición acerca de la interpretación jurídica que prescinde de la intención del legislador, estableciendo una separación tajante entre la autoridad legislativa y el texto que resulta aprobado. En §3, plantearé el interrogante de si no sería más provechoso realizar ulteriores diferenciaciones entre los contextos jurídicos en los cuales Poggi analiza la aplicación y aplicabilidad de la teoría de Grice. Intentaré mostrar cómo esas diferenciaciones se vuelven necesarias, especialmente para evaluar la posibilidad de que sí existan contextos cooperativos en el ámbito jurídico y situaciones donde podrían coexistir contemporáneamente contextos cooperativos y no cooperativos. Finalmente, en §4 ofreceré una breve conclusión.
AB  - This paper is based on a reflection on the reading of Francesca Poggi’s recent
book, Il modello conversazionale. Sulla differenza tra comprensione ordinaria e interpretazione
giuridica, in which the author intends to clarify some aspects of ordinary
communication and legal interpretation, highlighting similarities and differences. In
§2 I will raise the question whether a conception of a legal norm such as Karl Olivecrona’s
independent imperatives, based on non-voluntaristic imperativism, could
be a category of independent imperatives of interest to a position on legal interpretation
that dispenses with legislative intent, thus establishing a neat separation
between legislative authority and the approved text. In §3, I will raise the question
whether it would not be more profitable to make further distinctions between the
legal contexts in which Poggi analyses the application and applicability of Grice’s
theory. I will try to show how these distinctions become necessary, in particular to
assess the possibility that there are cooperative contexts in the legal field and situations
where cooperative and non-cooperative contexts might exist simultaneously.
Finally, I will draw a brief conclusion in §4.
PB  - Madrid :  Marcial Pons
T2  - Analisi e diritto 23(2)
T1  - Dos comentarios a Il modello conversazionale, de Francesca Poggi
EP  - 58
SP  - 41
DO  - 10.4454/analisiediritto.v23i1.621
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2023",
abstract = "El presente trabajo surge como una reflexión a partir de la lectura del reciente libro de Francesca Poggi, "Il modello conversazionale. Sulla differenza tra comprensione ordinaria e interpretazione giuridica", en el cual la autora se propone esclarecer algunos aspectos de la comunicación ordinaria y de la interpretación jurídica, poniendo en evidencia sus similitudes y diferencias. En §2, plantearé el interrogante de si una concepción de norma jurídica como la de los imperativos independientes de Karl Olivecrona, basada en un imperativismo no voluntarista, podría ser de utilidad para una posición acerca de la interpretación jurídica que prescinde de la intención del legislador, estableciendo una separación tajante entre la autoridad legislativa y el texto que resulta aprobado. En §3, plantearé el interrogante de si no sería más provechoso realizar ulteriores diferenciaciones entre los contextos jurídicos en los cuales Poggi analiza la aplicación y aplicabilidad de la teoría de Grice. Intentaré mostrar cómo esas diferenciaciones se vuelven necesarias, especialmente para evaluar la posibilidad de que sí existan contextos cooperativos en el ámbito jurídico y situaciones donde podrían coexistir contemporáneamente contextos cooperativos y no cooperativos. Finalmente, en §4 ofreceré una breve conclusión., This paper is based on a reflection on the reading of Francesca Poggi’s recent
book, Il modello conversazionale. Sulla differenza tra comprensione ordinaria e interpretazione
giuridica, in which the author intends to clarify some aspects of ordinary
communication and legal interpretation, highlighting similarities and differences. In
§2 I will raise the question whether a conception of a legal norm such as Karl Olivecrona’s
independent imperatives, based on non-voluntaristic imperativism, could
be a category of independent imperatives of interest to a position on legal interpretation
that dispenses with legislative intent, thus establishing a neat separation
between legislative authority and the approved text. In §3, I will raise the question
whether it would not be more profitable to make further distinctions between the
legal contexts in which Poggi analyses the application and applicability of Grice’s
theory. I will try to show how these distinctions become necessary, in particular to
assess the possibility that there are cooperative contexts in the legal field and situations
where cooperative and non-cooperative contexts might exist simultaneously.
Finally, I will draw a brief conclusion in §4.",
publisher = "Madrid :  Marcial Pons",
journal = "Analisi e diritto 23(2)",
title = "Dos comentarios a Il modello conversazionale, de Francesca Poggi",
pages = "58-41",
doi = "10.4454/analisiediritto.v23i1.621"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2023). Dos comentarios a Il modello conversazionale, de Francesca Poggi. in Analisi e diritto 23(2)
Madrid :  Marcial Pons., 41-58.
https://doi.org/10.4454/analisiediritto.v23i1.621

Rabanos JA. Dos comentarios a Il modello conversazionale, de Francesca Poggi. in Analisi e diritto 23(2). 2023;:41-58.
doi:10.4454/analisiediritto.v23i1.621 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "Dos comentarios a Il modello conversazionale, de Francesca Poggi" in Analisi e diritto 23(2) (2023):41-58,
https://doi.org/10.4454/analisiediritto.v23i1.621 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rabanos, Julieta A.
PY  - 2023
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2381
AB  - The aim of this paper is to critically reconsider some of the main tenets underlying
Karl Olivecrona’s works. The first two sections are devoted to a brief reconstruction
of his position on methodology for the study of legal phenomena, including
the endorsement of philosophical realism and the enterprise of demystifying legal
language through linguistic therapy (§ 2), as well as his particular conception of
legal notions as hollow words (§ 3). I will then provide a brief analysis of a central
legal concept – that of “authority” – to show how Olivecrona’s methodological
framework can be applied (§ 4). The last two sections are devoted to the analysis
and evaluation of three possible criticisms of Olivecrona’s claims as a legal realist (§
5) and some brief concluding remarks on the usefulness of Olivecrona’s approach
for contemporary legal philosophy (§ 6).
PB  - Bologna :  Il Mulino
T2  - Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, 1/2023
T1  - Back to (Law as) Fact: Some Remarks on Olivecrona, Scandinavian Legal Realism, and Legal Notions as Hollow Words
EP  - 231
SP  - 205
DO  - 10.1436/107089
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Rabanos, Julieta A.",
year = "2023",
abstract = "The aim of this paper is to critically reconsider some of the main tenets underlying
Karl Olivecrona’s works. The first two sections are devoted to a brief reconstruction
of his position on methodology for the study of legal phenomena, including
the endorsement of philosophical realism and the enterprise of demystifying legal
language through linguistic therapy (§ 2), as well as his particular conception of
legal notions as hollow words (§ 3). I will then provide a brief analysis of a central
legal concept – that of “authority” – to show how Olivecrona’s methodological
framework can be applied (§ 4). The last two sections are devoted to the analysis
and evaluation of three possible criticisms of Olivecrona’s claims as a legal realist (§
5) and some brief concluding remarks on the usefulness of Olivecrona’s approach
for contemporary legal philosophy (§ 6).",
publisher = "Bologna :  Il Mulino",
journal = "Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, 1/2023",
title = "Back to (Law as) Fact: Some Remarks on Olivecrona, Scandinavian Legal Realism, and Legal Notions as Hollow Words",
pages = "231-205",
doi = "10.1436/107089"
}

Rabanos, J. A.. (2023). Back to (Law as) Fact: Some Remarks on Olivecrona, Scandinavian Legal Realism, and Legal Notions as Hollow Words. in Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, 1/2023
Bologna :  Il Mulino., 205-231.
https://doi.org/10.1436/107089

Rabanos JA. Back to (Law as) Fact: Some Remarks on Olivecrona, Scandinavian Legal Realism, and Legal Notions as Hollow Words. in Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, 1/2023. 2023;:205-231.
doi:10.1436/107089 .

Rabanos, Julieta A., "Back to (Law as) Fact: Some Remarks on Olivecrona, Scandinavian Legal Realism, and Legal Notions as Hollow Words" in Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, 1/2023 (2023):205-231,
https://doi.org/10.1436/107089 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Zdravković, Ana M.
AU  - Begović, Aleksandra A.
PY  - 2023
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1443
AB  - U radu su analizirani međunarodnopravni akti, sudske odluke
međunarodnih i nacionalnih sudova i kvazisudskih tela, kao i
praksa država u pogledu prava na osnovno obrazovanje. Za
omogućavanje jednakog pristupa obaveznom osnovnom obra-
zovanju neophodno je da ono bude besplatno, što je i propisano
međunarodnopravnim aktima. Međutim, rezultati istraživanja
su pokazali da se ovaj standard različito tumači, a to dovodi do
neujednačene prakse u državama. Ilustrativni primer su svakako
bivše jugoslovenske republike, te će poseban deo rada biti posve-
ćen analizi normativnog okvira i prakse Republike Srbije, koja i
dalјe ne obezbeđuje besplatne udžbenike za osnovnu školu.
PB  - Institut za uporedno pravo
T2  - Strani pravni život : teorija, zakonodavstvo, praksa
T1  - Pravo na besplatno osnovno obrazovanje : od ideala do stvarnosti
T1  - The right to free primary education
EP  - 298
IS  - 2
SP  - 271
DO  - 10.56461/SPZ_23206KJ
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Zdravković, Ana M. and Begović, Aleksandra A.",
year = "2023",
abstract = "U radu su analizirani međunarodnopravni akti, sudske odluke
međunarodnih i nacionalnih sudova i kvazisudskih tela, kao i
praksa država u pogledu prava na osnovno obrazovanje. Za
omogućavanje jednakog pristupa obaveznom osnovnom obra-
zovanju neophodno je da ono bude besplatno, što je i propisano
međunarodnopravnim aktima. Međutim, rezultati istraživanja
su pokazali da se ovaj standard različito tumači, a to dovodi do
neujednačene prakse u državama. Ilustrativni primer su svakako
bivše jugoslovenske republike, te će poseban deo rada biti posve-
ćen analizi normativnog okvira i prakse Republike Srbije, koja i
dalјe ne obezbeđuje besplatne udžbenike za osnovnu školu.",
publisher = "Institut za uporedno pravo",
journal = "Strani pravni život : teorija, zakonodavstvo, praksa",
title = "Pravo na besplatno osnovno obrazovanje : od ideala do stvarnosti, The right to free primary education",
pages = "298-271",
number = "2",
doi = "10.56461/SPZ_23206KJ"
}

Zdravković, A. M.,& Begović, A. A.. (2023). Pravo na besplatno osnovno obrazovanje : od ideala do stvarnosti. in Strani pravni život : teorija, zakonodavstvo, praksa
Institut za uporedno pravo.(2), 271-298.
https://doi.org/10.56461/SPZ_23206KJ

Zdravković AM, Begović AA. Pravo na besplatno osnovno obrazovanje : od ideala do stvarnosti. in Strani pravni život : teorija, zakonodavstvo, praksa. 2023;(2):271-298.
doi:10.56461/SPZ_23206KJ .

Zdravković, Ana M., Begović, Aleksandra A., "Pravo na besplatno osnovno obrazovanje : od ideala do stvarnosti" in Strani pravni život : teorija, zakonodavstvo, praksa, no. 2 (2023):271-298,
https://doi.org/10.56461/SPZ_23206KJ . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Đorđević, Mila
AU  - Vlajić, Milica
PY  - 2023
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1408
AB  - Namera rada je da se prikaže položaj advokatskih pripravnika u Srbiji. U prvom delu rada dat je teorijski okvir istraživanja, kao i pregled normativnog položaja advokatskih pripravnika, dok su u drugom delu prikazani metodološki okvir istraživanja i analiza prikupljenih podataka na osnovu odgovora 517 ispitanika. Rezultati istraživanja potvrđuju hipotezu o prenošenju efekata raslojavanja unutar advokatske profesije kao posledice aktuelnih društveno-ekonomskih promena na položaj advokatskih pripravnika, pružajući i uvid u lična iskustva i izazove u vezi sa obavljanjem pripravničkog staža, te navode na preispitivanje pravne regulative kojom su definisani prava i obaveze advokatskih pripravnika.
AB  - The aim of this paper is to examine the position of legal interns in Serbia. The first part of the paper provides the theoretical framework for the research, as well as an overview of the normative position of legal interns, whereas the second part presents the methodological framework of the research and analysis of the data collected from 517 respondents. The results of the study confirm the hypothesis that current socio-economic changes have led to the transmission of stratification within the legal profession to the position of legal interns. Additionally, the data provide valuable insights into the experiences and challenges faced by legal interns, which have implications for the review of legal regulations governing their rights and obligations.
PB  - Univerzitet Union - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Pravni zapisi
T1  - Koliko košta advokatski pripravnik? - o karakteristikama obavljanja pripravničkog staža u advokatskim kancelarijama u Srbiji
T1  - How much for a legal intern?: Internships at law offices in Serbia
EP  - 147
IS  - 1
SP  - 126
VL  - 14
DO  - 10.5937/pravzap1-40711
UR  - conv_2826
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Đorđević, Mila and Vlajić, Milica",
year = "2023",
abstract = "Namera rada je da se prikaže položaj advokatskih pripravnika u Srbiji. U prvom delu rada dat je teorijski okvir istraživanja, kao i pregled normativnog položaja advokatskih pripravnika, dok su u drugom delu prikazani metodološki okvir istraživanja i analiza prikupljenih podataka na osnovu odgovora 517 ispitanika. Rezultati istraživanja potvrđuju hipotezu o prenošenju efekata raslojavanja unutar advokatske profesije kao posledice aktuelnih društveno-ekonomskih promena na položaj advokatskih pripravnika, pružajući i uvid u lična iskustva i izazove u vezi sa obavljanjem pripravničkog staža, te navode na preispitivanje pravne regulative kojom su definisani prava i obaveze advokatskih pripravnika., The aim of this paper is to examine the position of legal interns in Serbia. The first part of the paper provides the theoretical framework for the research, as well as an overview of the normative position of legal interns, whereas the second part presents the methodological framework of the research and analysis of the data collected from 517 respondents. The results of the study confirm the hypothesis that current socio-economic changes have led to the transmission of stratification within the legal profession to the position of legal interns. Additionally, the data provide valuable insights into the experiences and challenges faced by legal interns, which have implications for the review of legal regulations governing their rights and obligations.",
publisher = "Univerzitet Union - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Pravni zapisi",
title = "Koliko košta advokatski pripravnik? - o karakteristikama obavljanja pripravničkog staža u advokatskim kancelarijama u Srbiji, How much for a legal intern?: Internships at law offices in Serbia",
pages = "147-126",
number = "1",
volume = "14",
doi = "10.5937/pravzap1-40711",
url = "conv_2826"
}

Đorđević, M.,& Vlajić, M.. (2023). Koliko košta advokatski pripravnik? - o karakteristikama obavljanja pripravničkog staža u advokatskim kancelarijama u Srbiji. in Pravni zapisi
Univerzitet Union - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 14(1), 126-147.
https://doi.org/10.5937/pravzap1-40711
conv_2826

Đorđević M, Vlajić M. Koliko košta advokatski pripravnik? - o karakteristikama obavljanja pripravničkog staža u advokatskim kancelarijama u Srbiji. in Pravni zapisi. 2023;14(1):126-147.
doi:10.5937/pravzap1-40711
conv_2826 .

Đorđević, Mila, Vlajić, Milica, "Koliko košta advokatski pripravnik? - o karakteristikama obavljanja pripravničkog staža u advokatskim kancelarijama u Srbiji" in Pravni zapisi, 14, no. 1 (2023):126-147,
https://doi.org/10.5937/pravzap1-40711 .,
conv_2826 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Spaić, Bojan
AU  - Đorđević, Mila
PY  - 2022
UR  - https://ralf.ius.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1379
AB  - U ovom radu bavimo se odnosom između relativnog broja sudija u okviru jedne jurisdikcije i efikasnosti pravosuđa. Da bismo utvrdili kako broj sudija utiče na efikasnost, upoređujemo podatke o pravosuđu iz šest zemalja: Srbije, Hrvatske, Slovenije, Francuske, Austrije i Norveške. Analiza je zasnovana na podacima prikupljenim u 2018. godini od strane CEPEJ-a i Indeksa vladavine prava World Justice Report-a za 2018. godinu. Zaključujemo da se efikasnost pravosuđa ne poveć ava sa poveć anjem broja sudija u jednoj jurisdikciji.
AB  - In this paper, we deal with the relationship between the relative number of judges within a jurisdiction and the efficiency of the judiciary. To determine how the number of judges influences efficiency, we compare data on the judiciary from six countries: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, France, Austria and Norway. The analysis is based on data collected within the 2020 Evaluation cycle (2018 data) of CEPEJ and World Justice Report Rule of Law Index for 2018. We conclude that judicial efficiency does not increase with an increase in the number of judges in a jurisdiction.
PB  - Univerzitet Union - Pravni fakultet, Beograd
T2  - Pravni zapisi
T1  - Manje je više? - o broju sudija i sudijskoj efikasnosti
T1  - Less is more?: On the number of judges and judicial efficiency
EP  - 445
IS  - 2
SP  - 421
VL  - 13
DO  - 10.5937/pravzap0-41043
UR  - conv_2824
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Spaić, Bojan and Đorđević, Mila",
year = "2022",
abstract = "U ovom radu bavimo se odnosom između relativnog broja sudija u okviru jedne jurisdikcije i efikasnosti pravosuđa. Da bismo utvrdili kako broj sudija utiče na efikasnost, upoređujemo podatke o pravosuđu iz šest zemalja: Srbije, Hrvatske, Slovenije, Francuske, Austrije i Norveške. Analiza je zasnovana na podacima prikupljenim u 2018. godini od strane CEPEJ-a i Indeksa vladavine prava World Justice Report-a za 2018. godinu. Zaključujemo da se efikasnost pravosuđa ne poveć ava sa poveć anjem broja sudija u jednoj jurisdikciji., In this paper, we deal with the relationship between the relative number of judges within a jurisdiction and the efficiency of the judiciary. To determine how the number of judges influences efficiency, we compare data on the judiciary from six countries: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, France, Austria and Norway. The analysis is based on data collected within the 2020 Evaluation cycle (2018 data) of CEPEJ and World Justice Report Rule of Law Index for 2018. We conclude that judicial efficiency does not increase with an increase in the number of judges in a jurisdiction.",
publisher = "Univerzitet Union - Pravni fakultet, Beograd",
journal = "Pravni zapisi",
title = "Manje je više? - o broju sudija i sudijskoj efikasnosti, Less is more?: On the number of judges and judicial efficiency",
pages = "445-421",
number = "2",
volume = "13",
doi = "10.5937/pravzap0-41043",
url = "conv_2824"
}

Spaić, B.,& Đorđević, M.. (2022). Manje je više? - o broju sudija i sudijskoj efikasnosti. in Pravni zapisi
Univerzitet Union - Pravni fakultet, Beograd., 13(2), 421-445.
https://doi.org/10.5937/pravzap0-41043
conv_2824

Spaić B, Đorđević M. Manje je više? - o broju sudija i sudijskoj efikasnosti. in Pravni zapisi. 2022;13(2):421-445.
doi:10.5937/pravzap0-41043
conv_2824 .

Spaić, Bojan, Đorđević, Mila, "Manje je više? - o broju sudija i sudijskoj efikasnosti" in Pravni zapisi, 13, no. 2 (2022):421-445,
https://doi.org/10.5937/pravzap0-41043 .,
conv_2824 .